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ABSTRACT
Crown Finance and the Governance under James I: Projects and Fiscal Policy 1603-1625.
This thesis is a hmdamental reassessment of Jacobean crown finance and its 
importance in the early-modern English polity. The concurrent focuses are the Jacobean 
conceptualization of crown finance in terms of projects and the analysis of fiscal policy. 
Fiscal policy was dominated by attempts to balance the consumptive demands of the 
patronage culture with the fiscal needs of meeting the state's responsibilities of governance. 
The introduction describes the origins of projects and their relationship to the Jacobean 
patronage culture; it also discusses the importance of fiscal policy as a jumping-off point for 
a reassessment of the Jacobean polity. The structures of policymaking are examined in 
Chapter 1 with special emphasis on the process of counsel and the central role of James I in 
the responsibilities of governance. The conceptualization of crown finance in terms of 
entrepreneurial-like projects is fully explored in chapter 2 as is the importance of the doctrine 
of necessity in fiscal policy. Chapter 3 examines the nature of projects using a case-study of 
fishing fleet initiatives. The most significant challenge to the project basis of finance 
occurred in the parliament of 1621; the consequences of these events, long misunderstood as 
an attack on monopolies, are re-examined in Chapter 4. Origins of opposition to projects in 
popular culture, among James' ministers, and in parliament preface this chapter.
The three chapters making up section II of the thesis seek to rehabilitate fiscal policy 
with a focus on policymaking and governance. Robert Cecil’s project for fiscal refoundation 
would have established a precedent of public taxation to support the crown. Its collapse is 
subjected to a reinterpretation in Chapter 5 which challenges Revisionist orthodoxy on 
Jacobean parhamentaiy politics and political philosophy. Chapter 6 examines a number of 
attempts through concüiar policymaking (1611-1617) to meet ongoing financial challenges 
which ultimately influenced fiscal policy for the rest of James' reign. The concluding chapter 
recreates Lionel Cranfield’s formulation and application of the abstract ideal of the public 
good in fiscal policy. Cranfield represents the sharpest Jacobean example of a minister 
seeking to balance the demands of serving the king and the state in their own rights; and the 
challenges of so doing. The conclusion places the thesis into a wider perspective of early- 
modern governance and our understanding of the Jacobean polity.
ui
PREFACE
This is a study of crown finance and its place in the Jacobean polity. Investigating 
this subject requires the mastery of two interconnected yet distinguishable elements: the 
crown’s finances as an abstract entity consisting of revenues and expenditures; and the 
making of fiscal policy, in effect how and why the crown finances were guided and 
manipulated for specific political and social ends. This necessarily creates a work in two 
parts, either of which was worthy to be the subject of this thesis in its own right. Framing the 
project this way within the constraints of a thesis involved sacrifices. Specialized chapters on 
crown lands and customs as well as parliament became impossible as did two other project 
case-studies (recusancy revenue and proclamations for buildings in London). The case- 
studies were the principal victims, but choosing between them separated 'the wheat fi'om the 
chaff while the integration of the parliamentary material into the policy chapters (5-7) 
removed an artificial distinction that was largely inappropriate. The justification for this 
approach is that to have analyzed fiscal policy-admittedly of somewhat wider appeal- 
without first examining the crown finances would have been akin to watching the hands of a 
clock move without really knowing how the mechanism itself worked. At the same time 
understanding the moving parts without seeing what they were turning, in which direction, 
and with what results seemed somewhere between esoteric and pointless.
In this thesis original spellings have been retained with the following exceptions: 'u' 
and ’v’ have been reversed in manuscripts, but not in printed works; the thorn is transcribed as 
'th'; abbreviations have been extended in brackets; punctuation has been altered only where 
necessary. Dates have been appended to documents where relevant and corrected in brackets 
for the year beginning on 1 January. The £ symbol has been used in place of li; it was 
generally found more efficacious to drop shillings, pence, and half-pence from amounts cited. 
The regular text uses American spelling. The few abbreviations used in this study are 
obvious and can be found in the bibliogr aphy in brackets; otherwise short citations have been 
used (subsequent to the first full entry in the footnotes). Citations for the Cranfield 
manuscripts at the Centre for Kentish Studies require a brief explanation. Cranfield's papers 
were recently cataloged into broad categories with the result that all relevant manuscripts are 
noted by the same citation; for instance CKS U269/1.OE108 designates all the 
correspondence from Buckingham to Cranfield. I have chosen to include A. P. Newton's 
original manuscript numbers in brackets to facilitate closer identification of documents; e.g. 
CKS U269/1.OE108 [Cranfield Ms 7]; where this was not possible I have described the 
document in brackets.
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INTRODUCTION
Projects and Crown Finance
I
There is scholarly unanimity that James I of England was as great a fiscal disaster as
James VI of Scotland. In Jenny Wormald's words, the ’spendthrift before 1603 was the
spendthrift thereafter, on a greater scale. The king who had been bad at refusing suitors in
Scotland was not better in England, but had much more to give.'^  The defining assessment
has been that of Frederick Dietz:
Neither now, nor at any subsequent time, is there the slightest indication that James had aity 
sense o f the value of money or of the meaning o f the balance of debit and credit. He seems to 
have been incapable of understanding the fact that a considerable income and even the 
occasional presence of large amounts of coined money in the hands of tellers of the exchequer 
were entirely compatible with a coiKiition verging on bankruptcy. As long as there was 
money, or any other resources available to his hands, James was inclined to exercise that spirit 
of generosity which he had been compelled to suppress so long in Scotland.^
Marc Schwarz noted 'that there has been no attempt to defend the King's economic policies
for the works of Robert Ashton, R. H. Tawney and Menna Prestwich have made clear how
disastrous they were.'^  Prestwich's Cranfield compelled Wormald to conclude it is 'virtually
certain that any reappraisal of James will not upgrade his financial abilities, even though he
inherited considerable problems because of the conservative policies of Elizabeth and
Burghley'.  ^ Finally, surveying Jacobean revisionism, Maurice Lee wrote that only 'with
respect to finance has there been no change; James's reputation for feckless extravagance has
been confirmed'.^
Uenny Wormald, 'James VI and I': Two Kings or One?', History 68 (1983), 198-199.
2p. C. Dietz, English Public Finance 1558-1641 (New York, 1932/1964), 101.
^Marc L. Schwarz, 'James I and the Historians: Toward a Reconsideration', Journal o f British Studies 13 (1973- 
1974), 133. The works referred to are Robert Ashton, The Crown and the Money Market 1603-1640 (Oxford, 
1960); R. H. Tawney, Business and Politics under James I: Lionel Cranfield as Merchant and Minister 
(Cambridge, 1958); and Menna Prestwich, Cranfield: Politics and Profits under the Earlv Stuarts (Oxford, 
1966).
^Wormald, 'James VI and I', 199.
^Maurice Lee, Jr., Great Britain's Solomon: James VI and I in His ITiree Kingdoms (Urbana, 1990), xv.
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This Study of Jacobean fiscal policy proceeds from no desire to rehabilitate James, 
despite the manifest biases of Dietz, Tawney, and Prestwich. Rather it seeks to rehabilitate 
fiscal policy itself, to recapture it from the overpowering spectre of James' reputation, the 
stigma of being old-fashioned, high politics, and the consequent lack of interest in recent 
scholarship. Fundamental to this agenda is acknowledging fiscal policy's proper aspect 
within the wider English pohty.  ^ It was, like its Caroline counterpart, a seminal issue of 
governance and entwined with questions of counsel, public good, and policymaking. As such 
it represents an insightful analytical tool and a re-examination of fiscal policy is a study of 
James' kingship and the nature of the Jacobean polity. It has also proved to be an important 
point of entry for a reassessment of key issues in the Jacobean parliaments and present 
interpretations of them. Finally, this study seeks to abandon 'modem' historiographical 
preconceptions of crown finance and fiscal policy and understand them as James and his 
ministers comprehended them. Projects were the conceptual basis of their fiscal policies, the 
point at which their financial mental worlds fused with fiscal reality and practice. An 
exploration of the origins of projects will introduce us to the themes and arguments of this 
study.
II
'Early Stuart England', Linda Peck has written, 'was governed by a personal 
monarchy, which ruled through a patrimonial bureaucracy organized within a hierarchical 
society structured by patron-client relationships.'^ Patronage and bounty were important 
components of Jacobean governance, serving as the 'means of political control from the 
center over the localities by dispensing royal bounty to local governors who ruled in the 
countryside in the king's name. It also rewarded royal officials so as to provide for 
continuing policy-making and royal administration.'® Liberality, generosity, and
 ^A corpus of recent work by Julian Goodare addr esses a number of fliese issues in Scotland under James VI. 
Julian Goodare, 'Parliamentary Taxation in Scotland, 1560-1603', Scottish Historical Review 68 (1989), 23-52; 
Julian Goodare, 'The Nobility and the Absolutist State in Scotland, 1584-1638', History 78 (1993), 161-182; 
Julian Goodare, 'The Estates in the Scottish Parliament, 1286-1707, Clyve Jones (ed.), The Scots and Parliament 
(Edinburgh, 1996), 11-32.
^Linda Levy Peck. Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England (London, 1990), 4.
®Linda Levy Peck, "'For a King not to be bountiful were a fault": Perspectives on Court Patronage in Early 
Stuart England', Journal of British Studies 25 (1986), 37-38 and Linda Levy Peck, 'Peers, patronage and die
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magnificence were aspirations of Renaissance princes, 'an ideal espoused by the monarchs 
and theorists alike' which 'posited the free giving of gifts and reward because it was virtuous. 
Duty and deference would then follow from grateful recipients.'^  James VI espoused these 
ideals in Basüikon Doron. advising Prince Henry to 'Vse trew Liberalitie in rewarding the 
good, and bestowing frankly for your honour and weale'.^ ®
This was the early-modern culture of patronage in which monarchs, ministers, 
courtiers, and favour-seekers existed. Crucially, these were the individuals for whose 
personal benefit fiscal systems were increasingly exploited. It was assured that James' 
accession would be like a 'Christmas' of bounty, the better for the new king to reward 
supporters and create his own affinity.i^ The fiscal demands of the Spanish war created a 
dearth of patronage in the last decade of Elizabeth's reign that James would also be under 
irresistible pressure to alleviate, Finally, James' liberal nature and the Spanish peace in 
1604 combined to further redirect fiscal resources toward royal consumption, reward, and 
patronage as military requirements eased. Conceiving of himself as a Renaissance prince, 
James gloried in being a river unto his people, effectively presiding over a vast patronage 
welfare state for the ehte and their social dependants. In parliament in 1604, James 
commended his own shower of honours, advancements, and rewards as thankfulness for the 
loving welcome at his accession, 'without vaunting' affirming that he had given 'more then 
euer King of England did in so short a space',
The demands of this patronage culture, the inadequacy of established revenues, and 
the administrative weakness of the early-modern state created the conditions under which
politics of history', John Guy (ed.). The Reign o f Elizabeth I: Court and culture in the last decade (Cambridge, 
1995), 87-89.
^Peck, 'Court Patronage', 36-37. Also R. Malcolm Smuts, Art and the material culture o f majesty in early Stuart 
England', R. Malcolm Smuts (ed.), The Stuart court and Europe: Essays in politics and political culture 
(Cambridge, 1996), 87-96; Simon Adams, 'The patronage o f the crown in ElEabelhan politics: the 1590s in 
perspective', Guy (ed.), Elizabeth 1.20-45.
l®Peck, 'Court Patronage', 37 and King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Johann P. Sommerville 
(Cambridge, 1994), 48.
M. Ormrod, 'The West European Monarchies in the Later Middle Ages', Richard Bonney (ed.). Economic 
Systems and State Finance (Oxford, 1995), 158; Goodare, 'Nobility', 169-175.
12peck, 'Peers, patronage', 106-108.
l®John Guy, 'Introduction: The 1590's: the second reign o f Elizabeth I?', Guy (ed.), Elizabeth 1. 4-6 and Peck, 
'Peers, patronage', 88-89 and 107.
I'^Peck. Court Patronage. 32-36.
^^King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 144.
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projects flourished and became the conceptual basis of Jacobean crown financeT^ Two 
decades ago, Joan Thirsk masterfully examined the place of projects in the early-modern 
English e c o n o m y . 12 project and projector entered the lexicon of the age: 'Everyone with a 
scheme, whether to make money, to employ the poor, or to explore the far comers of the 
earth had a "project". The concrete noun is significant. A project was a practical scheme for 
exploiting material things; it was capable of being realized through industry and ingenuity... it 
did much to promote the commonweal, by creating employment, and dispersing cash through 
all classes of society.'i® The projects Thirsk studied were 'schemes to manufacture, or 
produce on the farm, goods for home consumption', in short, 'industrial and agricultural 
projects' from which projectors and commonwealth, each in their own ways, realized material 
gain. 19 Economic projects spread in the mid-Tudor period after attracting the attention of 
commonwealth men in the Edwardian government interested in European ideas, employment 
for the poor, and new manufactures.^ ® They were an integral part of the dissemination of the 
Renaissance commercial-entrepreneurial mentality, compellingly described by Lisa Jardine in 
her new history of the Renaissance. ^ i
Projects flourished under Elizabeth because of the support of Edwardians like Sir 
Thomas Smith and William Cecil.^  ^ However, the dynamic of projects changed significantly 
by the 1580s. The first patents giving projectors concessionary rights to new inventions and
l^Early-modem Europe experienced a vast increase in the mobilization of economic and fiscal resources to 
finance governance and policy, a chief aspect o f the development of the modem state and a process in which 
Scotland and England were as concerned as other Renaissance polities. The literature on the subject is vast but 
the most recent surveys are Bonney (ed.), State Finance: Charles Tilly, Coercion. Capital, and European States. 
AD. 990-1990 (Oxford, 1990); Samuel Clark, State and Status: The Rise o f the State and Aristocratic Power in 
Western Europe (Montreal, 1995) particularly die thoroughgoing bibliography; M. J. Braddick, The nerves of 
state: Taxation and financing of the English state. 1558-1714 (Manchester, 1996). Also Michael Mann, States. 
War, and Capitalism (Oxford, 1988) and his 'State and society, 1130-1815: an analysis o f Enghsh state 
finances', M Zeitlin (ed.). Political Power and Social Theory (Greenwich, 1980), 1 ,165-208; P. K. O'Brien and 
P. A. Hunt, 'The rise of the fiscal state, 1485-1815', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 66 (1993), 
129-176; M. J. Braddick, Parliamentary Taxation in Seventeenfli-Centurv England: Local administration and 
Response (London, 1994).
12joan Thirsk, Economic Policy and Projects: The Development o f a Consumer Society in Earlv Modern 
England (Oxford. 1978).
^®Thirsk, Policy and Projects. 1-2.
^^Thirsk, Policy and Protects. 3 and 22.
29Thirsk, Policy and Projects. 31-36.
2lLisa Jardine, Worldly Goods (London, 1996), 37-132 and generally.
^^Thirsk, Policy and Projects. 32-54.
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products began in 1552.^ 3 These privileges, monopolistic in nature, became accepted as 
necessaiy protection and assistance for the success of many projects. Also large numbers of 
patentees and projectors ’were no longer inventors and skilled craftsmen, but courtiers, 
merchants, and speculators who planned to hire the services of such craftsmen, while they 
themselves shouldered the main financial risk' and stood to reap the benefits of successful 
undertakings.24 This was Burghley's work, presiding 'over a major re shaping of the financial 
basis of the crown's patronage.'^ 5 He was 'a leading encourager of monopolies, both of 
imported commodities and of domestic manufactures. Initially the latter were intended to 
support a policy of import substitution, but after about 1572 monopolies began to feature 
prominently as rewards."  ^ He shifted patronage from the crown estates to commercial 
revenues, actions which reflected a simultaneous transition occurring in the crown's fiscal 
base.22 Thirsk's projectors were drawn inexorably into the patronage culture.
The crown possessed an ever-growing stake in customs revenues and when 'projects 
became successful native industries, the customs receipts fi*om foreign imports of these same 
articles fell, and the Crown's revenues suffered.'^ ® This issue came to a head over perceived 
customs losses with new draperies and woad. Thomas Smith believed that lost revenues on 
imports were more than recouped through increased exports of new goods, but Burghley 
remained unconvinced. Projectors took their cue from the rising noises made by the crown 
and 'new projects began to be presented in fresh form to forestall criticism: would be 
patentees promised the Crown a percentage of their profits to offset any loss that might be 
incurred in customs revenues.'^ ® The prospect of financial gain for simply sealing a 
projector's patent became a siren-song to Burghley and Elizabeth. If the patents were granted
^^Thirsk, Policy and Projects. 52-54.
'^^Thirsk, Policy and Projects. 57.
^  Adams, 'Patronage’, 39.
Adams, 'Patronage', 40; Thirsk, Policy and Projects. 59-61. Adams ns% monopoly where Thirsk would 
choose project, a confusion o f terminology that has not furthered the recognition o f projects' true place in crown 
finance. Monopolies or patents, are more properly understood as synonymous terms for a similar subset of  
projects.
^2 Adams, 'Patronage', 39-40; below, 129-132.
2®Thirsk, Projects and Policy. 57.
^^Thirsk, Projects and Policy. 58.
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to reward a courtier or servant, so much the better during the cash-starved years of war with 
Spain.
By this means, the crown developed its own concessionary interest in projects and 
was well on the road to becoming a projector itself. Thirsk concludes that projects became 
’caught up in a complicated tangle of conflicting interests: they were being used by the 
Crown to further its financial interests, by local authorities to assist in the relief of the poor, 
and by private speculators who began to recognize what a gold-mine a successful project 
could be, and wanted their share in its profits.*®® James' accession only intensified these 
forces. Roger Wilbraham recounted its impact: 'It is the manner, after the death of a long- 
reigning prince, that by discontented minds or wits starved for want of employment, many 
new projects, suits, inventions, and infinite complaints are brought to the successor instantly 
... so it happened at this time.'®i The siren sang louder, but what no one could have 
anticipated in 1603 was that, in the struggle to mobilize ever-more fiscal resources, the crown 
became the supreme projector, the Jonsonian Merecraft of its own polity.®^
Projects have not been lost in earlier discussions of Jacobean finance. James 
Spedding reviewed Francis Bacon's work in them, Dietz wrote of an 'Era of Projects', and 
interest by present historians has broadened awareness.®® Thirsk recently expanded her 
discussion of projects to their role in the management and exploitation of the crown estates.®  ^
Unfortunately, most existing scholarship remains limited by economic or patronage
®®Thirsk, Projects and Policy. 51,
®lRobert Ashton (ed.), James I by his Contemporaries (London, 1969), 63.
®^Ben Jonson, The Deyil is an Ass, ed. Peter Happe (Manchester, 1994), 90-96, below, 97-100.
®® James Spedding, The Letters and l i f e  of Francis Bacon (7 yolumes; London, 1861-1874), IV, 310-336; Dietz, 
Pubic Finance. 144-181; Peck, Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I (London, 1982) and 
her Court Patronage. Also Keyin Sharpe, The Personal Rule o f Charles I (New Hayen, 1992), 105-130 and 235- 
274; Richard Hoyle, '"Shearing die hog": the reform o f the estates, c. 1598-1640', R. W. Hoyle (ed.). The Estates 
of the English Crown. 1558-1640 (Cambridge, 1992), 204-262. In addition, Tawney, Business and Politics: 
Prestwich. Cranfield: Louis Knafia, Law and Politics in Jacobean England: The Tracts o f Lord Chancellor 
Ellesmere (Cambridge, 1977); Ronald Rebholz, Sir Fulke Greyille: First Lord Brooke (Oxford, 1971); Keyin 
Sharpe. Sir Robert Cotton 1586-1631: History and Politics in Early Modern England (Oxford. 1979); L. M.
Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy: The Public Career o f Sir Juhus Caesar. 1580-1636 (Stanford, 1988); Pauline 
Croft (ed.), 'A Collection of Seyeral Speeches and Treatises of the Late Lord Treasurer Cecil and of Seyeral 
Observations on the Lords o f the Council Giyen to King James Concerning His Estate and Reyenue in the Years 
1608,1609,1610', Camden Miscellany XXIX (London, 1987); Dayid Harris Sacks, 'The counteryailing o f  
benefits: monopoly, liberty, and beneyolence in Elizabethan England', Dale Hoak (ed.), Tudor Political Culture 
(Cambridge, 1995), 272-291.
®'^ Joan Thirsk, 'The Crown as projector on its own estates, from Elizabeth I to Charles I', Hoyle, Estates 1558- 
1640.297-352.
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perspectives and antipathetic attitudes toward projects. Projects offered James and his 
ministers the same advantages as they had Burghley and Elizabeth without necessarily being 
deleterious.®  ^ By all counts early-modern states lost vast revenues through administrative 
weakness in the form of waste, corruption, and ignorance of their own fiscal rights. In 
Scotland, the treasury commissioners known as the Octavians focused on these very losses 
and 'financiers' rose to pre-eminence in the French fiscal machinery partly through their 
projects to improve the yield of existing revenues.®® It was no great leap for the new breed of 
projectors to put their schemes and methods at the service of an inadequate administration or 
for the crown itself to assume the mantle of projector.®  ^ Far from being the work only of 
entrepreneurs or patronage-seekers, projects were the conceptual basis of crown finance and 
it can only be understood from that perspective. Recreating that conception is the agenda for 
the first section of this study.
in
In an age when we are told ad nauseam that governments can do nothing and should 
aspire to do even less, it is important to remember historical evidence to the contrary. We 
need only reflect on the range of members’ bills in parliaments, the warrants and orders in the 
privy council registers, and the commonwealth interests of ministers like Thomas Cromwell, 
Burghley, Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, or the earl of Northampton to appreciate the activism- 
effective or otherwise-of early-modern English government. Particularly in Jacobean 
England we must not let the structure and politics of the patronage culture, of so much 
interest in recent years, overshadow governance. Financing the state was the premier 
question of Jacobean governance and the logical goal of fiscal policy. For James and his 
ministers this effectively meant seeking the point of equilibrium between the consumptive 
interests of the patronage culture and the fiscal requirements of the state in discharging the
®5peck. Court PaUonage. 136-138.
®®William Purves, Revenues of the Scottish Crown. 1681 ed, D. M. Rose (Edinburgh, 1897), 13-35; Atholl L. 
Murray, 'Sir John Skene and the Exchequer, 1594-1612', The Stair Society, Miscellany One (Edinburgh, 1971), 
129-131; Julian Dent, Crisis in Finance: Crown. Financiers, and Society in Seventeenth-centurv France 
(Newton Abbot, 1973), 58; Martin Wolfe, The Fiscal System o f Renaissance France (New Haven, 1972), 117- 
118.
®2peck. Court Patronage. 143-146; Conrad Russell, Parliaments and English Politics 1621-1629 (Oxford. 1979), 
66-70,
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responsibilities of governance. Among James' ministers this was the subtext of statements 
like Lionel Cranfield's, that 'to move the king to give now is to move the king to mack him 
selff miserable for the present & to kepe him soe.'®®
'Suites and protects'—the name of the earl of Salisbury’s book of projects-were the 
key fiscal point of contact between the patronage culture and governance.®® In the cause of 
governance, projects were a means to mobilize economic resources or privatize functions of 
government which the Jacobean administration was incapable of managing. For purposes of 
patronage they rewarded individuals' inventiveness, industry, or speculative talents and often 
sought to do so from sources of revenue which the crown would not otherwise have tapped. 
Licensing alehouses typified this duality within many projects. Projectors and their hirelings 
assumed the administrative responsibilities of licensing (regulating) and the crown received a 
percentage profit of the licenses or a fixed 'rent' for the entire contract. The projectors 
pocketed the profits in excess of costs and received only the gains which their own industry 
made possible. Despite these reasonable sounding premises, the actual project for alehouses 
was one of the scandals of James' reign and the corruption and abuses of the projectors 
prompted attacks in the parliament of 1621 which bordered on the blood-thirsty.^ At the 
level of individual projects this was an issue of the balance of private gain and public good. 
Within a financial system conceived in terms of projects this became the debate over the 
fiscal equilibrium between patronage and governance. In the familiar words of Thomas 
Wentworth, 'to what purpose is it for us to drawe a silver streame out of the contry into the 
royall cesterne, if it shall dayly runne out thence by private cocksY'^ t
The second half of this study analyzes the fiscal policies both offered and employed to 
put governance and patronage into balance. In these final chapters—and the thesis generally- 
there are implicit agendas accompanying the study of Jacobean crown finance. There are two 
significant weaknesses in present scholarship of the period. First, the absence of a modern 
study of James VI and I which looks afresh at the king and remains untainted by the legacy of
®®CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770].
®®Below, 39-48.
'^^Wallace Notestein, Frances Relf, Hartley Simpson (eds.), Commons Debates 1621 (seven volumes; New  
Haven, 1935), II, 168.
^^Samuel Rawson Gardiner /ed .l Parliamentary Debates in 1610 (London. 1862), 11-12.
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his historical character assassins.^ The second is the lack of anything which might constitute 
a defining interpretation of the Jacobean period on its own terms. This study aims to 
overcome key aspects of these historiographic deficiencies, particularly the chapters focusing 
on fiscal policy. Crown finance itself does not offer a defining interpretation of the period, 
but a major reassessment of fiscal policy brings a modem interpretation that much closer. 
Further, this study has been at pains to treat the reign of James VI and I as something other 
than a footnote to Gloriana's or a preface to Charles I's. Projects were an early-modern 
European phenomenon which spanned the entirety of James' reign and this has been 
recognized, but the conception and emphasis of this study are deliberately 'Jacobean' rather 
than 'early Stuart'.
This conceptual preference for a 'Jacobean' period—and 'Caroline' when addressing 
Charles T-is in recognition that James deserves pride-of-place in any study focusing on 
governance during his reign. Governance might best be understood as policymaking and 
administration. No one would support the assertion that James was integral to administration 
in his realm, but he was the nexus of policymaking. Governance was still a personal art in 
this period and policymaking a dynamic centered on relationships and communication 
between James and his ministers, subordinate officials, and 'counsellors'. Chapter 1 is a tour 
d'horizon of this Jacobean policymaking process in its abstract form and as it applied 
generally to fiscal policy. Building on the concept of counsel recently offered by John Guy, 
it casts away stmctural perspectives which identify policy and governance with 
administrative and institutional moulds.^ A formal analysis of this kind taking James' reign 
as a whole has not been offered before. The final three chapters examine the character of 
fiscal policy at the same time they demonstrate this process at work in producing those 
policies. It is hoped these chapters also go some way to dismantling the erroneous 
perspectives of James as a both a captive to factions or bedchamber cronies and a detached.
Anthony Weldon, The Court and Character o f King James (London, 1651); D. Hams Willson. King James VI 
and I (London, 1956). Jenny Wormald's new biography o f James is eagerly awaited.
^^ ®John Guy, 'The rhetoric o f counsel in early modern England', Hoak, Tudor Political Culture. 321-350.
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disinterested monarch who indulged his affection for the chase more than his love of
kingship.44
Fiscal policy is a continuous strand of governance through which it has been possible 
to examine the Jacobean polity itself. There has been the chance to learn anew, in some cases 
for the first time, some of the major and minor personalities of the period, their relationships 
to one another, and the political philosophies which framed their mental worlds. After as 
much as thirty years it was time to revisit the mentalities and practices of important ministers 
like Julius Caesar, Ellesmere, Edward Coke, Cranfield, and even those of more recent 
subjects like Salisbury, Northampton, Bacon, and James himself. The contest between 
patronage and governance occurred at the levels of individual projects and fiscal policy, but it 
also characterized the mental worlds of these figures. They rose and profited by the 
patronage culture, engaged with its politics, yet held the daily responsibility for the 
governance of the state and personally had to reckon with competing fiscal demands. 
Salisbiuy, for instance, had no pangs of conscience over pocketing £7000 from the silk duty 
farm while decrying the fiscal disaster of annual deficits exceeding £140,000 and debts 
reaching toward £500,000. The patronage culture paid the salaries of ministers responsible 
for deciding the fiscal equilibrium between it and the interests of the state. Cranfield’s mental 
world most resolutely defines this phenomenon.^ ^ It reveals what is, in effect, the ongoing 
transformation of the king's servants into the state's servants, taking place on a personal 
conceptual level.
Finally, fiscal policy was a 'hot topic' in James' parliaments, even the 1624 assembly 
dominated by foreign affairs, and it has been necessary to revisit that historiographic 
battleground. In concluding his recent examination of the Addled parliament, Conrad Russell 
wrote, 'England in 1614 was still a monarchy. It was a monarchy experiencing constitutional 
conflict. Under James that conflict almost exclusively centered on royal claims to raise 
money. The conflict did not mark a struggle for sovereignty or for rival constitutional ideas.
'^Neil Cuddy, 'The revival of entourage: the Bedchamber of James 1 ,1603-1625, David Starkey (ed.), The 
English Court: from the Wars o f the Roses to the Civil War (London, 1987), 173-225; Ashton. James I . 8-10. 
45Below, 233-238.
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It marked a simple, plain shortage of money.’^  Understandably, Russell's assessment is 
warmly received, but worn shibboleths like sovereignty and constitution remain. This study’s 
insistence upon a Jacobean frame of reference is a function of its belief that the W hig- 
Revisionist—contra-Revisionist debate has become increasingly circular and anachronistic, 
representing one of the significant obstacles to detaching the Jacobean and Caroline periods 
and allowing us to view James and his reign on its own terms-as well as Charles I's. These 
schools of thought have 'written the book', so to speak, on early Stuart history. This study of 
crown finance and fiscal policy aims above all else to write a Jacobean book.
^®Cora:ad Russell, The Addled Parliament o f 1614: The Limits o f Revision (Reading, 1992), 26.
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PROJECTS AND POLICYMAKING
CHAPTER 1
The Structure of Policymaking and Crown Finance
I
Laws and institutions do not govern states. They may serve as guides and tools, but 
individuals practise the art of governance. The relationships and communication between 
ministers, crown officers, and the king were the essence of governance in the Jacobean 
polity.^  Governance consisted of policymaking and administration (including oversight). 
The focus of this chapter is policymaking, a process which can be broken into constituent 
parts for analytical purposes: information, counsel, and d e c is io n m a k in g . 2 The processing of 
information in all its forms shaped the content of counsel while the character of this advice 
and evaluation of it were the crucial elements in producing policy decisions.® The 
personalities of James and his ministers vitally influenced the functioning of this process. 
James' love of sports and the countryside emulated that of his Tudor predecessors and he, like 
them, was often on progress from London.^  James has been crucified for this apparent 
lethargy and indolence, yet he loved the sport of kingship.^  The king who wrote so 
passionately and engagingly about kingcraft is to be thanked for his perambulations. The 
normal, predominantly verbal process of policymaking-despite the increasing amount of 
written record that accompanied institutional development—was continued in the only way 
open to the seventeenth century: it was committed to paper. Surviving, scattered letters and 
memoranda are the vehicle to recreate the great swirling river of information, advice, 
discussion, and debate that was the making of fiscal policy. They are also the means to refute 
arguments that James was detached, disinterested, or uninvolved.
iThe importance of communication has been sketched in Kevin Sharpe, ’Crown, Parliament and Locality; 
Government and Commimication in Early Stuart England', English Historical Review 101 (1986), 321-350.
^The paradigm of counsel employed here is that elaborated in Guy, 'counsel ', 292-310.
® Despite its focus, the best general analysis o f policymaking in terms of communication and interaction amongst 
pohcymakers is Alexander L. George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Pohcy: the Effective Use of 
Information and Advice (Boulder, 1980), 1-136.
'^John Nichols, ITie Progresses. Processions, and Magnificent Festivities of King James I (4 volumes; London, 
1828). For example, see the record of the summer progress of 1616: PRO SP 15/40/97, fol. 180r (8 September, 
1616).
^WiUson, James VI and 1 .175-196.
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James' movements created two policymaking venues: London (the standing palaces 
of Whitehall, Westminster, or closely removed at Greenwich and Hampton Court) and the 
court on progress. These venues determined the surviving evidence from which to 
reconstruct policymaking. The London forum was dominated by direct, verbal interaction in 
the formal setting of the privy council—with or without the king—and the personal attendance 
of ministers and councillors upon James and each other. Despite recent emphasis on the 
politics of the bedchamber, the privy council is the most conspicuous body in discussions of 
Jacobean governance.® Admittedly it possessed high political status, but the identification of 
institutional structures with policymaking creates distortions. The loss of the early council 
registers (1601-1613) in the Whitehall fire has long been accepted as a crippling blow to 
recreating the council's workings.2 Recently Pauline Croft alluded to the loss in her 
introduction to an edited collection of Salisbury's speeches, writing that in 'the absence of the 
privy council registers for 1602-1613, lost in the Whitehall fire, they provide probably the 
best single source for James I's relationship with his chief minister.'® Yet fragments survived, 
most notably an abstract of the registers for 1547-1610.® It would be preferable to have the 
actual council books, but the surviving registers make clear they never contained the 
information necessary for recreating policymaking, i® The registers record the administrative 
end-product of policy. Their purpose was not to reveal the personal interactions which were 
the birth and nursing of policy. Policymaking must be recovered from the letters and papers
®Neil Cuddy, 'The revival o f entourage: the Bedchamber of James 1 ,1603-162.5, David Starkey (ed.), The 
English Court: from the Wars of the Roses to the Civil War (London, 1987), 173-225. The standard study of 
the privy council is Edward R. Turner, The Priw Council o f England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries 1603-1784 (2 volumes; Baltimore, 1927), 1 ,1-214; also Peck, Northampton. 78-101. Sharpe, Personal 
Rule 262-274; Richard Cust. The Forced Loan and English Politics 1626-1628 (Oxford, 1987), 13-90; Peter 
Donald, An Uncounselled King: Charles I and the Scottish troubles 1637-1641 (Cambridge, 1990), 1-42; and 
Sabrina Alcorn Baron, '"The Board did Think Fit and Order": The Structure and Function of the Privy Council 
o f Charles I, c. 1625-41, With Special Reference to the Personal Rule’ (unpublished University of Chicago Ph.D 
thesis, 1995) provide varying Caroline perspectives.
2 Acts o f the Priw Council o f England 1618-1619. 342; Turner, Priw Council. II, 448-454.
®Croft, 'Several Speeches', 254.
®BL Additional Ms 11402. :
^®This is largely true for the Elizabethan and Caroline registers. Stephen Alford, William Cecil and the British |
Succession Crisis o f the 1560's' (unpublished St. Andrews Ph.D. dissertation, 1996) and Baron, 'Privy Council 1
of Charles I'. iI14 I
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of James and his councillors. Counsel and debate would be recorded there—if that was ever 
to be the case.n
At the heart of this approach is archival reconstruction, stitching back together the 
working papers of James’ ministers from the array of collections in which they now reside. 
The historian becomes the keeper of a 'virtual archive', one of his or her own fashioning. 
This archive eschews the institutional and definitional preoccupations of Georgian or 
Victorian archivists and restores the original relationships and purposes of papers belonging 
to Salisbury and Caesar, Northampton or Cotton, Ellesmere, Cranfield, and the other fiscal 
minds at James' service. In this respect, the Whitehall fire as an explanation for archival 
holes is too simplistic. 12 By the account of Thomas Wilson, keeper of the king's records, the 
greatest dangers to the state papers were his inability to recover papers rightly belonging to 
James and Robert Cotton's acquisitive habits. 1® He complained to James that since 
Salisbury's death (1612) he had been unable to recover the French, Latin and Irish papers, 
numerous council books, and the papers of the disgraced favourite Somerset (Robert Carr, 
formerly Viscount Rochester), Secretary Ralph Winwood, and Lord Treasurers Dorset and 
S u f f o lk .  The 'teething problems' of establishing an effective archive were also factors: 
'State documents in the early seventeenth century were often kept in a jumbled pile in the 
Secretary's office, whence many drifted back to private houses. Anyone working on these 
papers would have found little difficulty persuading the secretaries and keepers to lend 
them'.i® The 'virtual archivist’ must step into Wilson's shoes and complete his work.i® Only
1 1a. G. R. Smith, 'The Secretariats of the Cecils', English Historical Review 83 (1968), 500-502, helps define 
the importance o f the councillors' papers over the institutional records.
12Acts 1613-1614. v-viii; also PRO SP 14/105/20%, fol. 29r (12 January, 1619); SP 14/105/20%, fol. 29r. 
l®PRO SP 14/135/14%, fol. 20r (1622?); SP 14/81/69, fol. 120r (24 August, 1615); SP 14/81/69%, fol. 121r-121v 
(24 August, 1615); Sharpe. Robert Cotton. 58-66.
14pRO SP 14/135/14%, fol. 20r; PRO SP 14/118/76b, fol. 106r (1620?); also SP 15/42/91, fol. 150r-151v 
(1622?) for Wilson on the role o f the paper office.
 ^^ Sharpe, Rolrert Cotton. 64,73-74.
^®In addition to Sharpe, Robert Cotton interesting studies of 'state' papers, including contemporary Jacobean 
works are BL HarleianMs 94, fol. 51r-58v; BLLansdowne Ms 137, fbl. lr-93v (31 December, 1610); Thomas 
Powell, DIRECTION FOR SEARCH OF RECORDS (London, 1622); R. B. Wernham, 'The Public Records in 
the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', Levi Fox (ed.), English Historical Scholarship in the Sixteenth and 
Seventeenth Centuries (Oxford, 1956), 11-30; also discussions in Graham Perry, The Trophies of Time: Enghsh 
Antiquarians o f the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1995), 76-77 particularly.
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once these papers have been re-integrated, particularly correspondence, is it possible to 
analyze policymaking.
II
Policymaking forums (London and James-on-remove) and processes of counsel 
within them will be examined initially; the elements of information and decisionmaking will 
be taken up in the following sections. Particularly for the London forum, it is regrettable 
there were no great diarists among James’ councillors and that Salisbury did not possess his 
father's penchant for pro-contra memoranda.!  ^ If anyone in Burghley's 'academy' developed 
related tendencies it was Julius Caesar, who proved a copious writer of notes and memoranda 
throughout his career (Chancellor of the Exchequer 1606-1614).i8 Yet he left scant council 
remembrances after two decades as a councillor. A sequence of council meetings in 
September 1615 are indicative of these evidentiary realities and a striking example of events 
that never entered the institutional record.^  ^ 24 September is marked in the register by a 
letter to the Lord Deputy of Ireland, the appearance of three men on bond, entry of James' 
formal resolution in a dispute, a passport granted to a preacher for the Turkey Company in 
Constantinople, and a letter to the bailiff of Jersey to grant re-tiial to a petitioner.20 Detailed 
minutes composed afterward report that James assembled his councillors at Greenwich that 
day and sought their counsel on means of clearing his debts. He was interested in 
retrenchment, but others argued parliament was the only w a y .22 The motion raised, James 
commanded them to debate the question and, if they opted for parliament, devise preparation 
that would give hope of a better outcome than the Addled Parliament (1614).23 On 25 
September, the day the register records an appearance by five bonded servants and another
^^For instance BL Cotton Ms Caligula B X, fol. 86r-88v ([August?], 1559) and HH Salisbury Ms 155, fol. 124r- 
124v (16 October, 1568). I am indebted to Stephen Alford for our many discussions of William Cecil's working 
habits.
^ '^Hül, Bench and Bureaucracy. 6.
am grateM to Professor John Guy for drawing my attention to this document when I began work on this 
subject in the fall o f 1993.
20 Acts 1615-1616.285-290.
2lBL Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 224r. The report was probably made at the suggestion of the Earl o f Exeter. J. D. 
Alsop, 'The Privy Council Debate and Committees for Fiscal Reform, September 1615', Bulletin of the Institute 
of Historical Research 68 (1995), 191-192.
22b L Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 224r.
23b L Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 224r.
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passport granted, James' councillors met at Whitehall and concluded parliament was his only 
hope.24 The following day was appointed to discuss preparation for an assembly, but 
councillors who were not entirely happy with the decision attempted to draw the agenda back 
to retrenchment. We know only that 'after sum dispute ye former resoluton was confirmed* 
and the debate was rescheduled for the 28th.25
After two disastrous parhamentary sessions (1610 and 1614), the significance of such 
debates cannot be overstated.^  ^ Eighteen privy councillors forthrightly ventured their 
opinions on steps necessary for a successful parliament, but our only 'complete' report is 
Harleian manuscript 4289, of which a partial version survives in the State Papers.2  ^ J. D. 
Alsop recently studied these, but could not ascertain their authorship.28 In fact, Thomas 
Lake, the junior secretary who spoke commandingly during the final debate, was the 
author.29 Yet even this is once removed from the actual give-and-take, written and corrected 
after the fact. The closest account of the actual meeting was recorded by Ellesmere, who 
made personal notes as the discussion unfolded.^ ® The original altercations over parliament, 
arguments advanced by those opposed, and the response of others would have been 
fascinating.2i Political sensitivity surely deterred Ellesmere and Lake from recording those 
disputations with the same attentiveness as they did the final meeting.32 Similar 
considerations are largely responsible for the registers' sterile character, the outright exclusion
24Acts 1615-1616.290-291; BL Harleian Ms 4289.
25b L Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 225r. The Council of the register busied itself on 26 September with more 
passports, the Venetian ambassador welching on his debts to 'divers inhabitauntes o f the cittie o f London' and a 
building dispute. Acts 1615-1616.291-292.
26BeIow, 202-215.
27b L Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 224r-233r; PRO SP 14/81/115, fol. 184r-198r.
28 Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform', 192.
29xhe partial report is a corrected draft by Lake; the changes were incorporated into the full report. PRO SP 
14/81/115, fol. 184v and 186v for examples of corrections. The inclusion of the amendments into the Harleian 
version was noted by Alsop, but he seems not to have recognized them as being in Fake's hand; while each 
councillor's opinions are recounted in the third person except for Lake's. Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform', 191. The State 
Papers account is undoubtedly a partial copy of the corrected draft of the report made by Lake (from his notes), 
a complete version of it once existed and, though now lost, formed the basis o f the Harleian copy.
39h HL Ellesmere Ms 2628. Two other examples o f notes by Ellesmere are Ellesmere Ms 441 (July, 1615) and 
445 ([1616]).
31b L Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 224v-225r.
32Alsop, "Fiscal Refbrm', 195-196 has argued that 'no' annotations by Ellesmere in his personal notes illuminate 
some o f these divisions, but the discrepancies between Ellesmere's jottings and Alsop's criteria leave the 
argument open to disagreement.
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of clerks from debates, and the paucity of personal minutes.33 Nevertheless, the evidence 
suggests that conciliar disputation was common, as was James' involvement.
Patterns in London also emerge from Caesar's journal of Salisbury's first months as 
lord treasurer (1 6 0 8 ) .3 4  He recorded Salisbury's centrality and the regular interaction of 
James' ministers in council or otherwise. Many of Salisbury's days wa*e taken up with the 
barons in Exchequer causes, handling business in the Wards, or presiding over active revenue 
commissions. On days when Salisbury 'sat with other ll[ord]s' upon commissions, he was 
often sitting with his conciliar colleagues wearing different hats.35 On other occasions 
Salisbury was 'w[i]th the king & w[i]th the ll[ords] in Counsell touching the affaires of 
State.'36 These were days during which James was attended by Salisbury and his councillors, 
perhaps in formal council, as well as the council itself meeting, and Salisbury personally 
attending his master. A surviving memorial of business in James' hand signposts this 
complex interaction. For their usual Sunday meeting, James divided the agenda into matters 
for the council, Salisbury, and the Archbishop of Canterbury.37 Idle beggars, vagabonds, and 
the abuses of hospitals and alms houses found their way into the council agenda, along with 
'compte taking of some of my greate officers' and 'praeparation for the parliament'; 'with the 
beagle', James would discuss the park at Nonsuch, a letter to Ralph Winwood in the Low 
Countries, the French and Spanish ambassadors, the examination of Thomas Douglas (over a 
forged letter to the Magistrates of Cologne?^), and the 'pairtenaris suite' of Arthur Aston and 
'Charles his maister'; Canterbury would be dealt with for 'papistes conclusions in
33 As for the registers, 28 September passed with business on the dispute between Lords Willoughby and Norris, 
and assisting Abraham Derkinderen to recover £400 worth o f pearls sewn into a dress o f 'the Ladie Arbella 
[Stuart], now lately deceased'. Acts 1615-1616.293-294.
34b l  Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 297r-307v; also L. M. Hill, 'Sir Julius Caesar's Journal o f Salisbury's Fhst Two 
Months and Twenty Days as Lord Treasurer: 1608.' Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research. 45 (1972), 
311-327.
3%L Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 304r-305r.
36b L Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 300v. Such days were 29 May and 5 ,1 2 ,2 4 ,2 6  June. Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 
298r-300v. State business (usually undefined) was also the agenda for 8 ,1 1 ,1 4 ,1 6 ,1 7 ,2 2  May; 1,4, 8 ,10,14,  
15,19 June; and 17,19,21 July. BL Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 297r-303r.
37pRO SP 14/14/51, fol. 115r. 'Memoreall for Sondaye', the document is provisionally dated to 21 June from 
internal evidence which would make the Sunday in question 23 June, 1605.
38Douglas passed himself off as an ambassador o f the king to the Elector Palatine, was found out, and quickly 
returned to London where, after examination and confession, swiftly lost his life for his antics. See PRO SP 
14/14/50, fol. 112r-l 13v and SP 14/14/501, fol. 114r-114v for his examination on 21 June, 1605, the internal 
evidence on which the king's memorial is provisionally assigned to the same day. Also HMC Salisbury. XVII, 
271-272,276-277, and 291-292.
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generall-.Worcesters comission in particulaire’ and Richard M u r r a y .39 James was preparing 
to be king-in-council and king with his minister(s).^o
Lord Treasurer Dorset (1599-1608) wrote copiously in the course of his duties 
(regularly to Salisbury), frequently complaining how and why James' coffers were empty and 
that God alone knew how they could be replenished.^ ! The ageing treasurer was often at the 
mercy of a fantastic variety of 'phisiks' and he seems to have found 'working at home* 
p r e f e r a b l e . ^2 One letter to Salisbury in October 1605 effectively summarizes the bustling 
activity that was counsel, policymaking, and judicial responsibility while James was at 
Westminster. 'My lord,’ he wrote, 'acording to my promise 1 attended here in court from our 
coming from the star chamber until five of the clok to have ioind with your Lo[rdship] 
toching some good cours for the French merchauntes, but considering how late it was & that 
at your Lo[rdship's] return from the tower it was likely that you wold strait to the king to 
report what was doon theare & I also having much busines to dispatch at home, 1 went away 
ready & willing to mete you at any lime & place when soever you will apoint... I taried the 
half hour after fyve.'43 These records are interesting, but inadequate. We can see the London 
chessboard and its policymakers, but relationships and communication are largely elusive. 
James' progresses and his ministers' sojourns have more to tell us because counsel and 
policymaking found their way onto paper, most often in correspondence.
James' ministers were not wholly prepared for the activist, peripatetic king they 
acquired at the old Queen's death. Elizabeth's later years had seen a hardening of the '"Court" 
council’, increasingly fixed at Whitehall, and characterized by the 'distant, less urgent 
monarchical control of a semi-deified G lo iia n a '.^ ^  They adapted to the regular running of 
posts, but it was thought necessary to have formal instructions for James' a b s e n c e s .  45 When
39pRO SP 14/14/51, fol. 115r.
Salisbury Ms 134, fol. 51r (undated) for another memorial by James.
41b L Additional Ms 36767, fol. 92r (30 May, 1607).
42Dorset house was a victim of the Great Fire (1666) and Dorset's government papers were held there; if  any 
survived, they have yet to be found in significant numbers. HMC Sackville. I, xiii-xiv. Here is an model case in 
which Thomas Wilson failed to recover papers for which he pressed the king to issue warrants to that end. PRO 
SP 14/118/76b, fol. 106r.
43h H Salisbury Ms 112, fol. 163r (5 October, 1605).
^John Guy, Tudor England (Oxford, 1988), 310 and Cuddy, 'entourage', 173.
45pRO SP 14/12/13, fol. 17r (9 January, 1605).
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James departed London matters might arise other than those 'which wee left last in memoriall 
(with you o[u]r principall Secretaire) to bee debated of by o[u]r Counceh'.^ The councillors 
were to assemble once a week before Queen Anna and stand ready to meet oftener at Cecil's 
order for acquaintance of James' pleasure or other matters of importance.47 in practice of 
course they met more often, as Caesar's diary demonstrates.48 James would return if matters 
waiTanted, but he expected Cecil to diligently acquaint him how 'aU thinges passe amonge 
yow whereby wee maie either send yow our approbacon or geve yow some further 
direccons.'49 The instmctions were practical and the firm command given to Cecil was likely 
to head off any presumptions that might develop in James' absence.^  ^ The council praised 
James' 'resolution to hold ye middle path betweene necessarie cares & necessarie repose', but 
these instructions formally established the exercise of James' personal rule outside London.^ ! 
The extraordinary amount of surviving correspondence is testimony to the existence of this
system.52
The post was the practical link in the continuance of governance and its functioning 
was closely monitored.53 Its failure to appear in the morning always irritated James. 'I 
fownd great laziness in the postes', the earl of Worcester wrote, 'The king was very 
inquisityve all the morning what myght bee the cause, examining the howrs and myles, 
concludyng it could be no other but the post was so n k e '.5 4  Delays brought sharp comments: 
'The letters from my Ll[ords] of the Councell with the dispatch for Ireland came hither this 
evening after fowre of ye clock ... which is not much above two myle an howre to[o] slow for 
anie specill service of his Ma[jes]ty if cause shalbe of more h a s t [ e ] ' . ^ 5  Between 1604 and
46pRO SP 14/12/13, fol. 17r-17v.
47pRO SP 14/12/13, fol. 17r-18r.
Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 297r-307v.
49pRO SP 14/12/13, fol. 18r.
50pRO SP 14/12/14, fol. 19r-22v.
51pRO SP 14/12/20, fol. 35r.
52a 1so PauUne Croft, 'Robert Cecil and the Early Jacobean Court', Linda Levy Peck (ed.). The Mental World of 
the Jacobean Court (Cambridge, 1991), 135-139.
53joan Parkes, Travel in England in the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1968), generally and 225-231 with 
specific reference to the king's travels. For instance James' proclamations for the better ordering of the posts 
between 1604 and 1609. James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes (eds.), Stuart Roval fYoclamations Volume I 
Roval Proclamations of King James 1 1603-1625 (Oxford, 1973), 74-82 and 219-224.
54piH Salisbury Ms 127, fbl. 108r (Worcester to Salisbury; 24 July, [1609]); Salisbury Ms 104, fol. 121r-121v 
(2 April, 1604).
55h h  Salisbury Ms 123, fol. 93r (5 December, 1607); also Salisbury Ms 128, fol. lr-3v (10 October, 1609).
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1611 Salisbury was the chief, but not sole, terminus for James' letters.56 When not written by 
James personally, they were usually composed at his command, frequently by Thomas Lake 
and Roger Aston. Nearly every letter from court commenced with a note of when the 
original letters which occasioned the response arrived and James read them. Aston wrote to 
Salisbury, 'I receaved y[ou]r L[ordships] letteres this Sondaye the vj att X in the fore noone 
derected frome Witt Hale yestemyght att xij a cloke, this enclosed his Ma[jes]ty has amended 
in thre sondry plyces, his desyerr is thatt yo[u]r L[ordship] wold send it awaye with as much 
sped as yow maye'.^  ^ These statements occur like salutations, but demonstrate that for nearly 
every letter or packet leaving court, one had arrived from Salisbury or another minister. 
However, few of the original letters sent to court before 1612 have survived; the small 
number of Salisbury's which have are often drafts.
Before writing off those letters to the usual gremlins of ignorant clerks, damp, vermin, 
and the Whitehall fire, more than a few may have gone up in smoke of a different kind. The 
earl of Northampton's discreet nature-or suspiciousness with the taint of treason heavy in his 
family?-seems to have made him nervous of committing things to paper. While James was 
at Royston he wrote Lake: 'Worthy knight I must entreat you over againe to doe me the same 
favor you did in presenting unto his M[ajes]ty the first ftutes of this dayes worke at the stara 
chamber, which I knowe will be very acceptable to him, and yet wold faine have my letter 
bumed.68 Northampton's intent was clearer three days later: 'I have yealded his M[ajes]ty ... 
a very iuste account of this daies labor wholly spent about the reformation of his howse, the 
fiawes and excessis of which are infinit.... beseche his M[ajes]ty firom me to burne this letter 
with his owne hande when he hath perused it for it is trewe that I forgate to put him in minde 
to make it a martyr.'59 Sorting out James' household was politically unenviable, but 
Northampton's caution seems not to have been reserved for treacherous waters.^ » ’[l]f the 
kinge forget instantly to bume my letters', Northampton explained, 'put him in minde from
56rhe process is illuminated particularly well in Levinus Munck’s court journal from 1603-1605. HH Salisbury 
Ms 278.
57pRO SP 14/66/54, fol. llOr (6 October, 1611).
58pRO SP 14/15/93, fol. 154r (18 October, 1605).
59pRO SP 14/15/97, fol. 158r (22 October, 1605).
6®HH Salisbury Ms 189, fol. Ir-lv.
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me, for I wold be loth that all the groomes of his chamber should eyther reade what I write 
ore divulge what I delivere, for my [ode] tells me when the kinge is heer that letters are a 
praye which many hunt after.'^ i Northampton's letters did not meet their hoped-for fiery end, 
but they may have been the exception, Roger Aston wrote Salisbury: 'after he [James] had 
red the yerle of Norhamttones letter he cast it in the fyre saing he wuld commett thatt to the 
same cabinett to kepe that kepeed ail the rest, after it was bumtt he repentted and sayd 
there was so good sportes in it as he was sorry it was burntt.... for yor L[ordships] letter it was 
as his Ma[jes]te sayd vere fantastike and wold have it keped tel the nextt morning att wich 
tyme he called for it, agane red itt and so commetted it to the fyre'®
The prospect of James regularly burning his ministers' letters or the grooms of the 
chamber spiriting them away for their own reasons to unknown places is tantalizing. It 
seemingly explains the scarce evidence of the counsel James received, but does nothing to 
undermine arguments for the vibrancy of the process. The clearest examples of the counsel 
offered James survive in the remarkable series of original letters and drafts composed by 
Northampton for the king and Somerset.63 ft is clear from these letters that the axis of fiscal 
policymaking after Salisbury's death became that of Northampton and James with Somerset 
as the cipher. Northampton's own demise (1614) and the appointment of his nephew, 
Suffolk, to the treasur ership ushered in a diffusion of counsel and leadership, reflected in the 
archives. It is for this period (1614-1617) when Wilson's inability to recover papers 
belonging to Secretary Winwood and Suffolk most impacts our picture of policymaking, but 
the papers of Ellesmere and Cranfield, in particular, evidence a sometimes competitive 
conciliarism in fiscal policy. This process did not play out until the appointment of Cranfield 
as lord treasurer in 1621, a renewal of strong fiscal leadership reflected in Cranfield's massive 
collection of working papers, ones which provide us with some of the most dramatic
61pRO SP 14/15/87, fol. 146r (13 October, 1605).
62h H Salisbmy Ms 123, fol. 104r-104v (10 December, 1607); emphasis mine. Nor was it alone, as Aston 
reported the same fete tor another of Salisbury’s letters, 'wich came to my hand this Tewesday att nyght, the 
xxix of this enstand... the letter enclosed his Ma[jes]e presenttly bumtt.' HH Salisbury Ms 126, fol. 74r. The 
paucity o f Buckingham's letters to James is remarkably similar. BL Harleian Ms 1581, fol. Ir; Thomas 
Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution: English politics and the coming of war. 1621-1624 (Cambridge, 1989), 64. 
®Chi6fty CUL Cambridge Library Ms Dd.HI; BL Cotton Titus C VI; CSPD 1611-1618.133-219.
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moments of James’ involvement in fiscal policy. It was through these shifting relationships 
and avenues of counsel that policymaking occurred.
Ill
While personal attendance and correspondence were the chief means of offering 
counsel, this counsel was frequently the product of processing experience and various 
information streams including administrative documents, petitions and suits, and historical 
records or precedents. They yielded interconnected counsel benefiting a minister’s own 
interests (personal), furthering work with colleagues (collegial), and advising the king 
(primary). The archival evidence for these functions is abundant in two respects: attention to 
the management of information and the character of ministerial collections.
The distinction between personal and professional papers was in its infancy-Thomas 
Wilson’s self-serving quest to secure ministerial archives was a precursor to a stricter 
demarcation. It must be recognized that collections, 'private or public,' constantly served the 
causes of governance. Arthur Agarde’s 1610 treatise on the organization of the king's papers 
is remarkable for this utilitarian perspective.^ ^ For instance, Agarde rationalized treaties 
according to country, endorsed and dated each, appended similar pertinent information, and 
tagged the boxes and bags of treaties appropriately. He catalogued the treaties and deposited 
the record at Westminster for when 'they shalbe called for by the Kinge or his Counsayle as 
in this book and the Kalendar thereof may plainely appeare'. Foreign and domestic papers, 
the latter largely fiscal documents, in four different repositories (Exchequer of receipt, 
Whitehall, Westminster abbey and cloister) were similarly dealt with. Agarde concerned 
himself not only with enhancing the use of the papers, but preserving them for their 
functional value. Fire and water were obvious dangers. Rats and mice ate through boxes and 
'manie goodlie recordes have been spoyled with that kinde of vermin by gnawinge yea and as 
evill as that by pissing upon them'. Misplacing must be avoided, Agarde counselled, while 
outright theft occurred as numerous crown officers called for and kept papers despite 
demands for their return. Wilson defended his office in 1622—ironically against charges of 
being a 'newe office’ and therefore a target for retrenchment—along utilitarian lines which
64b l  Lansdowne Ms 137, fol. lr-93v (31 December, 1610); another copy BL Harleian Ms 94, fol. 51r-158v.
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were not wholly disingenuous: 'great officers and counsellors have made that use of it and 
me that many of them that are yett alive will saye it is not an office to smale p u r p o s e .*65 
Cotton was Wilson's great bogeyman in respect of purloined papers, yet Cotton could well 
have defended his library's utility on the same l in e s .6 6  Cotton's fragmentary borrowing 
records reveal how often his holdings were employed by James' ministers while his personal 
service to councillors like Northampton is well known.6? The 'king's papers' and individuals 
who presided over collections were much more than antiquarian in orientation. Both were 
elements in the process of governance and formulation of counsel.
The collections of most Jacobean ministers who were central to fiscal policy have 
survived in some recognizable form and can be subjected to archival reconstruction.68 None 
better reflect the processing of information and the resultant progressions through personal, 
collegial, and primary counsel than Caesar's or Ellesmere's. If there was a fiscal policy 
workhorse in James' first decade, it was Caesar. Robert Cotton's library is renowned, but it 
should not overshadow Caesar's as a pre-eminent Jacobean policymaking archive. The sense 
of history, devotion to precedent, and humanist mind which characterized Cotton's collections 
are true of Caesar's. Caesar also painstakingly organized and catalogued his library of nearly 
200 volumes.69 Caesar consistently composed memoranda to counsel his own actions, 
evaluate the course of present policy, and chart future initiatives, work which often 
seamlessly formed the basis of his collegial and primary counsel, particularly in partnership 
with Salisbury and, later, Northampton.
Fiscal reclamation became James' great matter in August 1607, replacing Union, and 
Salisbury headed a triumvirate including Caesar and Dorset in directing policy.7® Caesar
65pRO SP 15/42/91, fol. 150r-151v (Wilson to [Secretary Calvert]; [1622?]).
66siiarpe, Robert Cotton. 58-66.
67r l  Harleian Ms 6018, fol. 148r-185r; Peck. Northampton. 101-121.
68rhe ministers and major collections are: Caesar, BL Additional and Lansdowne Manuscripts; Salisbury, PRO 
State Papers Domestic and HH Salisbury Manuscripts; Northampton, PRO State Papers Domestic, BL Cotton 
Manuscripts, and Cambridge University libraiy Ms Dd.IIl; Suffolk, PRO State Papers Domestic and OBL Carte 
Ms 121-123; Ellesmere, HHL Ellesmere Manuscripts; Cranfield, PRO State Papers Domestic, CKS U269/1 
[Cranfield Manuscripts], and BL Harleian Ms 1580-1581.
69xhe best sources for reconslructing Caesar's libraiy are BL Lansdowne Ms 123 (printed auction catalogue of 
Caesar's library) and 124 (Caesar's own catalogue of his collection).
70h H Salisbury Ms 193, fol. 137r (15 August, 1607); BL Additional Ms 36767, fol. 123r-124v (16 September, 
1607); Salisbury Ms 122, fol. 72r (20 September, 1607); BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 106r (17 October, 1607).
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fashioned a complete assessment of James' estate out of two earlier reports, documentary 
templates which his chancellorship brought to Jacobean fiscal policy J! The fii’st was a 
breakdown of revenues and expenditures with periodic revisionsJ2 These figures were the 
basis for the next document, a comparison of Jacobean expenditure with similar Elizabethan 
charges.73 These juxtapositions ushered in a decades-long quest for solvency by parroting 
Elizabethan numbers, a fatuous ideal counselled by Salisbuiy, the conciliar regimes, and 
Cranfield in turn. At the bottom of the document Caesar penned the consequent axioms: 
'The meanes to abate the p[re]sent charge, must bee an abstinence fro[m] giving any thing 
belonging to the k[ing]s revenew; an abatement of the s[ai]d increases of charge either in 
whole or in p[ar]t... & by increasing the revenew w[i]thout co[m]milting either against the 
lawe or the co[n]veniency of the pollicy of this estate.*74 When Caesar revisited these 
principles he added that unless deficits could be permanently cured, royal debts would 
speedily grow to their former levels or worse despite any efforts to pay them. Caesar's was a 
strong blend of prescriptive and political counsel, at once offering succinct, fiscal courses of 
'princely parsimony' and projects for raising ready money and yearly revenues while 
counselling against the political dangers of new commercial impositions and the unlikelihood 
of successfully exploiting parliamentary revenue.75 Caesar's 'Notes for my ll[ord]s' represent 
a mindset held in common with his colleagues. Deficits grew into a frightening debt and both 
must be cured by retrenchment, improvements, and new revenues. James shared their 
thinking: 'for the matter of my rentis [finances], quhiche I can not denye, stikkes much in my 
mynde, till I see it come to some goode & certaine ende... I meane by all the pairts thairof as
7!b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 301-302v (drawn originally on 8 September, 1606; revised by Caesar on 20 
September, 1607), 303r-305v (September, 1606), 306r-311v (17 September, 1607). Later assessments of 
Caesar’s include Additional Ms 10038, fol. 28r-30v (28 August, 1609); BL Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 32r-46v (17 
August, 1610); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138r-139v (2 January 1610[1611]; revised by Caesar on 12 October, 
1611); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 148r-149v (16 January, 1610[1611]; revised by Caesar on 16 January, 
1611[1612] and 26 April, 1614); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 211r-212v (1 June, 1612); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 
223r-226v (18 March, 1612[1613]; revised by Caesar on 1 June, 1613)
72b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 301r-302v.
73b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 303r.
74b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 303r.
75b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 306r-311v.
25
The Structure of Policymaking and Crown Finance
well addition & multiplication of meanes, as by reformation of abusis, & substraction of 
unnecessarie & not honorable ch a ir g e s .'7 6
Caesar’s counsel was distilled from blends of administrative information, historical 
record, and experience. Ellesmere took the same elements and added liberal measures of 
precedent. His was the archetype of the legal mind turned to fiscal policy. An interest in 
trade and hostility toward aliens drove Ellesmere’s mind toward strict enforcement of 
multifarious statutory restrictions on foreign merchants, both for revenue and as projects to 
enhance commercial wealth.^ ? Ellesmere conducted an impressive examination of the fiscal 
utility of the prerogative's legal dimensions.7® Perhaps believing James incapable of ever 
restraining his bounty, he particularly cast about for legal precedents and judicial mechanisms 
to cancel grants, sack time-serving officers, and sue corrupt administrators, finding sanction 
in precedents as diverse as the prosecution of Edward I s master carpenter for stealing nails.79 
Ellesmere informed and advised himself with many such memoranda and they influenced the 
performance of his office and translated into collegial and primary counsel. This is 
dramatically seen in the September 1615 council debates over parliament and fiscal policy in 
which numerous personal memoranda by Ellesmere underpinned much of the formal, written 
counsel he offered his colleagues and (once removed) James.^ o Jacobean fiscal policy was 
formed out of just these transformations of information and experience into ascending levels 
of personal, collegial, and primary counsel.
IV
Information and counsel may have served personal and collegial needs, but James' 
ministers would have agreed as one that counsel foremost answered their master's demands. 
Counsel, good, bad, or indifferent in practice, was the basis of decisionmaking, a prerogative 
wholly possessed by the king. Further, James' personality and exercise of kingcraft defined 
the political culture in which the process of governance took place. This section will examine 
the synergistic elements of personality, political philosophy, and political culture which both
76h H Salisbmy Ms 134, fol. 84r ([3 December, 1607]).
77h HL Ellesmere Ms 465,1216/4 [Ellesmere's pagination], 1672, and 1673. 
78h HL Ellesmere Ms 476.
% IHL Ellesmere Ms 1216/1 and 476.
8%elow, 206-209.
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shaped and reflected James' style of kingship. James defined the process of governance and 
put himself at the center of policymaking and decisionmaking. An accurate study of fiscal 
policy must acknowledge and explore James' place in governance.
James remains a difficult figure for historians as king and individual: complex, 
emotive, contradictory, possessed of wit and temper, moved by conviction, endowed with a 
dynamic sense of self; in short, uniquely human. Isaac Disraeli speaks to anyone taking a 
fresh look: 'Many years ago I set off in the world with the popular notions of the character of 
James I.; but in the course of study, and with more enlarged comprehension of the age, I was 
frequently struck by the contrast of his real with his apparent character; and I thought I had 
developed those hidden and involved causes which have so long influenced modem writers in 
ridiculing and vilifying this monarch.'^ ! Jenny Wormald and Maurice Lee have taken up 
Disraeli's standard most fervently.^2 Out of their work, James has emerged as a remarkably 
adept king of Scotland, particularly before 1603.®3 The Scottish polity's essential feature was 
the need for 'personal intervention by a king who stepped down from his throne and joined in 
as one of the protagonists in the hurl-burly of d e b a t e . ' ^ ^  Rule was personal or it faltered: 
James 'had a profound belief in the importance of personal contact, not only with the crown's 
servants but also, crucially, with his opponents. This was effective kingship in Scotland.'®^
The kingship of James VI was an inseparable marriage of political theory and 
practical politics. Just as Elizabeth's childhood and education shaped her queenship, so 
James' upbringing was instrumental. The learned but adamantine George Buchanan set a 
'rigid and wearying' schedule of history, Greek, and Latin followed after dinner by
8!lsaac Disraeli, An Inquiry into the Literary and Political Character of James the First (London, 1816), vii. 
®2wormald, 'King James VI and I' and her Court. Kirk, and Communitv: Scotland 1470-1625 (London, 1981) 
and 'James VI and I, Basilikon Doron and The Trew Law of Free Monarchies: the Scottish context and English 
translation' in Peck, Mental World. 36-54. Also Jeimy Wormald, 'One king, two kingdoms', Alexander Grant 
and Keith J. Stringer (eds.). Uniting the Kingdom? Tire making of British History (London, 1995), 123-132; 
Jermy Wormald, 'James VI, James I and the Identity o f Britain', Brendan Bradshaw and John Morrill (eds.), The 
British Problem, c. 1534-1707: State Formation in the Atlantic Archipelago (London, 1996), 148-171. Lee, 
Government bv Pen and Solomon: Maurice Lee, Jr., 'James I and the Historians: Not a Bad King after all?', 
Albion 16 (1984), 151-163. Important earlier reassessments are Mark H. Curtis, 'Hampton Court Conference 
and its Aftermath", History 46 (1961), 1-16 and Schwarz, 'James I', 114-134.
®3wormald. Court. Kirk. 156. James' own assessment of his power and authority as king of Scotland, delivered 
during the Union debates in 1607, is interesting. King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 171-
178.
84\Vormald, 'James VI and I', 197.
®5wormald, 'James VI and I', 197. Also Lee, Solomon. 35.
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composition, dialectics and rhetoric, and, time permitting, arithmetic and cosmography.®6 
James 'absorbed it all and became in his turn a genuine intellectual... one of the most learned 
and intellectually curious men ever to sit on any throne.'®  ^ Poetry, theology and kingship 
fired James' mind throughout his life and found regular expression in speech and writing.®® 
The political theory James' received was Buchanan's, his mother's 'most outspoken and 
vicious critic whose personal attack on her had been subsumed into a political theory which 
made James's power ultimately dependent on the will of the community.'®  ^ James reacted 
against these ideas and embraced Guillaume Bude's Institut du Prince and Jean Bodin’s Six 
livres de la republique.^ o
At the centre of James' political theory was the complete refutation that anyone 'wil 
judge and give law to their king, but will be judged nor controlled by none’; these were 
dreadful hallmarks of a regimen populare.^  ^ The protection of his authority, of his royal 
prerogative, was the theoretical underpinning of James' kingship in Scotland and as king of 
Great Britain. In Scotland this meant asserting royal dominion over the nobility, kirk and 
p a r M a m e n t . 9 2  gy 1 5 9 7 , as Jenny Wormald has written, James' 'control of the church and state 
was becoming irresistible. And after, 1596, he settled down to write about it.'^ The Trew 
Law of Free Monarchies and Basilikon Doron made the future James I of England 
remarkable for not 'since Alfred had a ruler combined the practice and theory of kingship in 
his own p erso n .'9 4  These political works remain debating topics, but are no longer
®6Lee, Solomon. 32; J. H. Burns, The True Law of Kingship: Concepts of Monarchy in Earlv-Modern Scotland 
(Oxford, 1996), 191-196.
®7Lee, Solomon. 32; Wormald, 'Basilikon Doron', 36-37.
®®Lee, Solomon. 32. King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville; C. H. Mcllwain (ed.), The 
Political Writings of James I iCambridge. MA, 1918); Wormald, 'Basilikon Doron'; James Doleman, "'A King 
of thine own heart": The English Reception of King James VI and I's Basilikon Doron', The Seventeenth 
Century IX (1994), 1-9; Kevin Sharpe, 'Private Conscience and Public Duty in the Writings of James VI and I', 
John Morrill, Paul Slack, and Daniel Woolf (eds.). Public Duty and Private Conscience in Seventeenth-century 
England: Essays Presented to G. E. Aylmer (Oxford, 1993), 77-100.
®9Wormald, 'Basilikon Doron', 43; Burns, True Law. 196-209; Goodare, 'Estates', 17-19.
90Wormald, 'BasiUkon Doron', 43; Bums, Tme Law. 226. Also, Roger A. Mason, 'Imagining Scotland:
Scottish political drought and the problem of Britain 1560-1650' in Roger A. Mason (ed.), Scots and Britons: 
Scottish political thought and the union of 1603 (Cambridge, 1994), 9-10.
9lQuoted from Basilikon Doron in Wormald, 'BasiMkon Doron', 47. James was addressing the Melvillian 
challenged to his religious authority. Wormald. Court. Kirk. 148-149.
92Lee, Government by Pen. 7-9.
^^Wormald, 'Basilikon Doron', 45.
94wormald, 'Basilikon Doron', 36.
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caricatured as blueprints for a b s o l u t l s m . ^ 5  James’s themes of kingship are expounded in them 
and they are, J. H. Burns concludes, ’a unique amalgam of late sixteenth-century royalist 
ideology with a shrewd appraisal of the problems of royal government in a particular
kingdom/‘76
One cannot but be struck that in James' 'free monarchie' duty might be 'Reciprock and 
mutuair, but the burden of responsibility weighed most heavily on the sovereign.^ ? Drawing 
on biblical kingship, James defined the monarch as law-giver and judge.^ ® The institution of 
monarchy was of God, but James committed his most powerful argument and sustained 
exposition to Fergus' establishment of monarchy in Scotland by conquest.^  ^ James 
unremittingly drew the origins and authority of law within the monarchical orbit by virtue of 
that conquest. To 'establish good Lawes to his people, and procure obedience to the same' 
was the basis out of which the king discharged the other duties of his 'office': minister justice 
and judgment, advance good and punish evil, decide all controversies that arise among his 
subjects, be God's minister and punish the evil, and procure the people's peace.!®® ft 
followed, therefore, that a monarch who 'gouernes not by his lawe' cannot satisfactorily 
account to God 'nor haue a happy and established raigne'.!®! The lawless monarch could 
never meet the responsibility to 'procure the weal and flourishing of his people, not onely in 
maintaining and putting to execution the olde lowable lawes of the countrey, and by 
establishing of new (as necessitie and euill maners will require)... and to maintaine concord, 
wealth, ciuilitie among them.'i®2 The monarch was 'as a louing Father, and careful 
watchman, caring for them more then himselfe, knowing himselfe to be ordained for them, 
and they not for him'.i®^
95peck, 'Mental World', 13 and Schwarz, 'James 1', 128-133. Woiinald, 'Basilikon Doron'; J. P. Sommeiville, 
'James I and the divine right of kings: English politics and continental theory'. Peck, Mental World. 55-70; and 
Paul Christianson, 'Royal and parliamentaiy voices on the ancient constitution, c. 1604-1621', Mental World. 
71-95; Burns, True Law. 222-281 are the most interesting recent engagement over James' writings.
96Burns, True Law. 254.
^^King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 63.
^®King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 64-65.
®^King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 66-75.
!®®King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 64.
!®!King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 75.
!®2lCing James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 65.
!®3Ring James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 65-66.
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The essence of James’ theory was that monarchs, in their capacities as lawgivers and 
judges, were ordained to secure the public good, the commonweal. While a monarch was 
'aboue the law, as both the author and giuer of strength thereto; yet a good king will not onely 
delight to rule his subiects by the lawe, but euen will conforme himselfe in his owne actions 
thervnto, alwaies keeping that ground, that the health of the common-wealth be his chiefe 
lawe.’!®4 To this end the monarch could interpret, mitigate, even suspend the laws if they 
proved ’doubtsome or rigorous’ and Vpon causes onely knowen to him.’i®5 Nevertheless, ’a 
good King, although hee be aboue the Law, will subiect and frame his actions’ to it and 'vpon 
the perill of his soule to procure the weale of both soules and bodies, as farre as in him lieth, 
of all them that are committed to his charge.’!®® In Basilikon Doron. James forcefully 
reiterated that a 'good King ... emploieth all his studie and paines, to procure and maintaine, 
by the making and execution of good Lawes, the well-fare and peace of his people ... 
subiecting his ownepriuate affections and appetites to the weale and standing of his Subiects, 
euer thinking the common intéressé his chiefest particular'. i®7 Buchanan’s instruction is 
apparent in James assertion. The hated tutor had argued the commonweal was to be secured 
’by applying the maxim Populi salus suprema lex esto' while James repeatedly defended his 
devotion to the peoples' welfare as the supreme law.!®®
Lawlessness and rebellious subjects were Scottish realities. James understandably 
ai’gued subjects owed their monarch obediance and prayerful acquiesance at the hands of a 
tyrant.!®  ^ Rebellion was indefensible, yet James articulated the case that the best defense 
against it was less divine right than good government, preventing the practical causes of a 
reality not of God's realm, but of his.ü® James advised Prince Henry to daily censure his 
kingship and reform it appropritely.ü! Proactive kingship will so 'prop the weale of your
!®4gjng James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 75; also Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and 
the Stuart Constitution (New Haven. 1996), 40-43.
!®^King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 75.
!®®King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 75 and 65 respectively.
!®7King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 20.
!®®Bums, True Law. 202.
!®9King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 75-84.
!!®King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 30-31.
!ÜKing James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 17-18.
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people, with prouident care for their good gouemment, that iustly Momus himselfe may haue 
no ground to grudge Tension was inherent to James’ theory. He regarded his Scottish 
coronation oath as 'the clearest, ciuill and fundamentall Law’ defining the king's office as 
salus populi, but denied it represented a contract with anyone but the almighty, certainly not 
the subject.!!3 Further, applying the precedent of 'contract law', James asserted only God 
could judge whether his government advanced the public good.ü4 This meant that in the 
realities of earthly government, James alone held the power to define salus populi and judge 
his effectiveness in achieving it. Public good and policy, the essence of governance, was a 
debate between James and his God and only at the king's discretion did the wider body politic 
have a place in the dialogue. This was James' refutation of Buchanan's assertion in De jure 
regni apud Scotos that a 'king must have a council of wise men and must permit himself to be 
guided by them' in the law's 'interpretation and application', ü® As James was reported to 
have said in 1622: 'he would govern according to the good of the common weal, but not 
according to the common will.'ü®
Self-evidently, practical governance in Scotland under James was not a conversation 
of one, but of many.ü^ Counsel was the process by which the Scottish political nation, like 
its English counterpart, joined the dialogue of public good and policy.!!® James took counsel 
widely, in defiance of boundaries of institutions and traditions, and created a competitive 
policymaking environment. The personal nature of James' kingship and his studied 
involvement of magnates, lesser nobility, and the new professional class in governance were 
integral.!!^ The Scottish court also reflected and ftirthered competitive policymaking. Henry 
Wotton informed Robert Cecil that it was 'ruled more in the French than in the English
! !2King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 31. 
ü^King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 65, 81.
! !4 'Now in this contract (1 say) betwixt the king and his people, God is doubtles the only ludge, both because to 
him onely the king must make count o f his administration (as is oft said before) as likewise by the oath in the 
coronation, God is made the iudge and reuenger of the breakers'. King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. 
Sommerville, 81.
!!5Robert M. Kingdom, 'Calvinism and resistance theory, 1550-1580', J. H. Bums and Mark Goldie (eds.). The 
Cambridge History o f Political Thought 1450-1700 (Cambridge, 1991), 217.
!!®Thomas Birch, The Court and Times o f James the First (two volumes; London, 1849), II, 289.
!!7Wormald, 'James VI and I', 198.
!!®Bums, True Law. 56,69-72,95,99, and 228-230.
Ü^Wormald, Court. Kirk. 149-155; Goodare, 'Nobihty', 164-175; Lee. Solomon. 32-36.
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fashion. Anyone can enter while the king is eating...; he speaks to those who stand around 
him while he is at table,...and they to him.'i^ o The king's natural love of debate and activist 
personality found play in this environment. 121 James peripatetic nature increased the fluidity 
of court and policymaking. 122 ft also aroused jealousies among councillors, ministers, and 
courtiers who sought or expected an enhanced, even monopolistic, influence with the king.!23 
The judgment of George Nicolson, English envoy in Scotland, is often recounted in 
describing this milieu: 'The King is so inclinable to his Chamber and his favourites' advice 
for their desires to do anything now inconvenient soever, as all good men are weary and will 
withdraw themselves by little and little as they may.'!24 Nicholson counted James' nobles and 
councillors among the alienated, displeased 'that the Chamber should meddle and carry the 
King in all things, placing and displacing at their pleasures, having his Majesty so addicted to 
them, as he uses his authority to their humours.'!2S
Modem perceptions of James being a captive of faction and chamber cronies comes 
from misunderstanding the rivalries underlying the information in such reports and the king's 
personality.!2® James' open countenance, love of debate, and determination to stand above 
faction or the dominance of anyone moulded policymaking designed to secure 'unity and 
peace under his unchallenged authority.'!2? James 'saw kingship in its highly academic and 
its highly personal guise. He understood very well the art of managing men, and gave a lot of 
time to it.... He was a remarkable combination of a man of informality, and casual and 
friendly approach'.!28 Northampton included among James' 'excellent vertues ... that all his 
subjects had accesse unto him’ when singing the king's praises before parliament in 1610.!29 
Henry Wotton pointed to the real dynamic: 'In the handling of affairs of state he is held to be
!20Ashton, James 1.4-5 (c. June, 1602). Also Lee. Solomon. 141-143.
!21ln 1615, Thomas Coke wrote John Coke o f James' stay in Cambridge from which he returned most content. 
Ins imagination having been fired in debate and argument with the learned fellows. BL Additional Ms 64875, 
fol. 156r-156v (16 March, 1615).
I22j_£e, Solomon. 132-133.
!23Lee, Solomon. 141.
!24Quoted in Lee, Solomon. 141.
!25Quoted in Lee, Solomon. 141.
!2®Lee is ambivalent on the subject but seems to favor Nicolson. Lee, Solomon. 141-142.
!27gYirns, True Law. 223.
!28Wormald, Court. Kirk. 155 and 150 respectively [emphasis mine].
!29Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.17.
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one of the closest Princes in the world, but he does not settle even the smallest matters 
without c o u n s e l .'!3 o  James took counsel, but knew his mind and jealously guarded his 
ultimate authority in policymaking. Among his closest servants, the king often favoured 
those whose opinions and personalities he found agreeable to his own. But he advised Prince 
Henry to choose royal servants wisely and to exercise particular care in 'ruling them whom ye 
haue chosen.'!3i
Another aspect of James' character has fuelled the notions of faction. Once kingship 
and governance slipped from the realm of policymaking to administration, James distanced 
himself from the process. He 'did not share the interests of his administrators in the sheer 
slog of government. He needed civil servants, as any king did, but he was no Philip U'.!32 
The nobility, James told Prince Henry, 'must be your armes and executers of your la w e s .' !3 3  
M. Fontenay's assessment has been instrumental in creating the view of James as 'too idle and 
too little concerned about business, too addicted to his pleasure, principally that of the chase, 
leaving the conduct of business to the Earl of Arran, Montrose, and the Secretary... that this is 
pardonable in one of his youth but there is fear that i t  will become a h a b it .'!3 4  However, 
James demanded his ministers keep him fully informed in aU matters of policy and his 
attendance in the privy council was im p r e s s iv e .  !35 James' temper exploded if his business 
was neglected: 'I heve been Fry day, Setterday, and this day waithing upon the directioun of 
my affairs, nevir man comand. Thame of the Chekker that was ordainit to tak the compts 
nevir one. The turns of the hous should have bene endit this day, na man comes down. I sent 
for the advocat baith Fryday and Setterday—nather met nor answer..,. Quhat is spokin this 
nicht is forgot the morne. In the morning I see nathing menid but to gurne.... Therefore let 
this writ be a witness for my part. Quhen evir it beis called in question I protest I may do no 
mair nor I may, gif I war thaim vaiting on als lang I cannot be vayted.'!^ ® The young king's
!30Ashton, James J. 4.
!3lKing James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 34. 
!32\vormald. Court. Kirk. 155.
!33King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. SommerviUe, 29. 
!34Ashton, James 1.3. Also Lee, Solomon. 46.
!35Lee, Solomon. 137 and 141. 
i36pmrves, Revenues, xxxvii-xxxviii.
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boast, according to Fontenay, 'that there occurred no matter of importance of which he did 
not take cognizance' would become altogether true in his adult k i n g s h i p .  ! 3 7
It was inevitable English political culture and practice would change with James' 
accession. The force of James' personality, his Scottisliness, gender, and style of kingship 
combined to refashion 'political action and the codes of conduct, formal and informal, 
governing... what the [political] players presume the nature and limits of their game to be.'!3S 
Francis Bacon believed that it was an historic moment, following 'the strangest variety' of 
reigns: that of 'a child; the offer an usurpation ... the reign of a lady married to a foreign 
Prince; and the reign of a lady solitary and u n m a r r i e d . ' ! 3 9  Bacon's post-1603 writings 
regularly asserted the aberrant nature of Elizabeth's queenship despite his p r a i s e s .  !4 0  Gender 
created the uncertainty: 'If a queen were confidently to demonstrate the attributes of power, 
she would not be acting in a womanly manner; yet womanly behavior will ill-fit a queen for 
the rigors of rule.... Everyone expected she would marry and solve the problem of being a 
woman ruler by turning the governance over to her h u s b a n d . ' ! 4 i  Elizabeth should provide a 
ruler-consort or, at the very least, her queenship should be once removed from personal rule; 
while women were not incapable of governance, they were less competent than men.i42 But 
she remained 'an unmarried woman who wielded power, refused to be the modest woman 
who listened to her advisors and preachers, and would not marry or name a s u c c e s s o r ' .  143
Elizabeth's gender and a queen's court created barriers to the arena-like policymaking 
practised by James in S c o t l a n d .  ^44  Courtiers and ministers might seek influence with James 
through his chamber cronies, but Elizabeth's bedchamber was barred on the basis of gender,
!37Ashton, James 1.3 and Wormald, Court. Kirk. 158.
!3®Dale Hoak, 'Introduction', Hoak, Tudor Political Culture. 1.
!39spedding. Letters and the Life 114 volumes; London, 1861-1874), III, 250 (Bacon to Ellesmere; April, 1605), 
!40james Spedding, Robert LesUe EUis, and Douglas Denon Heath (eds.). The Works o f Francis Bacon (7 
volumes; London, 1857-1859), VI, 275-277 (History of Great Britain) and 305-318 (Eulogy for Queen 
Elizabeth).
141carole Levin, The Heart and Stomach of a King: Elizabeth I and the Politics o f Sex and Power 
(Philadelphia, 1994), 3; Pam Wright, 'A change in direction: the ramifications of a female household, 1558- 
1603', Starkey, English Court. 147-172.
!42j_£ivm, Heait and Stomach. 10-12.
!43Fevin. Heart and Stomach. 171.
!44xhe gender-based constraints of faction at the Elizabethan court are discussed in Wright, 'female household', 
147-172.
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as Essex discovered to his d o o m . 145 Ritual courtship and pretended affection were 
prerequisites to preferment at the Elizabethan court.!4® Elizabeth turned these games of 
wooing and expectations of femininity to her advantage: 'dithering, prevarication and
generally dismissive behaviour which was understood to be archetypical of the conventional 
"mistress" provided Elizabeth with her weapons of political manipulation and manoeuvre. In 
order to beat her male courtiers at their own game, she changed the rules and capitalized on 
the power granted to her by virtue of her g e n d e r .'i4 7  where James defended his authority 
against presumptuous magnates, dangerous philosophers, and the kirk, Elizabeth asserted 
hers over the expectations of gender and the dangers of political marginalization through 
marriage or designation of a successor.
Like her Scottish cousin, Elizabeth took counsel, but predominantly from within the 
ranks of her councillors and ministers. The privy council was the Elizabethan locus of 
counsel and policymaking, but, in what John Guy has termed her 'first reign' (1558-1585), it 
rested on opposing conceptions of its role.i48 Councillors like Burghley contended 
Elizabeth's prerogative 'was limited by the advice of the Privy Council' or parliament while 
the queen held a position James VI would have found agreeable: 'her imperium was ordained 
by God alone and her prerogative unlimited by her councillors' advice’ or parliament's. 149 
Elizabeth's delineation of counsel and policymaking was another assertion of authority, seen 
most strongly in her repudiation of parliamentary demands to counsel on issues such as the 
succession and religion.!®® She controlled policymaking—negatively—through the power to 
limit and reject counsel.!^! However, the Spanish war, 'the conduct of which required 
strategic planning and instant reflexes', loosened Elizabeth's control; as she 'persistently 
dithered, decisions were taken on her behalf, and for the first time she tacitly condoned the 
fact.'!® Essex's failed rising in 1601 was the last challenge to the privy council's exclusive
!45 John Guy, 'The 1590's: the second reign of Elizabeth I?', Guy, Elizabeth 1.4. 
!4®Guy, 'Second reign', 3.
!47ouy, 'Second reign’, 3.
!48ouy, 'Second reign', 1 and 13.
!49cuy, 'Second reign', 13; Altbrd, 'William Cecil '.
!5®Guy, 'Counsel', 301-303.
!5lGuy, 'Counsel', 301 and Guy, 'Second reign', 4 and 13.
!52Guy, 'Second reign', 4.
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place in policy and Robert Cecil's pre-eminence among his c o l l e a g u e s .  !^ 3 This process of 
counsel and policymaking did not survive Elizabeth's death intact.
A broad consensus among privy councillors and leading courtiers, anxious to 'ensure 
their continued access to political power and royal favour', guaranteed James Vi’s peaceful 
a c c e s s i o n .  1 5 4  The fluidity of Scottish counsel and policymaking were grafted onto an 
enlarged English privy council with its administrative sophistication and accommodated 
within the tighter formalities of English court culture, Peers who had gone unrewarded 
and unrecognized in Elizabeth's last decade were a d d e d ,  i®® James sought to expand his 
affinity outside Cecil's own with these appointments, particularly former supporters of Essex 
like Henry Howard (Northampton), and reward those who had supported his accession. i®7 
The addition of Scots to the council and their appointments to offices of state, albeit junior 
positions, were unprecedented changes designed to give practical expression to the union of 
the crowns. 15® Finally, the various gender barriers under Elizabeth separating the 
bedchamber fi*om political involvement and checking the ambitions of other courtiers 
collapsed with a king.i®9
The most profound impact was on policymaking and decisionmaking. James was the 
first male monarch in the collective experience of the English political elite and arguably the 
most personal and active ruler they had ever known. He possessed 'strong opinions of his 
own, and a very high estimate of his kingly abilities, as well as a circle of close [Scottish] 
friends and long-standing advisors. It was obvious that he would listen to many voices, not 
just to that of the secretary [Cecil].'i®® Where the council, almost as an entity, had
l53ouy, Tudor England. 452-453. Also Pemy Williams, The Later Tudors: England 1547-1603 (Oxford, 
1995), 341-388; Paul E. J. Hammer, 'Patronage at Court, faction and the earl o f Essex', Guy, Elizabeth 1.65-86. 
!^4Linda Levy Peck, 'Peers, patronage, and the politics o f history', Guv. Elizabeth 1. 97-98 and 106-108; 
Williams, Later Tudors. 383-388.
15®Croft, 'Jacobean court', 134-138; Neil Cuddy, 'Anglo-Scottish Union and the Court of James 1 ,1603-1625', 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Societv 39 (1989), 111; also Lee, Solomon. 132-157, a useful if superficial 
survey.
15®Peck, 'Peers, patronage', 106-108; Croft, 'Jacobean court', 135.
157Wormald, 'James VI and I', 201-203.
l5®Cuddy, 'Union', 109-111 and 121-125; Croft, 'Jacobean court', 135.
159Croft, 'Jacobean court', 135-136 and Cuddy, 'entourage', 173-225. Also, Neil Cuddy, 'The Conflicting 
Loyalties of a "vulger counselor": The Third Earl o f Southampton, 1597-1624', Morrill, Slack, and Woolf, 
Pubhc Duty. 121-150.
1®® Croft, 'Jacobean court', 135.
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monopolized the process with the old queen, under James, councillors, ministers, courtiers, 
and servants all competed in counselling the king with varying degrees of advantage. Cecil, 
with some frustration, described the extent of the change: It fareth not with me now as it did 
in the Queen's time... for then I could have done as great a matter as this without other help 
than myself; she heard but few, and of them I may say myself chief; the king heareth many, 
yea, of all kinds.'!®! When the privy council held session with Queen Anna during the king's 
absence, James jibed Cecil, 'Ye and your fellows there are so proud now, that you have got 
the guiding again of a feminine court in the old fashion that I know not how to deal with 
ye'.!®2 And James practised a very Elizabethan prerogative of decisionmaking: he ignored 
counsel from his ministers, parliament, and cronies with varying practical and political 
consequences. In short, James' Scottish principles of kingship, his determination to be a 
'universal king' were finding English expression: nobles as natural counsellors, tying
individuals to the crown through service, balancing opinions and ambitions, and jealously 
guarding the royal final-authority in all matters.!®®
The fiscal policymaking process was defined by James in a letter to the privy council 
in October 1607. It afiows us to reconstitute the elements of information, counsel, and 
decisionmaking which this chapter analyzed. In 'this disease [of want] I ame the patient, & 
ye have promised to be the phisicians,' James wrote, 'to use the best care upon me, that youre 
wittes, faithfulnes, & diligence can reache unto, as for my pairte, ye maye assure youre selfis 
that I shall facilitate youre cure by all the meanes possible for a poore patient, both by 
obseming as straite a dyete as ye can in honoure & reason praescryue unto me. as also, by 
using seasonablie, & in the richte forme, suche remedies and antidotes, as ye are to aplye 
unto my disease'.!®4 The demarcation of responsibility and authority was clear. The 
formulation of counsel and policy prescriptions was located within the wits of ministers like 
Caesar, Salisbury, Northampton, and Cranfield. But James would decide on the appropriate- 
in the case of bounty, honourable—course of treatment once his doctors had presented their
!®!Quoted in Lee, Solomon. 144.
!®2Quoted in Cuddy, 'Entourage', 196.
1®3 Wormald, Court. Kirk. 150-156; Wormald, 'James VI and I', 201-203. 
!®4h H Salisbury Ms 134, fol. 113r; underlining by Salisbury.
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diagnoses and offered prescriptions. He would neither take their remedies sight unseen nor 
stand back from prescribing his own antidotes. Decisionmaking, in essence the final shaping 
of policy, was the king's prerogative. Consequently, fiscal policy was an indivisible part of 
James' practice of kingship and central to governance. Before addressing these broader 
themes of governance in the second section of this thesis, we must examine the conceptual 
basis of crown finance: projects.
C H A P im 2
Projects and the Conceptualization of Crown Finance
Projects were the point at which the financial mental world shared by James and his 
ministers fused with fiscal reality and practice. Their fiscal policies were conceived in terms 
of projects. Two remarkable instances of this contemporary project conceptualization have 
come down to us intact, but have previously failed to elicit recognition. Over three nights in 
December 1757, St. Paul’s coffee-house was the venue for the sale of Julius Caesar's library, 
mortgaged by one of his last descendants 'for £40 to an upholsterer for a debt'.! Caesar’s 193 
volumes fetched £352, but not before the auction was postponed three weeks to allow Samuel 
Patterson to catalogue the collection.^ Patterson consulted Caesar's own catalogue of the 
library and copied the contents directly into the auction guide.® Sale item 52 was titled 
simply 'Projects’, taken from Caesar's original title, 'The Contents of the 14 booke, in fol[io] 
containing Proiects.'^  The volume was eventually purchased by the British Museum and 
became Additional Manuscript 10038.^  Something as interesting and significant is to be 
found in a report of 'pap[er]s touching] the Tresury & Excheq[uer] etc. delivered to Mr 
Wilson by Mr Dudley Norton out of the late L[ord] Tresorers study' in Whitehall.® Among 
more than 100 bags, boxes, and books once belonging to Salisbury was a volume called 
'Suites and proiects'.^  At some point the book passed out of the keeper's hands and is now 
among the Harleian manuscripts.® Neither of these volumes are finds—Caesar’s, at least, has 
often been cited—but their significance has been unappreciated. These manuscripts represent
! b L Lansdowne Ms 123, fol. Iv.
2b L Lansdowne Ms 123, fol. lv-3r. 'they would now (anno 1780) perhaps sell even for double this sum.'
®BL Lansdowne Ms 124.
4b L Lansdowne Ms 123, fol. 9r, 34r. The item was purchased for £2 1 Is by a Mr. Boddington (from the office 
of the Tower ordnance) Lansdowne Ms 123, fol. 8r-8v.
®BL Lansdowne Ms 123, fol. 8v.
®BL Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 211r-214v (21 June, 1612).
7fiL Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 213r.
® 'Suites and Proiects presented to the late Earle of Salisbury Lord high Thier o f England'. BL Harleian Ms 
4807, fol. lr-68v. This may well have been present with papers Wilson found 'confusedly dispersed' among 
Salisbury's records; one o f the items was titled 'sûtes of innovation & newe proiects.' HH Salisbury Ms 140, fol. 
48r. He probably labelled the vellum cover o f Harleian Ms 4807 when it came into his custody after Salisbury's 
death. Compare with Wilson's hand in HHL Ellesmere Ms 1672,1673.
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vital analytical tools for understanding how James' own ministers conceptualized and 
understood projects; they are Caesar's and Salisbury's practical definitions.
The overall shapes of the volumes are instructive. Caesar added projects as late as 
1619, but almost all date to two periods, 1607-1609 and 1611-1613; Salisbury's projects 
overlap the first period, principally 1608-1609. These dates perfectly correspond to the most 
intense projecting periods. Caesar's is several times larger than Salisbury's, but the projects 
in each are wide-ranging; topics, if not actual documents, are duplicated between them while 
each volume contains unique projects. The disparity in size reflects Caesar's workhorse 
position in his partnership with Salisbury—and as a treasury commissioner (1612-1614) with 
Northampton. Caesar alone had the depth of expert treasury knowledge to best evaluate 
projects. However, personal endorsements and annotations are to be found throughout both 
collections. The volumes are replete with individual project documents, but Caesar's also 
contains several policy memoranda. This underscores the previous discussion about the 
processing of information, in this case individual projects, into policy prescriptions and 
counsel. The project case-study in the next chapter will particularly analyze this aspect of 
Caesar's volume. Most significantly, the opening documents in both volumes are copies of 
the instructions for and memorials of grantable suits for purposes of royal liberality and 
bounty.^  In no manner is the bond between projects and the patronage culture more starkly 
evidenced nor the awareness of James' ministers of the relationship. A holistic view of these 
volumes makes possible a synthesis of projects' chief characteristics: their origins in suits 
and petitions, with frequent patronage complications; employment of the languages of 
commonwealth and public good; the proto-privatization of government; monopolistic 
possibilities; and projects as an early-modern European phenomenon. A closer look at |
several projects in the Caesar and Salisbury volumes will both elaborate and reinforce these 1
seminal characteristics. Ii
Salisbury held a project for populating the 'abundance of vacant and waste I
igroundes'.!® The economic dislocation of the 1590's significantly heightened concerns about 4
I
9b L Harleian Ms 4807, fol. lr-2v; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 4r-4v. 
!®Guy, 'Second reign', 18. BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 14r.40
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social stability and crime, No late Elizabethan councillor or 'magistrate would have 
doubted that vagrancy was criminal, that democracy was the worst form of government, and 
that plebeian forces were dangerously on the increase.'T hese apprehensions stayed with 
ministers like Cecil at James' accession and explain his interest in this project. It is structured 
in a style common to nearly every project: premises, mechanics, assurances (in anticipation 
of objections), and benefits. There were numerous wastes within forests, parks, chases, but 
because they remained 'common to all' they were neither 'inclosed nor inhabited with honest 
industrious people, that may convert the same into tillage and pasture and other suche 
profitable uses for the common wealthe'.i^ James could reverse this by leasing 100 acres 
each to 5000 yeomen who would enclose and work the land, while constructing a sturdy 
house and farm buildings. Their rent would be £20, yielding new revenues of £100,000 The 
projector anticipated James' concern for the adjoining forests and game with requirements 
that the lease-holder become a 'keeper and p[re] server of the deere' and provide 'gates and 
places of passage' through their enclosures for royal hunting. Another £100,000 flowing into 
the Exchequer was an obvious inducement for the crown, but promises of order and 
prosperity aimed at socio-economic concerns: 'whereby ten tymes five thousand people 
shalbe maintained to live, by this meanes his Ma[jes]tie shalbe better enabled in [military] 
force and strengthe by raisinge of soe many able subiectes, his subsedy so muche increased, 
the common wealth greatly imiched, and bettered by providing of so many dwellinge houses 
for so many desolate people w[hi]ch nowe doe wante placed of habitation.'i^  Increased 
agricultural production would also force down prices. It concluded with the mantra of all 
projects: 'This wilbe a meanes to set a number of idle persons on worke, wherby to avoide 
idlenes and drunkennes and all other foule vices w[hi]ch doe raigne chiefly by idlenes.' The 
language of commonwealth, public good, and mutual gains to crown and society—pm bono 
publico—v e^re consistent throughout p r o j e c t s .S o  too was the exposition of direct and
^Ijim Sharpe, 'Social strain and social dislocation, 1585-1603', Guy, Elizabeth 1 .193. 
l^Guy, 'Second reign', 18 and 11 respectively. 
l^BLHarleianMs 4807, fol. 14r. 
l^BLHaiieianMs 4807, fol. 14v.
15por instance PRO SP 14/51/29, tbl. 95v (1609?); BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 271r-272v (19 July, 1612).
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indirect benefits: £100,000 in revenue; a fitter populace, new subsidy-men, and secondary 
employment of 45,000 people.
The project for a company of exploration and discovery is an interesting counterpoint. 
It falls into a category of projects whose allure lay more in what was not said. Its bait was 
up-front: ’It is conceaved that a proiect may be delivered to his Ma|jes]tie by w[hi]ch he may 
satisfie a greate p[ar]te of his debtes.’^  ^ It was beneficial to and necessary for the 
commonwealth and prejudicial to none, but further explanation was not forthcoming. The 
author instead pressed his suit that a tenth of its proceeds be committed to establish a joint- 
stock exploration company in Plymouth, managed by a president and twelve councillors, and 
constantly maintaining two ships at sea in search of commercially exploitable discoveries. 
The contrast with the previous project is pointed. Repopulation was a project Salisbury 
endorsed as fitting 'to be offred to ye P a r l i a m e n t . ' was a government project with clear 
benefits to both crown and commonwealth. That of exploration introduces us to the suitor 
and projector: 'the partie w[hi]ch is to discover this proiect hath served this crowne and state 
twentie & sixe yeres and spente in yt att the least tenn thowsand markes.... yt is usuall in 
ffrance, Spaine and other kingdomes to allowe unto all such as by good meanes, w[i]thowt 
hurtinge or preiudicinge anie person, advantage the kinges revenewe or his purse, to some a 
fourth, to some a third, and others a moytie of the procedue of theire proiect.'^ ® Once James 
guaranteed the projector his percentage, he would be 'readie to declare the secrett to his 
Ma|jes]tie and the meanes to compassé yt.' The projector only disclosed that it was 'neither 
imposicon, tax, nor monopolie.' Corresponding gain was affirmed: the commonwealth would 
benefit by expansion of commercial opportunities, while James and the projector shared 
residual profits of the latter's expertise. Not surprisingly, obtuse projects of this sort often
found little s u p p o r t .
Licensing apprentices particularly highlights projects' relationships to patronage, 
monopolistic possibilities, and the privatizing of government responsibilities. The premises
l^BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 61r. 
l^BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 15v,
18BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 61r.
19por instance, BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 16r-17v (23 March, 1607[16081).42
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were straight-forward. The 1563 statute of artificers ordered apprentices to be indentured for 
seven years, but it was not done for want of a responsible official.^ » Consequently, ’unskilled 
artificers exceedingly increase, wherfore auncient artificers doe finde themselves much 
impoverished by yonge men that daylie sett upp & use trade contrarie to the said statute’.^ ! 
The project posited the privatization of legal enforcement. The projectors hoped James 
would grant by ’letters patent to some meet person full power and authoritie to enroull & 
record the said indentures in such places ... where their is not alreadye any authorised for that 
purpose'.22 They also sought power to dispense with the statutory fines against offenders 
already settled in their trades (penal fines).23 The structural deficiencies of Jacobean 
administration were to be remedied by patentees, a precipitating factor of projects throughout 
the period.24 The fiscal gains were uncertain, but like all projects speculation ran high. The 
projectors believed settled artificers would compound for up to a fourth of statutory 
forfeitures to receive a dispensation. Assuming 60,000 artificers in England and Wales 
capable of paying, the projectors believed they would realize £139,375.25 For their efforts, 
they asked for the standard 21 year grant and 5s in the pound for expenses, approximately 
£43,555.26 James would receive £200 in rent and the remaining proceeds of the 
compositions, over £90,000.2? Enforcement would produce socio-economic benefits. 
Unskilled artificers and shoddy goods would be curtailed while stopping pretended artificers 
who were little better than vagabonds and beggars.2s
Many lawfiill artificers suffered at the hands of informers for want of licences and 
were thr eatened with exposure and forfeitures. It was this clamour for legal dispensation that 
the projectors claimed inspired their proposal. However, the project had its immediate 
origins in patronage, neither profit for James nor benefits for the commonwealth had been
20b l  Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 25r; BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 63r. 
21b L Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 25r.
22b l  Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 63r.
23b L Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 63r.
2"^he discussion in Russell, Parliaments. 66-70 is useful.
25b L Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 24r.
26b L Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 25r.
27b l  Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 25r.
28b l  Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 64r. 43
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initial motives. This form of the project was insistently pressed upon James, who ordered 
Salisbury to have it examined by Caesar and others, it 'being now proponed for his 
Ma|jes]ties profitt especiallie & followed by Mr More ... that hertofore prosecuted it for my 
Lo[rd] Haddington'.29 The original project was blatantly designed for personal profit, but, 
when redrawn, James was fully prepared to turn it to his own ends. He resolved to 'make the 
best use of this sute for himself, so as it may evidentlie apeare to bringe a profitt w[i]th honor 
to his coffers & w[i]thout enormitie or inconvenience to his subiectes.'3® The crown would 
become the projector. Corporate towns had officers to enforce the statutes, but in other 
places Caesar replaced the project’s patentees with the clerks of the peace.^! He and 
Salisbury decided against it after Caesar judged 'the p[ro]fit veiy uncerteine & extreme 
small'; probably not a little from the unreliability of local officers with a variable revenue. 
When it was reviewed again in 1612, the chief inconvenience was that it would become a 
'first and leading president of profitt... made by a penall lawe ... otherwise then in ordinarie 
forme of lawe.'^ 2
The fierce politics of patronage complicated situations when projects had their origins 
in suits.33 The common law judges were asked in November 1604 to answer whether the 
prosecution and execution of penal laws could be contracted out to p ro jectors.^ ^  James' 
councillors were particularly intent upon exploiting the forfeitures of lands and goods in the 
recusancy laws for revenue and p a tro n a g e .^ 5  The judges firmly declared that the legal 
process was statutorily committed to the king and could not be given over to private persons 
for their own gain.36 Further, they disapproved of granting the benefit of forfeitures before
2^BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 8r [emphasis mine] (23 October [16071; Roger Wilbraham to Salisbury), 
Haddington was originally acting for the earl o f Dimbar. BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 142r-143v (25 M y, 
1607), For Dunbar's involvement, PRO SP 14/24/71, fol. 124r-124v (undated).
30b L Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 8r.
31b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 15r (24 August, 1609).
22b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. l l v  (18 September, 1612).
33por example: BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 61r-61v (outlawries/Lord Haddington), 128r-129v (logwood, 
com, copper tokens/ Lord Montgomery), 148r-149v (conyskins/Edward Villiers), 212r-212v (oaths at 
julies/Arabella Stuart; James' cousin), 230r-231v (ofïïce for appraising the goods o f die dead/Lord Haddington), 
271r-272v (register of burials and christenings/Henry Martin; Caesar's father-in-law), 389r-390v (latitats/Lord 
Cobham).
3^HH Salisbury Ms 107, fol. 106r-107v; PRO SP 14/10/6, fol. 9r-9v (both 8 November, 1604). James' 
suspended the penal laws at his accession.
35b l  Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 344r-347v (27 November, 1604).
36h H Salisbury Ms 107, fol. 106r. 44
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they had been formally answered in the E x c h e q u e r .32 That said, loopholes were left for 
patronage. James might not be able to farm prosecution and collection, but the Exchequer 
taking could still be granted for those assisting the course of law.^ s The council approved the 
judges' verdict and James ordered them to begin enforcing the penal laws again in the assizes, 
circuits, and sessions of the p e a c e . 9^ Courtiers became servant-informers-or employed 
others in that capacity-performing the task of uncovering recusants for prosecution with the 
promise of forfeitures for their pains.^ ^
Projects were not simply an English phenomena, but characteristic of early-modern 
states.41 The French crown’s insatiable hunger for revenue spawned projectors, 'roundly 
denounced by Bodin’ as another opportunistic hand through which the king's money must 
pass.42 French projectors increasingly advanced credit to the crown for patents for their 
schemes, often the erection of new offices, tolls, or recovery of decayed revenues—much like 
their English counterparts.^  ^ Scotland suffered revenue woes under Mary and projects 
offered to her included retaining the benefits of wardship, licensing export of prohibited 
goods, exploitation of the coinage and mines, pre-emption of salt, monopolization of coal by 
the crown, and development of a Scottish fishing fleet."  ^ James' ministers possessed a 
genuine interest in foreign practices. Caesar had among his projects one for exactions 
employed by the French crown to pay its debts.45 Salisbury spoke of 'foreign industry and 
example offering] divers projects, good precedents to follow, for the adorning and enriching
32pRO SP 14/10/6, fol. 9r.
38pRO SP 14/10/6, fol. 9r.
39pRO SP 14/12/29, fol. 39r-39v (21 January, 1605).
‘^ ^Salisbury’s jmpers are strewn with petitions tor the benefits of recusancy. For example the work of Lord Saye 
and Sele, HH Salisbury Ms 114, tbl. 135r ([1605]); Salisbury Ms 117, fol. 162r-162v (20 September, 1606). For 
a large number of these petitions, KMC Salisbury. XXIII, 97-222 and KMC Salisbury. XXIV 1-229; Salisbury 
Ms P.1347 ([29 March, 1605]) is exemplary. PRO SP 14/14/64, fol. 139v (June, 1605) endorsed by Cecil as 
'The Proiect o f a l[ett]re wherby his M[ajes]tes pleasure is to be certefied whensoever any swte is made for 
Recusants'. Also M. C. Questier, 'Sir Henry Spiller, Recusancy and the Efficiency o f the Jacobean Exchequer', 
Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 66 (1993), 251-266; John J. LaRocca, 'James I and his Catholic 
Subjects 1606-1612L Some Financial Implications'. Recusant History. 18 (1986-1987), 367-391,
'^iRichard Bonney, 'Early Modem Theories of State Finance', Bonney Economic Systems. 165-168 and 177-
179.
‘^ ^Bonney, 'State Finance', 168.
‘^ 3pent. Crisis in Finance. 58.
44b l  Harleian Ms 4612. 50r-51v.
4^ 5b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 32r-33v (1561). 45
Projects and the Conceptualization of Crown Finance
of this state’; unfortunately they often perished in execution. 6^ George Carew’s 
remembrances of his embassy in France interested Salisbury.47 in them, Carew described the 
economic and physical wealth of France, made the greater by an industrious people so 
burdened with taxes they could not afford idleness.'^ While detailing the fiscal power and 
exactions of Henry IV and Sully, Carew seems to have been most impressed by Sully's 
reform of the revenue farms, 'reducing that to the king’s coffers, which was embezled by
under-officers.'49
The connections of projects across states is difficult to ascertain. The Tudor 
commercial projects were often the work of foreign experts and the incorporation of new 
skills into the English economy was an explicit objective.^ ® Jacobean suitors continued to 
offer projects for the development of foreign technologies (particularly individuals with 
overseas voyages behind them).5i Caroline contracts with Dutch experts to drain 'drowned 
lands’ were among such projects.62 The most definite sharing of projects was across James' 
three kingdoms after 1603. The ongoing struggle to settle the Irish government and revenues 
saw the greatest level of participation.53 Salisbury despatched George Carew to Ireland in 
July 1611 with instructions to employ the usual approach of abatements, improvements, and 
new revenues.54 Carew and company collected and evaluated some 60 projects.^ s 
Northampton, working with the Irish solicitor-general Robert Jacob, took even greater 
interest.56 Jacob detailed current and potential projects; improvements from concealed lands, 
wardships, customs and impositions (com, wine, tobacco, aqua vitae, alehouses, hides, 
pipestaves, herrings), extension of English tenures, letting fishing rights, profits of seals, fines
^^Croft, 'Several Speeches’, 310.
“^ ^Crott, 'Several Speeches’, 311nl60.
48h h L Huntington Ms 41951, fol. 9v-13r
‘^ ^HHL Huntington Ms 41951, fol. 13r-30v; Thomas Birch, An Historical View of the Negotiations between the 
courts o f England. France. Brussels from the Year 1592 to 1617 (London, 1749), 486.
^^brhirsk, Policv and Projects. 31-58.
5lFor example BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 43r-50v and 78r-81v.
52b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 222r-229v; Sharpe, Personal Rule. 249-262.
53b L Lansdowne Ms 159 which includes numerous Tudor papers on Ireland; Lansdowne Ms 156, fol. 191r- 
193v (12 July, 1612); BL Royal Ms 18A.LXV ([c. James fi); HMC Hastings. IV, 48-49 (May, 1617).
54h H Salisbury Ms 196, fol. 43r-44v (27 July, 1611).
55hH  Salisbury Ms 196, fol. 45r-46v (28 Jidy, 1611).
56peck, Northampton. 149-151.
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for treasons and felonies, and composition for the lord deputy's purveyance were among 
them.52 Cranfield wanted Ireland to turn a profit.^  ^ His commissioners looked to projects 
such as incorporation of herring fishing while Cranfield set his sights on 'the vices of torpor, 
inefficiency, and corruption which he had fought at h o m e '59 However, Irish government 
possessed administrative incapacity in spades and experienced some of the worst aspects of 
projects turned to private gain.^ o
Little work has been done on Scottish projects, but there are indications that they were 
prevalent long before grand schemes such as Charles I's Anglo-Scottish fishery. 6i James' 
support for projects reflected his practice as king of Scotland for rewarding servants and 
creditors with monopolistic patents; after 1603, James, with his Scottish deputies, applied his 
English experience with projects to his native kingdom.62 Commercial projects attracted 
considerable attention; the book of rates was revised in 1611 and the customs tack (farm) 
brought a significantly greater rent at each renewal.63 Anti-usuiy statutes were enforced with 
fines for offonders-a project deemed unworkable in England-and copper moneys were 
authorized twice.64 Monopolistic patents remained prevalent and increased markedly after 
1618-as they did in England.65 Scottish projects included glassmaking, tanning and sealing 
leather, sugar refining, pottery vessels, and soapmaking.66 Problems of private gain and 
public good were likewise encountered in Scotland. Inspection and sealing fines were 
extorted by holders of new offices firom Scottish merchants trading into Ireland. Nathaniel 
Udward's soap patents aroused particular irritation for his product's poor quality and high 
price against finer European varieties; the burghs finally bought out his patents for a dear 
price. Charles I's soapmaking project occasioned the same bitter complaints from consumers.
52h MC Hastings. IV, 8-10 (12 April, 1613). Î
58prestwich, Cranfield. 226-228,346-356; Tawney, Business and Politics. 208-210 j
59c k S U269/l.Hi260 ['A Proiect how to employe 400001ib in fishing ypon the coaste of Irelandl; Tawney, |
Business and Politics. 210. {
60hMC Hastings. IV, 9-13; Prestwich, Cranfield. 352-356. |
6lMaurice Lee, Jr., The Road to Revolution: Scotland under Charles 1 .1625-37 tUrbana. 1985), 100-105,170- |
171, 175-176.
62Lee, Government by Pen. 13-14.
63Lee, Government by Pen. 85-86,131.
6^Lee, Government by Pen. 131,203; below.
65Below, 106-113.
66Lee, Government by Pen. 196-201.
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but the king’s perseverance in supporting the project gave it time to take root; it was 'worth 
over £30,000 to Charles I in the closing years of the personal rule.'67
Drawing upon these major characteristics as seen in individual examples, it seems 
appropriate to offer a summative definition of 'project.' The Oxford English Dictionary offers 
two which are appropriate. In the first, project is identified with a proposal, scheme, or 
device. 'Sûtes and Proiectes' is an important pairing of Jacobean words from this sense. 
Salisbury's project volume bore that moniker because so many had theft origins in suits. 
Significantly, both his and Caesar's books began with copies of the memorial of grantable 
suits. This reflects the extent to which projects were subsumed in the demands of funding the 
Jacobean patronage culture. In this sense a project can be regarded as a specific scheme. As 
Thirsk has written: 'Everyone with a scheme, whether to make money, to employ the poor, or 
to explore the far corners of the earth had a "project'".68 Projects were more than suitors' idle 
designs though. The crown was itself a projector. Projects were an opportunity to exploit 
patronage for the crown's own fiscal gain within a weak administrative state. Roger 
Wilbraham spoke for James as well as Elizabeth when he testified the old queen believed 
projects 'were profitable for the common weal' and because 'some of them y elded her a rent & 
saved her revenew, which otherwise should have ben weakened by such instant sutors’.69 
This principle was at work in projects for artificers, exploration, and recusants. New 
impositions, the Great Contract, general pardons were but a few ways in which the crown 
sought its own monopoly of financial reward and James and his ministers became projectors 
in their own rights. The crown as projector draws us to the QED definition of a project as a 
conception. In this respect, they were also a mindset shared by James, Dorset, Caesar, 
Salisbury, Northampton, Ellesmere, Cranfield which wove individual projects into a tapestry 
called fiscal policy. The following section will reweave that tapestry out of a theoretical 
schema of the fiscal system and the project collections of James' ministers.
n
67shaq)e, Personal Rule. 122-123.
68xiiirsk, Policv and Projects. 1.
69 Ashton, .lames 1.7. 48
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Robert Cotton constructed the most sophisticated analyses of the Jacobean fiscal 
system in his ongoing research for Northampton during 1 6 1 2 -1 6 1 4 .7 6  Cotton's 'Means to 
repair the Kings estate" was an annotated abstract not unlike a fiscal family tree, but one 
offering the roots of financial health through a menu of abatements and improvements.7i The 
purpose of this section is to integrate Cotton's scheme with actual Jacobean projects thus 
graphically demonstrating their centrality to crown finance. Particular emphasis will be 
given to the Caesar and Salisbury project volumes, but three other sources will be tapped, 
Cotton's project compilations for Northampton, Ellesmere's various fiscal programs (c. 1615), 
and the Cranfield archive.72 The value of these other collections for adding bold colours to 
the tapestry of projects is without question. Together they represent the finest Jacobean fiscal 
intellects. This is not a lone instrument sounding its own note, but an orchestra of diverse 
minds performing a symphony.73
Cotton's abstract was at once reflective of practice and advisory. Reading much like 
Caesar’s frequent analyses, monarchs repaired their estates by diminution of their present 
charges, raising ready money, and improving revenues. Money and revenues sprang fi*om 
two major categories, grants of the subject and the monarch’s sovereign power over lands, 
goods or merchandize, and regalities, what might be called the king's own.74 Lands were 
either the king's or the subjects' and projects directed at both were routine.75 Management of 
the king's estates consisted of selling, farming and manuring, and improving. Numerous
70peck. Northampton. 113-117.
71b .L Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 66r-67v.
72b L Cotton Ms Titus B IV and B V; HHL Ellesmere Ms 441 (July, 1615), 465,478,1216,2610, and 2507; 
CKS U269/1 [Cranfield Ms]. Cotton Ms Titus B V contains full-blown Elizabethan and .Tacobean projects while 
Titus B IV is less projects than the makings o f projects: medieval Exchequer proceedings, for reform in that 
court; the act o f resumption of 3 Henry VII, guide for a Jacobean act; articles for incorporation of the courts o f  
augmentations into the Exchequer, preparation for effecting the same with the Duchy of Lancaster; a draft o f 
Henry Vfil's circular letter to die bishops for an aid, precedent for the (clerical-initiated) benevolence of 1614. 
73The projects cited in the following discussion are intended as a representative sample reflecting the interests 
of James' ministers between 1603 and 1619. They can only convey an imperfect sense o f the range of 
inventiveness and imagination that went into them. It might be usefiil—albeit simphstic-to identify the 
following ministers with the corresponding manuscript collections. Salisbury: BL Harleian Ms 4807 and HH 
Salisbury Manuscripts. Caesar: BL Additional Ms 10038 and 36767 and BL Lansdowne Manuscripts. 
Northampton: BL Cotton Ms Titus B IV, B V and Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI. Ellesmere: HHL Ellesmere 
Manuscripts. Suffolk: OBL Carte Ms. Cranfield: CKS U269/1 [Cranfield Ms]. There is inevitably overlap 
between Caesar and Northampton while Caesar's manuscripts are effectively the only evidence remaining of 
Dorset's thinking.
74b L Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 66r (abatements; grants of the subject), 66v (lands), 67r (merchandize), 
and 67v (regalities).
75Thirsk, 'Crown as projector' and Hoyle, "'Shearing'" are usefiil surveys.49
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projects existed for sales including old castles and ruined houses;76 demesne of m anors 
copyholds as fee-farms;7s and coppice woods and dotard treesJ9 Vague projects suggested 
the king directly farm his lands or stock his holdings 'as in old tyme'. Improvement of 
forests, wastes, and commons akin to the project previously examined were ever-present, but 
often stumbled over administrative abuses in practice or James' shrewd anticipation of 
spoilage in the hands of projectors.
The subject's property offered fiscal possibilities by virtue of their titles, tenurial 
incidents, and royal stewardship of the realm's landed inheritance, the two former particularly 
a consequence of failures in record-keeping and surveying.®  ^ Defects in titles were 
consistently exploited by confirming defective titles;®  ^issuing titles for illegal assarts;^  ^ the 
like for encroachments on royal lands;^  ^hunting royal deer and game;^ 5 and sale of title to 
lands entailed to the crown upon death of the holder.^  ^ Tenurial profits centered on James' 
residual feudal rights: wardship;^  ^ reliefs;^  ^ heriots;^  ^ respite of homage;^ ® alienations;9i
76b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. l l l r ( l l  August, 1608); BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19v (10 August, 1609) 
and 328r-329v (27 January, 1611[16121); BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, tbl. 74r (18 September, 1612),
77b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 66v.
78b L Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 276r-278v; Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 106r-l 13v.
79b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 208r-208v; Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 202r-203v.
80b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19v; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 21r, 29v, 30r, 68r-69v; BL Harleian Ms 4807, 
fol. 14r-15v (undated); BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 73r-74r, 114r-l 17v; Cotton Ms Titus BIV, tbl. 295r- 
296v, 326r-331v, and 332r-335v; Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 202r-203v, 319r-319v, 399r-400v; HHL Ellesmere 
Ms 441,465,2610/6-7; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v.
 ^^ David Thomas, 'Leases of Crown lands in the reign o f Elizabeth I', Hoyle, Estates 1558-1640.179 and 
Richard Hoyle, 'Reflections on the history o f Crown lands, 1558-1640', Hoyle, Estates 1558-1640.424-426. 
82b L Additional Ms 36767, fol. 174r-174v (30 June, 1608) and 182r-184v (5 July, 1608).
^^BL Additional Ms 36767, fol. 218r-218v (6 October, 1608) and 232r-233v (19 December, 1608); Additional 
Ms 10038, fol. 309v; BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 307r-312v (endorsed by Northampton).
84b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 72r-72v; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 375r-358v (15 January, 1613[1614]); 
also Thirsk, Crown as projector', 309-310 for the origins of encroachments.
S5b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 20v.
S6b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119v (14 April, 1609); BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r and 309v; BL Cotton 
Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 74r; Cotton Ms Titus B IV, fol. 361r-362v (undated); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v; 
HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/7
87b L Additional Ms 10038, tbl. 20v, 250r-253v (4 August, 1612).
^%L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119v; BL Additional Ms 10038, tbl. 19r; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 29r.
% L  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119v; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; BL Additional Ms 10038. tbl. 29r (28 
August, 1609); Additional Ms 10038, fol. 260r-261v (25 February, 1610[1611]).
9%L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. l l lv ;  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119v; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; 
Lansdowne Ms 172, fol. 336r-348v; PRO SP 14/87/75, fol. 154r-154v, SP 14/87/751, fol. 155r-156v, SP 
14/87/7511, fol. 157r-159v (all 30 June, 1616); HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/10
91b L Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 22r-23v (undated; the project is endorsed by Salisbury); OBL Carte Ms 121, fol. 
23r-26v, 50r-52v. 50
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knighthoods;92 right of marriage for widows; custody of lunatics; and other concealed 
obligations.93 The surrounded marshes of the Fens were the foremost example of lands 'unfitt 
in care of the publique Father to be lost to the Common wealthe' and remained the grandest 
land project throughout the Jacobean and Caroline periods.94
Cotton's goods and merchandizes are recognizable as commercial revenues. Customs 
and impositions were just one component; if every new imposition or customs increase were 
included, the projects in this realm would dwarf all others. In general, Cotton offered two 
major strategies tor improving the customs, expanding trade and raising the import/export 
duties. Increase and balance of trade weie sought with major projects: enforcement of the 
statute of employments and laws for preservation of bullion within the realm, dyeing and 
dressing cloth before export, and creation of a British fishing fleet.95 The erection of houses 
of credit and exchange in major commercial cities was expected to improve trade, but this 
was not pursued.96 Various customs projects singled out the Great Farm, currants, French 
and Rhenish wines, silk, tobacco, Irish customs, 3d tax on merchant strangers, and ulnage.97 
Ellesmere and Cranfield particularly concerned themselves with trade while the increases of 
customs duties by Dorset and Salisbury both in revision of the book of rates and laying new 
impositions is well known.98
92b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 11 Iv; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19v.
93b L Additional Ms 36767, fol. 131r-134v (15 January, 1607[1608]); BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 41r-42v (13 
June, 1608); Additional Ms 10038, fol. 309v.
94Vaiying projects o f this decades-long initiative are t(X ) numerous to mention, but the highhghts include; BL 
Additional Ms 10038, fol. 226r-227v (12 August, 1613), 228r-229v (undated) 309v, and 224r-225v (16 July, 
1619); Additional Ms 36767, fol. 286r-290v (26 November, 1610) and 307r-310v (7 and 16 July, 1611); HHL 
Ellesmere Ms 2610/7; BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 317r-318v (undated; endorsed by Northampton); Cotton 
Ms Titus F IV, fol. 316r-320v (18 July, 1605; parliamentary plans for such a project). Also Thirsk, 'Crown as 
projector', 310-314; Sharpe. Personal Rule. 121-122 and 253-256.
95b l  Lansdowne Ms 165,225v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 465,478,2610/4-5,478 and 7; Prestwich, Cranfield. 178- 
186.
9%L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 43r-50v (8 August, 1608); Additional Ms 10038, fol. 36r (28 February, 
1610[161 H); HHL Ellesmere Ms 465
97h HL Ellesmere Ms 2610/4-5; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 224v-225v, BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 73r-77v 
(September and November, 1613), BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 62r-62v (undated). For the 3d tax see below. 
Chapter 8; Harleian Ms 5257, fol. 2r-17v (undated).
9^HH Salisbury Ms 129, fol. 6r-8v (1610?); HHL Ellesmere Ms 2458 For projects to increase the book of rates, 
BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v; PRO SP 14/86/25, fol. 39r-39v ([January?], 1616); below, 128-133 and 200- 
201. 51
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Licensing new manufactures and commodities, many with attendant, custom’s duties, 
and revival of charges on others occupied countless projects: kelk for dyeing cloth;99 
execution of the statute of maulsters, one of many projects preserved by Caesar concerning 
brewing; ^ 00 licensing alehouses and 'publick innes by way of rent yerelyV^i pinmaking;^®2 
projects for a fine on usury (as a form of co m m erce)th e  making of ’sopeasshesV^^  ^ the 
growth of mulberry trees in Britain and development of silkmaking;io5 dyeing with 
logwood;î06 reforming abuses in the paper trade;i®7 alum;i08 steelmaking;i09 
starchmaking.no These were just a few, but not without legal concerns, particularly on 
monopolistic grounds.ni
Monarchs sometimes retained the sole trading and purveying of certain goods in their 
own hands. Edward I the wool staple, Edward III tin, Henry VI grain, and Elizabeth ’by 
warrant of privy scales' caused 'a greate proportion of beere to be purvayde transported and
99b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 11 Ir; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19v. Other dyeing projects are Additional 
Ms 10038, fol. 123r-129v; BL Cotton Ms Titus B V. fol. 302r-302v and 364r-365v. Also Thirsk, Policv and 
Projects. 35-40.
1®^BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 180r-188v (9 June, 1608). For others see 
Additional Ms 10038, fol. 158r~169v (1610-1611) and 176r-177 (7 July, 1616); OBL Carte Ms 121, fol. 83r- 
94v.
lOlHH Salisbury Ms 142, fol. 189r~193v (1604); HH Salisbury Ms 189, fol. 60r-60v ([1604]); BL Additional 
Ms 10038, fol. 19r; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 213r-214 (undated), 215r-215v (4 June, 1611), 216r-221v (6 July,
1607); BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v.
Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r; BL Additional Ms 11038, fol. 19r; Lansdowne Ms 152, fol. 302r-329v 
(various 1606-1608); BL Cotton Ms Titus B IV, fol. 171r-171v (undated); Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 287r-288v 
(undated) and 314r-314v (undated). Also Thirsk, Policv and Projects. 78-83 and 149-150.
103b L Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, 67r. BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 30r; 
Additional Ms 10038, fol. 202r-203v (August, 1609), 204r-205v (3 May, 1610), 206r-207v (7 March 
1611[1612]), 208r~209v (1 July, 1608), and 210r-211v (25 February, 1618[1619]); Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, 
fol. 76r; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v.
IO^ b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19v; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 318r-319v (18 September, 1607). Also Thirsk, 
Policy and Projects. 6 and 102-105.
1®^BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 57r-60v (undated); BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 20r; BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, 
fol. 195r-196v (copy of a project from the time of Henry VIII) below; HH Salisbury Ms 193, fol. 28r-28v 
([1606]); PRO SP 14/25/6, fol. 16r-17v ([January?], 1607); PRO E 407/128 (18 November, 1609); E 407/128 (c. 
31 December, 1612); Thirsk. Policv and Projects. 7,120-122, and 143.
106o b L Carte Ms 121, fol. 95r-98v.
1®7b l  Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 330r-331v (undated). Also Thirsk, Policv and Projects. 56-57 and 143. 
IOSq BL Carte Ms 121, fol. 73r-82v.
1®9b l  Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 373r-375v (undated; directed to 'the Lord Cooke').
* ^®BL Additional Ms 36767, fol. 189r-191v (July, 1607); BL lansdowne Ms 152, fol. 114r-130v (various 1609- 
1612); BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 76v-77r; Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v; Cotton Ms Titus B IV, fol. 
297r-298v; Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 295r-26 Iv and 328r-329v. Also Peck, Northampton. 67-69 and Thirsk, 
Policv and Projects. 83-93.
lllH H L  Ellesmere Ms 2610/10; BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 46r-46v.52
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soulde to hft use beyonde the sea.'1^2 At varying times prerogative pre-emption was 
proposed or employed in favour of cloth, lead, tin, alum, iron ordnance, wine, and salt, while 
foreign imports such as Spanish pepper and quicksilver, French salt, Florentine corn, and 
Italian alum attracted similar a t t e n t i o n .  Purveyance was placed here because of its 
commercial nature and various projects for relief by composition were advanced (besides 
national efforts in p a r l i a m e n t ) ,
Regalities snared a plethora of projects and James might well have become Henry VII 
redmvus—albQit not as Francis Bacon would have envisioned-had his ministers fully 
exploited them.^ 5^ Cotton fashioned categories for temporal regalities and those simply 
called 'mixt'. Revenues of mixed regalities were primarily clerical: dispensation for
pluralities; 'Restitution of the temporalities of Abbots and Bishops for w[hi]ch Hen[jy] the 7 
receaved great sommes'; 'Corodies in cathedrall or collegiat Churches'; benefit at the vacancy 
of bishoprics; the tenth part of properties formerly held by religious houses, despite being in 
lay hands should be paid 'since they weere setled in the crowne by a former lawe’; the king 
could gain £20,000 annually if he exercised concurrent jurisdiction as had the pope and 
legates like Wolsey; tithes out of parish es;fin ally , another of Henry VII's projects, the 
promotions to d e a n e r i e s .
Temporal regalities were largely the profits of justice and administration. Revival and 
enforcement of the Elizabethan statutes for apprentices offered large sums as we have
^12b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 46r. This project was posited in 1608, one Caesar described as 'short & 
prety.' BL Additional Ms 10028, fol. 21v.
1 l3por varying projects see also the following references. Lead: BL Lansdowne Ms 16.5, fol. 11 Ir; BL 
Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19v; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 189r-190v (24 January, 1606[1607]) and 191r-192v 
(30 March, 1619); BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 267r~267v. Tin: above. Chapter 2 and Additional Ms 36767, 
fbl. 67r-68v (11 August, 1606), 212r-227v (October, November, 1608); Cotton Ms Titus B IV, fol. 336r-337v 
(undated); Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 406r-418v (undated; some with notes and endorsements by Northampton). 
Alum: Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v; Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 351v-360v (undated; endorsed by 
Northampton). Iron ordnance: BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 320r-321v (3 October, 1608); Pepper: Additional 
Ms 10038, fol. 21v and Additional Ms 10038, fol. 30r; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v. Also HHL Ellesmere 
Ms 2610/10 and 478.
ll^BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; PRO SP 14/63/29, fol. 29r-29v, SP 
14/66/9, fol. 9r-9v, and SP 14/66/17, fol. 17r-18v (11 September, 1611).
^l^HHL Ellesmere Ms 478; S. J. Gunn, Earlv Tudor Government 1485-1558 (London, 1995), 124-131. 
ll^BL Additional Ms 36767, fol. 352r-357v; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 264r-268v.
 ^17gL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 51r, 67v, 72r; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 22r-, 30r, 119r, 265r 266v 
(22 September, 1607), and 267r-268v (undated); HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/7 and 478; Additional Ms 36767, fol. 
352r-357v (undated); BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 32r-34v (undated).53
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seen.iis Two different suits souglit a corporations of appraisers for inventorying the goods of 
the d e c e a s e d .  119 Projects galore devised compositions and pardons which would have turned 
loose murderers, rapists, and felons as well as settling with those responsible for ’outlawries 
upon debt’, ’uncustomed good’, new buildings in London, and infractions against penal laws 
and proclamations;i20 general pardons found their way into projects similarly. 121 Payable 
fines were examined for dereliction by sheriffs, exemption from serving as justices of the 
peace or sheriffs, customs officers trading as merchants, prisoners who escaped while in 
charge, keeping of slanderous books against the king or state, grants of naturalization, 
excessive apparel, licences to keep retainers, and confirmation of liveries and coats of arms 
granted by former Kings; 122 old fines, amercements, and nichilled debts were targeted for 
recovery in similar projects. 122
Impulses for creative bureaucracy were translated into new offices ranging from the 
useful to the ridiculous: keeper of patents for new inventions, various offices to hold bonds 
and recognizances, a register of all burials, christenings, and marriages, and a corporation 
dedicated to preserving ancient monuments and r e c o r d s .  ^ 24  Profits due from the seals of 
offices (Chancery and Exchequer particularly) had room for improvement. ^ 25 Outright sale 
of offices was disapproved, but plans were afoot for entry fines to offices (a form of sale) and 
new honours and knighthoods to be sold upon completion of the Union—an impulse which 
seems to have been transferred to the creation of b a r o n e t s . ^ 26  Projects for ’small copper
Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 8r-9v and 24r-25v (undated); PRO SP 14/24/71, fol. 124r-124v (1606?); SP 
14/24/72, fol. 125r-125v (1606?); SP 14/24/73, fol. 126r-126v (1606?); BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 142r- 
143v (25 July, 1607), 132r-137v (1610), 140r-141v (13 November, 1611), 138r-139v (24 July, 1612), 130r-131v 
(4 March, 1612[1613]).
119b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r; particularly BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r-21v for the most amazing 
variety o f these incidents; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 232r-240v (26 August, 1607) and 230r-231v (21 March, 
1614[1615]).
120b L  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 67v.
121b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; PRO SP 14/80/1, fol. Ir (5 January, 1615); SP 14/80/38, fol. 55r; SP 
14/80/115, fol. 181r; HHL Ellesmere Ms 445; OBL Carte Ms 121, fol. lr-20v.
122b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 20v-21r; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 465 
123b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 20v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 465.
124b l  Cotton Ms Titus B V fol. 200r-201v, 210r-210v; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 21v-22r, 271r-272v (19 
July, 1612).
125b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 67v.
^26b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225v and Peck, Court Patronage. 9-28,116-123,162-198; 'Knighthoods of the 
Union, or the like.' BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; OBL Carte Ms 121, fol. 21r-22v, 27r-30v; HHL 
Ellesmere Ms 465; Lawrence Stone, Crisis o f the Aristocracv (Oxford, 1965), 82-97 and generally.
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monies of halfpe[n]ce & farthings’ were fools’ gold that glinted in Jacobean eyes with 
variable brilliance. 12? An appropriate place to end with regalities is the collection of old 
debts, a major project of the period, but one which defies neat categorization owing to the 
diverse natures of the debts i n v o l v e d .  128
Projects littering the king’s own, while telling, are insufficient to assert their 
dominance in crown finance. Cotton’s first table is crucial to the case: were projects 
advanced for grants of the subject and abatements?i29 The major popular grants were 
paiiiamentary subsidies, loans on privy seals, and voluntary offerings (benevolences, free 
gifts).i30 The significant area in which parliamentary revenue was addressed by projects 
were those to revise and increase the value of the subsidy, tenth, and fifteenth, but the 
political authority and will did not exist to deal with chronic undervaluations.Loans and 
benevolences were conceived as projects. Two of Caesar’s chief projects in 1609 were ’Privy 
seales not payed’ from the round of 1604 and ’Newe privy seales to others.’122 Following the 
forced loan of 1611, Cotton brought together among his projects lists of ’Men able to lend and 
yet lend not upon their Pr[ivy] Seales.’^ 23 in 1616, a project whereby 1000 people would be 
asked to lend £100 was offered, while Edward Coke proposed those who had particularly 
tasted of the King’s bounty be asked for larger sums.i^  ^ Cotton did much of the groundwork 
for the revival of benevolences, sifting and accumulating precedents, working papers, and 
past plans for such projects; Henry Martin also proposed a benevolence, which Caesar
^2?bL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. l l lv ;  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; BL 
Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 3r-4v (undated; endorsed by Salisbuiy), lOr-llv (undated), 12r-13v (9 May, 1609), and 
52r-56v; Additional Ms 10038, fol. 36r; PRO SP 14/72/135, fol. 242r-243v, SP 14/72/136, fol. 244r-245v, SP 
14/72/137, fol. 246r-246v, SP 14/72/138, fol, 247r-247v, SP 14/72/139, fol. 248r-249v, SP 14/72/140, fol. 250r- 
250v, SP 14/72/141, fol. 251r-252v, SP 14/72/142, fol. 253r-254v.
128b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19v-20v, 304r; Additional Ms 36767, fol. 121r-122v, 206r-207v; HHL 
Ellesmere Ms 2610/9; OBL Carte Ms 121, fol. 31r-32v.
129b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 66r.
5^0b L Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 66r.
121b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; PRO SP 14/23/28, fbl. 59r-60v, SP 
14/23/29, fol. 61r-61v, SP 14/23/30, fol. 62r-63v SP 14/37/38;, fol. 80r-80v; BL Harleian Ms 188, fol. 2r-32v 
(addressed to Northampton).
132b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r.
133b L  Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 175r-180v (12 December, 1612).
134pRO SP 14/8763, fol. 126r-126v (19 June, 1616).
 ^3 5 b l Cotton M s Titus B VI, fol. 126r-128v; Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 158r-159v and 174r-174v (erroneously 
catalogued as pertaining to privy seals); Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 301r-313v.55
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placed in his project v o l u m e ;  3^6 a benevolence was collected in 1614 at the lead of 
Archbishop Abbot and the clergy. Cotton also included James' 'soveraigne right, as aides for 
knighting of ye K[ing’s] eldest sonne or mariage of his Daughter' among grants. Salisbury 
pursued this project for Prince Henry in 1609 which accounts for the inclusion of 'Aides for 
the Lady Elizabeth' among Caesar’s projects that same year.^ ?^
Retrenchment and reform figured unambiguously among p r o j e c t s . a  series of 
papers by Gerson Wilford and John Fount, an 'intymacon of the excessive arréragés and 
debtes retayned in the handes of the Kinges accomptantes ... contrarie to the lawes of this 
Realme in that case provided w[i]th the true cause thereof and the Remedie how it maie bee 
p[re]vented’, was endorsed by Dorset as 'A proiect toching Acomptes’ and kept by Caesar 
with his p r o j e c t s .  ^39 Cotton presented some of Wilford’s reports to Northampton who read 
and endorsed them.i^ o Among Salisbury’s projects were those to redress the abuses of 
manorial stewards for better answering the king’s rightful revenue and another for precise 
division of crown revenue among the four Exchequer tellers, lessening duplication and 
assigning accountability. ’Abatements of charges in the howsehold, wardrobe, 
Admiralty, ordina[n]ce, works, starcha[m]ber, liberties of the Excheq[uer], Ireland, Low 
Countries etc' were projects looking for practical expression throughout the reign, first 
enunciated by Dorset and taken up by Caesar and Salisbury at his d e a t h .   ^4 2  This 
conceptualization of abatement is reinforced by the inclusion in Caesar's volume of the list of 
superfluous household officers which Dorset received from Knollys and W o t t o n . i 4 3  During 
the ensuing years, Morgan Coleman, the officers themselves, Thomas Vavasour, and 
Cranfield all presented projects for household r e f o r m . ^ 4 4
136b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 241r-242v (25 April, 1612).
137b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119v; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r.
138particularly HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/2
139b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 82r-82v respectively; the entire sequence of the papers are Additional Ms 
10038, fol. 82r-122v.
140b l  Cotton Ms Titus BIV , fol. 299r-300v.
 ^“^ ^BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 18r-19v (undated) and 40r-40v (12 January, 160811609]; signed authorization by 
Salisbury).
142b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 29v; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 11 Ir (11 August, 1608); PRO SP 14/5/53, 
fol. 125r-125v.
143b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 352r-353v (18 December, 1607).
144pRO SP 14/61/117, fol. 208r-208v (27 February 1611), SP 14/63/22, fol. 30r-30v, SP 14/63/23, fol. 31r-31v, 
SP 14/63/24, fol. 32r~32v, SP 14/94/57, fol. 89r-90v, SP 14/94/58, fol. 91r-92v, SP 14/94/59, fol. 93r-94v; BL56
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The marriage of Cotton's tabulae with actual projects decisively demonstrates that no 
facet of crown finance was untouched by the projecting mentality. There were over 150 
significant projects examined or considered by James' ministers during the years 1603- 
1618.145 Projects for lands were 32% of that total, followed closely by those for merchandize 
and goods (29%) and revenues derived from regalities (27%). Fewer projects for grants of 
the subject reflected the narrower scope for exploitation in this area, but were significant 
nonetheless, while projectors were even eager to confront the entrenched interests inside 
James' household. Far fiom being a preserve of commercial adventurers, numerous projects 
were advanced for the entire range of crown finance. At the same time the array of projects 
in categories of merchandize and regalities belie any Jacobean outlook described as 'fiscal 
feudalism', an anachronism more fitting for historiographic debates over feudal and early- 
modern society than application to a financial system which was never conceived in that way 
by James' ministers.i46 Projects were the conceptual basis of crown finance. The troika of 
chapters which end this thesis will advance jfrom the project conceptualization to their central 
role in the making of fiscal policy.
m
Before concluding this chapter it is necessary to examine aspects of the relationship 
between projects, the law, and political philosophy which were at the heart of conflicts over 
fiscal policy—Caroline as well as Jacobean. At the center were the monopolistic properties of 
many projects and letters patents combined with the increasingly assertive doctrine of 
necessity. In charting the course of her own study of projects, Joan Thirsk wrote: Thus we
Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, 96r (undated; [c. between September 1612 and June 1613]); CKS U269/1, O wl50  
and OwlO (both April, 1618) [Cranfield Ms 4731 and 4753 respectively]; U269/1, O wl50 (8 October, 1619) 
[Cranfield Ms 6277].
l^^xhese aie derived from the project lists of Dorset, Caesar, Salisbury, and the Treasury Commissions. BL 
Additional Ms 10038, fol. 314r-315v (24 September, 1606); BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 11 lr-112v (11 August,
1608); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r-120v (14 April, 1609); Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r-23v (10 August,
1609); Additional Ms 10038, fol. 28r-31v (28 August, 1609); BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 71r-77v (18 
September, 1612); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 223r-227v (1 June, 1613); Lansdowne 165, fol. 242v-243v (15 
October, 1613); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 290r-291v (28 September, 1618); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 270r-271v 
(18 December, 1618). Duplications have been eliminated, as have projects which cannot reasonably be placed 
witiiin one of Cotton’s tabulae (only 8), as well as those for which the crown expressed no obvious interest of 
pursuing.
146joel Hurstfield, 'The ftofits o f Fiscal Feudalism', Economic History Review 8 (1955), 53-61; Joel Hurstfield, 
The Queen's Wards (London, 1958), 311-325; Joel Hurstfield, Freedom. Corruption, and Government in 
Elizabethan England (London. 1973), 163-186.
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must follow the path of those many currents that between 1580 and 1624 muddied a onco- 
clear stream.... We cannot follow projects and ignore m o n o p o l i e s . ' 4^7 David Harris Sacks has 
done the most insightful work on monopolies, seconding their definition as "'an institution or 
allowance by royal letters patent of or for the sole buying, selling, making, working, or using 
of anything whereby any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, are sought to be 
restrained of any freedom or liberty that they had before, or hindered in their lawfull 
trade.'"^ ^^  James' 1603 proclamation suspending all monopolies pending review seemed to 
give force to the late queen's hollow promises, but the redirection of crown revenues and 
patronage toward commercial sources accelerated under him.^ 49 Further, James' bounty was 
the principal demand made upon his revenues other than the household and offices of state. 
This was the beginning of a duel between the culture of patronage and provision for the 
responsibilities of governance which would shortly become acute. These forces ensured that 
patents and projects became even more prominent. 1603 represented something of a 
linguistic divide though. Euphemisms like 'suits', 'grants', 'impositions', and 'projects' 
replaced the tainted language of monopolies. The projector of a patent for licensing 
alehouses and inns in 1604 was careful to inform Salisbury that it was 'cleerly without the 
compassé of a monopolye, as the imposicon of a custome upon any comoditie'.i^o Tellingly, 
this project was among the big three patents around which the great monopolies debates of 
1621 revolved.1^1 'We must therefore consider both together,' Thirsk writes appropriately, 
'explain why scandals developed around monopolies, but demonstrate at the same time that a 
strong tide of healthy economic energy still surged through projects.'^ ^  ^ Healthy fiscal 
energy is the tide this study seeks in conflicts over projects.
147j|jjj.gk, Policy and Projects. 51.
l48David Harris Sacks, 'Private Profit and Public Good: The Problem o f the State in Elizabethan Theory and 
Practice', Gordon J. Schochet (ed.), I_aw. Literature, and the Settlement of Regimes (Washington, DC, 1990), 
123 and generally.
I'^^Xjirkin and Hughes (eds,). Proclamations: James 1 .11-14; Adams, 'patronage', 38-41.
150h h  Salisbury Ms 189, fol. 60r.
15lNotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. VII, Appendix B.
152-phirsk, Policy and Projects. 51-52.
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Contests among Stuart historians over political and constitutional theory have 
intensified considerably in recent y e a r s .  i 5 3  Stimulating as they may be, this is a study about 
the practical exercise of political power in financial affairs. Self-evidently, fiscal policy was 
not made in a vacuum devoid of political thought; neither was it subservient to paradigms of 
ancient constitutions or absolutism nor a problem child for the cause of Jacobean consensus. 
Like James himself, fiscal policy must be taken on its own terms. New and improved 
revenues were preferable to retrenchment because grants of the subject proved difficult in 
parliament, regular forced loans or benevolences were politically inadvisable, and borrowing 
bred ’nothing els but co[n]tinua[n]ce of care & dishonour & increaseth the wantes more & 
more as wofull experience hath already taught us.'^ ^^  James' ministers were left with the 
king's own as the 'best' means to support his estate. In Cotton's words, 'Kinges have relieved 
their wants out of their Soveraigne power in disposing of Landes Marchandize & 
R e g a h t i e s . ' i 5 5  The imperial prerogative was central to this course and James' ministers were 
forced to reconcile its utilization for explicit fiscal ends and the political repercussions of 
doing so. Thomas Fleming gave two expositions of the prerogative that are particularly 
significant for Jacobean fiscal policy; the first as solicitor-general in Darcy v. Allen (1602) 
and the other in Bate’s case as chief baron of the Exchequer (1606).
Monopoly patents—a subset of projects—proliferated in the 1580's and 1590's as 
patronage for Elizabeth's servants during those cash-starved war y e a r s .  The grants by 
letters patent awarded monopolies over inventions and manufacturing processes, 'exclusive
153in chronological order: James Daly, The Idea of Absolute Monarchy in Seventeenth-Century England’, 
Historical Journal 21 (1978), 227-250; Russell, Parliaments: J. P. Sommerville, Politics and Ideology in 
England. 1603-1640 (London, 1986); Johann Sommerville, 'Ideology, Property and the Constitution', Richard 
Cust and Ann Hughes (eds.). Conflict in Earlv Stuart England: Studies in Religions and Politics 1603-1642 
(London, 1989), 47-71; Glenn Burgess, 'Revisionism, Politics and Political Idea in Early Stuart England', 
Historical Journal 34 (1991), 465-478; Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: An 
Introduction to English Political Thought. 1603-1642 (London. 1992); J. H. Hexter (ed.). Parliament and Liberty 
from the Reign of ElizabeÜi to the English Civil War (Stanford, 1992); Conrad Russell, 'Divine Rights in the 
Early Seventeenth Century', Morrill, Slack, and Woolf, Public Duty: Johann P. Sommerville, 'English and 
European Political Idea in the Early Seventeenth Century: Revisionism and the Case o f Absolutism', Journal of 
British Studies 35 (1996), 168-194; Burgess, Absolute Monarchy.
154b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 139r.
^55b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, 44v [emphasis mine]. For a survey of prerogative principles related to 
finance, Clive Holmes, 'Parliament, Liberty, Taxation, and Property', Hexter, Parliament and Liberty. 122-137. 
156pRO SP 12/268/47, fol. lllr-122v (1602) and J. R. Tanner. Constitutional Documents of the Reign of James 
I (Cambridge, 1952), 337-345 respectively.
157h h L Ellesmere Ms 2290; Adams, 'patronage', 38-41; Sacks, 'Private Pioflt ', 124.59
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trading rights', and cancelled the rigor of penal statutes. 158 The drive for profits within a 
monopolistic structure increasingly tempted patentees into abuse and corruption, particularly 
as their rights were extended to established commodities and c r a f t s .  i^ 9 The increasing rigour 
with which grants were defended by patentees and the crown—which had its own stake in the 
annual rents paid by holders-created public grievances which found strident voices in the 
parliaments of 1597-1598 and 1601.i^ ® Pledges of action by Elizabeth's councillors 
forestalled conflict in 1597, but their promises were never made good and provoked 
disputations in 1601 which David Dean has characterized as the most outspoken in any 
Elizabethan parliament,i^i 'Rituals of accommodation' in the masterful speeches of Elizabeth 
and Robert Cecil helped soothe tempers, but concrete action had more to do with defusing 
political c o n f l i c t .  1 6 2  Elizabeth promised swift justice over patents which she delivered by 
proclamation—printed copies were presented to members within days.i63 Many were 
suspended outright while Elizabeth sanctioned testing the rest in the courts. i64
Compromise was forced on Elizabeth and her ministers because they urgently needed 
parliamentary supply; their acquiescence was political and d e f e n s i v e .  1 6 5  Protecting the 
prerogative was central. The council had already forestalled a common pleas' suit against 
Edward Darcy, a groom of the chamber who held the playing card patent, to prevent 
Elizabeth's prerogative being called into q u e s t i o n .  1 6 6  Parliamentary murmurs of a bill against 
monopolies demanded pre-emption. i67 Elizabeth's proclamation removed the matter from 
parliamentary hands and cauterized the political wounds, making the best of a bad situation. 
The real test came the following year when Darcy challenged Elizabeth's proclamation as an
158David Dean, Law-making and Society in Late Elizabethan England: The Parliament of England 1584-1601 
(Cambridge, 1996), 85; J. E. Neale, Elizabeth I and her Parliaments 1584-1601 (London, 1957), 352.
159sacks, 'countervailing', 273; Dean, Parliament 1584-1601. 85-92.
160sacks, 'countervailing', 273-275; Sack's 'Private Profit', 128-133.
161 Dean, Parliament 1584-1601.91-92; Neale, Parliament 1584-1601.352-355.
162'phe expression is from Sacks, 'countervailing', 282-289; Dean, Parliament 1584-1601.91-92 and Neale, 
Parhament 1584-1601.384-393.
163Neale, Parliament 1584-1601.385-387.
164paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (eds.), Tudor Roval Proclamations Volume III: The Later Tudors 
(1588-16031 (New Haven, 1969), 235-238. The proclamation further cancelled all privy council letters which 
had been issued to assist enforcement. Also, Dean, Parliament 1584-1601. 90-92.
165j)g^n, Parliament 1584-1601.90-92.
166Hughes and Larkin (eds.), Tudor Proclamations. HI, 236n; Dean, Parliament 1584-1601. 86-87.
^67sacks, 'Private Profit', 126-128. 60
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infringement of his patent which thereby allowed others to flout it. The council agreed with 
Darcy and imprisoned the offenders pending trial by law; hardly an act within the spiiit of the 
proclamation, but one consistent with its crucial clause. The proclamation declared 'that if 
any of her subjects shall seditiously or contemptuously call in question the power or validity 
of her prerogative royal annexed to her imperial crown in such causes; all such persons 
offending shall receive severe punishment according to their demerits.'i68 Members who 
opposed a bill recognized their inability to bind the prerogative and that 'practical remedy 
against the patentees depended upon the queen's g o o d - w i l l . ' ^ 6 9
Thomas Fleming's spirited demurrer proclaimed that Elizabeth's prerogative could 
give legal force to Darcy’s patent. Darcy v. Allen was the opportunity to defend the use of 
patents despite Elizabeth's goodwill; their utility was too great. Fleming asserted the 
importance of subjects understanding the sovereign authority which bound them rather than 
disputing their prince's power. i7i The ancient and fundamental laws were the sinews which 
bound the head and body and by which the head commanded and governed the body.i^z 
Justice, a perfect virtue, was the end of law, to which end the ancient laws entrusted English 
monarchs with plenary powers to give it 'force effect and efficacy' for the common good. 173 
The coronation oath was the ultimate sanction for 'If the lawe require such an oathe of the 
k[ing], will not the lawe geve him powers to p[er]forme it'?i74 The sovereign's power was 
greater than the law because the law is 'nothing unlesse it be directed and used', a 
responsibility entrusted to the monarch. i75 Fleming reconciled the inequitable relationship 
between law and monarch with his exposition of a dual prerogative. 176
168Hughes and Larkin (eds.), Tudor Proclamations. Ill, 237.
169 Sacks, 'Private Profit', 128.
170pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. l l lr .
1 7 1 p R O  SP 12/286/47, fol. l l l v .
172pROSP 12/286/47, fol. l l l v .
173pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 112r.
174pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 112v.
175pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 112v.
176There are a number of discussions on the dual nature o f the prerogative and its place in a wider perspective: 
Francis Oakley, 'Jacobean Political Theology: The Absolute and Ordinary Powers of the King', Journal of the 
History of Ideas 29 (1968), 323-346; John Guy, 'The "Imperial Crown" and the Liberty of tihe Subject: The 
English Constitution from Magna Carta to the Bill o f Rights', in Bonnelyn Young Kunze and Dwight D. 
Brautigan (eds.). Court. Country, and Culture: Essavs on Earlv Modem British History in Honour of Perez 
Zagorin (Rochester, 1992), 69; Sommerville. Politics and Ideology: Burgess. Ancient Constitution. 139-162; 
Burgess, Absolute Monarchy. 17-62.
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The monarch possessed an ordinary prerogative within the law's command, but also 
one which was 'absolute indefinite, not limitted, and above all lawes, that is not to be disputed 
by the ordinarie forme of lawe.'i^? Fleming's examples of the absolute prerogative included 
powers of war and peace, summoning and dissolving parliament, and coinage, but-crucially- 
-there were 'infinite more in nomber... to take order and provyde for the benefitt and safety of 
the Realme from the enemyes abroade, from evell manner at home and to doe all thinges for 
the health of the comon wealth as the occurents and affaires of the state r e q u i r e s . ' i 7 8  Subjects 
must assume monarchs exercised their absolute prerogatives to 'sett order and policie 
amongst us', therefore they 'must submitt and not dispute their reasons and c a u s e s . ' 179 in 
effect, the absolute prerogative was employed for reasons of state, for the preservation and 
advancement of the common weal, at the discretion of the s o v e r e i g n ,
Fleming supported monopolistic control over playing cards because it stemmed the 
evil social consequences of unfettered gaming and gambling, an act encompassed within the 
promotion of commonweal, but his real interest was in buttressing patents generally. To the 
argument that patents benefited a few at the expense of many, Fleming countered that the 
inequitable distribution of favour by royal action was the essence of patronage, In fact, 'so 
incident and insep[er]able is this prerogative to the crowne to grante priviledges &c. that it 
cannot be checked or tyed up by expresse wordes of Act of Parliam[en]t', though the monarch 
could voluntarily assent to parliamentary restraints. 1^2 Fleming believed it more important to 
delineate the present circumstances in which grants could be made, yet even these limitations 
were q u a l i f i e d .  Elizabeth could not change the law with a patent, except where it had no 
purchase. However, to assert that 'all priviledges granted against the comon lawe shold be
177pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 112v. 
l78pRo SP 12/286/47, fol. 113r.
179pRo SP 12/286/47, fol. 113r.
ISOpieming wrote: 'By veitue of this power and authoritie the k[ing] of this lande to prevent anie evell or 
inconveynence groweing in the comon wealth have used according to their owne princely prudence and 
wisedome publicMy to cause p[ro]clamacons to be made in all k[ings] tymes sometymes comanding sometymes 
forbidding according to the occurrents and necessarie affaires of state, and as the nature o f the cause happening 
required.' PROS? 12/286/47,fol. 113r.
ISlpRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 114r-114v.
l®2pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 114v. Fleming carefully drew attention to the power of the sovereign with a non 
obstante to dispense with prohibitions o f this sort. SP 12/286/47, fol. 114v.
183pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 114v.
184pRO SP 12/286/47, fbl. 114v-115v.
62
Projects and the Conceptualization of Crown Finance
void were asmuch to saie no priviledge can be granted, for every priviledge is in some kinde 
or degree against the comon lawe, otherwise it were no p r i v i l e d g e ' . ^ ^ s  Rather, patents which 
crossed the common law 'in genere' were not allowable, but those which contravened only 
some particular and held no apparent injustice were l e g a l .  The construction was usefully 
vague.
Particularly significant to fiscal policy and projects was Fleming’s discussion of 
whether patents could impose a charge—effectively a tax—on the subject. His answer was 
negative, but equivocal. The subject could not be charged Tor the benefit of anie p[er]sonne 
unlesse the cause wherfore it is imposed doth bring a benefitt [or commodity] also to the 
subiect that is to be charged'.^ 7^ Fleming employed the example of the ferry, only the subject 
who paid the toll benefited, but strayed into greyer areas: 'the k[ing] by his grante may erect 
an office and grante a reasonable fee to the officer if it be such an office as tend to the good 
of the comonwealth and to the furtherance of Justice and upright dealing in contractes, 
buyeinge, sellinge, and c o m e r c e ' .^ ^ s  This sort of economic regulation was exemplified by 
offices for ulnage of cloth, town markets, inspection of London packer-ships, weights and 
measures, garbling spices, and sealing new drapery-all of a kind with the project patents 
which we will encounter a g a i n .  1^ 9 Further, Fleming refuted the contention that the monarch 
could not grant patents which entailed injury to the subject. This rule was true in general, but 
where a patent advanced the common good and the public gain was greater than that to the 
patentees it was a l l o w a b l e .  190
It plainly appeared, concluded Fleming, 'that in speciall cases priviledges may be 
granted albeit the same doe touch the enheritance, goodes, liberties, or trades of private 
p[er]sons and be to their preiudice hurt damage or losse, But then are they moste to be 
allowed when as either by a consequence or by a meanes a more publick or comon good may 
ensue then the private losse of anie one man or of a few w[hi]ch is not to be r e g a r d e d . ' i 9 i
185pRo SP 12/286/47, fol. 115v. 
186pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 115v-l 17r. 
187pRo SP 12/286/47, fol. 117r. 
188pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 117r. 
189pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 117r-117v. 
190pRo SP 12/286/47, fol. 118r-118v. 
191pRO SP 12/286/47, fol. 119r. 63
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While it would seem requisite at this juncture to judge Fleming’s statements within Jacobean 
political philosophy, a different perspective may prove more v a l u a b l e ,  ^92  Significantly 
patents did not end with Elizabeth’s proclamation, nor James' own in 1603, not even with the 
act against monopolies passed finally in 1624.^ 93 Darcy v. Allen allowed Fleming to 
articulate a legal and philosophical case for patents and projects, but this must not obscure the 
fact that he was defending an important, practical tool of governance. The true rationale for 
patents was the fiscal necessity of the crown, but that was not an argument which held sway 
in the two forums which might challenge them. The plain language of financial need was a 
discourse inapplicable in the law courts and politically untenable in parliament except for 
requesting supply.i94 Law and prerogative were the discursive languages in which patents 
must be defended. Fleming accomplished that by employing the dual prerogative and his 
exposition of the discretionary powers granted to the monarch through its absolute 
component, cleverly defined in terms of public good and reason of state. But necessity of 
state, in this case fiscal necessity, underpinned the argument.
Fleming turned back legal challenges to patents for twenty years, but helped stir 
political tensions with his protection of another product of fiscal necessity: impositions. 
John Bate's refusal to pay the impost on currants handed Dorset and Salisbury a test-case with 
which to publicly assert the legality of extra-parliamentary customs, a new source of revenue 
toward which both ministers were favourably d i s p o s e d . i 9 5  Fleming again drew upon the dual 
prerogative in his judgment. The king's absolute prerogative, 'most properly named policy 
and government' was exercised for 'the general benefit of the people and is salus popull and 
varied according 'to the wisdom of the King for the common good'.i96 Importantly, the
192xhese Judgements have been offered most recently in Sommerville, Politics and Ideology. 37-38 and 108 
regarding similar arguments by Fleming in Bate’s case; Burgess, Ancient Constitution. 165-166 on Fleming's 
views generally; David Harris Sacks, 'Parliament, Liberty, and the Commonweal', Hexter (ed.), Parliament and 
Liberty. 95-98; Burgess, Absolute Monarchy. 83-86.
193conrad Russell, 'English Parliament 1593-1606: One Epoch or Two?', D. M. Dean and N. L. Jones (eds.). 
The Parliaments of Elizabethan England (Oxford, 1990), 200.
^94on the latter point, for instance, Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. 1,22-23,69, and 218.
195pauiine Croft, 'Fresh Light on Bate's Case', Historical Journal. 30 (1987), 530-536. The political theory in 
Bate's case is argued in Sommerville, Politics and Ideologv. 151-162; Burgess, Ancient Constitution. 140-141; 
Burgess, Absolute Monarchy. 78-81.
^96xanner (ed.). Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.340-341.
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infinite numbers of absolute prerogatives Fleming wrote of in Darcy were expanded to 
include 'all commerce and affairs with foreigneres', in which case James had 'done well to 
execute his extraordinary power' in laying the currant imposition.i^v Fleming had taken 
advantage of the absolute prerogative's vagueness to defend a new tool of fiscal policy. 
Further, currants were properly a Venetian commodity; depriving Bate's of his goods without 
parliamentary consent was an inapplicable a r g u m e n t .  ^ 98 By law and precedent, the king 
could impose on foreign commodities for the common good, and his 'wisdom and providence' 
were not to be disputed. 9^9
Fiscal necessity was implicit to Fleming's arguments in Darcy v. Allen, but remained 
unexpressed. This changed in 1606 with James' necessities and the explicit intention of 
Dorset and Salisbury to re-endow the crown with impositions.200 Fleming admitted they 
were 'imposed by the King without Parliament upon merchandise for the augmentation of his 
revenues', but it was Baron Clarke who articulated this as reason of state: 'And as it is not a 
kingdom without subjectes and government, so he is not a King without revenues, for without 
them he cannot preserve his dominions in peace, he cannot maintain war, nor reward his 
servants according to the state and honour of a King; and the revenue of the Crown is the 
very essential part of the Crown, and he who rendeth that from the King pulleth also his 
crown fi’om his head, for it cannot be separated fi’om the Crown. And such great prerogatives 
of the Crown, without which it cannot be, ought not to be disputed'.^ oi Fleming did not 
dissent, asserting 'when the King is in want he is to be relieved by a general imposition or 
subsidy upon all the subjects', but he could not effectively reconcile the logical extension of 
his and Clarke's opinions, that 'if he may do so much [with impositions], he may do it in 
infinitum and upon all other merchandise.'202 This exercise of the absolute prerogative for
^97Tamier (ed,), Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.341.
^98xanner (ed.), Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.342.
^99xanner (ed.). Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.343-344.
200Below, 136-152.
201xanner (ed.). Constitutional Documents 1603-1625. 338. Compare with the language discussed in Maurizio 
Viroh, From Pohtics to Reason of State: Xhe acquisition and transformation of the language of poMtics 1250- 
1600 (Cambridge, 1992), 238-280. Clarke concluded: 'and in these cases o f prerogative the judgment shall not 
be according to the rules of the Common Law, but according to the precedents o f this Court wherein these 
matters are disputable and determinable.' Xanner (ed.). Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.338. .
262xanner (ed.L Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.343.
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fiscal necessity was supported by precedent—'it were lawful in ancient times ... and the Crown
hath the same attributes that then it had'2®3_„and must be 'referred to the wisdom of the King,
who guideth all under God by his wisdom, and this is not to be disputed by a subject'.^ The
crux of these arguments was that the absolute prerogative was employed salus populi and the
common good and preservation of the king’s state demanded James' necessity be relieved.
Impositions were legal, indisputable, and justifiable for reasons of state, for securing the state
against perilous fiscal necessity.
This still remained a legal and philosophical argument to defend a practical policy and
the real challenges of governance in fiscal matters. In that respect, the lament of Henry I V of
France in George Chapman's Conspiracie. and Tragédie of Charles Duke of Byron might
have been James' own:
I neuer sought to build,
More forts for me, then were within their hearts;
Nor vse more steme constraints then their good wills,
To succor the necessities of my crowne.
That I desird to ad to their contents 
By aU occasions, rather then subtract;
Nor wisht 1, fliat my treasury should flow,
With gold that swum in, in my subiectes teares;
And then I found no man, that did not blesse.
My few yeares raigne, and their triumphant peace.
And do they now so soone, complaine of ease?'^®^
Necessity was likewise an operative concept for James and his ministers because fiscal
necessity was an unchanging reality. Bacon called necessity 'the great god of the powerful’
while Dorset even refused to enforce a statute against transporting goods in flat-bottomed
boats 'because some Custome is come to the King’.^ o^  Northampton triumphed necessity as
the reason for supplying James' wants in 1610 and Salisbury warned parliament that necessity
Tanner (ed.l. Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.344.
2d4xanner (ed.l. Constitutional Documents 1603-1625.343-344.
^O^George Chapman, ITie Conspiracie. and Tragédie o f Charles Duke of Bvron. Marshall o f France (London,
1608), M2r.
206Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651 (Cambridge, 1993), 109; David Harris Willson (ed,). 
The Parliamentary Diary o f Robert Bowyer 1606-1607 (Minneapolis, 1931), 205.
66
Projects and the Conceptualization of Crown Finance
would compel extensive prerogative exploitation otherwise.^ Necessity held only marginal 
sway in parliament though and Francis Tate avowed that 'If the King in necessity extend his 
prerogative, that is no sufficient ground of the r i g h t ' .^ o s
Caesar captured the prevailing mindset among James and his ministers: 'the king in 
using his owne right wrongeth no m a [ n ] . ' 2 0 9  Salisbury concurred on legal and theoretical 
grounds, sounding much like Fleming: 'Although there hath been many curious questions 
made, of prince's power to impose upon their subjects, some restraining it only to 
commodities brought in and transported, others stretching it farther (all grounding their 
arguments upon several differences and distinctions)... Yet I am well resolved, that princes 
which are the parents of the commonwealth and have the same tutelage, have power in case 
of politique necessity, to help themselves in their body politique, by the subjects fortunes.'^ io 
'I think it such a kind of sacrilege to dispute of the power of a king,' Salisbury continued, 'as I 
esteem it more safe to shun those rocks'. For Salisbury, it was better to question 'whether the 
practice be seasonable for the time, than to dispute the authority, for time is the great 
commander in the actions of men.' Necessity commanded Jacobean fiscal policy and projects 
were those most seasonable instruments for that time.
207Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1,22-23 and Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 53-56,301, and 304. 
^O^Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610. 83.
Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 35v.
2^®Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 288. 67
nHAPTER 3
Busses and Fishing 
(A Project Case-study)
I
Thus are wee eaten out in Trade and the bread taken out of our mouthes in our owne 
Seas and the great Customes averted from yo[ii]r Ma[jes]tes cofers to forraine Princes and 
States by the greatnes of their Busses and multitude they take 19 weeks before our ffishings 
beginne at Yarmouth and our ffishinge lasts but vij weeks with small crayers and cobles 
where there great Busses continue the herringe ffishinge 26 weeks togitherV The writer 
borrowed from the renowned commercial projector John Keymer and told a compelling story 
of 10,000 Dutch vessels, an armada of 100-ton fishing ships (busses), descending upon 
British waters and taking home more wealth than the king of Spain reaped from his treasure 
fleets in four years. ^  This undersea bounty put 40,000 Dutch to work while the British took 
'the least p[ar]te and make the least imployment’.^  'We are daily skorned by these 
Hollanders,' wrote Tobias Gentleman in 1614, 'for being so negligent of our profite, and 
carelesse of our fishing, and they do daily fioute vs that be the poore Fishermen of England, 
to our faces at Sea, calling to vs and saying ... You English, we will make you glad to weare 
our old shoes."^
That ’honor[able] and woorthie Comon Wealthe man, the Lord Burleigh' appreciated 
the economic consequences of foreign fishing fleets plying English coastal waters.^  
Addressing parliament in 1563, Cecil decried maritime decay in the lack of ships and 
mariners.^  The causes were obvious: foreign bottoms brought most goods to England and 
'the hearinges and other sea fissh taken upon our coast and brought and sold by strangers into 
the portes of the realme to the very inhabitantes of the portes that wer wont to be fishermen'.?
‘CKS U269/1.0E1575 [Cranfield Ms 8939] (20 December, 1622).
%CKS U269/1.0E1575 fCranfieldMs 8939].
3c KS U269/1.0E1575 [CranfieldMs 8939].
^Tobias Gentleman. England's Wav to Win Wealth, and to employ Ships and Marriners (London. 1614), 44. 
5c KS U269/1.0E1575 [Cranfield Ms 8939].
^T. E. Hartley (ed.l. Proceedings in the Parliament of Elizabeth 1 1558-1581 (Leicester, 1981), 103-104. 
^Hartley (ed.). Proceedings 1558-1581.104.
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Generating demand within the domestic economy was the way to produce a revival of the 
fishing industiy and recovery of maritime health.^  Ordaining Wednesdays an additional fish 
day was advocated to reverse the decline in demand since the reformation.^  Such measures 
were ordered by statute and proclamation, but did little to counter Dutch ascendancy through 
their established position in the trade and economies of scale; they largely supplied whatever 
increased demand was produced, defeating the legislation’s or proclamation's purpose.10 
Elizabeth's reign offered no solutions.
Commercial expansion consequent upon peace in 1604, worrisome growth in Dutch 
maritime wealth, and swelling customs revenues increasingly drew the attention of James’ 
ministers to trade. 11 Emphasizing less the decay of mariners and ships than their Elizabethan 
counterparts, Jacobean councillors and projectors cited economic injury (decay of coastal 
towns, loss of trade and unemployment) in condemning foreign fishing f l e e t s . A  spectrum 
of initiatives looked to confront the Dutch mastery. They were projects to license busses for 
a fee, a tax on the aggregate catch of each ship, forced incorporation of all fishing vessels in 
British waters, and construction of a rival fishing fleet to wrest the trade from the Dutch.
The previous chapter painted the history of projects with a broad brush. This chapter 
exchanges that breadth for a depth of field which only a case-study can achieve. Busses and 
fishing in their various guises outstandingly exemplify the chamcteristics of Jacobean 
projects: their use of historical precedent; the lure of unrealized revenues; the prerogative 
basis for the scheme; the crown’s incapacity to undertake the initiatives itself; the 
opportunistic sale of projectors’ services; finally, the recurring inability to secure the 
promised gains, the projectors' 'large promises & htle p[er]formans’ in the words of Lord
^Hartley (ed.), Proceedings 1558-158L 105.
^G. R. Elton, The Parliament of En^and 1559-1581 (Cambridge, 1986), 258-262.
lOprederic A. Youngs, Jr., The Proclamations o f the Tudor Queens (Cambridge, 1976), 35-36 and 123-125;
Elton, Parliament 1559-1581.258-262.
l  ^ The richness o f the commercial question is elucidated in T. W. Fulton, The Sovereignty of the Sea
(Edinburgh, 1911), 118-534 (overlooking the old anti-Stuart bias); B. E. Supple, Commercial Crisis and Change 
in England 1600-1642 (Cambridge, 1970); C. G. A. Clay, Economic expansion and social change: England
1500-1700 (2 volumes; Cambridge, 1984); Jonathan Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade. 1585-1740 (Oxford, 
1989); Robert Brenner, Merchants and Revolution: Commercial Change. Political Conflict, and London's 
Overseas Traders. 1550-1653 (Cambridge, 1993)--among many works.
^ '^BL Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 375r (1 February, 1607).
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Treasurer D orset.H ow ever, despite its changing faces and the activism of undertakers, this 
project remained a government initiative and allows us to fully explore something other than 
the familiar project suits pressed within the patronage culture. For this reason, busses and 
fishing were untainted by the contemporary hostility toward projects and thus represent an 
important corrective to projects' negative reputation.
II
Fishing projects shared a common heritage and Elizabethan precursors exist for two 
of them. Nearly every subsequent tract, book, or pamphlet produced in the next 35 years on 
Dutch fishing was based on information available in John Dee, Robert Hitchcock, John 
Keymer, and Tobias Gentleman. In the 1570's, Dee and Hitchcock wrote alarmingly of 
Dutch hegemony.14 Keymer recorded copious observations of maritime activity in his 
Elizabethan travels which underwent a bewildering series of permutations as projects and 
were heavily 'borrowed' from by others, Around 1601 Keymer composed a long discourse 
on the advantages to be gained ft-om establishing an English monopoly of the export of 
seacoals.i^ Shortly thereafter he documented in similar detail the Dutch fishing industry, i? 
Keymer described its productive wealth, methods of the industry, and the profits which might 
accrue to England through imitation. ^ ® In 1612 Walter Cope apparently presented a work to 
James on the decay of the state due to the encroachment of foreign traders, A copy with an 
expanded introduction notes that 'onlye one well affected Englishman, John Keymes 
m[er]chant hath made observatio[n] t h e r e o f . A  similar tract is titled: 'Certayne Notes
13h H Salisbury Ms 120, fol. 150r (5 April, 1607).
'^^Hitchcock's original memorial is BL Lansdowne Ms 14, fol. 70r-76v (1574). John Dee, General and Rare 
Memorials pertavning to the Perfect Arte o f Navigation (London, 1577).
l^The only extant copy of his original entreaty to Elizabeth seems to be CKS U269/1.0E1515 [Cranfield Ms 
6896]. Keymer also presented Queen Elizabeth with notes and projects based on Portuguese trade and 
commercial policies. Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 245r-249v. Also, though of uneven quality, M. F. Pritchard 
(ed.), Original Papers Regarding Trade in England and Abroad Drawn up bv Jolm Kevmer for the Information 
of James I (New York, 1967).
1%269/1.0E1515 [Cranfield Ms 6896].
l?The closest account to his original observations on fishing in 1601 is part of U269/1.0E1575 [Cranfield Ms 
8939] and a later reprint titled John Keymors Observations Made Upon The Dutch Fishing About the year 1601 
(London, 1664), the title page o f which notes it was 'Printed from the Original Manuscript, for Sir Edward Ford*. 
1%L Additional Ms 17478, fbl. 22r-28v.
l^PRO SP 14/71/89, fol. 164r-177v ; a draft o f which is PRO SP 14/71/90, fol. I78r-190v.
^®BL Additional Ms 22591, fol. 56r; PRO SP 14/71/89, fol. 164r. For the proposed connection of Cope, as well 
as Gerard de Malyenes and Walter Raleigh, to this tract, see Fulton, Sovereignty. 128n.
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taken out of Mr John Kemors protect for fyshing that theire is more wealth made of ffish 
gotten by the Hollanders and other n[a]tyons uppon the coasts of England, in one yeare then 
the Kinge of Spayne hath in fower oute of the I n d y e s / 2 1  The same language was employed 
by projector Richard Rainsford in September 1613: "The hollanders, as it is s[ai]d have more 
benefits in one y ere by their fisshing then the king of Spaine in 4 yeres by his Indies.*^  ^
Keymer and Gentleman had contacts with each other as well.^ Together with their 
Ehzabethan predecessors, they established the Jacobean perception of the Dutch fishing trade 
and supremacy.
Fishing projects, in one foim or another, found almost unanimous support fiom James 
and his ministers. The projector’s songs of maritime growth, employment at home, and 
thousands in new customs revenues were irresistible, as were the cries of native fishermen 
against foreign nations beating upon the British coasts.^ The basis for any project along 
these lines was the assertion of sovereignty in territorial waters and the king’s exclusive 
commercial rights within them. The capital-poor crown looked most favourably on the 
licensing project before 1611. Salisbury and Northampton seem to have been the driving 
force behind it, but it also interested Dorset and Caesar.25 It particularly demanded a clear 
statement of James' soveieignty and a draft proclamation was composed to that effect with a 
prohibition of fishing British waters without license of the crown.26 The draft and 
instructions were sent to Caesar—among others-for perusal because Henry VU's Burgundian 
treaties apparently contained clauses which might nullify the prohibition.2? Caesar believed
21b L Additional Ms 17478, fol. 22r.
22b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 243r (1 September, 1613).
23'in the course of his investigation of the fishing trade Keymer consulted Gentleman*. Peck, Northampton 142. 
Given the appearance of Keymer's information in other works and his own subsequent publication. Gentleman's 
version of their relationship seems disingenuous. He wrote: 'It was my fortune, some two yeares past, to bee 
sent for into the company of one Maister John Keymer, who is a man very well deseruing o f his Country , and 
hee knowing me to haue experience o f Fisher affaires ... shewed vnto mee some few notes that hee had gathered 
and gotten from other men of my trade, which hee seemed greatly to esteeme of: for that himselfe was 
altogether vnexperienced in such businesse, and further, I deliuered to him certaine principall notes which he 
seemed greatly to esteeme'. Gentleman, Englands Way to Win Wealth. 3-4.
24b l  Lansdowne Ms 798, fol. 80r; BL Additional Ms 17478, fol. 28r.
25'Northampton had practical example of licensing as warden of the Cinque Ports. Peck, Northampton. 74. 
26b L Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 358v.
2 ? B  L Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 375r-375v. The others were Secretary Herbert, Sir Danyell Dun, Sir Thomas 
Crompton, and Sir Griffith Perkins, but Caesar's experience as a former Admiralty judge with the Burgundian 
treaties put him firmly in the lead. BL Lansdowne Ms 154 (his volume of Burgundian contracts and treaties) 
and Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 207r-216v (calendar of his book of foreign treaties).
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there was no reason to prevent such a proclamation, but it wasn't until April 1609, 'having 
co[n]fered w[i]th the ftishermen touching] the season of all the ffishings uppon his 
Ma[jes]ties coasts' that he advised it go forwaid^s The Council proceeded on 6  May and 
defended the project along two l in e s .29 i n  very Elizabethan fashion it asserted the economic 
devastation of unchecked foreign fishing but asserted that 'the empeachment of our 
Prerogative Royall' had 'given occasion of over great encroachments upon our Regalities, or 
rather questioning of our Right'.^ o James' imperial prerogative was being advanced 
interconnectedly with the public good. From August forward annual licenses would have to 
be obtained from royal commissioners in I^ondon or Edinburgh with the charge proportionate 
to the vessel's tonnage.^ !
An alternative project vied with that for licensing in the two years preceding the 
proclamation. Enforced and administered, a simple tax upon a vessel's catch seemed to offer 
a substantial return. Richard Rainsford informed Caesar in 1609 that strangers took 700,000 
lasts from British waters, the tenth part of which was worth £700,000.^2 The initiation of this 
project is uncertain, but a syndicate represented by Jo. Bowssar offered to collect this 'tributt' 
as early as April 1606.^ 3 The licensing scheme entered Caesar's propositions in September 
1607 with a projected revenue of £12,000.34 Shortly thereafter, Bowssar pressed his tax 
project on Caesar again with classic projecting language, speaking of an offer 'made of the 
same p[ro]iect to pattentees to be rented, good men undertakers, weare dealt w[i]th and did 
underwritt, so that the perice then rested uppon ye conditines of the graunt, w[hi]ch had bine 
resolved and clered (as I take yt) had not untimely presures diverted and dismantled the 
course there of ... when so ever the p[ro]iect shall come to any maturity and p[er]fection 
yo[u]r honor to have a C [100] pounds anually owt of the same, and his Ma[jes]tie a good
23'BL Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 377r, 379r.
29Larkin and Hughes (ed.). Proclamations: James 1. 217-219.
30Larkin and Hughes (ed.L Proclamations: James 1.218.
3lLarkin and Hughes fed.l. Proclamation: James 1. 218. It is noteworthy that this was a comprehensively 
British policy, encompassing Ireland and Scotland as well as England; fiather Scotland had for many years 
already enforced the policy o f the ’assize-hemng’ on foreign fishing vessels. See Fulton. Sovereignty. 124. 
32b L Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 366r (8,400,000 barrels of fish).
33b L Lansdowne Ms 142, fbl. 373r.
34b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 309v (27 September, 1607).
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r e n t ’.3 5  Bowssar went nowhere, but Rainsford's persistence and connections with 
Northampton offered better chances.3^  Rainsford proposed strangers be taxed upon the tenth 
fish or make a fixed payment for their catch.3? Rainsford's syndicate offered to farm either 
charge for 20,000 marks the first seven years and £20,000 thereafter.38 In consideration of 
his efforts, Rainsford asked for letters patent allocating 10% of the profits during the projects 
first hundred years.39 This scheme was more popular with projectors than licensing because 
the scope for private gain was far greater. Unlike one-time payments and demonstrable proof 
of payment with a license, thousands of ships would be at the undertakers' mercy for payment 
of the tenth part of their catch or a fixed toll. The scope for abuse, against the fishermen and 
crown, was immense.
Rainsford's project was unoriginal. John Dee in 1577 argued the creation of a petty 
(auxiliary) royal navy on economic and militaiy grounds.^ He asserted Elizabeth's right to 
collect the tenth fish as a means to finance the fleet and for its own merits: 'Now, then, who 
can dout, (to begin withall) but that it is a most reasonable and freendly Request, of all these 
forreyn Fishermen, to require, (with all circumstances of Humanity, Courtesy, and 
Freendship, therin, and thereto vsed) The Tenth onely, of all their yeerly Fishings ... toward 
the charges of the sayd Pety-Nauy-Royall: That the Tenth, yeerly, of aU Forreyn Fishings, 
within the Sea Limits to her Maiesties Royalty appropriât, is aboue an Hundred Thousand 
pownds de Claro'^  ^ Whether Rainsford consulted Dee is uncertain, but he advanced another 
project in 1613 for setting 'on foot a navy royall' which shared many of Dee's arguments, 
while Rainsford's other projects employed identical precedents of sovereignty to D e e 's .4 2  I f  
nothing else, Rainsford might have been tempted to assess himself with Dee's words: 'and so
35b L Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 373r (17 October, 1607).
3fipeck. Northampton. 141.
3?BL Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 360r.
3%L Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 360r.
39b l  Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 360r; Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 367r-368v, 371r-372v; PRO SP 14/37/79, fol. 
169r; SP 14/48/94, fol. 126r-126v; SP 14/48/95, fol. 127r-128v.
4bDee, Memorials. 3-12; William H. Sherman, John Dee: The Politics o f Reading and Writing in the English 
Renaissance (Amherst. 1995), 148-171 discusses this tract.
4lDee, Memorials. 24,26.
42b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 243r; Lansdowne Ms 142, fol. 367r; also PRO SP 14/48/94, fol. 126r. Dee, 
Memorials. 54-64.
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my labours (after a sort) vaynely employed.'43 Rainsford hoped to further his cause through 
Northampton, but he faired poorly because of Salisbury's opposition and the proclamation 
marked a defeat for his undertakings.44
Salisbury was concerned by foreign policy implications. The Dutch were bound to 
react badly to any project. Preoccupation with the Burgundian treaties and the precedents of 
other nations demonstrate a determination to present an iiTefutable case of right.45 
Justification was not enough. A worthwhile—and profitable—level of compliance would also 
require an innocuous mechanism. Projectors, Rainsford-like, extracting a tax would prove 
anything but. Salisbury's letter to Charles Cornwallis in Madrid bears out his intentions: 
'The Occasion of my Writeing at this Time, is ... to prepare your self with the best Argument 
and Reasons upon which this his Majestie's Resolution is grounded ... Only for the latter I 
think fitt to express thus much, that this Course of asking Licence, among other Propositions 
of several kindes of Restraintes which have been offerred to his Majesty, hath been the 
mildest and the least subject to give Offence abroad.'46 The licenses were offensive enough 
for the Dutch to complain mightily and August came and went without serious 
enforcement.4? Formal Anglo-Dutch negotiations began in May 1610 to settle the dispute. 4» 
James was finally persuaded to suspend enforcement of the proclamation: 'his Majjesjtie 
notwithstandinge his right and title, for his great love to the low countries would forebeare to
43Quoted in Fulton, Sovereignty. 105n. |
44pRO SP 14/37/79, fbl. 169r (17 November, 1608); SP 14/48/92, foL 124r (8 October, 1609).
4 5 b l Lansdowne Ms 142, fbl. 362r-363v. I
4^Ralph Winwood, Memorials of Affairs o f State in the Reigns of O. Elizabeth and K. James I (3 volumes;
London, 1725), ill, 49 (8 June, 1609). A letter with much the same language had already been sent by Salisbury 
to George Carew in France. BL Harleian Ms 1579, fol. 61r-62v (16 May, 1609). *
47Already in April 1608, the Dutch, in the person of Noel Caron, were cont(%iting the assize-herring in Scottish }
waters, his chief argument being that it was an innovation, while James' Scottish lawyer disagreed and countered |
that not having been demanded for many years, if  at all, did not invalidate the precedent for it. PRO SP f
14/32/31, fol. 5 Ir ([April?], 1608). William Browne in Flushing wrote to Viscount Lisle twice after the i
proclamation was published in the Low Countries. He was in no doubt about how serious a matter it was: This !
will give great discontent, having never heretofore been debarred from fishing in the open seas. If hereon these î
men grow discontented, his Majesty wiU have the more reason to seek to keep them in devotion by i
strengthening his cautions [cautionary towns].' HMC De Lisle and Dudley. IV, 128-129 (20 May, 1609). Yet it I
would appear the prospects were not wholly bleek 'I assure you the King's prœlamation about fishing gave |
matter o f grave discourse and more discontent and murmuring than you can imagine; yet haply to acknowledge |
the King so far as to desire his leave with some little recognisance from the land in general I imagine will rather t
be yielded to than that they will protest against his Majesty's will and pleasure; but to come to any great i
imposition I think they will never accord but by force.' HMC De Lisle and Dudlev. IV, 128-129 (1 June, 1609). J
43pRO SP 14/47/111, fol. 259r-260v (August, 1608); Fulton, Sovereignty. 150-159. I
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p[ro]ceede accordinge to the p[ro]clamacon.'49 The matters of right and precedent were too 
contestable and neither side was likely to accept the other's interpretation. Effective 
compliance would require enforcement and James was unprepared to pay the necessary 
military and political costs in Europe. The licensing project was a determined and serious 
effort, but contained an element of bluff which the Dutch called.
The project made one significant reappearance. The projector in this instance was 
Queen Anna.5o It hardly seems coincidental the project found new life in July 1614, after the 
publication of Gentleman's particularly nationalist tract, the failure of parliament, and a visit 
by Anna's brother, King Christian of Denmark, who was determined to 'see some thing done 
in it before his departure.'^ ! The project admitted there had been many abortive schemes— 
and seems to have learned little from them.52 Based on the proclamation, a grant was sought 
for the right to compound with and license 'theis stranga-s for an yearly revenew to be paide 
unto her Ma[jes]tie'. The promised riches were posited to support Anna's estate fully and 
allow a fifth part to be given over to James. Ellesmere and Bacon examined precedents and 
the chancellor was given the task of drawing up the grant.33 James' intention was to settle 
some further revenue on Anna, preserve his prerogative rights over British waters, and 
protect his subjects' economic interests.^  ^ His rights in the proclamation were formally 
demised to Anna and her appointees for 31 years with the fifth part as rent. Compositions 
would be based on a vessel's tonnage and the number of licenses were left up to Anna's 
discretion. James, the projector, had made an undertaker of his queen. Word of the proposal 
reached the Low Countries by September and, while irritating, did not provoke the same level 
of concern as in 1609: "'I cannot perseave that from hence their is any purpose to sende 
depeuties to agree for the beusynes with the Queene. I doe imagine that these peopell are fair
49pRO SP 14/47/111, fol. 259r.
D. Alsop, 'William Welwood, Anne o f Denmark and the Sovereignty of the Sea', Scottish Historical Review 
59(1980), 171-174.
51h HL Ellesmere Ms 1213 (28 M y, 1614).
52pRO SP 14/77/79, fol. 148r.
33h HL Ellesmere Ms 1213:
34h HL Ellesmere Ms 1478 (undated).
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from coming to that course.’"35 Vague rumblings continued intermittently for years, but the 
prospects for a Jacobean licensing were effectively over.56
in
A week after the privy council decided to proceed with the proclamation, Richard 
Rainsford hoped to snatch something from defeat and proposed the creation of a society of 
fishermen exploiting British waters, to include ships of all nations plying the trade.57 It was 
an alternative to his own tax scheme and projects just gaining momentum for the creation of a 
rival fishing fleet. It was a strange blend of both. The Dutch would join the society to avoid 
competition with a rival fleet. They 'cannott be ignorant,’ chimed Rainsford, ’but wee may 
have Busses budded in denmarke and other places and p[ro]visions of other necessaries are to 
be had from other countries’, a statement reflecting the practical comfort the Dutch took from 
the logistical challenges awaiting the British. 38 The society would not pay the license or fish 
tax; instead they would collect amongst themselves the tenth or twentieth fish as an 
investment fund for the society itself, out of which they would pay James a reasonable rent.39 
(Gerard de Malynes forwarded the same project in February 1611, predicting that it would 
raise £40,000.®°) The Dutch were unlikely to think the society a better alternative to their 
present hegemony and contesting any claims of British sovereignty. A similar project was 
revived later in the reign with the interesting provision that the society be created by act of 
parliament, the stature of which would hopefully induce compliance by English and Dutch 
alike.®! Following defeat of the proclamation and fiscal crisis after the failure of the Great 
Contract (1610) James embraced a different project.
55h MC De Lisle and Dudley. V, 243 (27 September, 1614; John Throckmorton reporting from Flushing to 
Viscount De’Lisle; transcribed by the editor).
3®HMC Downshire. V, 206 (13 May, 1615; transcription). International distractions for the Low Countries in 
1618 also gave the king pause to think of manipulating the situation to his advantage, a second proclamation 
'never so opportune nowe when they fearest it most, & there state least setled in ill times', but again diplomatic 
considerations persuasively advised caution: 'What the king of Denmark tiie princes of the union... & the rest of 
the p[ro]testants thinke of my falling out w[i]th the low countries.' BL Lansdowne 142, fol. 383r (22 December, 
1618).
37pRO SP 14/48/95, fol. 127r-127v (22 Apiil, 1609).
38pRO SP 14/48/95, fol. 127v.
39pRO SP 14/48/95, fol. 127v-128r.
®°'BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 36r (28 February, 1611).
®lpRO SP 14/157/46, fol. 68r-69v, SP 14/157/47, fol. 69r-69v, SP 14/157/48, fol. 70r-70v (all [1623?]).
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The principal argument posited for meeting Dutch supremacy was to do so on its own
terms, with a full-fledged fleet of busses built and operated on the Dutch model.®2 Fishing
and dyed cloth both fit into economic perspectives which centered on the vibrancy of
commerce, in particular balance of trade, preservation of coin and bullion within the realm,
employment, and retention of value-added work at home.®3 These points were repeatedly
made in comparison of the English and Dutch: 
what wee doe; what they doe: 
wee make clothes, they dresse itt. 
wee raise wooles, they dresse them, 
wee make tynne, they worke itt. 
wee have ffishing, they the fishe. 
wee have coales, they transporte them... 
in course of m[er]chandise exceed us & all ye w o i i d . ® 4
As with fish, the massive Dutch trade in dyed cloth was based on processing an English base 
product then re-exporting value-added finished goods-to the English among others.®  ^ The 
projectors’ objectives in both cases were the same: it was ’fitt that all yo[u]r native
comodities should receave there full manewfactur by yo[u]r subiectes w[i]thin yo[u]r owne 
kingdomes’, retaining the value-added exploitation of home resources and consequent 
economic benefits of employment, commercial expansion, and preservation of coin.®®
The major Jacobean promoters of the busses projects were Keymer;®? the triumvirate 
of Northampton, William Monson, and their ’pen’, Tobias Gentleman;®® the East India 
Company governor Thomas Smythe;®  ^ the writer of Britaines Busse, whom history records
®2lsrael, Dutch Primacv. 23-24.
®3b L Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 235r-236v; Supple, Commercial Crisis. 197-253.
®4b L Additional Ms 22591, fol. 56v.
®5Supple, Commercial Crisis. 33-51 and Prestwich, Cranfield. 164-177 for the dyed cloth project.
®®BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 236v.
®?The comprehensive maritime project Keymer presented to James is BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 231r-244v 
and BL Lansdowne Ms 169, fol. 137r-138av (1 June, 1613). Numerous copies, fragments, and later versions are 
extant including PRO SP 14/118/114, fol. 170r-176v; SP 14/118/115, fol. 177r-188v; SP 14/157/45, fol. 49r- 
69v. The most complete version actually appears to be one Keymer sent to James some fifteen years after the 
original, Lansdowne Ms 798, fol. 78r-104v; in which Keymer complains his others had been broken into 
fragments and not examined as a whole. This was reprinted as A Cleare and Evident Way For enriching the 
Nations of England and Ireland (London, 1650). The argument for Keymer being the author o f Observations 
touching Trade and Commerce with the Hollanders (London, 1653), generally attributed to Walter Raleigh, is 
handled by Fulton, Sovereignty. 127n.
®®For Monson (Admiral of the Narrow Seas), PRO SP 14/47/112-114, fol. 260r-267v; Peck, Northampton. MO­
MS.
®9b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 276r-279v; HMC Downshire. Ill, 412.
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only as E. S;?° and James himself.?! Unlike the fishing tax, there is no doubt that these 
projectors consulted their Elizabethan counterpart, Robert Hitchcock, who both submitted a 
project for an English fishing fleet to the Earl of Leicester in 1574 and expanded it for 
publication as A Pollitique Platt in 1580.?2 The projects contained the same kinds of 
information: arguments for creating a fleet, its proposed size and cost (from 50 ships to as 
many for which undertakers could be found, priced as little as £200 and as much as £935 per 
vessel), costings to demonstrate profitability, a legion of commercial and economic benefits 
especially employment, and the state of the Dutch industry (valued in the millions of pounds).
Hitchcock's project had much to do with banishing the 'lothesome monster idelnesse 
(the mother and breeder of Vacaboundes)’, for remedy of which God had bestowed upon 
England the great bounty of fish.?3 Four hundred ships directly employing 10,000 men, 
distributed into port towns all around the coasts of England would generate £200,000.?4 If 
the fleet was employed for multiple herring runs (as the Dutch were) and fished cod and ling 
besides, the revenues stood to double or triple.?® The fleet would be an economic multiplier, 
generating enormous secondary and tertiary employment in provisioning and servicing the 
vessels-an outcome which often received even greater emphasis in Jacobean prqjects-at the 
same time it transformed the idle into trained mariners and drove commercial expansion.?® 
'Her Maiesties Customes and Subsidies [would be] greatly augmented.'?? Finally Hitchcock 
proposed an elaborate, government-supervised redistribution of the trade's profits, a stunning 
bit of social engineering which never found light in the Jacobean projects.?® Hitchcock also 
offered a more detailed mechanism for the creation of his fleet than his successors often
?°E. s.. Britaines Busse (London, 1615).
?!ln various guises Gerad de Malynes, Walter Cope, and Nicholas Hales also contributed to the debates. 
?2Robert Hitchcock, A Pollitique Platt for the honour of the Prince, the greate profite o f the pubhque state, 
reliefe of the poore. preservation of the riche, reformation of Roges and Idle persones. and the wealthe of 
thousandes that knowes not howe to live. 'Written for an Newyeres gift to Englande, and the inhabitantes 
thereof by Robert Hitchcok late of Cauersfeelde in the Countie of Buckyngham, Gentleman.' (London, 1580). 
The project of 1574 is BL Lansdowne Ms 14, fol. 70r~76v.
?3Hitchcock, Polhtique Platt. Air.
?4The revenue is based on 50 lastes per ship of hening caught (20,000 in total) sold at £10 per laste. Hitchcock, 
Polhtique Platt. A2r-A3r.
?®Hitchcock, Polhtique Platt. A3v.
?®Hitchcock, Polhtique Platt. A lv.
??Hitchcock, Polhtique Platt. A lv.
?®Hitchcock, Polhtique Platt. Alv-A2r.
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provided. An initial investment of £80,000 (400 ships at £200 each) was to be obtained by 
borrowing £50 from forty men in each shire, repayable with interest in three y e a r s .? 9  The 
'preservation of the riche'—as in Hitchcock’s title—from the dangers of idle masses were the 
best inducements for the wealthy to subscribe.®®
John Keymer proved to be a projector adept at packaging his schemes, but never quite 
realized success commensurate with their grandeur or intellectual importance. His first 
project for Elizabeth hit upon particularly bad luck. Keymer proposed that the commercial 
and economic wealth derived from his proposed English monopoly on coals become the 
springboard for a foray into busses and fishing.®! After the coal trade was firmly established, 
every two ships in that business ’might sett out one shipp to fishinge’, thereby bringing similar 
wealth and prosperity to England through that commodity. This interlocking program was 
sunk when Lord Treasurer Buckhurst imposed a charge on all seacoals and subsequently 
farmed its collection to a syndicate headed by Bevis Bulmer.®  ^ Keymer added a postscript 
decrying the farmers pretensions of serving the commonweal and his first rhetorical flourish 
of fishings offering more wealth than the Indies, but to no effect.®® Busses, which Keymer 
admitted he had not fully examined when composing the coals project, became his new 
focus.®4 Like many things in Elizabeth's waning years, Keymer’s 'Observations’ seem to have 
been overshadowed by more pressing matters of governance.®®
Keymer had written Elizabeth that if his coal project proved unappealing, 'have I 3 
artticles more of expedience in my Clossett of Remembrances w[hi]ch I have heere omitted 
(for being to[o] tedious)'.®® James' accession gave many suitors and projects new hopes and 
Keymer re-tooled his work. Busses now became the crucial component of a wider economic 
blueprint to arrest the 'decline in shippinge, traffiq[ue] and mariners.'®? Short-sided policies
?9FIitchcock, Pollitique Platt. A4r-A4v. The initial sum changed from the first project to the second: the first 
proposed ships from 100-200 tons at £400 each, but changed that to ships of 70 tons costing £200, effectively 
halving the start up cost for the fleet, no doubt improving the scheme's attractiveness—not sufficiently, however. 
®°Hitchcock, Polhtique Platt. Elr.
®lCKS U269/1.0E1515 [Cranfield Ms 6896].
®2Dietz, Pubhc Finance. 69, 88.
®®CKS U269/1.0E1515 [Cranfield Ms 6896].
®4c KS U269/1.0E1515 [Cranfield Ms 6896].
®3john Keymors Observation: Williams, Later Tudors. 364-388.
®®CKS U269/1.0E1515 [CranfieldMs 6896].
®?BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 231r.
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of merchants, ’undervallewinge of our coyne contrary to the rate of other Nations' and lost 
opportunities for value-added work were blamed. The commodities he was most concerned 
with in that regard were undressed cloth and fish, the twins of the age. Twenty busses would 
employ 8000 people, train more than 1000 mariners and give rise to a 'ffleete of fowre score 
saile of shipps ... wheare none weare before to take the wealth out of the sea to inrich and 
strengthen the land'.®® Keymer's optimism was infectious: 'Then whate good 1000 or 2000 
Busses will do for the makinge of yo[u]r kingdome powrefull by incresinge of ships and 
marriners & settinge yo[u]r people on worke for the inrichinge of yo[u]r coffers & bringinge 
in of all manner of plenty coyne and cheapnes to the land I leave to yo[u]r Ma(jes]tes 
consideracon.'®9 Keymer wished .Tames to emulate (more successfully) his predecessor 
Henry VIl who, 'desyerous to make his kingdomes powrefull and rich by increase of ships 
and mariners and imployment of his people, sent to his sea coastes townes movinge them to 
sett up the greate ffishinge w[i]th p[ro]mise to give them needfull privileges and to furnish 
them w[i]th lones of money if neede weare, the more to incourage them and yet his people 
weare slacke in that behalfe'.^ ® The realization of Keymer's project was to be in the hands of 
private undertakers, merchants and investors supported by requisite priviledges.9! To that 
end James might consider if 'it be not fitt that a state marchant be setled ... who may both 
dispose more proffitably of the riches thereof and incounter poUicie of stranger marchantes.
Tobias Gentleman described himself on the title page of Englands Way to Win 
Wealth as a 'Fisherman and Marriner.'^ s His project's four principal elements leave no doubt: 
argument for a fleet of busses;94 proof in the thorough examination of the Dutch monopoly of 
the trade;93 the pressing need for action as evidenced by the decayed state of coastal towns 
and pitiful condition of the fishing industry;96 and 'true valuation, and whole charge, of
®®BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 234v.
®9b L Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 234v-235r.
9°BL Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 234r.
91b L Cotton Ms Titus B V, foi. 234r.
92b l  Cotton Ms Titus B V, fol. 236v.
93Gentleman, Englands Way to Win Wealth. A ir (full title page). 
94Gentleman, Englands Way to Win Wealth. 4-10 and 40-46 
95Gentleman, Englands Wav to Win Wealth 10-18 and 47-50. 
96Gentleman, Englands Wav to Win Wealth. 18-36.
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Building, and Furnishing, to Sea, Busses'.®? The Dutch had 'growne exceeding rich and 
strong ... [and] his Maiesties Seas is their chiefest, principall and onely rich Treasury'.®® 
Competition using the Dutch model was the course and Gentleman turned his expertise to 
busses. Each would cost £500 to build and approximately £435 yearly to operate, but annual 
revenue would be £1000, ensuring even a small profit the first year and some £565 every year 
thereafter.®® Gentleman based the figures on Dutch practice and his force of argument 
showed real flourish: 'The Hollanders do make the profite of their Busses so certaine that 
they do lay out their owne childrens mony ... in aduenturing in the Busses, and also ther is in 
Holland a Treasury for Orphants, opened and layd out in aduenturing in the Busses.'!°° 
Profits were certain and gains to the commonwealth through trade, preservation of bullion, 
training mariners, and employment indisputable.!®! Shrewd, wealthy men would rush to 
commission busses and make the fleet a reality. Gentleman almost certainly consulted 
Hitchcock, some of the language in both projects is remarkably alike while the author of 
Britaines Busse, published barely a year later, reported that Hitchcock-and Dee—were 
circulating at the time. !®2
The Trades Increase, published early in 1615, employed the advancement of fishing 
as a vehicle to attack the East India Company and commercial monopolization by chartered 
companies.!®® They stifled adventuiing traders and their monopolistic practices suppressed 
faster growth in trade, precluded training mariners, brought superfluous commodities into the
®?Gentleman, Englands Wav to Win Wealth. A ir (full title page) and 36-40.
®®Gentleman, Englands Wav to Win Wealth. 4-5.
®®Gentleman, Englands Wav to Win Wealth. 36-37.
!®®Gentleman, Englands Way to Win Wealth. 37.
!®!Gentleman, Englands Way to Win Wealth. 40.
!®2compare Hitchcock, Pollitique Platt, with Gentleman, Englands Wav to Win Wealth. 1-2; also Gentleman, 
Englands Wav to Win Wealth. 7; Hitchcock, Pollitique Platt, title page. The author of Britaines Busse wrote: 
'Foure Bookes I haue seene of this Subiect. One called the Brittish Monarchy, written... 1576... The second 
intituled Hitchcocks New-yeares gfft, printed about 30 yeares since. The third, named Englands way to win 
wealth ... published within these 2. yeares... The fourth styled the Trades Increme, now newly come abroad.' E. 
S. Britaines Busse. A2v. The British Monarchy was the common title for John Dee's General and Rare 
Memorials. Sherman, John Dee. 167-170 interestingly discusses the evidence of readership o f the extant copies 
of Dee's M emorials by virtue o f detailed and sophisticated marginaha. Sherman is not able to identify the 
specific readers, but it seems entirely possible that Gentleman or E. S. may have been the individuals) in 
question.
!®®J. R., Trades Increase (London, 1615), 19,51; W. R. Scott, llie  Constitution and Finance of English. 
Scottish, and Msh Joint-stock Companies (3 volumes; Cambridge, 1912), II, 101-102 for a slightly different 
perspective.
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realm, and caused i n f la t io n . ! ® ^  By 'the report of many exercised in this mystery, and the 
relation of two especially ... Hitchockes and Gentleman’, a fleet of adventuring busses offered 
the perfect counterpoint. The technical information was wholly derivative, but the author's 
arguments were cogent: in busses 'the charges are not great, the paines are not great, the time 
is not long, the hazard is nothing at all' and in fishing there 'is wealth enough to satisfie the 
most thirsty thereof, without much cost, without any spoyle... out of our owne inexhaustable 
Sea'.!®3 The king’s customs revenues would increase by £50,000.!®® The preservation of 
coin in the realm was highlighted masterfully: with busses, England would cease to 'give 
away our coine to the stranger for our owne fish’;!®? they would 'barter' fish in export 
markets, particularly Eastern Europe, for their 'returnes wee neede and vse' for which 
merchants currently 'alwaies paid ready gold'.!®® Busses were strongly advocated, which was 
appreciated by the author of Britaines Busse, but the attack on the East India Company 
framing it did not go unnoticed; the same tactic was to be adopted in response.
Britaines Busse is such a detailed budget for the operation of a vessel of 70 tons for its 
first two years that it makes Gentleman’s appear superficial. After reading those other tracts, 
the author 'was much affected with the businesse' and 'out of a vehement desire to see this 
worke in hand, & the prosperity thereof, I enquired... what Busses ... were in building on our 
Coasts'.!®® He was disappointed to find only two men had taken up Gentleman's call and 
concluded it was because 'none of the foure Treatises before mentioned, had set downe in 
very plaine particulais the exact charge of ... a busse' nor 'the gaine or profite' to be made 
from one.!!® From nets to gilling knives to wages, he costed everything and, much like 
Gentleman, found the ship would make £65 the first year and £600 every year thereafter.!!! 
He proposed that 100 busses be built at first and more added as feasible. The ascribed 
benefits of the project weighed heavily on employment and in responding to questions of
!®4j. R., Trades Increase. 31-33 and 51-53. 
!®3j. R., Trades Increase. 39-41.
!®®J. R., Trades Increase. 46.
!®?J. R., Trades Increase. 41.
!®®J. R., Trades Increase. 44.
!®®E. s . Britaines Busse. A2v.
!!®E. s . Britaines Busse. A3r.
! ! ! e . s . Britaines Busse. C3r~C4v.
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feasibility borrowed much from Hitchcock’s objections and a n s w e r s . ^ 2  Britaines Busse was 
largely derivative in structure, but an important contribution to a vibrant group of competing 
projects.
IV
The busses project is a story of two halves, divided by 1613. The licensing project 
was aborted, but there remained the prospect of economic wealth and customs revenue so 
tantalizingly presented by Keymer and Rainsford. Late in 1611 James' councillors examined 
a project to set up a fishing company with power to govern, rule, and order all maner of 
fishermen'.!!® Caesar recorded their resolution, 'that the p[ro]iect for busses is convenient 
& necessary’ and fit that 'the same bee carried by a ioint co[m]panie & not by a disiointed 
trade, that is every towne building and fisshing for it self.'ü^ The project was approved, 
including various concessions and the company's structure, and appears to have been 
entrusted to a conciliar commission led by Caesar, ü® It was also decided to canvass the port 
cities for their opinions.!!® The response by the mayor and aldermen of Exeter indicates a 
genuine level of interaction between Westminster and localities in the project, ü ? The mayor 
and aldermen conferenced with the city merchants and interested parties within twelve miles. 
They ’conceave[d] that the said proiect may be advantagious to such as (dealynge in that or 
such like ffishinges) are neerer costers to those seas' than Exeter, concluding it was more 
profitable for 'others of the maiityme place not farre awaye from us beinge saylors, owners, 
and such like [who] ... will consider further of hitt'.ü® More important port cities appointed 
representatives to attend Caesar and the other commissioners.!!® The mayor of Sandwich
!!2 e . s . Britaines Busse. E2v-Flr.
!!®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 276r.
!14b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 284r (7 December, 1611).
! !®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 276r; Additional Ms 10038, fbl. 287r (2 March, 1611 [1612]).
! !®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 284v. Caesar's notes o f the council resolutions for the project originally 
included the cities of'Alborough', Yarmouth, 'Laustop', Ipswich, Harwich, Colchester, Lynn, Boston, Hull, and 
Newcastle, but this entire section was crossed off by. BL Additional Ms 10038, fbl. 284v. However Caesar's 
brief notes of the project and trade in general listed tiie cities o f Sandwich, Lynn, Dover, Yarmouth, Harwich, 
and Ipswich. Ad&tional Ms 10038, fbl. 286r. See William Ravenhill (ed.), Christopher Saxton's 16th Century 
Maps: The Counties of England and Wales (Shrewsbury, 1992), 30-33,54-57,72-73,76-77,80-81, and 84-85 
!!?BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 291r (13 January, 1611[1612]).
! !®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 29 Ir. Meeting 'bitwixt them & the inhabitants of tiie townes' such as Lyme 
and Plymouth would likely prove more fruitful.' Additional Ms 10038, fol. 291r. They suggested also the 
towns of Sydmouth, Dartmouth, Mübrook, and 'Saltash'. Ravenhill, Saxton's Maps. 42-43.
!!®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 287r.
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informed Caesar ’wee doe not only embrace and well approve of the course as a thinge muche 
tendinge to the benefitt of the weale publick, but will also be readie accordinge to o[u]r poore 
abillities to put the same in execucon when occasions shall fittly serveT^o
The letter from Exeter discloses the moving force behind this project. They were 
responding to the commission’s letter and to the enclosed ’coppye of his Maiesties to you 
beinge dated the eight and twentyth daie of November last’^ i^ Thomas Albery disclosed 
James' role in a letter to William Trumbull: 'This Thursday the lords sat at Whitehall about 
confirming the privilege for our fishing with busses whereto they were consigned by his 
Ma[jes]tys letter directed to them dated Nov. 2 8 .’!22 Albery informed Trumbull of James’ 
continuing resolution ’the busses shall be built’ in the fall.!^ ® James was almost certainly 
fortified by his receipt during the year of a discourse on trade with the Low Countries from 
Walter Cope (based on Keymer’s notes). Beset by financial cares, James must have been 
attracted by the opening: 'What soever you abate or improve at home comes our of yo[u]r 
subiectes, and be yt never so iust is hardly drawen from them w[i]thout clamor or murmur, 
but what you catch or mine out of the seas ... magnifies the glorie and wisedome of the State 
and infinitly inriches yo[u]r kingdome and people who will as readie as able to requite this 
yo[u]r gratious care with full handes.’!24 James' concerns which bred the proclamation were 
transferred to the busses project. His 'idea of encouraging fishing in Scotland’ was finding 
expression in England. !2® The undertaker for the busses company was revealed by Albery as 
Sir Thomas Smythe.126 Smythe was the current chairman of the East India and Virginia 
companies and his hand is visible in the proposed organization of the busses company. It was 
to be a joint-stock company which mhrored their organizations. !2? Smythe's history of
120b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 287r.
121b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 291r.
!22h m C Downshire. lU 332 (16 July, 1612).
123HMC Downshire. ffl, 412.
!24pRO SP 14/71/89, fol. 164r (1612).
!2®Scott, Joint-Stock Companies. 1 ,133. I
!26h m C Downshire. HI, 412. !
!2?BL Additional Ms 10038, fbl. 276r-279v and 284r-284v; Scott, Joint-stock Companies. II, 92-93; Brenner, |
Merchants and Revolution. 21-22. 1
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adventures with the Levant, Russia, and Virginia Companies also put the busses well within 
his orbit of interests while his standing with the crown was frequently high.!2S
Upon its constitution, the project passed to the subcommission for projects established 
in August 1612.!29 There it ran into trouble. Caesar and his colleagues were caught between 
opposing forces: James and the established merchant companies. The priviledges desired by 
the busses company were the sticking point. While the subcommissioners asserted their 
independent concerns, the established companies almost certainly exerted pressure on them 
well before.!®® The word was out already in July that 'the priviledges are very substantial’.!®! 
The fishing company was to have unrestricted access to port facilities, liberty to purchase 
land and erect fishing havens, and a monopoly on salt fi*om seawater for the preservation of 
fish.!®2 Worse, they would receive the monopoly provision of fish, both wholesale and retail, 
once they could fully serve the market.!®® Further, James would provide two guard ships at 
his cost to protect the fleet from the 'molestacons of the Hollanders’.!®^  But it was other 
provisions which most provoked the established companies. There was the ’power for the 
triall of all causes that concerne buying, selling, contractes, quarrelling or any other thing that 
may be profitable or preiudicall to the bodie of this companie touching this trade of fishing', 
backed by their own court.!®® But the commercial dynamite was the complete latitude to 
import any commodity fi’om countries where their fish was sold, regardless of 'anie priviledge 
akeadie granted or hereafter to be granted to anie other companie or companyes 
whatsoever.’!®®
!28scott, Joint-Stock Companies. II, 57-60 and 91-92 and Brenner, Merchants and Revolution. 95-102. Smythe 
was among the commissioners appointed for the investigation of household, navy, and ordnance in 1618, while 
James's refused to condone the moves to oust him from the Virginia Company in 1620, Prestwich, Cranfield. 
214-218 and 306-308.
!2®Below, 190-206.
!®®BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 76r (18 September, 1612).
!®!HM C Downshire. Ill, 332 (16 July, 1612).
!®2b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 276v-277r.
!®®BL Additional Ms 10038, fbl. 277r.
!®4b l  Additional Ms 10038, fbl. 277v-278r. Albery wrote Trumbull that this provision had been accepted by 
James. HMC Downshire. III. 332.
!®®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 276r.
!®®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 278r.
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The answers of the established companies to the subcommissioners illustrate their 
hostility to these priviledges.!®? The Levant, French, Muscovy (Russia), Turkish, and 
Eastland (Eastern Europe) companies, and the Merchant Adventures roundly condemned the 
priviledges and demanded their charter rights be respected.!®® Thomas Smythe’s old Russia 
company was the most critical, asserting the busses were a cloak for those who sought to 
capture their trade. Their already weak profits would be further eroded and the company 
would have to dissolve. Further, they were already venting as much fish as the eastern 
market could support, and Russia did not afford sufficient returnable trade goods even if the 
busses could sell their fish.!®® The Eastland company argued they had already reduced the 
number of cloths sold in their markets from 15,000 to 10,000 while the Merchant 
Adventurers flat-out refused to countenance any competition in theii* ’abode or p[re]cincts.’!4® 
The only concession they offered defeated the purpose of establishing a company: they would 
not allow ’any returnes to bee made of those of the co[m]pany of the busses being not of 
their co[m]pany.’!4! The merchants hoped to bring any busses enterprise within their own 
compass.
Against opposition from powerful established companies-though not the Virginia or 
East India companies helmed by Thomas Smythe—Caesar and his colleagues prevaricated. 
They expressed their hopes for the project, but concluded they were not to sanction the 
project—w[hi]ch wee conceave to bee rather a matter of estate, then matter tending to the 
K[ing]s profit’—and felt that only consideration of the priviledges was their proper remit. !42 
They agreed ’that w[hi]ch must be undertaken by private purses needeth the comfort of the 
more priviledges’, but found the scale of demands to be the ’maine stopp and impediment’. !4® 
Finding no hope of reconciliation they left it to the council's discretion, which effectively left
!®?BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 280r-283v and 289r-290v 
!®®BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 76r.
!®®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 280r (10 September, 1612). This concern was not a case of shouting in the 
dark. Precisely this eventuality was in ntind among the adventurers in Cockayne's project and when the dyed 
cloth scheme failed, effectively 'the Cockayne group had taken over the white cloth trade, "wherein they shall 
reap profit for which they never sowed".' Prestwich, Cranfield. 168-170.
!4®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 289r (II September, 1612).
!41b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 289r.
!42b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, foi. 75v (18 September, 1612).
!4®BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fbl. 75v.
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the onus for a decision on Northampton as head of the treasury c o m m i s s i o n .  1 4 4  The 
subcommissioners* evasion avoided defying James' favour and effectively killed the project in 
its present form. Yet this was not the end. Albery informed Trumbull six weeks later that it 
had ’been much hindered by the companies ... who have produced many blind allegation to 
hinder that excellent business. It had been this week effected, but for the prince’s 
s ic k n e s s ' ,!4 5  In  November, James was still 'resolved the busses shall be built’ and the 
company only waited for its charter to be s i g n e d . ! 4 ®  James seemed willing to defy the 
protests of the companies, but the treasury commission and council were not.
The forces of merchant opposition and royal favour make sense of the second half of 
the busses story and explain the preceding tracts. Circumstances point to Keymer's project 
originally firing James’ interest in busses and trade; it probably reached the king's hands 
between 1608 and 1610.^ 47 Smythe's company and the busses commission may have resulted 
from continued politicking by K e y m e r . i 4 8  Copies among Cotton's and Caesar's papers point 
to the project circulating among policymakers during 1611-1612, certainly in 1613.149 
Busses were among ’p[ro]iects likely to prove well’ in the treasury commission report of June 
1613, while Northampton was forced to explain to an impatient James why no progress had 
been made on the project three weeks later.!®® Northampton is the key to understanding the 
transformation of the project that summer. James had seized upon die busses with the same 
resolution he was shortly to devote to Alderman Cockayne's dyed cloth project while 
Keymer's and others' works were stirring him toward both. Northampton was caught in the 
web of his master’s obsession with an unworkable project.
!44bl  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, foi. 76r.
!4®HMC Downshire. Ill, 398 (6 November, 1612).
!4®h MC Downshire. Ill, 412 (Albery to Trumbull; 20 November, 1612).
!47The later copy of his project includes a preface noting that he had first submitted it to James some 14 or 15 
years earlier. Interest in fishing projects revived briefly during Cranfield's treasuiership, late in 1622 and early 
in 1623. It seems probable Keymer presented his project to James again around this time which would date 
back his original presentation to 1608-1610. BL Lansdowne Ms 798, fol. 79r, CKS U269/1.0E1575 [Cranfield 
Ms 8939]; PRO SP 14/139/66, fol. 89r (8 March, 1623).
!48lnterestingly, the 1622 project among Cranfield's papers included Keymer's work with the organization plan 
and concessions for the company first examined by Caesar in 1611. CKS U269/1.0E1575 [8939].
!49Cotton bound Keymer's project into his book o f projects for Northampton about this time. Cotton Ms Titus 
B V, fol. 231r-244v. Caesar's copy was dated 1 June, 1613 by him; its address described it as a 'true coppy... as 
it is delivered to ye Kinges Magesjtie.' BL Lansdowne Ms 169, fol. 137r-138av.
!®®BL Lansdowne M s 165, fol. 223r-227v; PRO SP 14/74/23, fol. 44r-44v (23 June, 1613).
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Northampton signalled a change when he noted that 'the busses dependeth much upon 
the waies of raisinge stockes, of buildinge vesselles, but above all upon the consideration of 
contracts and treaties with forrain states in former times'.!®! James was told simply that the 
project depended upon the fine-points of the Burgundian treaties and if the Council 'should at 
this instant fall upon this busines we should not be able to performe the taske... laid on us' for 
his other affairs.!®2 The difference with the subcommissioners' report is vast; the chief 
impediments were now diplomatic causes (as with the proclamation), logistical difficulties, 
and overworked councillors. Tobias Gentleman's project is the answer to why merchant 
opposition had disappeared. His England's Way to Win Wealth was commissioned by 
William Monson and dedicated to Northampton.!®® Busses were a project Northampton and 
Monson were eager to further and together they devised a solution to the impasse of James' 
enthusiasm and merchant opposition, one which Gentleman penned.
England's Way to Win Wealth was a masterful account of the Dutch fishing 
supremacy, the practices of the trade, the economic loss to England, and the commercial 
viability of busses, but it was foremost a rallying cry, a call to busses: 'shall wee neglect so 
great blessings: O slothfull England and carelesse Countriemen, Looke but on these fellowes 
that wee call the plumpe Hollanders, behold their dilligence in fishing, and our owne 
carelesse negligence.... Wherefore, seeing we can excell all other Nations, wastfully, to spend 
mony, let Vs, in one thing, leame of other Nations, to get thousands out of his Maiesties Sea, 
and to make a generall profite of the benefites that Almighty god doth yearely send vnto 
vs'.!®4 A chartered company was not the solution, a nation of adventurers was: 'Wherefore, 
seeing the profite so plainely, and by the grace of God so certaine ... Let aH Noble 
Worshipfull, and wealthy Subiects, put too their aduenturing and helping hands, for the 
speedy lanching, and floating forward of this great good Common-wealth businesse, for the 
strengthening of his Maiesties Dominions'.!®® Gentleman answered two of Northampton’s 
impediments. His call to wealthy subjects for ’helping hands' and business-like analysis of
!®!b L Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 87v.
!®2pRO SP 14/74/23, fol. 44r-44v (4 M y, 1613; Northampton to Lake). 
!53peck. Northampton. 141.
!®4Gentleman, Englands Way to Win Wealth. 10,44-45.
!®®Gentleman, Englands Wav to Win Wealth. 40.
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the busses’ viability were emotional and rational appeals for 'raisinge stockes' and 'buildinge 
vesselles'. A single adventurer with the capital could build a bus and be guaranteed a profit; 
a chartered company with substantial priviledges was unnecessary. The solution may have 
been naive but James’ enthusiasm was rewarded, the established company monopolies were 
intact, and the economic benefits beckoned. But Northampton's death, shortly after England's 
Way to Win Wealth was published, derailed the project.!®®
Britaines Busse in 1615 represented attempts to revive the project. The latter's author 
was particularly impressed with Gentleman's work.!®? His work, if somewhat derivative, was 
as serious as Gentleman's project. It had one crucial difference; it contained the 
reappearance of the project for a chartered company. The writer encouraged noblemen, 
gentry, and citizens to 'ioyne with Sir William Haruey, who is already entred the field alone' 
in building busses, but had no 'doubt but his Maiesty will bee pleased (at their humble suite) 
to encourage and incorporate them with piiuileges, immunities, and authority’ once they were 
active in the trade.!®® This seemed an opportunity to establish a chartered company by 
subterfuge, on the basis of an implied contract. If adventurers for this understanding were 
found wanting, the solution was for James to take the explicit course of incorporating 'some 
fit for this worke' into a joint-stock company with shares beginning at £5.!®® Once £70- 
80,000 was collected the officers of the company were to 'prouide an hundred Busses' and as 
'more stocke shal come in, so also more Busses to be so prouided and added to those 
former'.!®®
Perhaps only a suspicious mind would see Thomas Smythe behind this book, but there 
are interesting pointers. The reference to The Trades Increase being 'newly come abroad' 
would date Britaines Busse to the early months of 1615.!®! The direct counterblast to The 
Trades Increase. The Defence of Trade, was already being planned by the East India
!®®Peck. Northampton. 141.
!®?E. s . Britaines Busse. A2v-A3r. 
!®®E. s . Britaines Busse. F lv. 
!®®E. s . Britaines Busse. Flv. 
!®®E. s . Britaines Busse. F lv , F2r. 
!®!e . s . Britaines Busse. A2r.
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Company in February of that year.i®  ^ Britaines Busse would seem to be a backhanded retort. 
While acknowledging ’the Necessity, Faculty, Profit, and Vse of that Fishing trade’ were 
especially highlighted by The Trades Increase (and Gentleman), the advocacy of a chartered 
company of busses put Britaines Busse in direct opposition to the anti-company stance. The 
Trades Increase was a Gentleman-like call to busses and the only priviledge it sought from 
James was to forbid 'the sale and vttering of herring to his loyall subiects by any forrainer or 
stranger whatsoeuer'.i®® Further, Britain's Busse forwarded Smythe's company as the model, 
describing the division of stock and profits with busses 'as in the now East India company'- 
parroting the project of 1611-1 6 1 2 . !®4 The City community, 'euer forward for the kingdomes 
good', was called on to 'prouide and furnish the first C[100] of Busses' and 'giue light to the 
rest of the land to follow by them.'!®® This appeal resembles Smythe's work in the London 
merchant community financing the Virginia Company's projects from 1609-1613.!®® Perhaps 
most telling was the author’s conclusion: 'I thinke the East India company will liberally 
further this worke: for that thereby some of their greatest wants are like to be supplied.'!®? 
The 'individual' approach was damned with faint praise too when it was revealed only two 
adventurers were pursuing it, while there was an element of Shakespearean protest in the 
author claiming to be much 'affected with the businesse' before The Trades Increase 'came to 
light'.!®®
The re-emergence of the company project at this time was spurred by more than a 
philosophical debate on trade policy. In December 1614 the Merchant Adventurers had their 
charter suspended by royal proclamation in favour of Cockayne's new company for the export 
of dyed and dressed cloth.!®® The 'twin' project to the busses had brought down the most 
powerful of the established companies and it must have given renewed hope for a company
!®2Dudley Digges, The Defence of Trade. In a Letter to Sir Thomas Smith Knight. Gouernour of the East-Inida 
Companie (London, 1615) [STC 6845]. The book is a precise refutation of the specific charges levelled against 
the East India Company in The Trades Increase. For the dating see Scott, Joint-stock Companies. II, 102.
!®®J. R., Trades Increase. 43.
!®4r  s . Britaines Busse. F2r.
!®®E. s . Britaines Busse. F2v.
!®®Scott, Joint-stock Companies. II, 250-254.
!®?E. s . Britaines Busse. F2v.
!®®E. s . Britaines Busse. A2v.
!®®Acts 1613-1614.583-587 and Larkin and Hughes (ed.). Proclamations: James I. 327-329.
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of busses. Was Britaines Busse the attempt of Thomas Smythe to give new life to that 
project? If so, he succeeded to a point. James' ministers took up the matter in council before 
the summer progress of 1615 and, after much discussion, appointed a time in the next term 
for further deliberation.i'^ ® Ellesmere added busses to his preferred projects in his fiscal 
reform plans which he presented in council that September. He too had copies of 
Keymer's projects and also possessed a memorandum challenging The Trades Increase which 
may have been circulated in advance of The Defence of Trade. T h o m a s  Lake pushed the 
project in September as a commonwealth measure which would bring much credit upon 
James in any future p a r l i a m e n t . ^ Though approved and assigned to a conciliar committee 
for preparation, it seems to have died of inaction there.
If Cockayne’s victory offered hope of similar success by a company of busses, the 
quick and ominous signs of his large promises and little performance preoccupied James and 
his councillors. These developments must have cast a similar adventure in a bad light. 
The spectre of Dutch primacy probably deterred many of those wealthy adventurers the 
project sought to attract. As lord treasurer, Cranfield looked again at fishing and Keymer’s 
writings and a group of undertakers led by George Carew (also William Monson and Lord 
Hervy) held talks with various London merchants in 1623 on a busses p r o j e c t . O n  behalf 
of the council, they called together the major City merchants, but only William Cockayne and 
Sheriff Hanford appeared.^ ^  ^ 'They seemed to like admirably well of the Proiecte,’ Carew 
wrote Secretary Calvert, 'acknowledginge it to be the best worke for the publique, and the 
most profitable that the witt of man could Imagine, but they despayred that ever so greate a
170b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 226r.
Ellesmere Ms 2610/7 [Ellesmere's pagination] (18 September, 1615). I am disinclined to accept the 
statement by J. D. Alsop that this point at the meeting concerned 'the Crown's interest in creating a licensing 
system as a revenue supplement for Queen Anne's expenses'. Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform', 210n.94. The dominance 
of economic thinking such as Keymer's (focusing on value-added products and balance o f trade) when added to 
the commercial concerns and preoccupation of individuals like Cranfield, Ellesmere, Lake, Coke, and James 
make Alsop's contention dubious.
172h h l  Ellesmere Ms 2460-2462 and 2467 respectively.
Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 226r. It is doubtful that Lake would have described a licensing system to pay 
Anna's expenses in quite the same way.
1'7‘^ HHL Ellesmere Ms 2614.
175prestwich. Cranfield. 169-177.
176pRO SP 14/139/66, fol. 89r, CKS U269/1.0E1575 [Cranfield Ms 8939], U269/1.0E1515 [Cranfield Ms 
6896].
177pRo SP 14/139/66, fol. 89r.
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some of money (to accomplishe the same as the Proiect required) could be raysed.' Carew 
countered that they build 6 busses and 4 doggerboats, the success of which would serve as a 
model to draw in the reluctant. Almost a decade after Gentleman and Britaines Busse, it was 
still impossible to stir enough enthusiasm for merchants to venture their capital on busses. 
Only the crown possessed the ability to mobilize the resources needed to get the busses 
project going, but it proved fiscally incapable and unwilling.
V
Plagued by commensurate fiscal necessity, it is no surprise that Jacobean projects 
were revived in the reign of Charles I. The most successful Caroline fishing project was the 
plan to license and tax Dutch fishing vessels. Attorney General Heath's projects of 1625- 
1626 included its revival, but it bore no fruit until the next d e c a d e .  7^8 jn 1636, Lord Admiral 
Northumberland sent the ship-money fleet after the Dutch and licensed 150 busses in August 
at a cost of 'a tenth of their c a t c h . ' i 7 9  However, the effort dissipated by 1637: 'What 
compromised this policy was not the inadequacy of the fleet but the change in diplomatic 
climate. With England entering into closer negotiations with France for an alliance against 
the Habsburgs, it was not easy to perpetrate aggression against French allies-the Dutch..., 
The fleet, the secretary [Windebank] told Hopton simply ceased to obstruct Dutch f i s h i n g . '  
Unlike his father, Charles had the coercive means to enforce compliance with licensing, but, 
like James, the project’s ultimate effectiveness was undermined by diplomatic circumstances. 
The grandest Jacobean revival was Charles' creation in 1632 of the Society of the Fishery of 
Great Britain and I r e l a n d . T w o  old voices found Caroline chords: William Monson and 
the author of Britaines Busse, republished in 1630 as England's Royal Fishing R e v i v e d . 1^ 2 
The project had the direct support of Secretary John Coke and, critically, Charles himself.i^ ^ 
As with previous ventures however, undertakers were hard to come by and capital l o w .  1^4  
The joint-stock company struggled for a decade with consistent losses before collapsing in
1 7 8 p R O  SP 16/44/1, fol. Ir.
^79Sharpe, Personal Rule. 597. 
l^®Sharpe, Personal Rule. 597.
Sharpe, Personal Rule. 250-252; Lee. Road to Revolution. 102-105.
Sharpe, Personal Rule. 250; England's Roval Fishing Revived is STC 21487. 
Sharpe, Personal Rule. 250.
^^^Sharpe, Personal Rule. 251.
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1640, largely a consequence of the Scots w a r .  1^ 5 o f  the project, Kevin Sharpe has written: 
'The Society of Fisheries of Great Britain bears witness to the near insurmountable obstacles 
to the promotion of grand schemes for the improvement of trade. But its history is also 
evidence of the king's personal attention to the promotion of a project "which tends so much 
to the public g o o d " . '1^ 6 The lesson is that it was Charles' direct involvement which allowed 
this project to find effect—if not success—where its earlier counterparts failed. Sharpe is 
ambivalent whether it was solely a scheme 'for the improvement of trade' and not also a 
revenue project. If its Elizabethan and Jacobean predecessors are anything to judge by, there 
can be absolutely no doubt of its fiscal pedigree.
Interestingly, the company may have folded just as it was beginning to turn a profit with herring. Sharpe, 
Personal Rule. 252.
Sharpe, Personal Rule. 252.
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CHAPTER 4
The Patronage Culture and the Corruption of Projects
1
The parliaments of 1621 and 1624 rebuked two decades of fiscal policy,^  At the 
’humble suit' of Lords and Commons, James assented to a statute against 'all monopolies and 
all commissions, grants, licenses, charters, and letters patent... of or for the sole buying, 
selling, making, working, or using of anything within this realm or the dominion of Wales'.^  
Further, 'all proclamations, inhibitions, restraints, warrants of assistance, and all other matters 
and things whatsoever any way tending to the instituting, erecting, strengthening, furthering 
or countenancing of the same [patents] ... are altogether contrary to the laws of this realm, 
and so are and shall be utterly void and of none effect'.^  The real battle over projects and 
patents took place in 1621. It was then that Edward Coke fashioned the monopolies bill 
which received the royal assent three years later. The law censured projects, the privatization 
of justice, and the king’s prerogatives turned to private gain. It was the decisive moment in 
the history of Jacobean projects, one which reflected their pervasive unpopularity, a hostility 
often rooted more in the actions of projectors and undertakers operating within the patronage 
culture than the schemes themselves. This chapter will examine the seed-bed of hostility 
toward projects and projectors in popular culture, print, and among James' ministers. Further 
analysis will argue that, while these attitudes were important, it was the thrusting expansion 
of projects between 1618-1620, not a little thanks to Francis Bacon, which made public 
hostility inevitable once parliament was summoned in 1621.
n
Projectors seemed to occupy a place in the Jacobean hierarchy of knaves somewhere 
just above papists. Not every projector plotted and practised to engross profits and enterprise
iRusseil, Parliaments. 84-203; Cogswell, Blessed Revolution: Elizabeth Read Foster, 'The Procedure of the 
House o f Commons against Patents and Monopolies, 1621-1624' in William Appleton Aiken and Basil Duke 
Flenning. Conflict in Stuart England: Essays in honour o f Wallace Notestein (London, 1960), 57-85. 
^Reprinted in William Hyde Price, The English Patents o f Monopoly (Cambridge, MA, 1906), 135.
 ^Price, Monopolv. 135-136.
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to their sole benefit, but clever tricksters they were all the same. Ever one to view society 
with a keen, cynical eye, it is surprising Ben Jonson waited nearly a decade from his great 
success with Volpone. or the Fox to turn his satirical talents to projectors in The Devil is an 
A^.4 The rollicking image of Merecraft, 'the wit, the brain, the great projector’ in Jonson's 
later work is indelible: the one who ’projects Ways to enrich men, or to make 'em great. By 
suits, by marriages, by undertakings'.^  Yet Jonson first visited Merecraft’s kind in Volpone. 
There Jonson fashioned Sir Politic Would-be—'would-be crafty and skilled at intrigue and 
negotiation (like the Venetians).'^ Sir Politic, the parroting English knight in Venice, has 
been suggested as a parody of ambassador Henry Wotton or Anthony Sherley, both men who 
sought to procure favour in Venice with their projects and inventions.^  Sir Politic first 
instructs his satirical foil Peregrine on the art of politics: dressing in grave and serious 
clothes; refusal to tell secrets, 'scarce A fable but with caution’, and never a truth to strangers; 
'for your religion, profess none. But wonder at the diversity of all'; and, particularly in 
Venice, master the best culinary manners.^  'Nick Machiavel and Monsieur Bodin both Were 
of this mind’, puffs Sir Politic knowingly. As one would expect from a master. Sir Politic's 
journal includes notes of 'discourse With a Dutch merchant 'bout ragion' del stato' in the 
course of buying toothpicks and urinating at St. Marks.^  'Faith, these are politic notes!' 
exclaims Peregrine.
In this political environment Sir Politic longs for a man he can trust, one whom he can 
make rich and forbid to t h in k . ' As  how?’ asks Peregrine and Politic assumes the mantle of 
the projector.il Politic’s first project is to take the pre-emption of red herring brought to 
Venice through his undertaker in the Netherlands, a cheesemonger. 'But this is now If my
^Volpone was conceived and written between January and March 1606 and first performed at the Globe by the 
King's Men before the last week of March 1606. Ben Jonson, Volpone or. the Fox, ed. R. B. Parker 
(Manchester, 1983), 8-9. Jonson wrote The Devil is an Ass sometime in 1616 and it was probably acted by the 
King's Men at Blackfriars in November or December that year. Jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 21-22.
^Jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 90.
^Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 87n.
7Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 24.
® Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 221-223.
^Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 230. 
lOjonson, Volpone. ed, Parker, 223-228.
ll'With certain projects that I have'. Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 224.
95
The Patronage Culture and the Corruption of Projects
main project fail', Politic confides, 'which I mean, in hope of pension, to propound To the
Great Council, then unto the Forty, So to the Ten ... [by] one that, though his place b'obscure,
Yet he can sway and they will hear him.' Peregrine is dismayed to discover Politic's court
contact is a 'common seargant', but he is pressed to believe that such men put the words in the
mouths of the Great Council. Politic reveals his remaining projects. The sale of pocket
tinder-boxes would be regulated by his patent—might not the disaffected otherwise enter the
Arsenal and fire the galleys there? With 30 livres (£1) of onions:
I bring in your ship 'twixt two brick walls—
But those the state shall venture; on the one 
I strain me a fair taipaulin, and in that 
I stick my onions, cut in halves; the other 
Is full of loopholes, out at which I thrust 
The noses o f bellows...
Now, sir, your onion, which doth naturally 
Attract th’infection, and your bellows blowing 
The air upon him, will show instantly.
By his changed colour, if they be contagion;
Or else remain as fair as at the first.^^
To work his plague-testing bellows, Politic would employ his waterworks, a perpetual motion
invention 'Which is the easiest matter of a hundred'.
Whether the audiences attending Volpone reacted to Sir Politic's projects with simple
amusement or found them truthfully satirical will never be known. What would Julius Caesar
have made of them had he read the quarto which appeared in February 1607?i3 Trafficking
in red herring?; Caesar probably had his fill of fishing projects by the time he left the
Exchequer in 1614, fully able to avow that those herrings were part of the maritime bounty
taken from James' seas by the Dutch. Monopolies were hardly unknown to him. The
attractions at Eltham included a perpetual motion machine while projects for waterworks
began finding homes in Caesar's library a year after Volpone was published.^  ^ In 1613,
waterworks remained among those projects upon which the treasury commissioneis looked
^^Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 228.
^^Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 2,
‘^^ Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 228n; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 78r-81v (8 April and 8 August) and 222r- 
223v (9 December, 1612);
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favourably.^ 5 Finally, Caesar, the former Admiralty judge, might well have appreciated the 
time and cost to foreign merchants of having their ships quarantined and the 'purifying [of 
their cargoes]... with vinegar and spices’ when trading with Venice.Literary critics might 
regard Sir Politic and his 'fantastic propositions' as comic creations, but his projects would 
have occasioned all too knowing laughter from men like Caesar, Salisbury, or the project- 
watcher John Chamberlain. ^ 7
When Jonson, ironically the recent recipient of a 100 mark pension from James, 
turned his talents to the vice and decadence of London in The Devil is an Ass, he took aim at 
one of its most potent symbols of greed and corruption.There is little comparison between 
Sir Politic and the riotous plotting of Merecraft, dealing projects like cards: aqua vitae, dog­
skin leather, bottled ale, wine from raisins, the new office of master of dépendances, 
cosmetics, and the uproarious sealing of toothpicks.'^ Merecraft’s entry is a projector’s tour
de force:
Sir, money's a whoie, a bawd, a dnidge,
Fit to run out on errands: let her go.
Via pecunia! When she's run and gone.
And fled and dead, then will I fetch her again 
With aqua-vitae out of an old hogshead!
I'll never want her! Coin her out of cobwebs.
Dust, but I'll have her! Raise wool upon eggshells,
Sh, and make grass grow out o'marrow bones.
To make her come.^''
But where Sir Politic is the naive, would-be practitioner of politics and purveyor of 
projects, Merecraft and his circle are a projector and clientage with harder edges. These are 
characters whose satirical value might well depend more upon the quality of performances 
than the nature of their lines, dialogue which sometimes contains too much truth for
LansdowneMs 165, fol. 225v (1 June, 1613).
^^Jonson, Volpone. ed. Parker, 227n.
'7jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 46n40.
l^Jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 2 and 11-12; Leah Marcus, The Politics of Mirth: Jonson. Herrick. Milton. Marvel, 
and the Defense of Old Holidav Pastimes (Chicago, 1986), 85-105. 
l^Jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 92-99,139-140,
2®Joiison, Devil, ed. Happe, 92.
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humour.2' The bluff projector's greed and manipulation was applied to one of the most
grandiose projects, draining the fenlands in Anglia (with inventions akin to waterworks):
I'll drive his patent for him.
We'll take in cittizens, commoners, and aldermen,
To bear the charge, and blow 'em off again, 
lik e  so many dead flies, when 'tis carried.
The thing is for recoveiy of drowned land,
Wliereof the Crown's to have his moiety.
If it be owner; else, the Crown and owners 
To share that moiety: and the recoverers 
To'enioy the tother moiety, for their charge...
Yes, which will arise
To eighteen rmlhons, seven the first yeere:
I have computed all and made my survey
Projectors' works remained just so much scheming unless they found favour at court
and Merecraft’s cruel wife. Lady Tailbush is Jonson's vehicle for criticizing the court
intrigues behind these suits. She is Merecraft's match, scolding him for delays:
A pox upo' referring to commissioners.
I'd rather hear that it were past the seals:
Your courtiers move so snailike i' your business.
Would I had not begun wi' you.73
Merecraft assures Tailbush their suit has been referred, but only when the wife of Merecraft’s
counsel, Sir Paul Eitherside—frequently interpreted as a guise for Edward Coke-arrives from
court with confirmation does Tailbush rejoice,24 And a vicious greedy rant it is:
Yes, iaith, there's life in't now: it is reteixed.
If we once see it under the seals, wench, then 
Have with 'em for the great caroche, six horses,
And the two coachmen, with my Ambler bare.
And my three women: we will live, i' faith.
The examples o' the town, and govern it.
21lhe play was not well received by James on a number of grounds including reference to the Overbury scandal 
and projects. Jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 11-16; Marcus, Mirth. 99-105.
22jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 94-95. BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 222r~223v (9 December, 1612), 224r-225v 
(16 July, 1619), 226r-227v (12 August, 1613), and 228r-229v; also Richard Hoyle, 'Disafforestation and 
drainage: the Crown as entrepreneur?', Hoyle, Estates 1558-1640.376-388.
23Jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 160.
24jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 13 and 163; also Marcus, Politics of Mirth. 91-93 for her interpretation of 
Eitherside.
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I'll lead the lashion stilL...
I'll every day
Bring up some new device. Thou and I Eitherside,
Will first be in it, I will give it thee;
And they shall follow us. Thou shalt, I swear
Wear every month a new gown out of it.25
While Jonson's epilogue to the play’s denouement asserts ’’Thus the projector here is 
overthrown’, Leah Marcus writes that ’So far as we can tell, Merecraft, Everill, and Ingine are 
left free at play's end to pick up the broken pieces of their plots and go to work on a fresh set 
of gullible squires'.26
This is dramatically displeasing, but it may be Jonson’s shaipest commentary on the 
reality of projectors. Despite failures or deceits, the Jacobean Merecrafts, Thomas Shirley, 
Giles Mompesson, Arthur Ingram, William Cockayne, and their colleagues, kept on with 
their designs and never seemed to be brought to account. The character of Eitherside, lawyer 
and justice, must represent one key to this phenomena, ’allied for his own gain with City 
devils like Merecraft and Guilthead [a Jacobean ’Goldfinger']; his eagerness to pervert the 
workings of the law result in part from this shady partnership.'2? This ’shady partnership' of 
law and projects would become the cause célèbre in the parliament of 1621. The law 
offtcers-’referees’—responsible for certifying the legality and advisability of projects were 
investigated with severity and Lord Chancellor Bacon was impeached for his complicity. 
Ironically it was Edward Coke—Jonson’s Eitherside?—who led the charge against projectors.
Jonson’s use of the Fenlands pointed directly at the other pivot: 'James himself was an 
Eitherside, drawn into a wide variety of schemes by his pressing need for funds.... Simply by 
tying the City devil Merecraft to the "Crown" in connections with shady schemes which 
resembled actual contemporary projects, Jonson echoes Dekker and other critics of the king's 
financial dealings.'28 This judgment is astute and Jonson may well have meant James to 
understand he 'alone is capable of exorcising the projectors of London [and its other vices]
25jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 163-164. 
26jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 223. 
27Marcus, Politics of Mirth. 92. 
28Marcus, Politics of Mirth. 100-101.
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and completing the action ... so that genuine justice prevails.'^  ^ Yet projectors' wits were not 
easily countered as Merecraft proclaims in Jonson’s concluding scene, enjoining his 
conspirator Everill to 'be confident, 'Tis no hard thing t'outdoe the Devil in: A boy o' thirteen 
year old made him an ass But t'other day.'^ o
Ben Jonson sought to counsel James against the vices which inhabited the political 
and social center of his kingdom. Thomas Scott addressed himself to the judges at the 
summer assizes in a sermon he hoped would reverberate throughout the realm. He might 
'propound some admirable proiect, how to raise great summes of mony, filling the Exchequer, 
and those mountaines aloft, without drayning the Country bogges below, I should be 
welcome to Court, and my message and person intertaind with fauour,'^ ' But Scott had 
something very different to offer than Merecraft: 'Justice exalteth a Nation. Here is a Proiect 
to make you rich.'32 The conjunctions of justice-honour and sin-shame were the marks of a 
godly and virtuous commonwealth, but had not Jacobean England married justice with shame 
and sin to honour?33 Scott’s was a project 'more profitable, more gainefull, more necessarie; 
a warre more safe, more glorious, more honorable’ than any fevered device to fill the 
Exchequer.34 Each subject must judge theirs and the realm's virtue and by 'execution of 
iustice vpon himselfe, he may helpe forward to aduance the glorify of a State. But if (being 
no public person) hee cannot by Justice exalt a Nation, yet by abstaining from sinne, hee may 
bee one of the ten to preserue a people from shame’.35
Not unexpectedly in a sermon to the assize justices, Scott tailored his message to 
judges, plaintiffs, defendants, and witnesses. Judges were pressed to virtuous service: 'Your 
good words doe well, your good workes, and good examples doe better.... see, examine, 
search out truth and falshood, vice and vertue, right and wrong; for therein consisteth the
2^Marcus, Politics of Mirth. 94.
^®Jonson, Devil, ed. Happe, 206.
3lThomas Scott. The Projector (London. 1623) [STC 22081], 18.
37'Scott, Projector. 19.
33scott, Projector. 2-17 and 32-35.
34scott, Projector. 18.
3^The reference is to Lot, who would have preserved Sodom 'if there could haue beene found nine more iust like 
himselfe in that Citie.' Scott, Projector. 29.
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glory of a Magistrate; the aduantage of place giues you meanes to do if. 36 Judges must never 
forget that 'the shame of euill gouernement befals the Gouemours.' Plaintiffs and defendants 
should by their own virtue desist trom being 'wranglers and malicious persons, who seeke 
and hunt after occasions of suite and contention' and be restrained from such behaviour by 
severe public censure. The burden of forthright honesty rested most heavily upon witnesses 
whose deceits were offences against their consciences, the innocent, the judges, and god.37 
By this project, true justice would be restored and the 'decayes of the Church and State both 
in Honour and Revenue' reformed.38
Scott's discussion largely took place on a philosophical level, but he lightly spiced it 
with real-world examples and the language of projectors. JP’s were encouraged to emulate 
their higher judicial brethren in 'this large Patent of Iustice'.39 Jf any project entered popular 
culture it was Giles Mompesson's notorious alehouse patent and Scott wielded it as 
exemplary condemnation of projectors, their perversion of the course of justice, and damage 
to society. The project of justice would exalt the nation and recreate a time when 'euery man 
dares buy and sell, without feare of cousening, dares flie to the Courts of Conscience without 
feare of vndoing; dares plant, and plow, and sow, and reape, and grow honestly rich, and be 
knowne to be so, without feare of Empson and Dudley, or the like'.^ How could the English 
people feel so little shame for ignoring justice and virtue, 'wee that Hue in the cleare light of 
the Gospell?’4i Scott faced the pejorative projector with a mirror and, in so doing, confronted 
him with his twin in service to the commonwealth, furthering the ideals of justice and 
morality.
Pi’ojects were meant to pair private gain and public good for mutual benefit, but it 
was often a tense or incompatible partnership in practice.42 This problem preoccupied James'
36scott, Projector. 19-20.
37scott, Projector. 25-27.
38scott, Projector, tjtle page.
39scott, Projector. 21.
^®Scott, Projector. 11.
41Scott, Projector. 34-35.
'^ 2^peck. Court Patronage. 136-151; Thjrsk. Policy and Projects. 51-105.
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ministers and the project for copper base money is a case in p o i n t . ^ 3  Salisbury, Caesar and 
Bacon evaluated its fiscal and legal aspects in August 1608. Initially Salisbury wrote Caesar, 
’The more I look into our mony Proiect... the worse I like it, & therefore we must try some 
other means or ells it will goe hard w[i]th us.'44 Further examination only intensified 
Salisbury’s dislike, believing ’that nothing but inevitable necessitie can speak any word for 
it.'45 The projector was taken to task for setting down 'many weake and false grownds, and 
the same answered againe by the opposer w[i]th many weake and absurd reasons.' But it was 
clear the suitor had James' ear and Salisbury could not dismiss the project out of hand while 
attending the king on progress. Rather, deliberate deception was to be employed to subvert 
it: 'seeing the examples round about us censure not this cause negatively, but raise great 
benefitt by it.' Salisbury returned the project for Bacon's perusal, 'to handle it in his owne 
cogitation, and though it never come to execution, yett to give us his opinion (when wee shall 
meett) eyther uppon this as it is or as he could wishe it'. 'In the meane tyme', Salisbury 
concluded, 'lett it passe among our selves, for the best Alcumest in England will never washe 
out all the poyson of this Mercurye.' Salisbury was astute for the project finally found life in 
the hands of Lord Harrington, but only after the treasurer's demise and against the objections 
of Caesar and the treasury commissioners.
The corruption and incompetence of projectors and undertakers particularly concerned 
Ellesmere and his thoughts encapsulate the issues. The furtherance of suits and projects had 
diverted revenue from James' coffers into private hands while the new offices created were 
often needless and offensive to the s u b j e c t . ^ 6  future 'yf p[er]son shall make any proiecte or
offer of any sute wherby p[ro]fitt may be made, then the same to be converted to the increase 
of his Ma[jes]tes revenew, so farre forthe as maye stande w[i]th Justice, honour & 
conscience. And may be wythout inconvenience, grevance or offence to the people, ffor that 
is a poynt to be in all such sûtes specially r e g a r d e d ." ^ ^  Ellesmae did not reject projects, but
‘^ 3There are a number of copper money projects in Salisbuiy's book, but most likely the one referred to here is 
BL Harleian Ms 4807, fol. 3r~4v and/or 52r-54v; others are Harleian Ms 4807, fol. lOr-1 Iv, 12r-13v, and 55r- 
56v.
^ B L  Additional Ms 36767, fol. 196r.
"^%L Additional Ms 36767, fol. 202r (14 August, 1608).
46h h L Ellesmere Ms 2610/1 and 3 [Ellesmere's pagination]
47h HL Ellesmere Ms 2610/2.
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too many projectors had gained by 'shyftes & bargaynes'.^  ^ He demanded that special regard 
be had to the 'Integritye & fidelitye of the Ministers, to whome so great a charge & truste 
shall be com[m]itted', preferring always 'industrious and apte p [ e r ] s o n s ' . ^ 9  Dorset and 
Salisbury would have agreed. Dorset fulminated to Salisbury about Mr. Yewart, a general 
surveyor employed in the business of enfranchising copyholds within the manor of 
Wakefield.^ 0 His 'large promises & litle p[er]formans' drove Dorset's intention to 'thrust him 
out of comission & never [again] conioine so bad a man, so extortions & so bankrout with 
knights & gentlemen that intend nothing but honest, sincere & profitable preceding for the 
king'. Salisbury pronounced judgment on a project by Thomas Shirley in a letter to Caesar: 
'I frame no hopes out of this Proiect knowing the man as I do', from whom 'I never expect 
more then ye first payment (if any), for divers reasons w[hi]ch 1 will tell yow’.^ i
Dissatisfaction with projects and projectors was expressed in James' early 
parliaments, an almost pervasive Tacitean outlook that men would 'alwaies be more moved 
with private interest, then with publike p r o f i f .^2 j u  1 6 0 6 ,  the house threw out a bill for 
registering titles to lands because it would 'breade a new office'.^s Edwin Sandys suggested 
James part with purveyance in return for uncontested titles to and rents from drained 
Fenlands, believing it 'more acceptable to the people that the King receave the profit' than 
private undertakers.^  ^ The Elizabethan patent of Edwaid Hoby for 'Wooll jobbing and 
brogging’ was contested for the deceptive practices of his executors, its inflationary effects, 
and private profit coming at the consumers' expense.^  ^ The project for defective titles was 
adjudged gracious in James' mind, honourably performed by the commissioners, but William 
Tipper 'employed in the Execution hereof, doth grieve the People'; Tipper was 'a Person 
Notorious for his Evill Courses' and long detested for his 'Wicked, Odious, and Ungodly
48h HL EUesmere Ms 2610/8.
4^HFIL Ellesmere Ms 2610/8 and 9 respectively. Ellesmere was particularly incensed by the undertakers 
responsible for land sales, assarts, defective titles, survey o f woods, and leases in reversion.
50h H Salisbury Ms 120, fol. 150r (5 April, 1607).
51b L Additional Ms 36767, fol. 204v (21 August, 1608).
^^Tuck, Philosophy and Government 74.
53willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.53.
54willson, (ed.) Bowver 1606-1607. 72.
55willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607. 141-143.
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P r a c t i s e s ' . 5 6  James' counselled Prince Henry that Tustice should be blinde and friendlesse; it 
is not there ye should reward your friends, or seeke to crosse your enemies’, but it was 
difficult for the king's subjects to discern these maxims in the practices of many p r o j e c t o r s . ^ 7  
The virtuous projector remained a rarity in the Jacobean mental world. Sir Politic and 
Merecraft commanded the stage.
m
It was a sombre irony that James’ ministers understood the political destructiveness of 
their fiscal policies, yet deluded themselves into believing they could put an agreeable gloss 
on them when challenged. When James settled upon parliament as a tool of diplomatic 
persuasion in the Palatinate crisis and quest for the Spanish match, his ministers, Bacon chief 
among them, knew dangers loomed for the session.^s Monopolies, more than impositions, 
threatened to cripple any display of political harmony for foreign consumption. The tobacco 
monopoly occasioned assessment by Chamberlain: ’in truth the world doth ever growne 
under the burthen of these perpetual! patents, w[hi]ch are become so frequent, that whereas at 
the K[ing]s comming in there were complaints of some eight or nine monopolies then in 
beeing, they are now said to be multiplied to so many scores.'^ 9 What measures of hyperbole 
and reality did Chamberlain’s commentary encompass?®" Numbers support his sense of the 
times. Thirty-eight patents were termed grievances or received extended complaint in 
parliament. Thirty-three of them were granted or confirmed between 1617-1620; on average, 
eight a year.®^  The preponderance in these years is put in perspective by a second list, 79 of 
James' grants 'like those w[hi]ch have bene questioned’.®^  The period 1603-1617 averaged 
under four grants a year; in the three years following the median was over nine. When both
5®witison (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.147-148. Tipper was also censured for having access to title records in the 
king's hands which defendants were barred from using in their defense. Willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.133. 
^^King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 24.
^®Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 18-20. Russell. Parliaments. 87-91.
^"PRO SP 14/116/13, fol. 20v (8 July, 1620).
""Fortunately, there are multiple compilations of grants subsequently questioned in the Commons. PRO SP 
14/121/48, fol. 106r-107v; SP 14/121/49, fol. 108r-109v; SP 14/121/123, fol. 231r-231v; SP 14/121/124, fol. 
232r-232v; SP 14/121/125, fol. 234r-236v. The latter is the most complete list.
®lNine of the patents had extended histories, sometimes Elizabethan. Where multiple grants were made, the 
most recent grant or confirmation was used for purposes o f tabulation. PRO SP 14/121/125, fol. 234r; dating 
from Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. Vn, 311-564 (Appendix B, Grants). O f the remaining five 
grants, three were in 1615 and two had datings too varied to include.
®2pRO SP 14/121/125, fol. 234r-236r.
104
The Patronage Culture and the Corruption of Projects
sets are integrated the average grants between 1615 and 1620 rise to almost fourteen; the 
median is eighteen from 1618-1620; a remarkable 19 and 24 grants were made respectively in 
1618 and 1619 alone.®  ^ Chamberlain was entitled to think projectors were belabouring the 
commonwealth as never before.
Proclamations were also a touchstone for Chamberlain, in this case compositions for 
new buildings in London: 'On Wensday, divers were censured in the starchamber for
building contrarie to the K[ing]s proclamation, w[hi]ch was so farr inforced that the L[ord] 
Chiefe Justice said that yt was in effect and had the nature of an act of parliament.’®^ He later 
described the rise of an ominous partnership: 'indeed the world is now much terrified with 
the starchamber, there beeing not so little an offence against any proclamation but is liable 
and subiect to the censure of that court and for proclamations and patents they are become so 
ordinarie, that there is no end, every day bringing forth some new proiect or other'.®^  There 
was much truth in the assertion. In the past eighteen years, proclamations had furthered the 
cause of numerous projects, monopolistic or otherwise: the various faces of the tin business, 
assarts, defective titles, depopulations and enclosures, starch, jurors, alienations, alehouses, 
the alum works, fishing licences, an imposition on pepper, silk, dyed and dressed cloth, 
farthing tokens, felts, whale-fins, glass, forest laws, gold and silver thread, pins, wine casks, 
dyeing with logwood, the hot press for finished cloth, tobacco pipe-makers, and tobacco 
among them.®® Chamberlain was witnessing the conjunction of projects, proclamations, and
®3pRO SP 14/121/125, fol. 234r-236r. Including the earlier grants in these patents' histories would increase the 
average before 1617, but not o f the order o f magnitude for the period 1617-1620.
®4pRO SP 14/105/68, fol. 89r-89v (30 January, 1619).
®5pRO SP 14/116/13, fol. 20r-20v.
®®Larkin and Hughes Proclamations: James 1 .28-29 (tin; 16 June, 1603), 105-108 (leases and assarts; 17 
February, 1605), 111-112 (buildings in London; 1 March, 1605), 113-114 (assarts; 8 July, 1605), 154-158 
(depopidations and enclosures; 28 June, 1607), 161-162 (enclosures; 24 July, 1607), 163-166 (starch; 23 
August, 1607), 167-171 (jurors; 5 October, 1607), 171-175 (buildings; 12 October, 1607), 188-192 (starch; 5 
July, 1608), 193-195 (buildings; 25 July, 1608), 197-200 (alienations; 1 October, 1608), 200-202 (alehouses; 12 
December, 1608), 209-211 (alienations; 18 February, 1609), 213-217 (defective titles; 22 April, 1609), 217-219 
(6 May, 1609), 224-227 (alum; 19 June, 1609), 233-236 (pepper; 30 November, 1609), 236-237 (defective titles; 
30 November, 1609), 237-241 (starch; 10 January, 1610), 241-242 (defective titles; 11 February, 1610), 250- 
253 (starch; 22 August, 1610), 267-269 (buildings; 3 August, 1611), 169-271 (buildings; 10 September, 1611), 
282-283 (silk; 17 July, 1612), 287-290 (farthing tokens; 19 May, 1613), 299-300 (felts, 2 December, 1613), 
300-302 (dyeing cloth; 7 December, 1613), 308-310 (fartliing tokens; 21 June, 1614), 312-314 (whale-fins; 11 
September, 1614), 319-322 (alum; 10 October, 1614), 327-329 (dyeing and dressing cloth; 2 December, 1614), 
342-343 (glass; 23 May, 1615), 345-347 (buildings; 16 July, 1615), 348 (forest laws; 16 September, 1615), 350- 
351 (farthing tokens; 26 October, 1615), 352-354 (tin; 26 October, 1615), 363-365 (farthing tokens; 17 March, 
1617), 380-384 (alum; 16 March, 1618), 384-389 (gold and silver thread; 22 March, 1618), 398-400 (buildings; 
20 July, 1618), 401-402 (pins; 20 July, 1618), 409-413 (alehouses; 19 January, 1619), 426-428 (defective titles;
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Star Chamber being infused with Bacon's force of will as lord chancellor. In 1620, Bacon 
was behind the most unrelenting exploitation of proclamations and Star Chamber for fiscal 
ends that took place in James' reign. Eight of fourteen proclamations served the turns of 
projects, a preponderance rivalled only in 1607-1610, and 1614.®^
This was established policy. Conciliar plans in 1617 first gave serious attention to 
Star Chamber fines as a major revenue in their own right.®® After a false start late in 1618, 
the second treasury commission proceeded against the Dutch merchant community for 
exporting bullion in contravention of James' numerous proclamations.®  ^ This was the most 
lucrative Jacobean use of Star C h a m b e r .  7" Bacon sent James a remarkable proposal at the 
new year, 1620. Conforming to his later interpretation of Henry VII, Bacon suggested James 
assume the mantle of law-giver and publicly proclaim certain commonwealth commissions in 
Star Chamber.^ i Bacon's commissions are instructive. He cited the two standing 
commissions as examples, navy and buildings, to which he added others for advancing the 
cloth trade, preserving coin and bullion, regulating imports and exports of grain, suppressing 
the grievances of informers, tightening administration of the Irish plantations, and expanding 
stocks of ordnance, powder, munitions, and armour. With the possible exception of corn, the 
commissions had obvious, sometimes proven, revenue possibilities directly, by patents, or 
through punitive fines. Two others, preventing depopulations and recovery of drowned 
lands, were blatant projects. James was persuaded. He hoped Bacon would examine them
13 Febmary, 1619), 428-431 (buildings; 12 March, 1619), 441-446 (gold and silver thread; 10 October, 1619), 
455-457 (wine casks; 9 December, 1619), 457-460 (tobacco; 30 December, 1619), 464-466 (glass; 25 February, 
1620), 467-469 (logwood; 29 February, 1620), 470-472 (hot press; 22 March, 1620), 473-475 (starch; 5 May, 
1620), 478-480 (tobacco pipe-makers; 27 May, 1620), 481-484 (tobacco; 29 June, 1620), 485-488 (buddings; 17 
July, 1620).
®^1607,11 proclamations/ 5 for projects; 1608,10/4; 1609,15/7; 1610, 8/4; 1614,10/5. Larkin and Hughes 
(eds.), Proclamations: James I . xv-xxvi.
®®PRO SP 14/90/71, fol. 135r (20 February, 1617).
®9Spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 374-375 and PRO SP 14/109/87, fol. 160r-161v (11 June, 1619).
™PRO SP 14/109/112, fol. 203r-203v (26 June, 1619). The case can be followed in PRO SP 14/109/90, fol. 
164r-165v; SP 14/109/96, fol. 172r-175v; SP 14/109/101, fol. 180r-181v; SP 14/109/102, fol. 182r-183v; SP 
14/109/103, fol. 184r-185v; SP 14/111/66, fol. 106r~106v (8 December, 1619); SP 14/112/29, fol. 50r-51v (22 
January, 1620); SP 14/116/121, fol. 172r (29 September, 1620); BL Additional Ms 64786, fol. 154r-155v (8 
January, 1620); CKS U269/1.0E1424 [Cranfield Ms 6279] (1 March, 1619[1620]); Thomas G. Barnes, Mr 
Hudson's Star Chamber', Guth and McKenna (eds.), Tudor Rule and Revolution. 302; Spedding, Letters and 
Life, vn , 60-74; Samuel Rawson Gardiner (ed.L The Fortescue Papers (London. 1871), 96-99,104-108,131- 
132.
^^  Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 70-73; Spedding, Ellis, and Heath, The Works of Francis Bacon. VI, 85,242.
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and 'keep the clock still going, his profit being so much interested therein'J2 The 
commissions eventually chosen were unlikely to prove profitable, poor relief, suppressing 
vagabonds, and informers, and Bacon appears to have backed down from his initial 
enthusiasm, writing Buckingham that those tlrree alone were ready and concerned 'the 
execution of any law, for which my speech was p r o p e r . ' ^ ^  William Hudson's treatise on Star 
Chamber attacked the instrumentalism of Bacon' p o l i c i e s . ^ ^  jje damned Bacon's miscarriages 
of justice in the merchants’ case, establishing 'many dangerous precedents to the "antient 
course" of a court renowned for its justice ... from an excess of a zeal for the court's power 
and the king's [fiscal] interest.' The learned lord chancellor failed as Star Chamber's president 
because he gave ammunition to the 'rising tide of calumny' against it and could not effect the 
internal reforms necessary to protect it.
Bacon's attitudes which approved transforming Star Chamber into a truncheon for 
profit underpinned the dramatic expansion of monopolistic projects in these same years. Two 
moments in the tobacco projects are revealing.75 James loathed the 'noysome and running 
Weede', but the tobacco impost was a welcome revenue.^ ® The growth of English tobacco 
was prohibited by proclamation in December 1619, part of a larger project whereby the 
Virginia Company agreed to pay an additional 6d impost on tobacco sold in B r it a in .  7? In 
effect, a monopoly was being granted to traders in foreign tobacco. Bacon and Cranfield 
guided the project.'^ ® Bacon wanted agreement on the impost and farming the tobacco 
customs before the proclamation lest its motives be impugned. He pondered there might 
'occur some doubt in law, because it restraineth the subject in employment of his freehold at 
his liberty.' But Bacon's sense of the public good brushed aside monopolistic concerns:
^^Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 73 (Buckingham to Bacon; 19 January, 1619) and 75 (Buckingham to Bacon; 
22 January, 1619) respectively.
^^Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 81 (Bacon to Buckingham; 17 Februaiy, 1619).
^%arnes, 'Star Chamber', 297-304.
^^The stages and associated projects are well abstracted in Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. VII, 
450-461.
^®Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1.458 (30 December, 1619); Dietz, Public Finance. 350-357. 
^^Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1.459n and Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. 
VII, 454-455.
^®Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 62 (Bacon to Buckingham; 22 November, 1619); Prestwich, Cranfield. 243- 
244.
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'being for so many reasons pro bona publico, I think it is good enough.' James agreed 
completely, 'holding this the safest rule, Salus reipubllcae suprerm lex esto': let the safety or 
welfare of the people be the supreme law.^  ^ Another proclamation in June 1620 enforced a 
monopoly grant of the entire trade 'to a group of merchants headed by Sir Thomas Roe, in 
exchange for an annual rent of £16,000', a deal negotiated by Cranfield.®" The Virginia 
company lost heavily because the patentees were allowed to traffic in cheaper Spanish 
tobacco. Members of the company, including its director, the outspoken parliamentarian 
Edwin Sandys, would soon put Bacon's pro bono publico monopoly to the question. James' 
'safest rule' would not protect the witches' brew of projects, proclamations, and Star Chamber 
from Commons scrutiny.
For the ministers who had guided this unprecedented expansion, the recourse to 
parliament in 1621 was problematic. They knew patents and proclamations would become an 
issue. Chamberlain wrote, 'we are in suspense whether we shall have a parliament after 
Christmas or no, for mine owne part I cannot perceve any goode either way, for impositions 
and patents are growne so grievous that of necessitie they must be spoke of, and the 
prerogative on the other side is become so tender that... yt cannot endure to be touched.'®! 
He added, 'many new patents have come foorth and more dayly expected' and cited those for 
tobacco, saltpetre, scouring armour, hay, printed matter, stamping linen, and probate of 
wills;®2 all of which eventually found their way into the Commons’ grievances.®  ^ James 
sought an agenda for the session from Bacon, in consultation with the two Chief Justices 
[Hobart and Montagu] ('old Parhament-men’) and 'Sir Edward Cook (who is also their senior 
in the school) and Sir Randall Crewe the last Speaker'.®  ^ After initially being excluded. Coke 
was added to this inner circle.®^
^^Spedding, Letters and Lite. VII, 64 (Buckingham to Bacon; 27 November, 1619).
®"Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1.482n (29 June, 1620); Prestwich, Cranfield. 244.
®!pRO SP 14/117/37, fol. 83r (28 October, 1620).
®2pRO SP 14/117/37, fol. 83r.
®3pRO SP 14/121/125, fol. 234r.
®^Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 114 (Bacon to King James; 2 October, 1620).
®^ In drafting the proclamation. Bacon referred to 'my colleagues. Sir Edward Coke, the two Chief Justices, and 
Seqeant Crewe, who approve it well'. Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 123. Of Coke's involvement, Conrad 
Russell has written, 'James had advised Bacon to consult Coke on the preparation of business for the Parliament, 
advice Bacon imprudently failed to take.' Russell, Parliaments. 99. Also Jonathon Marwil, The Trials of
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Grievances were paramount. Bacon and his colleagues presented James with former 
complaints they thought likely to be renewed and new grievances: 'Proclamations and 
Commissions, and many Patents'.®® The contentious 'sorts of patents' were those for old 
debts, concealed revenues, and monopolies and forfeitures of penal laws.®  ^ Bacon employed 
a typology of patents which reveals the extent to which projects turned to private gain, not 
simply monopolistic devices, were the grievances. By condemning projects and patents as 
monopolies the Commons was to paint them in a particularly unpopular colour with bold 
hues of illegality. Bacon's distinction was lost in the session's zeal and has been little 
appreciated since. Old debts and concealments were legal and required separate treatment. 
Bacon advised an elaborate pretence: 'if some grave and discreet gentlemen of the country, 
such as have least relation to the court, make at fit times some modest motion touching the 
same; That his Majesty would be graciously pleased to permit some law to pass (for the past 
time only) no ways touching his Majesty's regal power, to free his subjects from the same'. 
After a show of deliberation, James should then 'give way.’
Monopolies were to be dealt with by similar Baconian subterfuge. James should 
chose a number to be revoked. Then they should 'be questioned before the Council-Table, 
either as granted contrary to his Majesty's book of bounty, or found since to have been abused 
in the execution, or otherwise by experience discovered to be burdensome to the countiy.' 
Further, their suspension should not have the taint of 'preparation to a Parliament', but a 
continuance 'of the Council's former diligence and vigilancy, which hath already stayed and 
revoked divers patents'. Tellingly, they affirmed so many remained that their suspension en 
masse would 'give more scandal that such things were granted, than cause thanks that they be 
now revoked.'®® James was also given a complete breakdown of the grants with their suitors 
and patentees. They were wary of meddling with proclamations and commissions. Loath to
Counsel: Francis Bacon in 1621 ('Detroit. 1976), 16-24. Robert Zaller. The Parliament of 1621: A Study in 
Constitutional Conflict (Berkeley, 1971), 54-61.
®®Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 145 (29 November, 1620).
®^Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 146. Bacon added (hey 'were somewhat more frequent since the session of 
7mo [1610]'.
®®Spedding, Letters and l i f e . VII, 147. A similar view was taken by Lord Treasmer Buckhurst as he and 
Robert Cecil prepared for the 1601 parliament. Dean, Parliament 1584-1601. 86-87.
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attract the attention of suspending former proclamations by another; it was best if 'they fell 
away by taking away the Patents' attendant on them.
Bacon, Coke, Montagu, Hobart, and Crewe had crafted an ambitious solution to the 
explosion of patents which was destined to remain unrealized. They were ready to report 
their work by mid-December and debated suspending the patents in council.®" Bacon argued 
conciliar attention would prevent them being contested in parliament and diverting attention; 
enough innocuous patents remained if parliament had to feast on something. Bacon likened 
his persuasion to 'Ovid's mistress, that strove, but yet was as one that would be overcomen', 
Conciliar opposition was both obstructive and rational. Members of parliament would 
probably have viewed it, correctly, as tactical. Setting parliament an unwanted agenda would 
be pointless, but contending that offered graces lost their value and that parliament had to be 
left to pick at something of their own design were rhetorical arguments."" Self-interest was at 
the heart of opposition. Why should the councillors willingly deliver up projects profitable to 
the king, themselves, or eitheds servants?"! Opponents made a point of arguing that 'former 
patents taken away by act of Council were upon the complaints of particular persons' rather 
than as some general obligation."^ There was no willingness, largely for reasons of 
patronage, to part with patents unless or until they became specifically objectionable.
Buckingham is the bell-weather. Among those to be suspended. Bacon and his 
colleagues included 'three which may concern some of your Lordship's special friends ... that 
to Sir G. Mompessons, touching the inns; The second to Mr Christopher Villiers and Mr. 
Maule, touching the recognizances for ale-houses: The third, to Mr. Lieutenant of the Tower, 
touching the cask.'"3 Bacon warned the patents could not be protected 'for that (specially the 
first two of them) are more rumoured, both by the vulgar and by the gentlemen, yea, and by 
the Judges themselves, then any other patents at this day.’ Bacon advised the favourite to 'put
®"Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 151-152 (Bacon to Buckingham; 16 December, 1620). The council debate 
t(X)k place 'two days past' or 14 December. It might be noted that this meeting found no record in the privy 
council registers. Acts 1619-1621.320-331.
""spedding. Letters and Life. VII, 152.
"!por instance, two of Mandeville's servants held the much disputed patent for licensing inns. Russell, 
Parliaments. 101-104, also 125n.
"^Spedding, letters and Life. VII, 152.
"^Spedding, Letters and l i f e . VII, 148-149 (Bacon to Buckingham; 29 November, 1620).
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off the envy of these things (which I think will in themselves bear no great fruit), and take the 
thanks for ceasing them, than the note for maintaining them.' This was courageous work for 
Bacon, but Buckingham was unyielding. Bacon broached the subject again after his failure in 
council, but to no avail."  ^ The very next day, Buckingham conveyed James' approval of 
Robert Flood being named patentee of the new office of engrossing wills;"  ^ an individual 
seconded by Bacon and Mandeville, to a grant pressed for by Christopher Villiers, and soon 
condemned at parliament’s hands."®
Three years earlier Buckingham had persuaded James to sever the privy council's 
authority when it proved unreceptive to retrenchment."? This time, Buckingham used the 
council as a stop against measures he disapproved. However, Bacon urged again the 
importance of 'a middle thing between art and chance: I think they call it providence, or 
some such thing; which good servants owe to their sovereign, specially in cases of 
importance and straits of occasions.’"® Bacon proffered further advice which he asked the 
king to peruse and then 'give me leave to wait on him', but preventative efforts with patents 
were dead. Bacon remained undeterred and attempted to intervene personally with James, 
bypassing Buckingham. This effectively doomed his partnership with the favourite. 
However, Buckingham's chance did not wholly triumph over Bacon's art. Vested patent 
interests were content to weather whatever storm might be generated in parliament, but they 
expected to mitigate its severity by framing the debate on the floor. Providence took the form 
of Edward Coke and Lionel Cranfield once the session began, prompting the outspoken 
Edward Alford to observe the readiness of James' councillors to 'doe the Commonwealth 
service.'""
IV
"'^spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 153.
"^Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 154 (Buckingham to Bacon and Mandeville; 17 December, 1620).
"®For the progress of the grant see Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 121-122,140-141, 150-151, 154; Notestein, 
Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. VII, 469-470.
"?Below, 223-229.
"®Spedding, Letter’s and Life. VII, 155 (Bacon to Buckingham; 23 December, 1620).
""Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. VI, 251 (19 Febmary).
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James’ opening speech promised legislation and redressed grievances would be the 
members reward for voting supply.!"" Cranfield and Coke structured this reciprocal agenda 
during debate of the king's address. Cranfield offered that 'supplies and grievances might go 
forward hand in hand.'!"! Coke recommended that the 1610 grievances be examined—an 
earlier act of preparation; Coke was proposing a path he had already trod. He echoed 
Cranfield: 'Let grievances be then spoken with duty and comeliness and what the true cause 
of them are, I shall be ready to further it. And if you should begin with the subsidy, yet let 
both grievances and subsidy end together. For they are like Hippocrates' twins.' He furthered 
the crown's constructive engagement by supporting immediate supply. In joining 
Hippocrates' twins, Cranfield and Coke put patents on the agenda along with religion, trade, 
and justice. !"2 Far from being an unwanted consequence of Commons' debates over 
economic hardship, as Conrad Russell states, patents were put on the block by the action of 
James' councillors. !"^
The Commons Initially stalled over freedom of debate, but it took only an afternoon’s 
debate for them to resolve upon supplying James once that was settled. !"^  Differing opinions 
on the size of the grant followed until Edwin Sandys suggested they give two subsidies as 'a 
present of love to the King ... in regard that it is no proportion for the regaining of the 
Palatinate, and therefore instead of terrifying our enemies it will hearten them’.!"^  Sandys' 
motion carried the debate and Coke delivered James thanks the next day.!"" Their 'fiee and 
not merchant-like dealing' would preserve his honour abroad and yield redress at home. His 
councillors promised he would meet them 'above half the way' with grievances. Coke’s own 
motion had precipitated this official support and the Commons should 'strike while the iron is 
hot and to appoint two days every week to hear grievances.' Thomas Crew reiterated that 
'there is nothing reasonable that we can ask but we shall have.'
! ""Russell. Parliaments. 84-91 and 118-121.
!"!Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 22-23 (5 Febmary).
! "^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. V, 437 (5 February).
!"3For a different perspective see Russell, Parliaments. 98-100.
!"4Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 25-92.
!"5Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. n , 91.
! ""Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 92-94 (16 Febmary, 1621).
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Craniield's speech the previous day restated the grievances as judicial abuses, decayed 
and unbalanced trade, and patents J"? He laid the boundaries of acceptable debate—over- 
broadly as it turned out: 'what patent hath not had a fair pretence, I know something because 
I have been a Master of Requests. In the beginning of a petition for a patent are the reasons 
of it, in the end the names of the parties. The King was ever jealous and would not refer it to 
those whose names were in it. If the referees be in fault, can he do himself more honor than 
to call them to account? If the fault be not in them, but in the executioners, do you not think 
that the King will punish them that shall abuse his grace?’ They could attack projects, 
undertakers, even referees, but James was absolved and, thereby, the prerogative. William 
Noy concurred: 'All peticions begin with favourable shewes of proffit. The Kinge rests not 
in this but refers them all.'!"® Therefore the projects must be examined, some 'are good in 
truth but abused, other[s] ill in their owne nature.' All projectors should be called to 'geve an 
account of their good husbandrie; if they have done well, to be rewarded; if ill, to be 
punished.'
From Edward Coke's challenge to the alehouse proclamation, 'spronge divers Motions 
aswell conceminge Proclamacions in generall'.!"" Edward Montagu drew attention to recent 
proclamations 'for binding of victuallers for dressing of flesh in Lent'.ü" Laws against 
'killing, dressing, and eating of Flesh in Lent, or on Fish dayes' were to be strictly enforced 
nation-wide by recognizances.!!! The benefit of forfeitures were granted to several of James' 
servants, and complaints spurred by their zealous efforts to profit by it had to be arbitrated 
before the privy council. These events were enough for Montagu to adjudge the 
proclamations’ purpose had been to 'increse new fees, which is a grievance.'!!2 They also 
drew 'the punishment from the course of the Stattute and the penalties imposed by Lawe to a
!"?Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 89; also IV, 58-59. Cranfield was not alone citing patents. 
Sackville regarded monopolies as the principal grievances, which like 'incubus and succubus, suck out even the 
vital spirits o f the subjects.' Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 85.
!"®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 78-79 (19 February).
! ""Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 90 (22 February).
!!"Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 119 (22 February). The proclamations Montagu referred 
to are Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1.450-454 and 498.
! ! ! Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1. 450-454. 
ü^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 119.
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tryall in the Starchamber.'! Secretary Calvert defended the proclamation and recognizances 
as the best means available to enforce the statutes and disingenuously claimed that someone 
'went to make a suit of it, but the King would not hear of it.'ü^ Unmoved, Francis Barrington 
was certain there have never been such proclamations in Gloriana's time. Edward Alford 
steered debate back from Barrington's golden age to Jacobean reality: 'We sit here in 
parliament to make laws, where our ancestors have sat who have made laws that we are 
governed by and not by proclamations, which are annexed to the monopolies which are 
grievous to the realm.'! !^  John Glanville would not deny the 'power to make proclamations 
in matters of state', but their abuse 'by these projectors to private ends’ was unacceptable; 
James should be petitioned 'that they may be used but in matters of state' and with 
moderation,!!®
The Commons were in danger of missing the forest for the trees by straying into 
general complaints with proclamations rather than their particular abuses. Lionel Cranfield 
warned them off a course which would surely provoke James: 'We are in a good way on a 
good subject. To question the king's prerogative in making proclamations is not meant. But 
if there be any grievance in any proclamation, let us seek to remedy it by humble petition to 
the King.'!^? The familiar royal refrain for prerogative irritants delivered, Cranfield 
accommodated their sentiments: 'these proclamations are gotten from the King by the same 
degrees the patents are'—upon misinformation and untrue pretences. The Commons resolved 
that 'all such proclamations should be considered by the Grand Committee for Grievances'.!!® 
The committee's resolution against alehouses was confirmed by the house with the addition 
'that seeing Proclamations were not Laws absolute but temporary, that the Penalties of 
Proclamations were boundless and not to be used, but when Necessity of State requires.'!!" 
The language of the ensuing debates establishes that proclamations were at issue less because
Ü^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 90.
Ü^^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 119-120.
!!^BL Harleian Ms 7614 apparently contains Alford's analysis o f a whole range or Tudor and Jacobean 
proclamations. Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 120n.
!!®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 121.
!!?Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 121-122.
!!®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. n , 122.
!!"Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. V, 485 (22 February, 1621).
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of their frequency or legal standing than their use as tools of projects, particularly those 
entailing substantial private gain, Heanage Finch compellingly condemned the patent for 
gold and silver thread on these grounds: 'the pattent is not a greevance in itselfe for that it 
grants but a priviledge for a tyme to a new invencion; but the Commission and execution of 
the Pattent are accompanied with proclamations, wherupon terrour and suits in the 
Starchamber are greivances.'!^"
Coke weighed in against projects in decisive fashion. He placed himself among those 
opposing Bacon's conciliar option, 'against the callinge in of theis Pattents before the 
Parliament, because then they would have been kept in store for a newe suite. If they be 
questioned and punisht here, they must not speake for the same things againe.'!2i Coke 
borrowed further from the preparations: abusive patents were those for penal statutes
because the king cannot delegate his prerogative, new offices and old debts, and 
c o n c e a l m e n t s . ! ^ ^  Coke concluded with an extensive recital of precedents against 
monopolistic patents.!^3 The rest of the debate is clouded, but, by its conclusion, inns and 
alehouses had become the primary targets, the very patents which Bacon had advised 
Buckingham and his relatives to give up.!^ Giles Mompesson held the patent for inns and 
was summoned before the committee with his records,!^5 Mompesson and his deputies were 
authorized to licence inns nation-wide because that duty fell outside the authority of IP's and 
justice of the assize were unequal to the task;!2® the patentees were also empowered to punish 
unlicensed innkeepers. !2? Little discussion was required to convince members it was a 
grievance worth thorough examination. !2S Coke borrowed a criteria from his work with 
Bacon by which projects were subsequently judged: abuses in conception, execution, or
!2"Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. V, 32 (8 March, 1621).
IZlNotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 79; Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 151-152. 
122]sjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 79. Compare with Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 145- 
148.
!23]sjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 79-81 (19-20 February).
!24]S[otestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 81 and above.
!25Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 108 (20 Februaiy) and Debates 1621. VI, 251-257 (24 
April). The process of investigation is summarized in Foster, 'Patents', 64-75 and illustrated in Debates 1621. 
VI, 249-278.
!2®Russell. Parliaments. 101.
!27Motestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 108 and Debates 1621. VII, 379-387.
!28]sjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. VI, 257.
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both. Of Mompesson's patent, *as it was ill in the project, so it was worse in the 
e x e c u t i o n ' .  1 3 0  All projects were judged by this standard, including the other great disputes, 
alehouses and gold and silver t h r e a d .i3i The denunciation of these projects, their execution, 
the patentees, and the ministers who approved them is remarkably consistent.
Projects were condemned in conception for being contrary to the book of bounty by 
which 'no man shall presume to become a suitor for monopolies and dispensation of penal 
laws.'i32 Coke and Noy asserted that inns were a free trade allowed by the common law and 
could not be licensed.i33 The thread patentees held the sole making for 20 years as a new 
invention, but witnesses testified it had been in use for decades. 134 Alehousekeepers were 
bound by recognizance to maintain good order; patentees received the benefit of their 
forfeited bonds. 135 Coke and his colleagues were uncertain about this, but knew if they 
'branded it in the execution only, the commission might have start[ed] up again in a short 
tim e... we branded the very institution of it likewise.'136 Investigation uncovered remaikable 
abuses in execution.i37 Mompesson's agent begged the keeper of an alehouse for lodging and 
promptly served him with process for keeping an inn without licence when he was offered the 
keeper's bed.i38 Forcing innkeepers to take licences, the explosion of inns given the profit 
incentive of licensing, and suborning the authority of assize justices were central 
allegations. 139 Subverting local government, this time the IPs', was behind the dispute over 
alehouses. I'll) Silver thread made under the patent was debased with lead, neither was bullion
l^^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 84-85 and Debates 1621. H, 112 (21 February). In 
November 1620, Bacon described patents which were conceived against the book of bounty, 'or found since to 
have been abused in the execution.' Spedding, Letters and Life. VII, 146.
130j^otestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 112.
131 For examples of this language see Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 118,128,145,176,184; 
Debates 1621. IV, 84-85, 87; Debates 1621. VI, 4 1 ,2 6 2 ,278.
l32Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 181 (8 March); also Debates 1621. VI, 43-44 (15 March). 
133]sfotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 174-175 (7 March) and 181.
134Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 184 (8 March). Seven years was also deemed sufficient 
for a new invention.
135jÿfQtestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 118 (22 February).
136i^otestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 118 and Debates 1621. VI, 265 (1 March).
)37por investigations in the Lords see Russell, Parhaments. 106-108.
138jq o^testein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV. 86. This is retold in Russell, Parliaments. 102, 
authenticating its veracity.
l39]sjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II. 174-176,179-184 and Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). 
Debates 1621. IV. 84-87.
140j^otestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II. 118-119. Also Russell, Parliaments. 101.
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imported for production, but the realm’s own scarce silver used.i')) More elaborate extortion 
ensued, including imprisonment of recalcitrant goldsmiths, when Mompesson and Francis 
Mitchell, on behalf of Edward Villiers, were empowered to regulate the production of gold 
thread. Heneage Finch followed every strand in condemning abuses of legal processes for 
thread: To settle this project there have been patents, indentures, proclamations,
commissions, informations both in the Exchequer and Star Chamber. All which were 
grievances both in the frame and e x e c u t i o n . '
Projectors and undertakers were viciously condemned. Mompesson fled abroad to 
escape the baying of parliamentary wolves.)^ '^ '^  He was condemned in absentia as 'one that 
would be loath there should be any ill in a commonwealth wherein he would not have a 
finger' while Hamon L'Estrange retorted 'Mompesson said he was justice per excellentiam, I 
may say per p e s t i le n t ia n iCoke invoked the spectre of Empson and Dudley and declared 
them fools to M o m p e s s o n . i 4 6  Members may have reserved their most fustian language for 
Mompesson, but Edward Giles was not alone when he hoped 'that this parliament will take 
order with these blood suckers of the k i n g d o m ' .  t 4 7  js^ oy protested James' dishonour that 
projectors 'fixed their bills upon posts like mountebanks and quack salvers ... that those things 
which are the king's royalties should be thus set to sale, it is a foul abuse.'^ ^^  The king's 
prerogative turned to private gain is the subtext of these c o n d e m n a t i o n s ,  was a crucial 
consideration in placing alehouses in the petition of grievances in 1606.15® Coke believed 
members in 1621 could 'perceive that injustice and iniquity do sometimes play the apes of
14lNotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 165 (5 March).
I'l^^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 166-167 (5 March); Russell, Parliaments. 102-103. The
former attorney general (Yelverton) and Bacon were heavily criticized for sanctioning such methods. Notestein, 
Relf, Simpson feds.l. Debates 1621. II, 166-167.
I'l^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 184 (8 March).
'^^ ‘^ Mompesson fled on 2 March. For various details, Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 145-146 
(27 February) and 160; PRO SP 14/120/52, fol. 82r (28 March, 1621); Larkin and Hughes (ed.), R-oclamations: 
James 1.499-500.
)')5Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 186 (8 March) and 168 (5 March) respectively. 
146jvjQtestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 161.
147Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 168.
I'^^^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 125 (22 February).
)49gee Russell. Parliaments. 100-103, though I disagree with the over-riding emphasis Russell gives this 
question against the larger dimension of fiscal policy.
)5®Willson (ed.), Bowyer 1606-1607.113, The patent was held by Lord Danvers and John Gilbert at this time.
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justice. They sit on the stool of wickedness and consult and set down instructions in the form 
of la w s . '* 51 According to Dudley Digges, 'when men will have to do with King's prerogatives 
some monopolies, monsters, half men, half beasts, a r e  p r o d u c e d .')5 2
Projects contributed to a crucial political impasse of Jacobean parliaments. James 
maligned previous arguments that members 'would give all they had if they knew it should 
come to my purse'.)53 Yet Carvile must have struck a chord with advice to 'show our 
grievances, which are such that out of every lOOOli levied in the country scarce 2001i come to 
his Majesty ... the greatest part of the grievances go into private men's purses and ... is 
colored out upon the King.")54 Carvile was speaking of projects turned to private gain, just 
as Digges did a month later: 'He compared the projectors to harpies... They had a virgin's 
face but their hands and feet were like griping talons. They pretended the profit of the King 
and good of the kingdom, what more fair. But they intended only their own gain though 
procured by unjust vexation and oppression, what more cruel.'^ 55 Members were convinced 
projects offered only a pretence of profit to James.i56 'The King hath not 4001i. of them' by 
Cranfield's rhetorical estimate.)57 Coke mused that projectors would join alchemists, 
monopolists, promoters, concealers, and depopulators in the pantheon of scraping villains 
who never thrived, but the Commons had uncovered nothing to support that conclusion. 15S
These details were embarrassing for Buckingham, his relatives and servants were 
fully implicated, but he disavowed his kin and remained untainted: 'truly I thought the 
projects had been good for the King and commonwealth as was p r e te n d e d .'i5 9  Would the 
investigations reach the king’s ministers who had approved projects?^ ®® Mompesson's inns 
were home to notable figures. Its legality was approved by Bacon, Baron Tanfield, and
151 Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 128 (23 February); also. Debates 1621. VI, 257.
152]sîotestem, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 129 (23 February).
153]sfo(estein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 8 (30 January).
154]sjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 87,
155>fotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 180; also, Debates 1621. VI, 40 (14 March). 
156Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II. 109. 'Sir William Stroude desires the house to consider 
what intent Sir Giles had in begging his Patent. There appeares no other cause but his own private gaine.' 
Debates 1621. VI. 256.
)57Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II. 90.
) 58Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II. 151 (2 March).
)59Notestein,Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II. 161; Russell, Parliaments. 107-108.
)®®Also Russell, Parhaments. 108.
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Justice Nicholls; Mandeville, Winwood, Lake, and Finch had certified its value.i®) Coke 
unavoidably condemned them in protecting James: 'If these did certify it, no king in
Christendom but would have granted it.'i®^  Yet only Francis Seymour dissented from the 
House’s seeming indifference to referees .i® ^  He was questioned for that intemperance and 
’licensed to go to the country for a few days’, It would appear James ministers who might 
be implicated, wanted the issue dropped. Seymour's recantation in the Commons did nothing 
of the sort: 'There was an order that referees might be questioned, but it is asleep and my fear 
tells me that it will not awake.... My suit is that there be set a day to hear what these referees 
will speak ... and then if their fault be as great as others, I see no cause why they should not 
be p u n is h e d '. The entreaty might have been weathered had not Cranfield backed 
Seymour.!®® The projector 'had had no patent if the referees had not certified both the 
lawfulness and conveniency ... agree that the referees and the certificate be brought hither.'!®  ^
Coke was ambivalent.!®® He attacked Francis Michel for asserting that 'many of the most 
judicious eyes of the kingdome hath viewed' his project.!®  ^ Yet he condemned Salisbury for 
instigating penal law grants over his objections and reminded members that Empson and 
Dudley had paid with their lives for such policies.!')'®
It became impossible to shield the referees.!^! The committee seems to have followed 
the via media of Henry Vane: I speak not that I would have these great persons called here
!®! Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. H, 108 (20 February). Suffolk was later found to have been 
involved. Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 183.
!®^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 108.
!®3Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 112; also Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621.
IV, 99 (24 February).
!®4Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 146n.
!®5Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. H, 147 (27 February).
!®®Conrad Russell has asserted the referees were 'bitterly pursued for the rest o f the session by a team o f three 
clearly acting in concert, Lionel Cranfield, Sir Francis Seymour, and William Mallory.' Russell, Parliaments. 
109.
!®2Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 147. Cranfield was speaking of Mompesson. 
!®®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. VI, 47 (13 February).
!®9Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 127-128 (23 February).
!701 Yet that great Lord Treasurer (though but a little man) got a reference of it to the Judges and they all agreed 
upon that I had said.' Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 125; also Debates 1621. VI, 286 (10 
March).
!7!For instance the investigations o f gold and silver thread. Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 
164-167.
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to answer, but that every man’s offence be laid open in the passage. 'Lords and Commons 
met in conference on 8 March for report on Mompesson and the thread p r o j e c t .  !^ 3 Dudley 
Digges spoke for the Commons and only obliquely touched on the r e fe r e e s . 1^4 At the 
particular urging of Cranfield, the referees were specified in the second conference two days 
later.!'75 The concerned ministers were named and the Villiers' clients identified.)'^ ® The 
referees for inns were implicated, but the thread project was worse: 'Divers great men were 
put in the commission ... [with] power to imprison men, which is contrary to the statute of 
Magna Charta ... as the Lord Chancellor [Bacon], Treasurer [Mandeville], Attorney 
[Yelverton], together with Sir Francis Michell, Sir Giles Mompesson, Twittie, and Fowle'.)'^ '^  
Guilt by association indeed. Bacon, Mandeville, and Buckingham defended themselves and 
submitted to James the same day.!'^ ® Bacon's fall began with these conferences and was 
assured when the Commons took up briberies and extortion in matters of j u s t i c e .  1^9  
Cranfield was instrumental in spotlighting referees, apparently confirming Prestwich's view 
he was pursuing a 'private aim of undermining Bacon when the opportunity occurred.'!®® But 
Cranfield was almost certainly striking at Mandeville, who was sunk in the mire of projects 
as deep as Bacon and 'the more strongly attacked of the two’.!®) James thought the 
Commons' pursuit of referees indulgent, but there was no telling whether, having destroyed 
Bacon, Mandeville might not be next.!®  ^ Mandeville's eventual removal served Cranfield's 
ambitions, to which Bacon's impeachment seems to have been incidental, though Cranfield
172]sjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 169 (6 March); also Debates 1621. IV, 31 (8 February).
!^3Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 179 (8 March).
!^'^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 179-183.
!25Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. VI, 45-51; also Debates 1621. H, 179.
!7®]sjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 183-198; also Detotes 1621. VI, 52-53 (19 March). 
!^^Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 185.
!^®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. VI, 52-53 and Lady E. DeVilliers (ed.), 'The Hastings Journal 
of the Parliament of 1621', Camden Miscellany XX (London, 1953), 29-31.
!'79pRO SP 14/120/38, fol. 57v (24 March, 1621); Peck, Court Patronage. 186-187; Russell, Parliaments. 111- 
114. Nieves Mathews, Francis Bacon: The History of a Character Assassination (New Haven, 1996) takes up 
Bacon's defense, not wholly unconvincingly. Unfortunately the presumption that printed texts of primary 
sources are adequate (and alone sufficient) and a largely uncritical appraisal, particularly of aged seco n d ^  
material—save for its treatment of Bacon-compromise much of the wider historical context with mlation to 
personalities and policymaking. For instance Mathews, Francis Bacon. 110-120 against the immediately 
preceding disucssion of Bacon, projects, and preparation for the session.
! ®®Prestwich, Cranfield. 287-289. '
!®!Russell. Parliaments. 104-111,125n.
!®^Russell. Parliaments. 119.
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opposed projects in principle and had little patience for the process and people involved.!®® 
But James 'was never prepared to defend any of his servants who were accused of corruption' 
and Buckingham found his estranged colleague a welcome scapegoat.!®"!
V
Conrad Russell was struck by 'absence of any royal resistance' to the attack on patents 
'or even any sign of royal displeasure'.!®5 It is hardly surprising. James and his ministers 
acquiesced to its inevitability: that Bacon had advised suspending many of them could have 
left no one doubting the Commons would demand action. James needed political unity and 
fiscal support,!®® The logic of politics advised against concessions before reaching the 
bargaining table. James followed that strategy in 1620-1621 when he refused to give up 
patents before the Commons bid for them. James was repeating Salisbury's initial opening in 
1610: a statement of need and general desire to reciprocate. !®^  When Cranfield and Coke 
made patents an open topic, it was a concession to the nature of political parley and 
inevitability, and, dare one say, a bid for the initiative. The successful vote for supply shifted 
the dynamic. James' residual need to maintain good relations with his parliament-two 
subsidies were hardly an answer if war became inevitable and his debts remained—and the 
king’s own sympathy kept him behind reform.!®® However, there was a limit beyond which 
James would not support reform. His parameters in dealings with parliament always 
remained that members might debate specific abuses, in this case of patents, but not the 
prerogative powers themselves.
Intention to frame a monopolies bill was put forward by Coke at the 10 March 
conference. !®9 The idea sprang from fiercely impassioned speeches on 5 March in which 
Coke recited Magna Carta, Digges called for a bill by which projectors, suitors, and certifiers 
'may be damned to posterity', John Walter seconded him, Edward Giles thought 'the more
!®®Below, 230-232; CKS U 269/1.0ol88 [Cranfield Ms 4074].
!®"!Russell. Parliaments. 111-113.
!®5Russell, Parliaments. 100.
!®®Russell. Parliaments. 87-89; Cogswell. Blessed Revolution. 18-20.
!®^Below, 152-156,
!®®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. U, 88 and Russell, Parliaments. 100 and 109-110. 
!®9Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. H, 194.
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examples we make of great men, the more good we do', and Hamon L'Estrange wanted those 
'Jezebels that whisper in the King's ears' to be made to hear Solomon's righteous wisdom.!90 
The litany of abuses fired members and precipitated a collapse of the political pragmatism 
which had prevailed to that point. Coke was tom between principle and office: reverence for 
the law and longing for place much like Cranfield's hatred of projects versus ambition and 
partnership with Buckingham. i9i Principles drove Coke to overzealousness, 'the sheer 
blundering force' of which brought him to grief after the second s e s s i o n . By the 
conference, members wanted all patents revoked and commissions for the king's revenue re­
granted to 'men of account.'!93 ft had become 'necessary that some law be made for the time 
to come that no monopoly be granted, and they that procure any such may incur some great 
punishment, and this will kill the serpent in the egg.'!94 The same day, James publicly 
defended his actions with the patents in the Lords. He agreed '(as Sir Edward Coke moved) 
there should be a lawe made against theis thinges' for 'I have bene alwayes a hater of projects 
and projectors ...soe troublesome to me that neither my selfe nor those about me could rest in 
their beddes quiet for projectors, as the greate backe gallery, if it had a voice, could tell.'!95 
Russell has argued James welcomed this prospective relief. !96 However, long before the bill 
passed, James testified since Parliament began, 'hee was free from Suitors'.'!^? If James 
supported a bill it was only to preserve the harmony of the session and because he was fully 
armed to overturn it.!9s
!9®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. ft, 167-168. Also Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 
1621. V, 25 (2 March) and Debates 1621. VI, 31 (6 March).
!91 Stephen D. White, Sir Edward Coke and 'The Grievances of the Commonwealth." 1621-1628 (Chapel Hill, 
1979) 3-23 and 113-141.
!92Russell. Parliaments. 123. This is particularly well demonstrated in the minute book o f the committee of 
grievances: Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. VI, 249-278. 'After the Parliament, whether on 
James' initiative or on Buckingham's, steps were taken to punish some of the leading members. Coke, Phelips, 
Pym, Hakewill, and Mallory were imprisoned. Rich, Crew, Digges, and Perrott were sent to Ireland, and Sir 
Peter Hayman were sent to the Palatinate.' Russell, Parliaments. 143.
193 Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 194 (Coke).
!94Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 194 (Coke).
!95DeVilliers (ed.), 'Hastings Journal', 26.
!96RusseU, Parliaments, 109-110.
!97Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 203-204 (27 March).
!98part of Russell's interpretation seems to rest on his belief that Bacon had been working on a monopolies bill 
during preparation for the session, with James' sanction. This is erroneous and based on a misreading of 
Jonathon Marvil's account of Bacon’s preparation. Russell, Parliaments. 99n. Bacon's actual letter is clear; he 
proposed legislation for old debts and concealments only. Spedding, Lettem and Life. VII, 146-147.
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The act itself was sufficient to incur James' opposition. Coke claimed he had not 
questioned the prerogative, asserting there was an incontrovertible component (absolute 
prerogative), however that part bound by law was disputable (ordinary). 199 The latter clearly 
encompassed patents in Cokes' mind, but the bill which he shepherded through several 
revisions eventually violated James' maxim about grievances. The final version not only 
questioned the prerogative right, but took it away.2®® The original act derived its authority 
from James' declaration against monopolies and penal law benefits in the book of bounty.2®i 
Coke added a clause by which those declarations were 'consonant and agreable to the ancient 
and fundamentall lawes of this your realme.'2®2 Rather than cite precedents. Coke used the 
language of common law supremacy to reject the king's power to grant such patents in the 
first place.2®3 Pragmatism required provision for future grants which might prove abusive in 
execution; they were to be tested according to the common law.2®4 A subsequent change 
barred Chancery and conciliar adjudication.2®5 Patronage was inextricably concerned. This 
prerogative power of patents and monopolies employed as patronage was a deliberate policy 
of Burghley's and only intensified under James.2®® It was central to the Jacobean patronage 
culture. James was plain with the Commons about his position on these two issues (as 
reported by Cranfield): 'He willed me to shew you that we should not aim at patents but the 
abuses of them. For he conceived that a grievance to ten or twelve was not a public 
grievance, for if it were, he should not be able to reward his servants.'2®2
This is not to imply that James was unsympathetic to abuses. His own acts for their 
remedy is the best evidence that he was opposed to legislation. One day after the monopolies
!99]Nfotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 79.
2®®Russell recognized the act as a "'statutory invasion of the royal prerogative’", but maintained it had James' 
sanction. Russell. Parliaments. 110.
2®! Samuel Rawson Gardiner (ed.). Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords 1621 (London, 1870), 151; 
Zialler. Parliament 1621.126-130.
2®2cardiner (ed.). Lords 1621.151.
2®3SommerviUe, Politics and Ideology. 93-95,100-105, and 155-156. Recall the numerous precedents cited by 
Coke early in the debates. Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 79-81. Zaller, Parliament 1621. 
127-128 has argued Coke rejected them because they had never challenged the legal basis of grants. Also 
Sacks, 'Countei-vailing benefits', 274-277.
2®4Gardiner (ed.), I_ords 1621.152.
2®5Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 197 (26 March) and Zaller, Parliament 1621.128-129. 
2®®Adams, 'patronage', 38-41.
2®7Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 318 (24 Apiil).
123
The Patronage Culture and the Corruption of Projects
bill was engrossed, James commanded a proclamation be drawn repealing the patents of inns, 
alehouses, and thread.2®® Yet he almost precipitated a rupture when he asked the 10 March 
conference be postponed lest the subsidy bill be neglected; the Commons retorted they would 
work late and accomplish b o t h .209 The Commons toiled over patents, but 'Baron-Tell-Clock' 
wanted them to move on now that exemplary punishment had been effected: 'I knowe yow 
have a gi eate number of Pattent presented to yow. I advise yow to stand upon those That are 
of most importance, That when yow resort to me with your Greivances They may consist 
more in Weight then in Number And that the very name of Pattent does not become a 
Grievance.'210 Good laws should take their attention.211 The same sentiments greeted the 
Commons when they returned from Easter recess.212 Subtle intimidation was also being 
aimed at the monopolies bill, which had yet to reach the Lords. He warned them against 
passing a law the Lords would reject.2i® This spurred members to a reconciliation conference 
with the Lords for the informers bül and a preventative agreement on the monopolies bill.2i4 
As May anived, James warned the time for recess approached.2i5 The monopolies bill 
received a final reading and was sent to the Lords.21® Edwin Sandys found it had been 
tampered with, two clauses were appended; that it should lapse at the start of the next 
parliament and it could be voided by a non obstante.2i7 The bill suffered a lingering death 
there.2i® It did not fail in 1621 despite James. It was a measme the king could not allow to 
pass. James' accession proclamation suspending Elizabethan patents heralded his stance 
eighteen yœrs later: 'Reserving to our selfe the Right justly appertaining to our Prerogative,
2®8fsjotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 202-203 (27 March) and Larkin and Hughes (eds.). 
Proclamations: James 1. 503-505 (30 March, 1621). The bill was engrossed on 26 March. Zaller, Parliament 
1621.129.
2®9Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. VI, 52 (19 March) and Debates 1621. II, 205 (10 March). 
219Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 209 (27 March). The expression was James' own: 'My 
office shall be to be Baron-Tell-Clock.’ Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 304 (20 April).
211 Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IV, 209.
212Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 304-306.
213Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 305-307. The informers bill was James' case in point. 
214Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 324 (26 April).
215]Sfotest6in, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. H, 343 (4 May). The Commons were not happy about the 
spectre of a recess. See Russell, Parliaments. 118-122.
21®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 360 (12 May).
212Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. II, 354 (8 May); Zaller, Parliament 1621.129.
21®The bill's fate wasn't decided until December when the Lords rejected it in voting. Zaller, Parhament 1621. 
129-130.
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for that we would not have it conceived, that in doing these things out of our Grace, we doe 
intend to renounce those ancient dueties and P r iv i le d g e s ' .2 i9  The purveyance bill of 1606 and 
impositions bill of 1610 were the p r e c u r s o r s .220 i n  all these cases, James refused to allow the 
prerogative to be circumscribed or lose the practical benefits the power provided.
James was true to his principles. As he acted decisively in 1606 and 1610 to 
(imperfectly) remove nagging abuses, so he dealt with the most grievous patents himself. He 
suspended the big three patents by proclamation.221 Two weeks into the summer recess, 
fifteen patents were publicly condemned in Star Chamber.222 These included patents which 
had been found 'matters of prerogative not fitt to be put into the dispensing of a subject.'223 
Among patents to be examined by the council were all 'proclamations for private endes.'224 
The judges and council were to evaluate whether proclamations were appropriate means to 
contend with problems of bullion, export of iron ordnance, wool, and fuller's earth, out-port 
commerce, informers, writs of certiorari, and supersedeas.225 Finally, all 'other patents 
graunted by his Ma[jes]ty to be reviewed by his Ll[ord]s to consider the natures of them and 
if unfitt to call for the patentees, and they to surrender them ... If doubtfull that they be left to 
ye triall of Lawe.'226 These judgements were buttressed by a proclamation on 10 July, 
touching matters 'of that quality and condition, as His Majestic needes no assistance of 
PaiJiament for reforming the same, and would have reformed them before the Parliament, if 
the true state of His Subjects greevances had beene then made knowne unto him.'22? James 
was all too well aware of these grievances before the session, but he had managed to act 
despite parliament and gave himself the basis from which to assert his own vigilance over the
2!9x^rl0ji and Hughes (eds.), lYoclamations: James L 14 (7 May, 1603).
220Below, 168-178.
221 Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1.503-505.
222pRO SP 14/121/124, fol. 232r (23 June, 1621).
223They were inns, alehouses, lotteries, gold and silver thread, gold foliate, licensing of peddlers, the statute of 
apprentices, general patents for concealed lands, tolls, and tithes, power to erect parks and warrens, patents for 
leets, markets, and fairs, Chancery fees, engrossing wills, and (he sole dressing o f common arms. PRO SP 
14/121/124, fol. 232r (23 June, 1621).
224%%e Others were lobsters and salmon, lampreys, lists and shreds, Lepton's patent, and the lighthouses at 
Winterton and Dungeness, and glassmaking. PRO SP 14/121/123, fol. 23Ir (23 June, 1621).
225pRo SP 14/121/124, fol. 232v.
226pRO SP 14/121/123, fol. 231v.
227Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations: James 1.512,
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necessity of legislation had the session’s abrupt collapse not made it a mute p o i n t .228 in so 
doing, he preserved and renewed the settlement enshrined in Elizabeth's Golden S p e e c h .229
The Elizabethan formula did not satisfy members in 1621, perhaps because some of 
them were refighting the same battle twenty years later.23® Their discontent is obvious from 
the continued searching after patents despite James' summer redress.23i The bill’s defeat in 
1621 was only a setback. The act was revived immediately in 1624 and skilfully guided to 
passage in both houses.232 Political circumstances compelled James to give his assent.233 
Coke's common-law language and adjudication remained in the final act.234 But vital 
exemptions defeated the sought-for control of projects. Monopolies of inventions and new 
manufactures were permitted. Gold and silver thread reminds us that determinations of 'new' 
were hardly clear-cut and held their own sort of inventiveness. Crucially, new offices and 
corporations were exempted. Projectors, undertakers, and patentees became office-holders; 
their projects and patents, corporations.2®5 Projects carried straight through from the 
monopolies statute into Charles I's first parliament and beyond.23® The statute also attempted 
to put an end to the relationships between projects, proclamations, and Star Chamber for 
private gain, but their grievous partnership was reinvigorated when James' definition of the 
commonweal and necessity gave way to his son's.23?
228This very argument was advanced by Lord Keeper Williams when he wanted the Commons to turn their 
attention to a subsidy in November. Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. in, 416, Debates 1621. IV,
424 (both 21 November). On the session's end, Russell, Parliaments. 132-144.
229sacks, 'Countervailing benefits', 277-282; Dean, Parliament 1584-1601. 90-92.
230Foster, 'Patents', 60,63, and 77; Dean, Parliament 1584-1601. 90-92.
231 Russell. Parliaments. 122-125 and 132-133.
232Russell, Parliaments. 156 and 190-192.
233Russelh Parliaments. 115-116; Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 246-261,
234price, Monopoly. 135-139.
235Sharpe, Personal Rule. 257 and Russell. Parliaments. 115-116.
236peck, Court Patronage. 138-139; Ronald G. Asch, 'The Revival o f Monopohes: Court and Patronage during 
the Personal Rule of Charles 1 ,1629-1640', Ronald G. Asch and Adolf M. Birke (eds.). Princes. Patronage, and 
the Nobility: The Court at the Beginning of the Modem Age c. 1450-1540 (Oxford. 1991) for a slightly 
different perspective.
237pRo SP 16/44/1, fol. lr-2v; BL Additional Ms 69909, fol. 40r-41v, 42r-43v, 48r-49v, 50r-53v; OBL Bankes 
Ms 5 ,6 ,9 ,1 1 ,1 2 ,1 5 ,3 7 ,3 8 ,3 9 ,4 0 ,4 1 ;  T 56/2; James F. Larkin fed.1. Stuart Royal Proclamations Volume II 
Roval Proclamations of King Charles 1 1625-1646 (Oxford, 1983), [nos.] 6 ,6 3 ,6 6 ,7 3 ,1 4 4 , 173,179,184,195, j
257,282,291 (tobacco); 7 (alum); 9 (buildings); 15,213 (farthing tokens); 50 (fee-farming); 53 (benevolence); 1
55 (forced loan); 75 (compounding with holders of new offices); 117,278 (starch); 118,1 66 (French wines); |
129 (iron wire); 130 (defective titles); 135 (distraint o f knighthood); 136 (London buikhngs); 138,277 (silk I
dyeing); 147,220 (fishing); 149 (sealing armour and weaponry); 161,176,186,250,273 (soap); 174,279 (tin); i
206 (glass); 239 (playing cards and dice); 240 (maulsters); 247 (wine casks); 248 (artificers); 256 (iron works); 1
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These were the consequence of a state whose fiscal apparatus and administiation were 
weak and a liberal king existing in a demanding culture of patronage. The monopolies bill 
attacked the symptoms and ignored the disease itself, the imbalance within the Jacobean 
polity between the consumptive interests of the patronage culture and the fiscal requirements 
of the state in discharging the responsibilities of governance. Finding the proper equilibrium 
between patronage and governance was the essential challenge of fiscal policy. The ensuing 
chapters will analyze the attempts of James' ministers to craft policy to that end.
263,293 (beaver hats); 268 (Latin wire); 271 (assizing bread); 311 (ship-money). Also Asch, 'Monopolies', 
364-366.
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II
FISCAL POLICY IN THE JACOBEAN POLITY
CHAPTER 5
Salisbury, Caesar, and Fiscal Refoundation 
(1603-1610)
I
James' reign was one long unsuccessful experiment in fiscal alchemy, many failed 
attempts to transform a multifarious blend of revenues into lasting supports and balance the 
requirements of patronage and governance. Between 1603-1609, Dorset, Caesar, and 
Salisbury were preoccupied with endowment, establishing new permanent revenues. Those 
years represent a quest, as the council wrote James, 'to establish some certainty of receipts 
proportionable to your ordinary issues and to lay some good foundation for supply of such 
extraordinary charges and future liberality as are necessary for so great a monarch.'^  
Salisbury's first year as lord treasurer was formative, convincing him that only fundamental 
restructuring of the crown finances could possibly cure the consumption of James' estate.^  
With Caesar's assistance, Salisbury developed the most ambitious and thoroughgoing project 
for fiscal refoundation ever attempted. Salisbury's spectacular failure in 1610 closed off 
significant reform for fifty years and revealed faultlines which ensured finance was a chronic 
source of political conflict for half a century. This chapter will examine the projects and 
policies for endowment through 1609, Salisbury's conception of a refounded monarchy, the
! Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 277.
^Varying interpretations of Salisbury's life and career are represented in Algernon Cecil, A Life of Robert Cecil: 
First Earl o f Salisbury (London, 1915); Willson, James VI and I : P. M. Handover, The Second Cecil: The Rise 
to Power 1563-1604 of Sir Robert Cecil, later first Earl o f Salisbury (London, 1959); G, P. V, Akrigg. Jacobean 
Pageant (Cambridge, MA, 1962), 85-112; ïYestwich, Cranfield. 1-48; Thomas M. CoaMey, 'Robert Cecil in 
Power: Elizabethan Politics in Two Reigns', Howard S. Reinmuth (ed.), Earlv Stuart Studies: Essays in Honor 
of David Harris Willson (Minneapolis. 1970), 64-94; Hurstfield. Freedom. Corruption: Lawrence Stone, Family 
and Fortune: Studies in Aristocratic Finance in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (Oxford. 1973), 3-114; 
Peck, Northampton: Alan G. R. Smith, 'Crown, Parliament and Finance: The Great Contract of 1610', Peter 
Clark, Alan G. R. Smith, and Nicholas Tyacke (eds.), The English Commonwealth 1547-1640: Essavs in 
Politics and Society Presented to Joel Hurstfield (Leicester. 1979), 111-127; Eric Lindquist, 'The Failure o f the 
Great Contract', Journal o f Modern Historv 57 (1985), 617-651 and his 'The Last Years o f the First Earl o f  
Salisbury, 1610-1612', Albion 18 (1986), 23-41; Croft, 'Several Speeches '; Cuddy, 'entourage', 173-225; Alan 
Haynes, Robert Cecil 1st Earl o f Salisbury: Servant o f Two Sovereigns /London. 1989); Croft, 'Jacobean court', 
134-147 and her 'The Reputation of Robert Cecil: Libels, Political Opinion and Popular Awareness in the early 
Seventeenth Century'. Transactions o f die Royal Historical Society 6.1 (19910,43-69; Cuddy, 'Southampton', 
121-150; Hammer, 'Patronage', 65-86; Natalie Mears, 'Regnurn Ceciliamml A  Cecilian perspective of the 
Court', Guy, Elizabeth 1. 45-64. Pauline Croft's forthcoming study o f Cecil's career is eagerly anticipated.
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failure of its crucial parliamentary component in the sessions of 1610, and the conflicts of 
political principle and practice which made refoundation a non-starter for decades afterward.
II
The period of endowment can be divided into two stages. Until August 1607, 
endowment was pursued along complementary lines of parliamentary revenue and the 
exploitation of the king’s own through projects. Following the failure of Union, 
parliamentary endowment became politically impossible and projects, by default, became the 
best hope. The ’Christmas’ of bounty and expenditure that was James' first year is a story 
which hardly needs retelling, but the scale of demands produced consternation.® Within some 
months of the accession, Dorset forwarded a list of proposed retrenchments to Cecil.4 
Military expenditure was targeted for reduction with the prospect of a Spanish peace while 
hopes grew that the running sore of Ireland could be reduced from £115,979.5 The household 
stood at the head of Dorset’s list; at £93,000 it was more than double the late queen’s while 
Anna’s court had yet to be established. Early attempts at household reform utterly failed and 
must have been instructive for Cecil, who developed no taste for the financial minutiae or 
political confrontation involved. He later told James that if household expense could be 
borne 'it were better to leave that charge unspoken of, than by labouring to retrench it, to give 
a greater cause for clamour than all the profit can be worth'.® The situation gave sudden 
urgency to endowment.
A spectrum of interests found their parliamentary voices in 1604. James was 
preoccupied with Union, a project which parliament and his English ministers found 
unappealing, Cecil included.^  The Commons in particular looked to the new king's first 
parliament to fulfil their hopes for commonwealth reform.® Fiscal grievances loomed large 
with monopolies, purveyance, debts, sales of crown lands, and wardship. Cecil looked to
® Willson, James VI and 1 .159-196; Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant. 15-33.
-^PRO SP 14/2/45, fol. 120r-121v (13 July, 1603)
5 p R O  SP 14/5/53, fol. 125r-125v ([1603]).
®Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 286; Pauline Croft, 'Parliament, Purveyance, and the city of London 1589- 
1608'. Parliamentarv Historv 4 (1985), 12-13.
^R. C. Munden, 'James I and 'the growth o f mutual distrust': King, Commons, and Reform, 1603-1604', Kevin 
Sharpe (ed.), Faction and Parliament: Essavs on Earlv Stuart Historv (Oxford, 1978), 62-66 and 71; Cuddy, 
'Southampton', 126-127.
®PRO SP 14/1/68, fol. 127r-132v; Munden, 'Reform', 43-62.
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exploit these projects to further endowment® Purveyance (the king’s prerogative right to 
victual the household at below market prices) and wardship of heirs derived from James' 
feudal overlordship came to dominate the session's work on endowment. Cecil offered a 
wardship project originally muted in 1598 at Burghley's death: abolition of the court 'in 
return for a fixed annual payment to the Crown'.i® The Commons embraced the project, but 
Cecil precipitously abandoned it after examining defensive reform proposals proffered by the 
court of wards' own officei s.ii Cecil feared the political fallout of being opposed by his own 
subordinates in pressing a scheme for which neither his conciliar colleagues nor royal master 
had much enthusiasm. 12 Despite offers of perpetual compensation with a surplus, Cecil 
doubted whether parliament would offer enough.Further, the master found renewed 
fondness for his own reform which allowed 'tenants-in-chief to buy out the wardship of their 
hefrs during their lifetimes' rather than leaving the childrens' disposition to the court.i4 
Robert Wroth proposed a bill to this effect which might prove fiscally advantageous to 
composition.!^ Faced with reform or elimination of wardship after 1604, Cecil never again 
demonstrated a preference for its abolition.!®
Purveyance occasioned some of the bitterest speeches in the whole of James' first 
parliament. Members decried the abuses and corruption of purveyors: impressment of carts, 
open purveyance warrants, and excessive quantities taken below market price without paying 
cash.!2 Numerous statutes already regulated purveyance, but the Commons believed—with 
good grounds-that they were deliberately ignored by the officers of the household, the 
Greencloth, and they demanded the officers answer for the abuses. James was sympathetic to 
the extent of punisliing abusive purveyors, but attacks on his servants acting for the provision 
of his household were difficult to countenance. Effective attention was deferred until the
®Pauline Croft, 'Wardsliip in the Parliament of 1604', Parliamentarv History 2 (1983), 39-40; Cuddy, 
'Southampton', 126-127.
!®Croft, 'Wardship', 39-41.
ÜHH Salisbury Ms 105, fol. 81r-84v; Croft, 'Wardship', 41-44.
!2Croft, 'Wardship', 44.
!®HH Salisbury Ms 105, fol. 82r.
!"!hH Salisbury Ms 105, fol. 82r and Croft, 'Wardship', 42,45; Sahsbmy Ms 101, fol. 164r-164v (20 October, 
1603).
!5Croft, 'Wardship', 45.
!®Croft, 'Wardship', 46-47.
!2Croft, 'Purveyance', 14-19.
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1606 session. Cecil's first attempts at endowment were abject failures. He turned against the 
Common's much-preferred composition for wardship, while members held the legal high- 
ground in refusing to compound with him for the unlawful practices of purveyors and the 
Greencloth.
Parliamentary failure brought home fiscal realities. Privy seals met some immediate 
demands, but Cecil, Dorset, and the council turned to projects in 1605.!® So abject was the 
situation by summer that the embarrassment of 'emptie coffers' figured prominently in the 
reasons for a second prorogation of parliament.!® Salisbury and his colleagues presented the 
situation to James with the authoritative stamp of a council memorandum.^ ® They praised 
James' resolution to stay his expenses and welcomed his support for projects, but the only 
hope for such a course was that projects not become the 'common pasture for all that are in 
need, or have unreasonable desires.'^ ! Reservations about projectors were forceful: 'it falleth 
that every private and needy person that hath wit to discern the scope of the [project] 
commissions finds either some pretext or other to draw benefit from your Majesty'. The 
patronage culture and private gain must give way before James' necessities.22 The emphasis 
on projects and retrenchment reveals uncertainty about parliamentary endowment. James' 
councillors were clearly struggling toward a settled program for their fiscal realities and the 
place that parliamentary revenue, if any, would play in it.
The agenda Salisbury laid out for the 1606 session left no doubt that uncertainty was 
going to be conlronted: Union, a renewed effort at endowment by composition for
purveyance, and a traditional vote of supply.2® Salisbury would not flatter his colleagues
!®HH Salisbury Ms 106, fol. 14r-14v (22 July, 1604); BL Lansdowne Ms 164, fol. 516r-516v (August, 1604). 
The projects included compositions for supplying the king’s house with wood, arrearages o f recusants’ lands, 
entailed lands, defective titles, assarts, and ’leases of exchequer and duchy lands'. Croft (ed.), 'Several 
Speeches', 274-275 and Salisbury Ms 190, fol. 11 Ir (29 June, [1605]).
!®HH Salisbury Ms 111, fol. 142r-142v (30 July, 1605); Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations: James I. 
117-118 (28 July, 1605).
2®Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 273-278 [16 July, 1605]. Interestingly, the compiler titled it a 'letter written by 
the lords of the Council to the K ing... Touching means to advance the king’s revenues by unusual means so 
as the king will take the act upon himself and be their protection.' Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 273 
[emphasis mine].
21Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 274-276.
22croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 277-278.
2®HH Salisbury Ms 189, fol. 100r-103v (Salisbury to the privy council; 7 October, [1605]). The dating o f this 
document can be found in Croft, 'Purveyance', 33n.l9.
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with protestations that James' promises to prosecute abusive purveyors had been anything 'but 
shadowes and colors w[i]thout substance'. Purveyance and projects were fiscal necessities 
and, while he had concerns about their irritating nature, Salisbury was not above seeing 
political ends in their unpopularity. He possessed a high-handed streak which believed that 
unpleasant, albeit legal, prerogative exactions should serve as an inducement to supply the 
king and thereby remove the circumstances which necessitated them. However, the ongoing 
abuses of purveyance only drove leading members of the Commons in 1606 to ignore 
composition and devote their energies to its legal dimensions. John Hare's bill mandated 
enforcement of existing statutes that would have destroyed its profitability.24 But James 
possessed the benefit de facto and his necessities made composition the only acceptable 
course. Hare's bill was passed to further an increase in the subsidy bill, but Commons and 
Lords could not reconcile their positions and James offered a proclamation addressing some 
abuses.25 Undeterred, members added purveyance to their grievances and James tetchdy 
answered that he would punish the Greencloth when warranted.2® Salisbury’s plan for 
purveyance collapsed over the clash of legal principle and fiscal necessity, a fundamental 
conflict which would be revisited in 1610.
The fiscal success in 1606 was securing normal parliamentary supply.2? In seeking 
supply, Salisbury played upon perceptions of internal threat after the Gunpowder Plot, 
gratitude for deliverance from the plotters, and desires for meaningful secular reform 
(projects and purveyance).2® With a thorough rendering of James' estate and pretenses of 
fiscal restraint, Salisbury built a consensus for supply.2® The Commons speedily and with 
goodwill agreed on two subsidies and four fifteenths.®® Expressions of affection for James' 
and gratitude at his preservation conjoined with watchful preparedness to carry debate. 
Salisbury had astutely assessed the moment. James responded with fulsome thanks and
24croft, 'Purveyance', 23-25
25croft, 'Purveyance', 27-31; Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1 .137-142 (23 April, 1606). 
2®Croft, 'Purveyance', 30-31.
27willson (ed.), Bowyer 1606-1607.1-184; supplemented for both houses by Commons Journal. 1 ,256-314 and 
Lords Journal. II, 355-448.
2®Munden, 'Reform', 58.
2® Also Cuddy, 'Southampton', 130-131.
®®Commons J ournal. 1 ,266.
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offered tangible appreciation.®! He approved desires to settle with purveyors and asked 
members to confer with the Lords 'both to understande the kings occasions, [and] to declare 
to their Lordships the greavances of the people.' The connection between supply and James' 
willingness to entertain grievances could not have been lost.
Dorset expounded on James' necessities in conference, rehearsing his debts 
(£734,000) and the costs of an expanded royal establishment.®  ^ Dorset’s report of alienated 
revenues completed the crown’s case for endowment and additional supply. The Commons 
spent the following weeks debating whether to legislate against purveyance or compound to 
buy out the prerogative right altogether.®® Against the preference of James and Salisbury 
they resolved to legislate, but then returned to grievances and supply.®"^  Despite genuine 
concern over James' debts and an explicit quid-pro-quo offered by Secretary Herbert, 
discordant voices emerged against augmenting the former grant.®5 One member argued 
'whereas it is moved wee should fill the kings Coffers ... if the bottomes be out then can they 
not be filled’ while Edwin Sandys didn't wish to see their generosity tainted with a 'h^vy or 
unpleaseing' addition.®® James settled the issue by offering to receive the Commons' 
grievances personally, though he expected moderation in their collection and discussion, and 
requested an answer on augmentation. ®^ The House voted 140-139 in favour; a margin of 26 
agreeing it should be by subsidy; and scant dissent on another subsidy and two fifteenths.®® 
James and Salisbury had preserved consensus with words and deeds that seemed to promise 
satisfactory attention to purveyance and grievances.®®
James’ outward interest in grievances dissipated after augmentation and the 
purveyance bfil never passed the Lords. Francis Bacon reported James' answer that he would 
remedy legal grievances with the judges, matters of state with his councillors, and
®! Willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.32.
®2willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.42-45,371-375. 
®®Croft, 'Purveyance', 9-34.
®"!Croft, 'Purveyance', 23-25.
®5willson (ed.), Bowyer 1606-1607.67.
®®Willson (ed.), Bowyer 1606-1607.77-81.
®2wiIlson (ed.), Bowyer 1606-1607. 83-84,153-154. 
®®Willson (ed.), Bowyer 1606-1607. 84-85.
®®Croft, 'Purveyance', 28.
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commercial complaints with merchants.^ ® Yet James prefaced his resolution with words far 
more revealing; The next challenge was by way of question, namely, whether these 
Grievances were not Grievances of former tymes, and yet then we found no fault, but 
commended the Gouvernment'."ü According to the Venetian ambassador, James 'listened, but 
in an elegant discourse he deferred all consideration of the points raised to a future Session. 
The members complain that, after granting subsidies, they have obtained nothing ... and the 
populace make this shrewd remark, 'Three subsidies, much evil, no redress.'""!^ James would 
take counsel from parliament in the manner he defined while parliamentary second-thoughts 
were too late as the subsidy bill was delivered to the Lords by the entire Commons 
membership before James' answers were heard."!® The grievances received ineffective 
attention and not only recurred but were used by Salisbury in the Great Contract as points of 
ease, testimony to the hollowness of James' promises. The Commons were had and 1610 
witnessed a determination that it would not happen again.
James' councillors had their answer on parliamentary endowment and the breakdown 
of Union in the following session was a turning point. Finance took the political center-seat. 
More significantly, recourse to parliamentary revenue became an almost impossible sell: 
James' bitter rants against the 'house of hell' in 1610 were not born solely of events that 
year."!"! The rejection of Union contributed significantly to his subsequent anti-parliamentary 
disposition. "!5 Lingering resentment also coloured James' personal relationships with his 
English ministers."!® Salisbury particularly had demonstrated a shocking level of 
ineffectiveness as a parliamentary manager. He, Caesar, and Dorset were charged with 
curing the king's fiscal consumption in August 1607 for which it was anticipated projects 
would serve the turns of endowment and retrenchment. James hoped to see the breaches of 
his estate made up that way."!^  Caesar concurred, reckoning that parliaraentaiy ill-will
"!®Wmson(ed.L Bowver 1606-1607. 158-164.
"!!Willson (ed.), Bowyer 1606-1607.166.
"!2ÇSP Venetian 1603-1607 (London, 1900), 353.
"!®Commons Journal. 1,309; Willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.164.
"!4pRO SP 14/58/26, fol. 61r (21 November, 1610); HH Salisbury Ms 128, fol. 168r-169v (3 December, 1610). 
"!5Cuddy, 'Union', 112-116.
"!®Cuddy, 'Southampton', 132-133.
"!7h H Salisbury Ms 134, fol. 113r-l 14v ([19 October, 1607]).
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promised an ’unfortunate’ outcome for new attempts at supply.4® Parliamentary endowment 
was off the agenda.
m
New impositions and improved customs emerged as the most significant projects for 
endowment. James pledged, among other things in October 1607, to curb his own 
expenditures and ordered his ministers to cost all suits before forwarding them."!® They were 
to observe particular care with those involving customs farms and their renewal because, he 
wrote, 'ye knowe hou greatlie that concernis my profite & that that is almoste the onlie sure 
hoape that is left for increase of my rente’. Seventeen years later James confronted the 
hawkish parliament of 1624 with the fiscal dangers of wartime commercial inteiTuption: 
'customes are the best p[ar]te of my revenewe, and in effect the substance of all I have to live 
on'.50 James' reckoning in 1607 was that customs were the last, best hope of a permanent 
increase in his revenues. By the close of his reign, those expectations had become reality. To 
be sure, James' predecessors exploited customs revenue and reaped fiscal rewards, but it is 
unimaginable that they or their treasurers would have been heard to utter James' categorical 
statement of principle.^ ! As significant, James did not mention crown lands. The king and 
his ministers were not simply taking advantage of expanding peace-time trade, riding an 
abstract economic wave to the triumph of commercial over landed revenues. They did not by 
accident reap nearly £40,000 in extraordinary customs revenues in 1620 and just £544 from 
the crown lands.52 Crown revenues were deliberately reshaped with customs at the center in 
these years.
The currant impost fired Dorset's mind with visions of new revenues as early as 
September 1605.5® Refusals to pay the impost were couched in terms of illegality and 
Suffolk's deputy-farmers wanted action which would 'not only free this doubt upon this 
particular of the imposition on corinths: but upon all impositions of like nature, set upon other
"!®BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 308r-308v.
"!®HH Salisbury Ms 134, fol. 113r-114v.
5®PR0 SP 14/160/62, fol. lOOv.
5tGunn, Tudor Government. 122-124; Dietz, Public Finance. 44 and 305-327. 
52pRO SP 14/116/121, fol. 172r (29 September, 1620).
5®Croft, 'Bate's Case', 525-526.
136
Salisbury, Caesar, and Fiscal Refoundation (1603-1610)
commodities without act of parliament.'54 Similar questions were raised by the tobacco 
impost.55 Neither issue came to a head, but refusals on grounds of legality had serious 
implications for impositions outside statutory approval. Currants were mixed up in 
negotiations to charter a new Levant company .5® Dorset and Salisbury had an agenda in the 
talks concerning the standing of extra-parliamentary impositions: 'If this trade of Turkey 
were settled, it would be most profitable for the crown and commonwealth, for then all the  
im position o f  currants and consequently all other im positions were settled for e v e r . '5 ?  
Their utility had been carefully thought out. Currants and tobacco were part of the larger 
realignment of finance which included the revised book of rates and the farm of the great 
customs; all proceeding apace at the end of 1604.
The Levant charter was agreed in October 1605 with assent to the currants.5® 
However, questions of trade and commerce were fertile political ground.^ ® Jealousies 
aroused by ’monopolistic’ trading companies and 'animosity against the customs-farmers' 
were among the forces at work which spurred John Bate to defy the impost even after the 
new charter.®® Bate could not be ignored and the result was his celebrated Exchequer case in 
July 1606. It was the perfect opportunity to settle the legal issues.®! ju Dorset's giddy 
estimation, the crown's arguments were 'so plain & so full of streunth & his consumacon so 
waighty & effectuall so as his Ma[jes]tie may rest assured that the iudgement by the Barons 
wilbe clere & certain on his side not only to please his Ma[jes]tie but even to please god him 
self for in their consceins the law standeth for the king'.®2 According to Croft, Salisbury 
wanted a verdict 'stated as briefly as possible to avoid further controversy', but the Exchequer 
barons and Dorset appreciated Salisbury's characteristic curtness and certitude were 
inappropriate.®® In a 'caus of so grete importans' and certain the merchants would contest the
54Quoted in Croft, 'Bate's Case', 531.
55croft, 'Bate’s Case', 531.
5®Crott, 'Bate's Case’, 528-530.
52Quoted with emphasis in Croft, 'Bate's Case', 530.
5®Croft, 'Bate's Case', 532.
5®Clay, Economic Expansion. II, 117-118 and 198-199.
®®Croft, 'Bate’s Case', 533-536.
®!pauline Croft argues Dorset and Sahsbury hoped it would have happened with the disputes over die tobacco 
impost in 1604; that case settled outside the Exchequer however. Croft, 'Bate's Case', 531.
®2h h  Salisbmy Ms 118, fol. 144r-144v.
®®Croft, 'Bate's Case', 536.
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judgment, the Barons were adamant they ’argue it & so to giwe reasons of their iudgement'.®  ^
That done and reported 'it wilbe forever settled and an assured foundacon for the K[ings] 
imposicons forever,’ The decision was a long time in coming for Dorset and Salisbury and 
the immediate exploitation of the favourable judgment further waited upon possible legal 
challenges.®  ^ It wasn’t untü Sahsbuiy's treasurership that they were exploited in earnest.
The replacement of the crown estates by commercial revenues is confirmed in 
Caesar’s analysis of the Great Contract. ’I am not ignorant that they bee the surest & best 
livelyhood of the crowne,' Caesar wrote of the estates, ’and that the realme is then most 
happie when they be so great as that by them the kings state and honor maie bee maynteyned 
& his expences bothe ordinarie and extraordinarie sufficientlie defraied.'®® This preface was 
answered with irony: 'But this maie be wished and hoped for.' Practice offered a different 
reality and Caesar turned the tables on Sir John Fortescue's endowed crown, putting the 
estates into their Jacobean perspective: 'Neither shall wee fynde yt[that] ever king of England 
lyved merely uppon his land revenews; but partlie uppon them, p[ar]tlie uppon his customes 
and imposicons or taxes, & p[ar]tly uppon subsedies, ffifteenths, tenths, benevolences, and 
the like given him by his people.'®’^ Dorset's and Salisbury's experiences had stopped them 
thinking of the estates as anything but one element in a larger mixture and they consciously 
advanced customs to primacy.®®
The subsidies voted in 1606 were inadequate to supply James' necessities before a 
shilling was every collected.®® Caesar made his first great examination of the accounts that 
September and within a week Caesar was praying for a chaste-minded Joseph to deliver them 
fiom it.'7® The next day, Dorset gathered some two dozen projects, the first such compilation 
of the reign.2i This and similar documents composed by Caesar are our touchstones with
®%H Salisbury Ms 118, fol. 144v.
®5Croft, 'Bate's Case', 536.
®®BL Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 130v.
®2b L Lansdowne Ms 151, tbl. 130v.
®®Policies o f Charles I and Archbishop Laud toward cathedral lands, a true endowment, resisted many Jacobean 
and Caroline policies employed on the crown's own estates and are an interesting counterpoint. Stanford E. 
Lehmberg, Cathedrals Under Siege: Cathedrals in English Society. 1600-1700 (Exeter, 1996), 146-150. 
®®WiUson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.43-44, 82-85; PRO SP 14/52/6, fol. 6r-6Av (8 January, 1610).
2®BL Additional Ms 10038, Ibl. 301r-305v (18 September, 1606); BL Lansdowne Ms 164, fol. 419r-419v (23 
September, 1606).
7lBL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 314r-315v (24 September, 1606).
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what might be regarded as the salad days of projects between 1606-1609. After examining 
the documents, it is impossible to be unimpressed with the labours put into projects by 
Dorset, Caesar, and Salisbury in these years. Dorset’s 'meanes to increase yerely revenue and 
to rais present monie' employed a taxonomy equivalent to endowment (yearly revenue) and 
ready cash (present money). He proposed farming management of the mint, the king's 
woods, and outlawries to ensure a certain revenue and shed the charges of direct 
administration. Endowment was expected from surrounded grounds, concealments brought 
to rent, fishing licences, allowing 'freholders in forests to sell their woods', issuing copper 
monies, answering ecclesiastical court fines in the Exchequer, fines on bonds in King's 
Bench, and installed debts. Permanent abatements in the cofferer, wardrobe. Navy, 
ordinance, works, the Star Chamber, liberates, and Ireland were seen as a means to 'increase' 
revenue available for other charges. Projects for ready money were clearing arrears of 
receivors general, enfranchising copyholds, leasing mortgaged lands, creations in the new 
order of knighthood, disposing of the Earl of Hertford's lands, and compositions for defective 
titles, assarts, lands entailed to the crown, and exemption from juries. From this sample, 
Dorset hoped to endow the crown and pay immediate demands.
Despite these projects, fiscal policy remained less a program than a series of shifts 
and starts between funding patronage and financing the necessities of government. By 
August 1607 it took little work on the parts of Salisbury, Northampton, Worcester, and 
Suffolk to convince James the time had come for something b e t t e r . ^ 2  Renewed efforts 
incorporated many of the previous year's projects as Dorset reviewed his eaiiier list.^ ® 
Projects considered in the past year were added; of particular interest compounding for 
depopulations, fining new buildings in London, and licensing a le h o u s e s .2 4  All of these seem 
to have been Salisbury's work: the alehouse project and offers to farm the fines were handled 
by him; depopulations and appropriate proclamations were managed in consultation with 
James during June and August; Salisbury corrected the draft proclamation against new
22h H Salisbury Ms 193, fol. 137r (15 August, 1607).
73b L Additional Ms 10038, tbl. 314r-315v.
24pRO SP 14/28/60, fol. llOr; BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 309r-310v. Others added included sale o f woods, 
compositions for alienations, project for glass making, impost on seacoals, and the starch patent. SP 14/28/60, 
fol, llOr.
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buildings which began the process in February 1605 and reviewed the 1608 commission 
which followed a second proclamation in October 1607J5 By the time of Dorset's death in 
April 1608, many of the projects were pending, under continuing scrutiny, or activeJ® 
Salisbury swept into office like a whirlwindJ^ Commissions for assarts, defective titles, 
concealed and entailed lands, depopulations, disorderly buildings, leasing recusants' lands 
and compositions for their goods seized, and drained Fen lands were quickly renewed^® 
Recovery of divers debts was pursued with particular vigour, holders of mortgaged lands 
were to compound for leases or forfeit their holdings, and old castles and houses were 
ordered surveyed with a view to repair or disposal.^ ® Fishing licences, new knighthoods, and 
copper monies were put in suspension.
Salisbury concluded his first months as treasurer with his regular summer progress 
while Caesar spent the summer of 1608 as he did many, reviewing fiscal policy. During that 
time he drew up a curious list of Dorset's projects, giving new voice for copper monies and 
knighthoods, while present projects of mortgaged lands and, interestingly, old castles and 
houses found mention.®® Caesar's purpose is uncertain, the abstract may have been for his 
own benefit, but probably represents work for Salisbury. It would be wrong to think that 
Salisbury, much as he gave leadership to fiscal policy before Dorset's death, did not require 
time to become fully versed in the details of his new position. Of the projects which saw 
Salisbuiy's attention in those months, five alone entailed endowment: leases of surrounded 
grounds, impositions, recusants, and abatements in pensions and diets; surveys underway 
held out hope of permanent increases by crown lands. Salisbury’s initial flurry of activity 
met only the tasks of assuming formal control and paying James' pressing debts. The report 
of James' debt payments reads like a project list of those first months: the earl of Hertford's
75Alehouses: PRO SP 14/12/99, foL (February 1605); HH Salisbury Ms 195, fol. 80r-80v (11608]). 
Depopulations: Larkin and Hughes (ed.), Proclamations: James 1. 152-154 (30 May, 1607), 154-158 (28 June, 
1607), 161-163 (24 July, 1607); Salisbury Ms 122, fol. 53r-53v; Salisbury Ms 193, fol. 139r; Sahsbury Ms 124, 
fol. 145r-146v. Buildings: Larkin and Hughes (ed.). Proclamations: James L 171-175 (12 October 1607). 
2®The projects included depopulations, improvement o f woods, recovery o f drowned lands (surrounded 
grounds), sale of inheritance to entailed holdings, enfranchising copyholds, fines upon building in London, 
exemptions from juries, the Scottish mines, and impositions.
2^BL Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 303v (27 July, 1608; Caesar’s journal).
2®BL Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 298r (Caesar's journal for 28 May, 1608).
2®BL Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 298r-305r.
®®BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 11 lr-112v (11 August, 1608).
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lands, sale of woods, leasing mortgaged lands, defective titles, assarts, enfranchising 
copyholds, and old debts; i^ only the sale of land, Gogerthon’s silver ore project, and the aid 
for Prince Henry were later i n i t i a t i v e s . ^ ^
The long-term course of endowment under Salisbuiy had yet to be mapped. Caesar’s 
summer project list represents the beginning of that process. Dorset’s list of 1606, Caesar's of 
August 1608, and another of 'what p[ro]iects reraaine yet unfruitfull’ compiled by him in 
April 1609 were the core of his massive abstract of 105 ’Newe Proiects’, completed in 
A u g u s t . Among them old debts, new knighthoods, copper monies, recusants, old houses 
and castles, and licensing alehouses were all present either singly or under larger categories 
(recusants were within forfeitures by penal laws). Mortgaged lands and depopulations were 
judged to have reached their effective usefulness and ended their runs. Forty or more of the 
projects were original, but many were not without precedent. Caesar and Attorney-General 
Hobart were charged with examining the catalogue while James’ councillors dispersed for the 
summer. Caesar fully reported to Salisbury at court of the long hours spent weeding them 
down.84 The product of these labours was his melodramatically endorsed ’Breviate of my 
vacation care'.85 Caesar’s marginalia in the earlier catalogue would seem to reflect the 
process of vetting which produced this document.86 Projects were evaluated by two marks, 
some combination of plusses and minuses, or left blank. These probably reflect each man’s 
opinion. Six projects aside, only those with two plusses found their way into the breviate’s 
forty. If this is the case, then the breviate was fashioned from at least two rounds of 
evaluations; some twenty other projects originally approved had their plusses circled and the 
entries crossed through by Caesar (in uniformity).
81pRO SP 14/52/6, fol. 6Ar (8 January, 1610), The debt was £1,465,000; £282,699 o f it was paid by diese 
projects.
82pRO SP 14/52/6, fol. 6 Ar. These accounted for £431,186 o f the debt. The subsidies o f 1606 met £453,000 
more and the debt was put at £160,000 (the outstanding loans on privy seals o f Elizabeth excluded).
85The manuscripts are BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 314r-315v (24 September 1606); BL Lansdowne Ms 165, 
fol. lllr-112v (11 August, 1608); Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 119r-120v (14 April, 1609); Additional Ms 10038, 
fol. 19r-23v (10 August, 1609).
84pRO SP 14/47/83, fol. 175r-176r (17 August, 1609).
85b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 28r-31v (28 August, 1609).
86b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 19r-23v.
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The breviate appears to have been fashioned for presentation to James' councillors 
upon their return at the new term. Entitled 'Questions & Answers to the[m]', it contained 
financial accountings in addition to 'newe p[ro]iectes of gaine... picked out of 97 videl.'^ ? 
The projects show signs of further weeding: nine were crossed out, three added, and 
marginalia were made by Caesar. It is probable the changes reflect Salisbury's scrutiny; 
Caesar had written him that 'the work is of such co[n]sequence, that we are out of hope to 
bring it to so good a conclusion, unlesse yo[u]r L[ordshi]ps succesfull hand both hammer & 
square it. In hope whereof wee will prepare it to yo[u]r h a n d '.® 8  The additions would seem 
to bear out Salisbury's involvement. While the project for usury was one which Caesar had in 
hand himself (and opposed), two projects for processes in ecclesiastical courts to be answered 
in the Exchequer or sealed in the king's name are in Salisbury's project v o lu m e .8 9  Old debts, 
fishing licences, copper monies, and old houses and castles were veteran projects which 
garnered final approval tlirough the long p r o c e s s ; ^ ®  recusants and London buildings remained 
within 'compositions for the Kings p[ar]t of penall lawes';^i new knighthoods and licensing 
alehouses were present casualties.
Caesar and Salisbury had conducted the most significant examination of projects in 
the reign. It was this hard look at projects which convinced Salisbury that they were not in 
themselves sufficient means to repair James' estate. Salisbury consequently developed a 
project for refoundation which again included parliamentary endowment. He followed the 
same approach which Henry Neville advocated two years later: 'And when his Mafjesjty 
hath made use of his peoples affection to put him out of want any fitt Projects that shall be 
oflred may bee the boldlyer entertained to fill his c o f f e r s ' . ^ ^  Salisbury committed to writing 
his conceptions and convictions for James' b e n e f i t .  ^ 3  They are a remarkable chronicle of 
intellectual evolution and the milieu of harsh experiences and sober reflections out of which
87b l  Additional Ms 10038, fol. 28r-30r.
88pRO SP 14/47/83, fol. 175r-176r.
89b L Additional Ms 10038, fol. 202r-203v (August, 1609 and 208r-209v (1 July, 1608); BL Harleian Ms 4807, 
fol. 32r-35v; also PRO SP 14/19/85, fol. 155r-156v and SP 14/19/86, fol. 157r~158v.
^^Larkin and Hughes (eds.), A^oclamations: James 1.232-233.
91BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 29v.
92pRO SP 14/74/44, fol. 87r.
^3croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 271-312.
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his plans for refoundation were born. In a political atmosphere at comt which was still 
hostile to parliament early in 1610, Salisbury tried to persuade James that parliamentary 
endowment was the vital element in any cure of his financial ills.^ 4
IV
We are indebted to Pauline Croft for editing and discussing Salisbury’s long written 
treatises. However, the extent to which they included Salisbury's conception of a refounded 
monarchy as much as presenting arguments for various positions has been overlooked. 
Salisbury fashioned refoundation with Caesar's assistance, but it had little support firom their 
fellow councillors, who were hesitant to coniront James with unpleasant fiscal truths and 
align themselves with a project which was both innovative and had decidedly uncertain 
p r o s p e c t s . ^ 5  Alone, Salisbury assured himself James would 'afford me just and gracious 
acceptance, not only because they shall come from me with a single heart and humble 
confidence, but because I should be unworthy of the honour and tmst I have, if I suffer the 
consequences of your pressing and important necessities to take the start of my clear accounts 
and honest counsels.’^  ^ Salisbury’s argument was simple; James' estate could not subsist 
without increased burden to his people and that it was inadvisable to impose that burden any 
further with the prerogative; therefore it was necessary to seek parliamentary endowment. 
James responded to Salisbuiy's first addresses by ordering the council to consider means by 
which he could live within the greatness of his predecessors, without taking 'from our 
servants or subjects all hope of reward', and advancing projects which furthered the socio­
economic development of the c o m m o n w e a l t h . ^ ^
The lengthy reply which followed was given under the auspices of the council, but it 
was effectively Salisbury's, strikingly suggested by Croft who noted the language changed to 
fhst person singular in the main body.^ 8 gj-st part rehearsed Salisbury's push for
^4croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 266-269 and 280-296. Parliament was prorogued five times between 
September 1607 and its eventual assembly in February 1610. See Larkin and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations: 
James 1 .166-167 (30 September, 1607), 181 (10 January, 1608), 196 (4 September, 1608), 202 (4 January, 
1609), and 232-233 (29 September, 1609).
^^Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 266-269. Cuddy, 'Southampton', 133-139 presents another perspective, but 
misunderstandings of Jacobean finance weaken his argument.
^^Crofi (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 281.
^^Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 296-298 (fc. after 12 January, 1610]).
^^Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 268.
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parliamentary endowment and outlined a general strategy for the session based on 
bargainingThe second offered James an overview of his refounded monarchy which built 
upon propositions about projects, retrenchment, and bounty in the earlier t r e a t i s e s ,  
admitting 'mo concessd that some form of supply would be had in parliament, James would 
see ’the whole bulk of your estate, as it must serve to answer your certain and casual 
expenses, and to reward your servants and others.’i9i Salisbury looked forward to finally 
having settled finances. To that end, he intended to allocate specific revenues to offices of 
state while a table of assignments would be prepared out of which to support the royal 
establishment. Provisions for normal wages, entertainment, and imprests would dramatically 
improve the king's service. Although the richest princes could not support a multitude of 
retainers, official salaries for a 'selected number of choice servants of both kingdomes' would 
be possible 'once your Majesty can hold in reasonable conformity with your [fiscal] estate’. 
Salisbury anticipated an endowment sufficient to support James, his closest affinity of
servants, and the administration on a workable, but binding budget; hoping thereby to
confront the waste, corruption, and ill-advised munificence which drained so much revenue 
from the system.
A  salaried affinity did not preclude James from exercising his generosity for well- 
deserving subjects, but giving must be judicious and tempered by the advice of
commissioners. 192 James' largesse haunted Salisbury, who tirelessly attempted to educate
James of the importance of curbing his personal spending. Such liberality was 'improper 
for this kingdom, which being compared with other monarchies may certainly be counted 
potent, but not opulent.'i®  ^ There might exist 'infinite causes of expense, but not infinite 
means’ and Salisbury could wish to see voluntary charges limited by James' 'timely and 
judicious resolution.'i95 Salisbury's sense of history was a lens through which James must 
understand his finances. I t  'almost hath not been the destiny of this crown to be involved in
99crott (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 299-303.
199Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 303-312.
191Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 303-304.
192crott (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 301 and Salisbuiy's discussion 304-310. 
193croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 254-259.
194croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 284 ,285n95.
195croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 300.
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extreme lack,’ Salisbury instructed, 'wheresoever it hath met a liberal hand... it is not possible 
for a king of England ... to be rich or safe, but by f r u g a l i t y Henry VIII was the Tudor 
who proved this: 'there was never king so memorable for his treasure as King Henry VII was 
... it soon appeared that riches and excess could not long stand together here, when his son 
King Henry VIII (to whom he left a million and a half pounds) had spent it by and by, and 
without the fall of abbeys had proved (in arido) the poorest son of the richest father that ever 
this land had.'i^ ? Salisbury believed too much of James' bounty fell within the bounds of 
p r o d i g a l i t y .  198 James was cognizant of Salisbury's message, pledging himself in October 
1607 to 'observing as straite a dyete ye can in honoure & reason praescryve unto me’.i99 But 
therein lay the crux, the inability to define the common ground between liberality and 
frugality.
Salisbury's refoundation intended to enforce frugality with the book of bounty, a 
project in which he and Caesar collaborated which would establish special commissioners 
with ’order[s] to be observed in the proceeding with every s u i t ' . H 9  The book declared the 
necessity of limiting grants, explained the workings of the commission for suits, and offered 
would-be suitors guidance with a memorial of suitable and unacceptable grants, m  Suitors 
were ordered to refrain from pressing then demands, James' officers were encouraged to stay 
suits contrary to the memorial before they passed the seals, and ready-made warrants were 
prohibited to prevent suitors bypassing the commission. Guided by the memorials, 
commissioners were to meet suitors once or twice a week, vet their petitions upon reference 
from James or his councillors, deliberate, and return certificates to the council which would 
render formal judgment. The commissioners were James' bulwark, protecting crown 
revenues by judging how all suits 'maye hurte o[u]r revenewes, stand w[i]th the good of o[u]r
^96croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 285.
197croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 286. B. P. Wolte, 'Heniy VII's Land Revenues and Chamber Finance', 
English Historical Review 79 (1964), 253-254 argues that Henry VII's horde was an historical flight o f fancy, 
but this has been interestingly disputed in Richard Hoyle, 'War and Public Finance', Diarmaid MacCuUoch (ed.), 
The Reign o f Henry VIII: Politics. Policy, and Pietv (London, 1996), 85-86.
^98crott (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 283-284.
199h h  Salisbury Ms 134, fol. II3r.
119croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 249,305-309.
Declaration of His Maiesties Royall pleasure, in what sort he thinketh fit to enlarge Or reserve Himselfe in 
matter of Bountie (London, 1610) [STC 9223.2].
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subiectes, or be agreeable to o[u]r lawes.’i^  ^ They also spared James the onus of refusal. 
Casual revenues were expected to serve as James' bank account of bounty, but only those to 
which the king’s entitlement was 'prima facie reputed clear and unquestionable’.
These structural tools were reasonable, but a failure. The explanation lies in tracking 
individual grants as they passed along the sequence of seals, something which has been done 
by Linda Peck: 'The early years of the reign were marked by a multiplicity of brokers and a 
contradictory process: on the one hand, important Household officials, especially members of 
the Bedchamber, secured grants and, on the other, privy councillors stopped grants once they 
had been obtained from the king.'1^ 4 Before 1614, Salisbury and Northampton were 
instrumental in stopping grants, but these 'stays were frequently temporary'.its James' 
unwillingness to acknowledge the impossibility of being 'rich or safe, but by frugality’ 
complicated matters’H^  Salisbury was forced on the defensive by such statements: 'yo[u]r 
Ma[jes]tie hath beene troubled with a woord that fell from my penne wherein I onley glanced 
that I sawe a fatalitie in the state that it would never be rich'.n^ A minute for the regulation 
of suits in 1608 is telling: 'yt hath pleased his Ma[jes]ty in his greate wisdome to resolve of 
some restraint and choice in his guiftes for some shorte time untill his great debtes bee 
pasyfied'.ii8 Caesar's notes reveal the royal mindset which agreed to these strictures being 
observed 'till it shall please God to rid hi[m] out of debt, & that hee hath equalled his revenue 
to his charge.'ii9 The mental underpinning of the commissions was disastrously incompatible 
with their professed purpose and could hope for no more than to contain or manage the 
patronage culture.
Neil Cuddy claims to have found evidence in Pauline Croft's work to support his 
position that fiscal policy was riven by a contest between prerogative (projects) and
Additional Ms 10038, tbi. 2v; Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 301. 
tl^Declaration... Bountie. 13-24 for the final demarcation, though somewhat different from Salisbuiy's 
proposals in Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 305-307.
 ^14peck, Court Patronage, 42.
^15peck, Court Patronage. 43-44. 
ll^Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 285.
Salisbury Ms 134, fol. 95r-95v (22 October, 1606).
Salisbury Ms 126, fol. 128r (1608). Emphasis mine.
^ 9^b l  Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 74r.
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parliamentary revenue. 120 This is an oversimplification. Experience convinced Salisbury 
that projects alone were not a sufficient basis for endowment, but he believed it was neither 
fiscally nor politically expedient to abandon them. Salisbury had lost his taste for those 'sour 
and harsh supplies, attending rather to what may be obtained in parliament', but asked James 
to empower a commission to examine his and Caesar’s labours. 121 Salisbury expected the 
commission genuinely to examine the projects, deliver recommendations, and put on them a 
public stamp of approval or rejection. The commissioners judgements were further expected 
to become guiding precedents for eager projectors and suitors. Far from ’bury[ing] 170 
"projects" in a vetting subcommittee’ Salisbury hoped that moving vetting into the light of 
day would be a means to reform projects and confront the corrupting tendencies within the 
patronage culture. 122
Projects offered many good precedents for 'adorning and enriching' the 
commonwealth and their importance was acknowledged in Salisbury’s refounded 
monarchy. 123 He pledged to 'remove all difficulties and lets that may block or choke up the 
passages of these excellent designs' to which end a project commission staffed by 'experts of 
science and occupation' was advocated again. They would vet projects and anticipate abuses 
of projectors in the same manner as the commission of suits would curtail inadvisable bounty 
and prodigality. It is essential to recognize that Salisbury was not simply opposing projects 
and prerogative revenues. 'I am not of those,' he maintained, 'that think it can sort with the 
majesty of a king that his occasions should depend upon the will of his subjects, by which 
men make not the king the judge and mediator of things, but the people'.i24 princes are the 
parents of the commonwealth and possess power 'in case of politique necessity, to help 
themselves in their body politique, by their subjects' fortunes, a power so material and 
inherent in the person of the king' that it was unquestionable. 125 But Salisbury believed the 
prerogative wielded for reasons of state should respect 'whether the practice be seasonable for
129cutidy, 'Southampton', 133-134. 
12lcroft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 292-293. 
I22cuddy, 'Southampton', 134.
123croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 310-311. 
124croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 289. 
125croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 288.
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the time'326  Projects became grievances when they failed the test of seasonableness and 
were solely instruments of private gain.
Perhaps the most emotive element in Salisbury's project was combating English 
xenophobia. He strove to reassure James about his own stance after the Union debacle and 
his determination to be the Scots' defender-cum-advocate in the coming s e s s i o n . i ^ v  Among 
the salaried affinity, Scots were to receive the third part more 'because they are further 
separated from their own private estates and revenues than the other, as also in respect of 
difference (possibly) in their means and a b i l i t i e s . ' i ^ s  Salisbury defended this course against 
jealousy as the maintenance of 'such particular men as are necessary for the service of 
princes’, a matter of public c o n s e q u e n c e . i 2 9  Against charges the Scots should live at home, 
Salisbury answered with vigour: 'what can be more just reply to such a one than to ask him, 
whether he would be glad that he that was their king, and now is ours also, should live there 
too?'i30 However, Salisbury was undeterred from confronting James with home-truths about 
the Scots which had become obvious in the Union debates.Henceforth, with the garden of 
casualties well tended, neither they nor the English would be 'suffered to range up and down 
the field of your Majesty's possessions, nor of your subjects, after such things as for the most 
part deceive their expectations and offend the people.’i32 Therein, Salisbury argued, 'consists 
the life of this project; then is that object of distate taken away, and on the contraiy one step 
to the Union gained... whoso sees not that the harsh effects and ill order of your Majesty's 
gifts heretofore hath troubled the passage of this desired U n i o n ' .  ^ 33 Law and nature were 
fully resolved to bring forth the Union of the kingdoms and Salisbury argued refoundation 
was a crucial step.
Parliament was the 'tickle shore' to which James would be driven to avoid the rocks of 
his necessities. Salisbury promised the strongest preparation he could devise to smooth the
l26ci-oft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 288,289.
^27%e 'crisis o f favour' Salisbury appears to have experienced after 1607 is posited in Cuddy, 'Southampton', 
132-133.
128cj-oft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 304.
129croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 309.
130c;roft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 309-310.
131 See Willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.244-253 and 255-290.
132croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 310.
133crott (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 310.
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passage and that initiatives ’shall be so far declared to be mine own, as your Majesty shall run 
no censure for any of my hollies’.i34 it’s clear that a prerogative bargain reminiscent of 
purveyance was in the offing. Salisbury wished James 'would be pleased to value your grace 
and bounty to your parliament, with dispensing with some of that monarchical power which 
is inherent in your royal person. Provided always, that it be not such things as tend to the 
diminution of your sovca*eign and absolute authority, in point of state and government, of 
which kind somewhat may be thought of, wherein your Majesty hath power to do more than 
ever your meant or mean to do.'i35 Salisbury resolved upon the dispensation of as yet 
unspecified parts of the prerogative 'as it reacheth at the money and means of your people'. 136 
By employing the distinction between the absolute and ordinary prerogative, Salisbury would 
test an increasingly uneasy consensus over the prerogative's scope and authority in fiscal 
matters when he faced parliament. i37
The broad outline of the refounded monarchy was the decisive element in persuading 
James to support Salisbury's project. It would have been hard for James to remain 
unimpressed: parliamentary endowment would provide sufficient additional revenue to put 
his estate on a sound footing; James' family, affinity, and offices of state funded in a certain, 
reliable fashion; casualties to serve his own unexpected needs and reward well-deserving 
subjects; the commission of suits and book of bounty established as a bulwark against endless 
importuning suitors; the realization of projects for the lasting enrichment of his 
commonwealth; the temper of English xenophobia checked and the possibility of Union 
reborn. Salisbury more than answered James' demand for 'some good and safe means to 
preserve our estate firom want, firom whence ariseth such a hydra of evils and dangers as it 
ought to be one of the principal cares of the greatest princes to cast out that monster both in 
root and seed.'i38 it was an undiluted advancement of the public good which fulfilled for 
James that duty which he had ascribed to all princes in The Trew Law of Free M o n a r c h i e s . 3^9
^34croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 295-296.
 ^35croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 302.
136croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 302.
137Guy, 'Imperial Crown', 74-75.
138Gi-oft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 297.
139King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 76.
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Finally, James' feelings at the prospect of his necessities ending were unlikely to have 
changed since 1607: 'I coulde thinke my selfe as happie in aU other respectis as any other 
king or monarke that ever was since the birthe of chryste'.^ o^ Salisbuiy offered James the 
fullest conception of a monarchy restored to fiscal health he ever received, but whether it 
could become reality remained to be seen.
V
The Great Contract became a vehicle for reflection on the nature of the Jacobean 
polity. Parliamentary endowment confronted seminal questions inherent to the balance of 
James' political theory with practical kingship. Members of parliament and the king faced the 
possibility that their actions might change the basic demarcations of authority and 
responsibility with the English polity. John Beaulieu recognized the gravity of business early 
in the session: Parliament 'according to the common opinion and hope, is like to bring forth 
very great alteration and reformation in the State.... it being in question not onely to eradicatt 
the strongest and most inveteratt Diseases of the State, but also to admitt new Seeds of 
temperature or distemperature in that bodie, you may think with what caution, wariness, and 
slowness they will proceed in so important a W o r k e ’.^^i it was obvious from his treatises that 
Salisbury's efforts in parliament would be founded upon a course of explicit bargaining. The 
only concession to parliamentary image and ritual which veiled the normal parley over 
supply was framing the negotiation as one between Lords and Commons in which James 
remained above the fray. Of course, James was anything but uninvolved behind the scenes, 
but the pretence was effective. However, it is essential to see both sessions for what they 
were: sharp parley seeking the most favourable terms of any settlement. Finally, it will 
become apparent that these parliamentary sessions significantly challenge Conrad Russell's 
perception of James' parliaments as consensual assemblies whose members 'voted as many 
subsidies as were asked of them, and did so with reasonably good g r a c e . ' 1 4 2
James deferred an opening speech, leaving Salisbury to set the agenda for his project, 
which he rehearsed in the Lords on 14 February and delivered to the Commons the following
140h h  Salisbury Ms 134, fol. 113r ([29 October, 1607]).
141winwood, Memorials. HI, 124-125 (1 March, 1610; John Beaulieu to William Trumbull). 
^42Russell, Parliaments, 49.
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d a y 343 The present session was required to ’procure supply of his Majesty’s state with some 
ease to be given to the subject' and creating Henry as Prince of Wales. 144 Good to his word, 
Salisbuiy detailed the fiscal facts of life, accounted for his management of the king’s finances, 
and crafted a portrait of dire necessity.i4S He repeatedly emphasized the inadequacy of 
James' ordinary revmue, consequent annual deficit of £46,000, the extent to which 
extraordinaiy charges only exacerbated matters, and the debt which had been paid down to 
£300,000 only after great labour, ^ 46 Strange it would be, Salisbury argued, if the Commons 
did not 'concur with us for supply to the payment of his debts, for support of his yearly 
expense, for provisions for his navy, for his magazines, and such like, with so much more as 
you would wish a king of Britain to have in store to answer all occasions.'i47 Salisbury had 
been clearer in the Lords: 'we must not look only to put the King out of debt but have 
sufficient supply to maintain and support his yearly and annual charge.'i48 He was aiming for 
one-time supply to eliminate James' debt and annual support to cover the deficit and leave a 
yearly surplus for extraordinaries.
The precedents of former parliaments were rehearsed to answer 'tacit' objections to the 
demand. Salisbury deftly turned Elizabethan 'war-time' precedents on their head, arguing 
'before she had any war with Spain or had sent any forces into the Low Countries, her people 
had so enabled her by frequent s u b s i d i e s ' . 4^9 Had not 'love and providence' been the motives 
of those subsidies 'they would neither have come so freely nor so frequently'. Salisbury 
trumped resistance to peacetime supply with this narration and future debates over the issue 
would center not on idle theories of taxation, but rather the management of crown finances.
143xhere exists no satisfactory study of the Great Contract. Lindquist, 'Great Contract', Smith, 'Crown, 
Parliament', and Wallace Notestein, The House o f Commons 1604-1610 (New Haven, 1970), 255-434 have 
l(X)ked at Salisbury's project in detail, but not without problems of interpretation. Most damaging to these 
studies is that the authors seem not to have consulted the manuscripts which were subsequently edited by Croft 
as 'Several Speeches', creating significant disjunctions between their evaluation of parliamentary events and 
Salisbury's thinking and intentions. The brief survey in Peck, Norfliampton. 198-205 remains the most 
effective; Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy. 150-178 is also useful.
144poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.11,11-12 (15 February).
145poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.11,14-18.
146poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.11,16-19.
147poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.11,25.
148poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1, 8.
149poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.11,15-16.
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Criticism of expenditure was anticipated and answered at length. Salisbury consistently 
argued that it was for causes 'inherent and ordinary to all p r i n c e s . ' ^ 5 o  Should Elizabeth have 
gone unburied?; would not a parsimonious entry and accession have been dishonourable?; 
was the on-going pacification of Ireland an idle expense?; could anyone argue that a watchful 
defense was imprudent?i5i Surely they were just and necessary to anyone, Salisbury posited, 
'except it be such as study nothing but their own envies, nor believe nothing but that they find 
written in the stories of their own i g n o r a n c e ' 3 5 2  Salisbury challenged English hypocrisy in 
deflecting charges James’ estate would be better had he stayed his hand from 'an irregular 
b o u n t y . ' i 5 3  James might have given less, but 'I think there is not many in both Houses that 
will be hasty to give back anything they have r e c e i v e d . ' i 5 4  As for bounty to the Scots, 'it 
must be remembered that he was bom amongst them... to have wished a king to have left so 
many unrewarded of worth and merit, had been to have moved him to have changed his 
vhtue because he had changed his fortune.’
Language of public good and counsel were heavy in the speech. The king of Scots 
had put England 'in the fruit of all good things': religion preserved, the back door of Scotland 
closed, a settled succession, peace with S p a i n .  i55 'From the first institution of this monarchy, 
which consists (as all others do) of people, government, and revenue,' the lord treasurer 
recounted, 'all wise princes whensoever there was cause to withstand present evils or future 
perils (so much the more perilous because invisible) have always addressed themselves to 
their parliaments for counsel'.i56 The object of consultation was the 'public utility': to 
consider of some supply as may make this state both safe and happy; th'other to assure you of 
our good intention to join with you in any reasonable request for the public good'.i^ ? Other 
than weak references to law reform and codification, Salisbury left retribution deliberately
l^Oposter (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II ,16.
ISlposter (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 18-22.
152pQgjej. (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 22-23.
153poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 23.
154poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 23n52.
I55pogter (ed.), Poceedings 1610. I I , 25-26 and Commons Journal 1 .396. 
156poster (ed.), Poceedings 1610. I I , II.
^57poster (ed.), Poceedings 1610. I I , 24.
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vague, simply a ’general redresse of all just g r i e v a n c e s ’. i ^ s  His digressions seem to have been 
designed to establish parameters. As kings did not demand contributions at pleasure, 
parliament should not ’denye them out of humor, when there was just cause pro bono 
p u b l i c o Expanding this, Salisbury commented the king's prerogative knew its true scale 
in 'concurance with the publike good', but there remained its absolute p o w e r ,  impositions 
with due regard of trade, tenures and wardships, the courts of justice, and the execution of 
penal laws were four of those inherent and inseparable prŒogative powers, While the 
Lords would join them in all humble requests for retribution, the Commons must maintain the 
'respects that are due to sovereignty and m o d e s t y ' .  1^2 ^ would appear Salisbury was warning 
the Commons off retribution touching the king’s absolute prerogative, but implicitly opening 
the field to its ordinary aspects so long as they proceeded with deference.
Salisbuiy's speech was a tour de force, 'though the subject and end could not be very 
pleasant to the hearers'. 1^ 3 it had been strong on principles, but short on details. It has been 
argued this was the result of unpreparedness and that the clear-cut division between one-time 
supply and support was not made at this time.1^4 However, the Commons immediately made 
the distinction in their debates and the argument of unpreparedness is a misconception. 
Salisbuiy knew his own mind and what he hoped to secure fi"om parliament for refoundation, 
supply and support were explicitly distinguished in the Lords, while he anticipated parting 
with certain prerogative rights in any bai gain. 1^ 6 Like an astute negotiator, Salisbury was 
testing the waters with generalities. It was essential to take the temper of the Commons after 
nearly two years without a session, particularly at a time when he was presenting them with
158poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 27; Samuel Rawson Gardiner (ecL), Parliamentary Debates in 1610 
(London, 1862), 7.
159Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.7. 
idOGardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.7.
IdlGardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.7-8.
162poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 27.
^93 winwood, Memorials. Ill, 123 (23 February, 1610; Beaulieu to Trumbull).
164Groft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 265-267.
165 'The Demands high-To free from Debt, and some annual Support.' Commons Journal. 1 ,398; also Gardiner 
(ed.), Debates 1610.9.
idÔThis contradicts Lindquist, 'Great Contract', 626-627, but is clear in Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 296 and 
302.
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an unprecedented request. Salisbury was letting the Commons muse over the demand and 
be the first to offer a price.
Salisbury's vagueness precipitated the searching debate for which he had hoped, one 
in which Caesar participated, but, more importantly, assessed and reported to his m a s t e r ,  
The committee of grievances took charge of the matter and a decision was promptly made to 
defer supply as something unfit to have been moved by the Lords at the beginning of the 
s e s s i o n .  1^ 9  Members turned to the 'yearly contribution desired, and of the retribution to 
proceed from the King' and numerous proposals were made for settling a new revenue on 
.Tames: the full benefit of recusancy and attained lands to be entailed to the crown; direct 
customs administration; removal of purveyance 'for which the subjects would yeald to His 
Majestic a greate yearly allowance'; the like offer for abolition of tenures and wardship; and 
faint murmurs of compounding for release from old debts and defective t i t l e s .^20 Thomas 
Wentworth questioned the value of any support without repairing the bottomless hole of the 
Exchequer and cited precedents for a council of in q u ir y .1 2 1  Caesar rounded on Wentworth 
for citing precedents from Richard II and Henry IV, one 'a dissolute and profuse prince’ and 
the other a usurper; for the matter of tenures and purveyance, Caesar served his master's 
interests by reminding members that they were profitable (pricing them at £60,000 and 
£40,000 respectively) and their removal would only make James' want of revenue the 
g r e a t e r .  122 The committee concluded only tenures and wardship were worth examining as 
retribution, but turned the tables on Salisbury by asking for a conference with the Lords for 
more details of what James would o f f e r .  ^23 i f  tenures were not included, the Commons' 
representatives should seek approval to consult on their d i s c h a r g e .
Salisbury had been checked. He had been hoping for agreement in principle to supply 
James which explains his irritation in discussions with his fellow Lords that the Commons
^92poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 25.
^98h 111, Bench and Bureaucracy. 155-157.
^^9Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.9-10 (19-21 February).
l^Ooardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.10-11; Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 32 (21 February). 
2^1 Gardiner (ed.l. Debates 1610.11-12.
122Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.12 (21 February).
123 Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.12-13.
124poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 32.
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had proceeded to 'retribution before we receive contribution ... For without the one the 
kingdom cannot subsist, without th'other it may',125 Further, he was unhappy supply had 
been shelved so quickly, retorting 'the lower House did not conceive the King's necessity'.i26 
Nevertheless, his consultations with Caesar led to an offer-sheet of retribution and the amount 
of supply and support to be demanded. Salisbury and Caesar were well-timed foils in the 
conference. Caesar began, seeking the terms of contribution and retribution. 127 Rhetorical 
chastisement for not attending the king' necessities preceded a demand for £600,000 supply 
and £200,000 support. Caesar rebuked his master for moving subsidies at the beginning to 
which Salisbury pleaded necessity while expecting some propositions on their part. That was 
beyond their commission and Recorder Henry Montagu stepped forward to ask the Lords to 
approach James with them for leave to examine tenures. 128
Salisbury was prepared and put them off tenures as a question first needing 
consultation with the Lords. 129 Rather he reiterated James' necessity and expectation of an 
answer in principle on supplying it, but enlarged the discussion of retribution. 18O it was of 
three kinds, matters of sovereignty with which James would never part; matters of justice and 
redress of grievances which the subject had of the king fieely; and 'Rights—but such as were 
onera to the subject' which be 'princely and of price.’i^i Salisbury offered ten such heads as 
retribution. Purveyance, defective titles, and old debts were taken fi-om the Commons' 
proposals. Salisbury added the elimination of informers and forfeitures for non-payment of 
rent; subjects would be allowed to plead generally not-guilty in Exchequer causes of 
intrusion; the statute of limitation (32 Henry VIII) would be applied to the prerogative. His 
final three proposals pertained to wardship: respite of homage would be eliminated while 
alienation fines and purchase prices for the wardship of heirs would be set at reasonable rates.
^25Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1 ,12 (24 February). James alluded to this impasse later in the session. King 
James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 193-195.
126poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1 ,12.
^22poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1 ,13-14; Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.13-15. 
l28Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.14 (24 February).
^29Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.15.
ISOpQgter (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1 ,15; Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 34-36. 
l8lGardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.15-16; Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 35 (27 February).
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Reacting to Caesar’s reports, Salisbury was hoping to deflect interest in tenures, something 
for which he had no desire to bargain except in reformist terms.
James’ agents in the Commons steered the debate to a statement in principle to supply 
the king, but Roger Owen expressed the majority sentiment that there existed no precedent 
'first to say we will give,'i82 Montagu provided a formula which would hold for much of the 
session. Supply was deferred with assurance that they would give good satisfaction at the 
appropriate time; they were ready to bargain for s u p p o r t .  8^3 n was not an unpromising start, 
but progress on support was tied to the Lords’ answer on tenures. They stalled, using an 
'answer answerless' from James. Agreement in principle was still being sought, but members 
refused to be baited despite Salisbury’s show of willingness to urge the abolition of 
tenures. 184 They rejected Salisbury's advice not to disparage the ten heads and secured 
another conference to press for tenures. 185 Against their inclination, Salisbury and James had 
to break the logjam with an affirmative answer. 186 Northampton praised the Commons' 
respectful carriage in seeking the fair Helen—with which James found no fault—but warned 
them to proceed without 'rubs or lets' to the prerogative or its exercise. 187 His conclusion was 
pointed: this is a rule infallible, that as long as there is a monarchy, you must maintain the 
monarch, though these means we have propounded be not usual in respect of the greatness of 
the demand, yet necessary for to maintain his Majesty's estate.'
The Commons had deftly side-stepped any general bargain for support and supply. 
Reminiscent of 1604, they instead fashioned a contract for tenures alone, for which they 
offered £1 0 0 ,000.188 in so doing they ignored James* preference for a bargain in total 
encompassing tenures, purveyance, and other h e a d s . 189 Salisbury was seeking broad
182commons Journal. 1,402 (28 February).
183 Commons Journal. 1 ,403.
184Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1,26 (2 March).
185commons Journal. 1 ,406 (5 March); Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1,28-32 (8 March).
186poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1 ,16,20-21, and 25-26.
182poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1 ,36 (12 March); Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 54-55 (12 March). 
ISSposter (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 64-67 (23-26 March); Commons Journal. 1 ,411-418 (15 March-2 April); 
Croft, 'Wardship*, 40-41; Croft, 'Purveyance', 13.
189poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. _1,35 (12 March).
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refoundation while the Commons looked to a specific contract.i9o This disjunction 
precipitated a crisis for Salisbury and James. £100,000 alone was inadequate; Caesar valued 
tenures at £60,000 which left the net gain of £40,000 a far cry from £200,000. Further, the 
Commons had rejected the other heads as worthless, making the prospects for another bargain 
decidedly uncertain. But to reject the offer would undermine progress. Certain legal 
mechanics of the contract remained to be settled and Salisbury postponed action until 
agreement was reached on them.i9i Salisbury maintained constructive engagement because 
he had decided to draw the contract for tenures within the compass of a broad agreement on 
support.
The conference on 26 April was political hardball. Northampton and Salisbury had 
already discussed a compromise position in the Lords, that of £200,000 support including 
wards, but a higher demand was forthcoming in conference. ^ 92 Salisbury reminded members 
that James’ inevitable necessity was such that only £200,000 clear was adequate. 193 
Oppressive flowers and regalities of the prerogative had been offered in exchange, but 
'Wardship was not emongst them.'194 'Shall I flatter you', Salisbury reasoned, 'when the 
Wardes is taken away 200m. li. a yare wül then be sufficient... you haveinge given cause of 
augmentacion by your demand.'i95 it was not a question of £100,000 being too little for the 
wards, it was simply too little for James' necessities. Unless they offered James satisfaction 
'not reddendo singula singulis, but sub tota materia 200m. li. a y ere above whatsoever we 
defalked from him by our contract, the Wards will not be had.'i96
The Commons had seen the full measure of their goals with tenures at hand and 
Salisbury placed them in jeopardy. It was a serious miscalculation which unnerved members
190Lindquist correctly made this distinction, but undermined its significance by arguing that Sahsbuiy was not 
bargaining, but pursuing a 'free revenue' which 'it should be emphasized, remained his only object throughout 
the year. It is true that he spoke o f a "large retribution" when he first addressed the Commons, but he did not 
specify the retribution, and he may have meant nothing more than redress o f grievances appropriate to a petition 
of grievances.' Lindquist, 'Great Contract', 623-627.
191poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1 ,63-66 (20 Apiil).
^92poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1,67-69 (26 April).
193 Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.149 (26 April).
194Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.150.
195Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.151. 
l96Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.151.
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to an extent which drove Salisbury to seek instructions from James.i^ ? The Commons' 
response was expected to be a flat refusal and James counselled Salisbury on confronting that 
possibility. 198 The Lords could retort that a sudden refusal was unfitting; if the demand was 
too high the Commons should make a counter-offer; or Salisbury might suggest that the 
demand was not peremptory and James might entertain a lower price. If they insisted on their 
single contract then, in James mind, 'twas a signe they had no desire to deale’ and further 
negotiations were pointless Nevertheless, James expressed confidence in Salisbury's ability 
to 'keepe the matter from a rupture' until his return. To that end, though he meant 'not to 
compound for all his offers but in grosse', James suggested a conference at which all the 
heads might be particularly valued, hoping to make the Commons 'more open to compound 
for the whole.'
The Commons drafted and debated their answer, finally requesting a conference for 
its d e l iv e r y .  199 Salisbury was dejected, knowing the Commons' refusal was imminent, and 
told his fellow lords he was 'ashamed to look back what hath been done this 9 w eek s'.^ o o  The 
Commons refused Salisbury’s request for an open debate, delivering instead their reason for 
contracting for tenures alone—that only the partakers of the benefit should be taxed for it 
which was impossible as part of larger support-and the unprecedented and politically 
impossible burden of £300,000.291 Salisbury harshly rebuked them for yet again preventing a 
free exchange of ideas in conference, reminded them of the value of those things which had 
been offered, and refused their answer, affirming the Lords had never said that for less than 
£300,000 retribution could not be had. 292 Salisbury's climb-down firamed any future 
settlement as a contract in total. He and James had lost over price, but successfully revived 
the original plan for refoundation, albeit within the formula of a contract.
Before support could be truly revived, James and Salisbury precipitated a bigger 
crisis. Throughout the weeks of negotiations the Commons' committee had been busy
l92Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 74 (1 May).
I98pni Salisbury Ms 128, fol. 118r-119v (30 April, 1610; Lake to Salisbury).
199Foster (ed.), Prœeedings 1610. I I , 75-76 (2 May); Commons Journal. 1 ,423-424 (1-2 May). 
290Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1,74 (3 May).
29lFoster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 75; Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1,80 (4 May). 
202Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. n, 80 and Commons Journal. 1,425 (5 May).
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collecting and perfecting grievances.293 in the heady atmosphere after James' leave to 
examine tenures, he praised the lower house for its discretion in burning a bundle of idle 
grievances, but thought it prudent to set parameters: abuses of government were acceptable, 
but not questions of authority or legal right; genuine grievances, not members' particular 
complaints. 294 By the end of April, the committee had determined upon an exhaustive 
examination of the legality of impositions and the judgment in Bate's case.295 Select 
members of the house were ordered to search the Tower records and gather all relevant 
precedents.296 Salisbury, Ellesmere, and the Lords generally were angry with this course, an 
ire which mirrored James' own.297 Speaker Phelips was given a provisional injunction 
against debating the issue which he delivered.298 This touched off a two week dispute over 
freedom of speech and debate.299
James made something of a second climb-down. He argued 'as this cause of 
impositions is fit to be handled for the ease of the subject, so this other business of support 
was necessary to be handled for the good of the kingdom* and wished them to 'proceed pari 
passu in b o t h . ' 2 i 9  The price of debate was renewed attention to support, but James implicitly 
tied progress on support to the satisfactory resolution of grievances, foremost among them 
impositions, a situation with grave implications for Salisbury's project. The Commons 
agreed, but felt it remained for the Lords to resume negotiations.2H Salisbury obliged with a 
somewhat obtuse accounting of their divergent positions, but affirmed James' determination 
to lower his demands 'and we take it in consequence if he fall you shall rise.’2i2 The 
Commons accepted the opening, but would not increase their offer before first considering 
and debating further points of ease, including the original ten h e a d s . 2 i 3  The surviving reports
293commons Journal. 1 ,404-454 is the best somce tor the work of the committee tor grievances. 
294Foster fed.t. Proceedings 1610. II, 61 (21 March).
295Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 73 (30 April).
206poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 74. (1 May)
297poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. 1,67-69 (26 April); Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. J , 82n2. 
208poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 82 (11 May).
299poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 82-114.
219poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 116 (25 May).
21lFoster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 119.
212poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 123.
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indicate the debates were particularly negative with some members refusing to serve on the 
subcommittee responsible.2i4
The summer recess was in the offing and twenty weeks without material progress was 
taking its toll on James' patience. The Commons might be 'well-affected to the state', but 
Salisbury seemed incapable of moving them to a conclusion and the upcoming impositions 
debate promised nothing but more delays.2i5 James intervened with a message through 
Salisbury, who was at pains to emphasize he was only a messenger.2i6 James wondered what 
would be the end of their 'great council': 'He offered you some branches, nay some fruits 
such as were never gathered, as fair as any in Britain ... The King asked too much, you 
offered too little, and yet a fair, an honorable, of offer. The distance is great, the time is 
short, the difficulty is infinite. To reconcile this difference, a mediocrity is fit to be sought 
for'.2i7 James expected satisfaction for support, but the time for agreement had passed. The 
king was content the contract would remain in suspension until the next session, by which 
time members would understand the disposition of their countries 'that now make you startle' 
from bargaining. As support was suspended, so the peoples' grievances must wait the next 
session. Instead, James expected immediate attention to supply, for which he would 'have 
just cause to complayne of this greate senate' if they denied him in such a time of 
necessity.218 Salisbury gave for inducement a promise to suspend some £20,000 worth of 
impositions once supply was voted and no impositions would be laid before the next session; 
they were also reminded of James' offer not to lay any future impositions except in 
parliament.219
The king's voices spoke for at least two subsidies while others opposed any before 
their grievances were a n s w e r e d .220 George More supported two subsidies, but suggested 
their grievances be put in readiness in hope of James answering them despite Salisbury's
214Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.46 (2 June).
215Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 132-133; Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. _1,100-101. 
2l9poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. I I , 135 (11 May).
212poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. I I , 138-139.
218Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.54.
219Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 140-141.
220commons Journal 1 .438 (13 June).
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speech.221 Finding 'the Howse bent against subsidies', Caesar intervened with a message 
from James, defending against suspicions that 1606 would be repeated: 'Some may think that 
supply being now yielded to the King, the parliament shall be dissolved and then the matter 
of tenures, which was projected, was but offered and not meant. His Majesty's answer to that 
is, he means expressly the parliament shall meet again. Others may think that then we shall 
have no answer to our grievances’, but he promised to hear and redress them, including 
impositions.222 Caesar opined that supply would encourage James' favour and supported the 
motion of two subsidies.223 Many members remained unswayed and a decision was 
postponed at the urging of James' supporters.224 Caesar arrived the next day with formal 
assurance from James of his pledge to hear their grievances before the recess.225 Further, 
James would deliver his lowest price for support once he had seen the grievances, 'whearby it 
might appear unto hym what yearly proffitt wee desyred to take from hym’.226
James' assurance was ineffective in clearing the spectre of 1606: 'have we not 
received messages of that kind with the like promises that Mr Chancellor [Caesar] brings now 
of good answers to our grievances and that promise should have been inserted in the 
preamble of the grant of the s u b s i d y . ' 2 2 7  Maurice Berkeley agreed. Lord Danver's patent 
suspended in 1606 was reborn in the hands of the hated projector Stephen Proctor, 'of which 
we complain now'; the way was clear: 'hear answer to our grievances f i r s t . ' 2 2 8  Sandys 
believed the division of opinion made it unseemly to put the question to a vote, which was 
a g r e e d . 2 2 9  The next day, Caesar delivered James' indifference concerning the motion and 
doubted not but they would satisfy him after their grievances were a n s w e r e d . 2 3 o  Caesar also 
conveyed James' tetchiness that one subsidy had been so controverted and ire with members
221 Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.55-56 (13 June).
222Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.56; Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 142-143 (13 June); Foster (ed.),
Proceedings 1610. II, 134
223Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.56.
224pogter (ed.). Proceedings 1610. H, 143.
225poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 143 (14 June).
226Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.56 (14 June).
227poster (ed.), ftoceedings 1610. II, 146 (John Savile); 'We had a message upon the last Subsidy; so of this. 
Commons Journal. 1,439; also Willson, Bowyer 1606-1607.165-166 and 185-187.
228poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 146.
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who had questioned his government and applied precedents of turbulent reigns to it. The 
initiative had done little but raise doubts in the Commons about James' goodwill and 
reminded them of past disappointments.
James' failure to move members to a successful vote of supply and one muted in any 
reasonable proportion to his demands seriously compromises Conrad Russell's statement that 
'Only once in the reign of James I, over the issue of impositions [in 1614], did they attempt to 
make supply conditional on the redress of grievances'.23i All other Jacobean parleys were 
only 'the sort of semi-tacit compromise and mutual exchange of favour which marks the 
political process in any system; this was the real thing because it was 'an explicit pistol-point 
d e m a n d ' . 2 3 2  James would have found these semantics problematic. Members consciously 
looked to 1606 when redress was promised as the reward for voting supply and failed to 
occur in a timely or positive fashion. They refused to be bought with promises in 1610 and 
explicitly said as much. Moreover, James accepted the inevitability of answering members 
grievances to receive any supply. Redress-supply in 1610 and 1614 did not represent 
qualitatively different moments, but engagements with varying degrees of constructiveness 
and determination. Both were examples of political reciprocity at its most timeless and 
elemental.
Freed from further debate, the members returned to support and asked the Lords to 
consider further retribution, the king's lowest price, and projects for levying support other 
than those wholly upon the land.233 The Commons' obvious defiance of James' course caused 
consternation in the Lords. Salisbmy believed this represented a crisis and wanted the 
backing of a delegation to sound out the king before any answer was returned. 234 Ellesmere 
disagreed, but the Lords favoured Salisbury's motion. T h ^  were uncertain whether to re­
open support negotiations against James preference. James' promised to answer them 
shortly .235 The beagle and his master were at loggerheads whether a successful conclusion to
231 Russell, Parliaments. 49.
232Russell, Addled Parliament. 5-6,25-26. 
233CoTnmons Journal. 1 ,441 (18 June),
234Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1 ,109-110 (19 June). 
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the project was still possible. James' actions indicate he no longer believed so, at least not in 
the present session. Salisbury looked to the consequences of failure and was willing to 
persevere. He persuaded James to continue the project, but would suffer his master’s 
reproaches in the Fall for 'self love of youre owin counsaill in holding together of this 
parliament quhair of aU men waire dispaired, as I have oft told you, but your selfe alone.'236 
The Lords' anxiety over further proceedings heightened while they waited for James' price.237 
Salisbury defended his project and, with Northampton, turned back talk of disputing the 
means of levying support in the conference. They wanted the focus firmly on retribution and 
the king's price rather than drawing in complicating issues which both men believed were 
premature. The conference was spirited with Salisbury and Richard Martin sparing over the 
value of retribution, including new heads offered by the C o m m o n s .2 3 8  The king's price was 
£140,000 support over and above that which he lost, valued at £40,000 each for purveyance 
and tenures: £220,000 in all.239
Consideration of support resumed after the great impositions debate, but grievances 
came to the f o r e . 2 4 o  James' received the petitions of temporal and spiritual grievances which 
he likened to tapestries.24i James answered those concarning profit a few days later, 
including a long defense by Salisbury of impositions, but enjoined them to return to supply 
and support now that he had answered some of their g r i e v a n c e s .  2 4 2  Dissatisfaction with these 
partial answers was testified by one subsidy and one fifteenth voted the next d a y . 2 4 3  it was 
hardly voted with 'good grace' and cannot be seen as anything but a conditional gesture when 
compared to James' necessities. Redress and supply remained insolubly connected. It was 
agreed that support would receive undivided attention for the rest of the s e s s i o n .  2 4 4  That 
resolution was almost certainly the result of a private meeting between Salisbury and a select
236h h  Salisbury Ms 134, fol. 143r-144v ([6 December, 1610]).
237p()ster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1 ,113-117 (26 June).
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group of members.245 He failed to answer their continuing concerns over impositions and 
could not persuade them to a meaningful supply.246 However, he seems to have found 
common ground in the need to act effectively with support or see parliament prorogued, 
perhaps dissolved. The pace was correspondingly brisk in the next ten days. The Commons 
resolved to offer £180,000 tor tenures, the remaining heads, and five new propositions.247 
Salisbury reported James' displeasure to the Lords that the lower house had not risen to his 
demand of £220,000, yet possessed the audacity to seek additional retribution.248 He was of 
a mind to 'dissolve the parliament and carry them no longer with hopes', but Salisbuiy carried 
a final offer into conference. James yielded on three points, refused the rest, and would 
accept £200,000 in support. 249 Salisbury warned, the 'distance is so little, the bargain so 
advantageous and the contentment both of King and people so great as if you should not 
accept it, you would hereafter repent yourselves.'250 The Commons' account closed: 'If this 
offer succeeded not, then this would be an End of this Parliament.'25i
The Commons agreed to give £200,000 in support by a margin of 60 and the 
committee was empowered to review the negotiations and propose any new points of 
retribution which did not touch the king in honour and p r o f i t . 2 5 2  As the Lords prepared to 
meet for the formal acceptance in conference, attention turned to the means of l e v y .2 5 3  
Salisbury, Ixird Sheffield, and Bishop Abbot carried the discussion with a motion to have a 
memorial drawn with the points of agreement to which both houses would subscribe and 
cement the bargain; the levy should not be contested until the next session. Finding some
245xhe members Salisbury consulted were Henry Neville, Edwin Sandys, Maurice Berkeley, Herbert Croft, 
John Scott, Francis Goodwin, and Edward Alford, some o f the king's sharpest fiscal critics in the Commons. 
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formula for a binding resolution of what had been accomplished became Salisbury's focus.254 
Against him, Sandys and the members who remained at Westminster were still looking to 
add.255 Salisbmy stuck to his desire for some binding statement which was supplied by 
George More's project for a memorial.256 The Commons' memorial was passed and delivered 
to the Lords, but the lower house was not through and sought a conference the following day. 
Sandys summarized the points of the contract, including the Commons' reservation of the 
power of proposing new retribution which did not affect James' honour and profit. Sandys 
offered new points, but Salisbury refused them and answered only the earlier additions now 
that they had received the Commons' memorial.257 it and the Lords' own were entered in the 
journal two days later.258 Salisbuiy's answer to the new propositions was included while the 
Lords were determined to protect James' interest—and their own—by also laying equal claim 
to the powers of addenda and explanation.259 That same afternoon James arrived from 
Whitehall to answer the rest of the Commons' grievances, give the royal assent to the bills, 
and prorogue parliament until October.260
Negotiations had been arduous, tempers and frustrations had built among all 
concerned, but James and Salisbury, Lords and Commons, had accomplished something 
historic. Edwin Sandys was 'happy to live in those days wherein we with our own eyes see 
that effected which our ancestors never dreamed o f . ' 2 6 i  Wardship and purveyance, scourges 
of the commonwealth for decades, had been swept away along with some of the most 
irritating Jacobean projects. On the other hand the beagle had faced his master with harsh 
reality and spared no pains to effect a difficult solution. Salisbury had prevailed and 'brought 
the rest of the greate houndes to a p[er]fect tune, w[hi]ch was before by there voyce much
254pogtgj. Pfoceedings 1610. II, 288-289.
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devided.’262 Had the Great Contract endured, that would have been the story's end. But the 
long parliamentary debates had aired deeply conflicting political attitudes and beliefs that 
demanded reconciliation. The frantic search after a binding statement of agreement and rush 
to add more points of ease were telling evidence that 'This great contract between the King 
and the kingdom is concluded but not finished'.263 At the last, there remained Salisbury's 
ominous statement: 'I long to hear my master say he approves it.'^^
V
'I marvel that you should make a doubt for your assurance,' Salisbury challenged the 
Commons, 'I leave it unto you whether the king may not bind himself by an act of parliament. 
I know not what an act of parliament may not do.'^^  ^ The question of assurance, whether 
there could be a secure and binding agreement between James and his subjects, was the rock 
on which the Great Contract foundered. The Commons resolved that assurance could only be 
by act of parliament, 'in such soit as by the advice of my Lords, the Judges, shall be thought 
sufficient both for his Majesty’s annual revenue by this contract and also for the people's 
security.'2^ ® Salisbury expected stable support would ultimately be established in the 
provisions for its levy while assurance was never contested in Caesar's long brief evaluating 
the C o n t r a c t .267 However, the peoples' security preoccupied the lower house: 'with what 
cords we shall bind Sampson’s hands, that is to say his Majesty's prerogative'.26S Members 
would have agreed readily with Salisbury's assessment of an act of parliament's strength, but 
they lived under a cloud of political practices and statements which undermined their 
assurances.
The Great Contract was not the first instance of examining the relationship between 
the king's prerogatives and the law. Members had already faced the issue with purveyance in 
1606. Those debates simultaneously took place on levels of political philosophy and
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practical governance which proved contradictory. In the case of purveyance, Salisbuiy and 
the Lords favoured composition while the Commons preferred legislation which enforced 
existing statutes. The Lords and judges defended against any bill by arguing 'that the statuts 
for Purveiors doe not bind the King', a position tantamount to bringing purveyance within the 
compass of James' absolute prerogative.269 The composition arguments reveal the crippling 
disjunction at work in the Lords' defense. Francis More favoured composition, but would 
leave the details of security in the bargain to the judges.270 Nicholas Fuller rounded on the 
notion. He had heard Justice Popham argue the inability of statute to bind James' prerogative 
in purveyance. Until the 'judges do directly affirme wee may have security lett us not talke of 
Composicion,' Hare argued. But for the judges to oblige was to make acceptable Hare's own 
bill. Bacon argued the king could voluntarily dispense with purveyance as not being 
'essentiall and inseperable' to his kingship while James intervened on the third day of debates 
to commend the question to the judges’ hands.27i This brought a sharp response. If '36 laws 
hath not helped us, one more wiU not ease or availe us,' answered Edwin Sandys, while if 
they should 'compound for the incomberance and oppression we might by the same reason 
also be drawen to compounde for removing anie other greavance.'272 When Hare's bill was 
allowed to pass to further the subsidy and debated in the Lords, the judges became the issue. 
Hare reported their conference with the Lords, including Popham's affirmation of the king's 
prerogative in purveyance.273 Fuller fought Popham, but he stood firm and 'delivered one 
ludgment in all mens opinions of dangerous consequence, that the prerogative was not 
subiect to law, but that it was a transcendent above the reach of parlement.'274 When the 
'ludges overruled all on the prerogative side' for purveyance against statute, they and the
269willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.60; Croft, 'Purveyance', 27. 
270willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.60.
271 Willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.65-66.
272wilIson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.71.
273Willson (ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.120.
274wiUson(ed.), Bowver 1606-1607.121; PRO SP 14/20/36, fol. 82v.
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Lords destroyed the logical basis of security in any composition between James and his
subjects.275
In explicit fashion, the Commons had confronted the practical challenges of binding 
the prerogative by statute. They were unable to find an effective formula and the judiciary 
stood against their attempts. The dispute over John Cowell's law dictionary, The Interpreter. 
renewed the issue in 1610.276 a  number of Cowell’s definitions and commentaries irritated 
members.277 That the English king was 'above his law' as an absolute monarch and therefore 
'to bind the prince to or by the laws were repugnant to the nature and constitution of an 
absolute monarchy' particularly struck at assurance. James had no choice but to respond to 
assertions which so angered members and intervened before any resolution could be had on 
Cowell's punishment. James 'had as absolute power as ever any monarch in this kingdom ... 
[and] taketh himself tied unto no elected power’, but was careful to assert 'the marriage 
between law and prerogative is inseparable and like twins they must joy and mourn together, 
live and die together, the separation of the one is the ruin of the other.'278 The common law 
was 'the counsellor of his actions with which he will always consult in the course of his 
govemment'.2'/9 For its boldness, Cowell's book would be suppressed by proclamation.2so
Tenures presented an opportunity for James to answer lasting concerns of his 
sympathy for ideas like C o w e l l 's .2 8 i  The royal philosopher contrasted the general power of 
kings in their likeness to gods and fathers with that of the 'setled and established State' of the 
English cro w n .2 8 2  i n  general, subjects were bound to supply their king's necessities; in 
England that was a parliamentary process for which they were presently assembled. The
2'/5pRO SP 14/20/36, fol. 82v; Croft, ’Purveyance', 31-32. Burghley had opposed similar legislation by Hare in 
1589 because the bill restrained the prerogative on both theoretical and practical grounds. Dean, Parliament 
1584-1601. 80-83.
276por discussion of Cowell, Sommerville, Politics and Ideologv. 121-127; Burgess, Ancient Constitution. 149- 
155; Linda Levy Peck, 'Kingship, counsel and law in early Stuart Britain', J. G. A. Pocock, Gordon J. Schochet, 
and Lois G. Schwoerer (eds.L The Varieties of British Political Thought. 1500-1800 (Cambridge. 1993), 91-94. 
277Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 37-39.
278poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1,29,31; Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II 50; Gardiner (ed.). Debates 
1610.24.
279poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 51.
280poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 49; Larkin and Hughes (eds.). Proclamations: James 1.243-245.
28lKing James VI and I, Political Works, ed. Sommerville, 180.
2®2King James VI and I, Political Works, ed. Sommerville, 181-184.
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present times called for the careful distinction between the 'state of King's in their first 
originall, and betweene the state of setled Kings and Monarches.' Every 'just King in a setled 
Kingdome is bound to obserue that paction made to his people by his Lawes, in framing his 
gouernment agreeable thereunto'. Good kings, unlike tyrants, lived within the bounds of their 
laws and James never doubted that he above all good kings would be remembered for having 
'his Lawes duly obserued'. James also restated the axiom with which he protected his 
prerogative: 'I wil not be content that my power be disputed vpon: but I shall euer be willing 
to make the reason appeare of all my doings, and rule my actions according to my Lawes.' 
The practical extension of this stance came in James' insistence that members dispute the 
abuses of government, not its legal establishment.283 While some members stuck at liberal 
allusions to God and kingship, the majority found it agreeable.284 James had articulated the 
prerogative’s duality and his willingness to 'maintain a clear distinction between his authority 
in essence, and his actual legal authority in domestic affairs', but the practical challenge of 
assurance had yet to be faced.285
Members confronted the decision in Bate's case after a lengthy contest in which James 
warned them against disputing his prerogative or that legal judgment.286 impositions were 
defended by Chief Baron Fleming as being part of the king's absolute prerogative, exercised 
by the king in his estimation of the public good, and incontestable. 28? Argument revolved 
around whether the subjects’ trade goods constituted their property and fell within the 
purview of common-law or, as Fleming argued, were commodities trafficked on the high 
seas, 'beyond the territorial jurisdiction of English common-law', and therefore subject to the 
absolute prerogative in an area where the common-law held authority.288 While it might be 
argued 'that impositions were less a form of taxation than a means of regulating trade', it was 
disingenuous to the point of incredibility.289 Revenue drove their introduction and
283King James VI and I, Political Works, ed. Sommerville, 190-191.
284poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 59n2.
285Burgess, Ancient Constitution. 155.
286poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 82-118.
287Quy, 'English Constitution', 74-76. ;|
288g^rgess, Ancient Constitution. 141-142.
289sommerviIIe, Politics and Ideologv. 152. |
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exploitation. Consequently it was difficult for members not to view impositions as taxation 
without consent and an attack on the subjects' property rights.^^o The bill against impositions 
which finally passed the Commons reflects the primacy of this concern, declaring 'that by the 
laws of England no impositions could be lawfully laid by the king upon the subjects' goods 
but by consent in parliament.’29i The danger of not enacting such a statement of principle 
was to accept those aspects of Fleming's decision which gave monarchs an absolute 
prerogative to impose upon merchandize and effectively create a precedent for taxation 
without consent which might be extended and upheld by the judiciary.
When 'the powder was spent on both sides', in Dudley Carleton’s words, members had 
been unable to make either case in a matter so 'intermixed with prooffs of divers natures: 
records. Acts of Parliament, judiciall acts, arguments legall, &c.'292 The Commons' Ifamed a 
petition which asserted parliament's sovereign power of 'taxing or imposing upon the 
subjects' good or merchandises'.^^s James' predecessors had confirmed these rights in statute 
and members asked him to follow their examples with the abolition of all impositions set 
without parliamentary assent and a law to prohibit the same course in f u t u r e . 2 9 4  Salisbury 
answered by asserting James was warranted by law, precedent, and the judges decision in 
Bate's case: 'I know not what he should have m o r e . '295  Salisbury was unbkely to have 
responded otherwise, but his explanation of why impositions were set is more interesting. He 
argued the merits of necessity from reason of state, a position evaluated by Dorset and in 
which he concurred: 'it was then thought no ill counsaile to preferre the former project of 
Impositions as the best temporaire remedie for those charges which were like to come on too 
fast to attend a Parliament, rather then to make choice of extending the King's prerogative for 
raysing of money any other waie upon the subjects, or to make benefitt by any rigorous 
prosecution of penall lawes, much less to fall upon monopolies and other vaine projects
2^®Sommerville, Politics and Ideology. 152-154.
29lFoster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. n , 165 (17 July, 1610).
292Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 250nl; Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.98. 
293Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 266 (7 July).
294Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 267.
295Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1 ,131; Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.154-162.
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devised by bankrupts and hatched in prisons.'^^e Salisbury's hypocrisy was courageous not 
least because he and Dorset had long employed penal laws, monopolies, and projects. 
Necessity was the crux. 'I am sure,' Salisbury avowed, 'if they knew your Majesty's necessity 
they would, were they in my place, do as I do, let them think of me as they please. I assure 
myself I shall be freed from being either an Empson or Dudley. From my heart do I wish that 
impositions and the necessity thereof might end with this parliament, and so your Majesty, 
your issue and estate were well and needed not these means.*297 But impositions were not 
temporary measures to answer short-term difficulties.^ ^s Fiscal necessity bore them, ensured 
their continuance, and an Exchequer judgment which the Commons refused to accept 
'legitimated' the practice.
Stronger thinking was behind the defense of purveyance in 1606. The consistent 
argument of the Greencloth had been that fiscal necessity absolved them from obeying the 
statutes.299 Necessity placed their actions outside the purview of statute. Salisbury 
maintained that the king's necessities would not allow any course with purveyance but 
composition.^^ This was not simply James' personal necessity. Salisbury and Northampton 
openly argued in 1610 that necessity produced a hydra of dangers which members had an 
obligation to repair with 'such supply as may make this state both safe and h a p p y T h e  
Commons understood Salisbury to mean that the 'King and the Prince must live in honour 
and plenty, if not in plenty, not in safety. If not in safety, we not in plenty.'^oz Northampton 
praised the Commons' care of James' wants as a manifestation of their 'care of the public 
good'.303 The argument being advanced was that the public good required that the king's 
fiscal estate be sound, the flip-side being that a 'body more consumed than nourished would 
not be durable, but a febris must necessarily foUow.’^ o^  Among his fellow Lords, Salisbury
296(3andmer (ed.), Debates 1610.156. Attomey-Geneial Hobait explicitly defended impositions by reason of 
state during the Common's debates, Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. H, 199.
297poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1 ,133.
298h h  Salisbury Ms 118, fol. 144v.
299croft, 'Purveyance', 17-18.
300croft, 'Purveyance', 26-27.
30lFoster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 24.
302Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. n , 35.
393poster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 40 and 39-45 generally.
304Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 44.
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Stated simply that 'True necessity must be satisfied and not disputed.'^ ®  ^ James was equally 
blunt: 'The supply of the king is the good of the people’.^ o^  The attainment or preservation of 
the public good, salus populi, was the purpose of the king's absolute prerogative.^ ^? If the 
public good required the king's necessities be supplied, the fiscal implications were ominous 
and would seem to have been demonstrated in policies and attitudes concerning purv^ance 
and impositions.
The Commons' depth of uncertainty over legislating the prerogative came forward in 
their first work on tenures. Their initial offer stipulated the conversion of all tenures to 
common socage, thereby wholly extinguishing those tenures by which wardship and other 
feudal incidents accrued to the king.308 Beaulieu reported to Trumbull the wariness that 
moved this demand, their 'fear of being circumvented in their Contract; because they hold this 
Matter of the Wardships to be so fast annexed to the King's Prerogative, as that it cannot be 
wholly seperated from it, but by the extinguishment of the Tenures whereby he doth hold 
them'.309 However, James was determined to retain the honour and rank inherent to the 
different tenures. Chief Justices Popham and Edward Coke expounded on the details of the 
offer and Coke argued that wardships and incidents were common prerogatives which 
subjects also possessed and could therefore be legislated away without extinguishing the 
tenures.^i® The Commons debated the Lords' position, fearful that by retaining the tenures 
'the old law of wardships might again be called to life', but relented in the face of James' 
resolution.311 However, they were adamant the 'judges and the King's counsel that be actors 
in this business be named in the act of parliament, their memory to be recorded to all 
posterity.' Fears of adverse judicial interpretation were behind the Common’s assertion in 
their memorial that 'the Extent of every Article that is desired for the Good of the Commons,
3®^Foster (ed.), Proceedmgs 1610.1 ,69 (26 Ajml). Another version records: 'When I shall carty to the lower
306pQgter (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 106.
39?Guy, 'English Constitution', 75.
308poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. 1 ,53-54. 
^O^winwood, Memorials. Ill, 145.
310poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1,56-60; 64-65. 
^Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 70.
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in this great Contract with His Majesty, should be expounded and explained, in all Clauses 
doubtful, by the House of Commons, according to their true M e a n i n g . '3 1 2  Determinations to 
extinguish tenures and assume adjudicative primacy were driven by the belief that the present 
political climate made legislating the prerogative problematic.
The entwined issues of legislating the prerogatives and necessity legitimizing its 
absolute component’s exercise in fiscal policy point up that the Jacobean polity had no 
accepted or effective means to compel the king to obey the law.^i^ Members had the 
pronouncements of James, the judges, and their colleagues to affirm this. They need not turn 
to the king’s writings for this position, only hear his words of warning against disputing his 
prerogative power to lay impositions.^!^ To their argument that impositions stood as a 
precedent against taxation without consent, James answered (like Fleming in 1606) it was 
tantamount to suggesting 'that because a king may do in excessive manner, therefore he shall 
not do it at all'. Beware of such arguments, James warned: 'You must not set such laws as to 
make the shadows of kings and dukes of Venice.’ Necessity was explicit. How, James asked, 
could it be a 'fit matter to dispute taking away 70,0001i. a year from me when you are called 
to consider of supply and support for me? I have expounded my necessities myself and my 
Treasurer at large to you, and the first devise and dispute is what to take fi*om me.' He 
avowed that only 'some extraordinary necessity' would cause him to lay further impositions 
and then only after he had taken counsel of his parliament, but he would reserve the final 
judgment to himself. As for the Contract specifically, James answered: God grant it never 
do me nor my posterity good to resume that which I once bargain fo r .'3 i5
This was the James of Basilikon Doron and Trew Law who took counsel of his 
subjects in the debate of public good and policy only at his discretion; the king who promised 
at his coronation to advance the common weal, but denied it was a contract which made him 
answerable to any one but God for his kingship. Thomas Wentworth went away from James' 
speech 'exceeding sad and heavy... that he saw nothing in that speech any way to restrain the
312Lords Journal. II, 661-662.
313Burgess, Absolute Monarchy. 18-20 presents a counter argument. 
314Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 100-107.
^l^Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 106.
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power of imposing, even upon our lands and goods, our properly, but we must be still at the 
mercy (for the moderation therein) of a good and gracious k i n g . *316 Subjects could only hope 
their king would be a good king. This was the Jacobean polity's inherent contradiction, that it 
could neither compel the king to act for the public good nor define salus populi and necessity 
independently of him. Richard Spencer understood when he spoke against composition for 
purveyance in 1606: 'no security can be given from the king. For as saied he as love is only 
betweene equalls in some degrea or measure so contracts and if such a contract be broken on 
the Kings side there is no remedy [but] to sue by peticion. And if a law passe on that behalfe 
no man can forbid the King to dispence with it.'^i? When necessity compelled the king to 
break their contract, Mr. James asserted, 'when our greavances notwithstanding continue, if 
wee be greaved for breach, and that wee are notwithstanding trobled with purveiors ... for 
south wee have tied the King to condicions which he cannot keepe'.^is Significantly, the 
member of parliament and Francis Bacon were in agreement that the king could, by his 
absolute prerogative, dispense with statutes in cases of n e c e s s i t y .
Members in 1610 had three months during which to reflect on the Great Contract and 
the problems and challenges of contracting with their king and binding his prerogatives. 
Much depended upon that resolution of James' for which Salisbury longed to hear. By the 
time members returned in October, they had sounded out their countries and established the 
criteria by which their trust in James' performance of the Great Contract's provisions would 
be satisfied.
VI
Lords and Commons demonstrated little alacrity in returning to work after their 
recess.320 Like members, Salisbury and Caesar spent the summer evaluating the bargain. 
Salisbury apparently called for copies of both memorials just before departing for Holdenby
^l^Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 108.
317Willson, Bowyer 1606-1607.66.
3 !8 Willson, Bowver 1606-1607.67.
^l^Burgess, Absolute Monarchy. 87-88.
320poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. 1,251-252; Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 295-297 and 387-388.
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where he was to meet James At the same time, Caesar comprehensively evaluated the 
Contract on fiscal and political grounds.222 The Contract had been agreed hurriedly amidst a 
confusion of additional propositions and they were sizing up the project.323 James' 
involvement in this process is indeterminate and largely circumstantial. Some of James' 
reservations and demands delivered in the Fall session dove-tailed with those of Caesar and it 
would have been uncharacteristic for him to have remained disinterested. What will become 
clear is that Salisbury, Caesar, and James were very nearly of one mind on the Contract, with 
one substantial exception. Salisbury was willing to bargain for a better deal.324 James was 
not.
Salisbury's study of the Commons' memorial left him concerned that it 'containeth 
much ambiguity with reference to addendo, diminuendo, etc.'^^s The tardiness of both 
houses in perfecting the Contract compounded his concern. In conference with the 
Commons, Salisbury was angry with what he took to be a coolness on their part, rehearsing 
James' continuing necessity and arguing the benefits of the Contract, tasks which he had not 
believed would be necessary to r e p e a t . 3 2 6  Waving their memorial, Salisbury called it 'a 
contract and no contract, for a power is left to add, diminish, and explain; which you may tell 
me is a good towardness and an entrance to bargain, but it is no binding bargain.' Speaking 
for himself and the Lords, Salisbury seconded James' position: he was not 'so enamored with 
it as to yield to all your desires, and to cram the child is the way to choke the child.' James' 
message was clear. They must have a speedy and binding conclusion 'or the body perishes, it
221 The response to Salisbuiy's request is PRO SP 14/57/12, fol. 18r-18v (10 August), 1610, He wrote Caesar 
on 9 August o f his departure for Holdenby; he seems to have left that day or the following. BL Additional Ms 
36767, fol. 280r-281v. On 6 August, Lake, Suffolk, Worcester, and KnoUys were at Holdenby; Lake was sent 
on to Kirkby with letters for James; Suffolk wrote Salisbury on 7 August that he, Worcester, aW Knollys would 
wait at Holdenby for James' arrival and attend him until Salisbury arrived. It appears James did not in fact reach 
Holdenby before 11 August, after Salisbury's arrival there. SP 14/57/5, fol. 8r-9v (5 August, 1610; Lake to 
Salisbury from Holdenby); SP 14/57/7, fol. 12r~12v (6 August; Lake to Salisbury from Holdenby); SP 14/57/8, 
fol. 13r-14v (7 August; Lake to Salisbury from Kirkby); SP 14/57/9, fol. 15r-15v (7 August; Suffolk to 
Salisbury from [Holdenbyl); Additional Ms 36767, fol. 282r-283v (11 August; Salisbury to Caesar from 
[Holdenby]).
322b l  Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 125r-139v (17 August, 1610); Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 32r-46v is a misfoliated 
draft of the former; the proper se<iuence of folios is 40r-41v, 32r-39v, 42r-46v.
323JTH Salisbury Ms 206, fol. 80r-80v.
324Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 301.
325poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1,252 (23 October, 1610); Lords Journal. I I , 661-662.
^26poster (ed). Proceedings 1610. II, 297-300 (25 October).
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grows on so last to a consumption'; if the determination was not had in the present session, 
'you shall never have another session for this contract.' 'The longer you are about it,' 
Salisbury warned, 'the more wül the King's affections kindle against the contract.'
Salisbury seems to have had another agenda with the speech, testing the waters to see 
if he could move the Commons to increase their offer for support. Caesar's brief undoubtedly 
provided the impetus behind this. The document is a conundrum which has elicited various 
suppositions from historians.32? Harking back to his classical education and civil law 
training, Caesar examined the Contract's fiscal and political dimensions with g ra v ity .^ 2 8  By 
pro-contra debate he hoped to establish the utility of such an unprecedented reform. Caesar 
answered his own questions, but took the unusual step of having his analysis copied by a 
scrivener. There seems little doubt, in the context of their partnership and friendship, Caesar 
did this for Salisbury's benefit. Salisbury seems to have started his journey back to London 
on 15 August, intending to meet Caesar that coming Saturday (18 A u g u s t ) .  329 The brief was 
composed on the 17th. Conventional scholarship has assumed both copies were essentially 
the same product. In fact, Caesar revised his original after the scrivener's work. It is difficult 
not to imagine Caesar and Salisbury—each man possessed of a copy—spending much of their 
Saturday meeting discussing the brief, with Salisbury's criticism being found in the shape of 
Caesar's corrections. Further, unfinished notes among Salisbury's papers were drawn fi*om 
Caesar's brief and more closely reflected his revisions than the scrivener's original.330
The amendments cast the Contract in a more favourable light and showed greater 
realism about fiscal altematives.33i Optimistic retrenchments were replaced with vague 
references to unspecified abatements.332 The original posited no clear gain by £200,000
32?Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy. 173-177; Lindquist, 'Great Contract', 638-642; Smith, 'Crown, Parliament', 
124; Prestwich, Cranfield. 41-45.
328^111, Bench and Bureaucracy. 5-10; Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes 
(Cambridge, 1996), 19-65.
329b l  Additional Ms 36767, tbl. 284r-285v (13 August, 1610); HH Salisbury Ms 196, fol. 14r-14v (15 August, 
1610); also Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy. 176-177.
33ÛHH Salisbury Ms 206, fol. 80r-80y (undated).
33!Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.164-179 reprinted the clean copy. I have found no evidence that Hill, 
Lindquist, Prestwich, or Smith read the actual manuscript copies. They uniformly cite and quote from 
Gardiner's transcription. If the originals were consulted, Caesar's post-facto amendments and the document's 
misfoliation did not attract attention sufficient to warrant mention.
332b l  Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 41 v, 32r-32v [misfoliated] and 33v.
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support, but the revision assessed revenues to be parted with and their possible improvements 
tougher and arrived at a gain of £50,000; £100,000 if improvements were excluded.333 The 
conclusions were still discouraging. The deficit for ordinary and extraordinary charges had 
grown from £150,000 to £200,000 thanks to Prince Henry's establishment and revenues lost 
through redress of grievances, particularly i m p o s i t i o n s . 334 Even with the Contract, the crown 
was short of the support it required by at least £100,000. Caesar was pessimistic about 
getting more; 'certeinely, they will never bee p[er]swaded to any yerely support further then 
they have offered a h r e a d y ' .3 3 5  Salisbury probably agreed with his friend, but thought it was 
worth another attempt.
James' necessity remained and Salisbury put that case before the Commons with 
inflated numbers, hoping-yet again-to move them to assist. Sounding much like James in 
the last session, he carped that the consequence of their demands in grievances and 
impositions was to deprive the king of £60,000, if 'then instead of addition there be 
subtraction, this is preposterous, regarding the King's necessity.'336 Members might retort the 
'he had it not all of right', but James had it 'de facto and hath lost it.'337 Further, his debts had 
risen from £300,000 to £500,000 (a padding of Caesar's figures by £100,000). These 
circumstances challenged James' position 'that the substance of it should not pass except the 
maxim of the King be observed who resolves never to be a poor king upon this contract and 
yet is poorer than he was.' Salisbury hoped members would draw the obvious conclusion, 
that James needed more from them, which, from his focus on impositions, must include a 
refusal of their impositions bill. However, he cautioned they were deceived if they believed
333b l  Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 125r-125v and 40r-40v. Caesar generally excluded the possible improvements 
to the revenues being lost and settled on the Contract's net value as £100,000. Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 44v. The 
assessment inlLH Salisbuiy Ms 206, fol. 80r gives a net gain o f £98,000, far closer to Caesar's revised figure of 
£100,000 than his earlier drafts of first £65,000, tiien £45,000, and finally £85,000. Lansdowne Ms 151, fol.
40r.
3 3 4 j j h  Salisbuiy Ms 206, fol. 80r gave the same figures o f £50,000 and £100,000 for the csrdinary and 
extraordinary deficits respectively. The other lost revenues were fiom seacoals, part o f the pre-emption o f tin, 
logwood, and alehouses. BL Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 41r. The original gave the total as £48,000. Lansdowne 
Ms 151, fol. 126r.
335gL Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 32v.
336poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 300. Caesar estimate the losses were £50,000. BL Lansdowne Ms 151, 
fol. 41r.
33?Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 300-301.
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that because the king's wants multiplied their desires should also. James needed more, but 
was unlikely to yield more in exchange.
Salisbury looked to the most compelling argument in the brief to coerce the 
Commons. He would not say James' case was so dire that he could not subsist without 
parliament. Salisbury protested he did not speak 'by way of menace’, but the consequences of 
failure must be faced: 'I am no physician to anatomize the King's wants; but except you 
redeem the things which before I speak of, they must be more pressed than they have been.... 
I do not say the King shall send you an Empson and a Dudley, but this I say, the King must 
not want... he must not lack to please you. If a ward fall it wiU cost you more than it hath 
done.' By positing the king's subsistence without support, Salisbury was countering his 
central argument with James for the past two years, but reflecting the conclusion of Caesar's 
brief: I trust yo[w] are satisfied that the king is not in such extreme need of the Co[m]mons 
helpe to relieve his p[re]sent wantes, but that he can by his owne meanes & w[i]thout taking 
any desperate course relieve h i [ m ] s e l f e . ’338 The briefs central political defense to such a 
course was that James' in using his prerogative rights wronged no one and Salisbuiy's 
conclusion echoed this: 'the King will not do injustice to his subject; he wiU not do all he 
may do. But more than he hath done he must do'.339
A week later, having largely ignored Salisbury's prodding to recognize fiscal realities, 
James weighed in. The last session was consumed in 'nothing but joy and acclamations, the 
other half in nothing but ejulatus and g r ie v a n c e s .'^ ^ o  All the time his estate 'lay a-bleeding' 
and 'he could not abate his expenses nor cut his coat according to his cloth because he could 
not know his cloth till the parliament was done'. Their grievances had also taken £30,000 
from his revenue and their lingering plunged him deeper into debt. James demanded a 
resolution: 'The conclusion is this, I speak to you as a king to Ms subjects; lay this ground at 
your next sitting together; resolve upon the giving me an answer affirmative or negative to 
your memorial and then whatsoever you shall offer to me I shall be ready to hear.... I have 
offered you a bargain, look into it, and then to what you as dutiful subjects shall present me'.
338b l  Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 35r.
33^b l  Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 35v; Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 300-301. 
340Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 309-311 (31 October).
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The Commons' offer of £200,000 was well known. That James framed his demand as 
waiting to hear their offer indicates he, like Salisbury, was hoping for a better one. The 
Commons deferred an answer and James took the initiative, determined to spell things out in 
the plainest teims.^^i It defied fiscal common sense that he would proceed with the Contract 
except that he received supply and support. Did not the last session open with a demand for 
the 'entire repair of his wants and establishing of his estate’? Had matters not moved to 
support only after he received a 'general promise’ of s u p p l y ? 3 4 2  No man, James affirmed, 'can 
be so weak in himself nor so easy to be abused as to conceive that that was a relinquishment 
of the matter of supply.' James demanded £500,000 as the price of continuing with the 
Contract: could he entertain, much less conclude a bargain which did not preserve his estate 
and posterity from present and future difficulty?; was that possible 'without a large supply of 
treasure and yearly revenue'?
The language is oblique, but James' sudden demand for supply was probably a 
response to his own realization that Salisbury had given up hope of getting it. Caesar's brief 
addressed future supply, but the pro-Contract position expressed serious doubts while the 
contra voice went to great lengths to explain how the debt could be paid without it. The pro­
position asked whether 'w[i]thout p[ro]ceeding in the s[ai]d co[n]tract, or giving the[m] better
co[n]tentment in theire pfrojposed greiva[n]ces, yo[w] shall be hable to drawe frofm] them jjone peny more for yo[u]r supply.'343 Grievances were the real key, the pro-voice positing 'It I
may well bee, that his Ma[jes]ty, by yealding the[m] co[n]tent in some of theire grieva[n]ces, 
wherin they are not yet satisfied w[i]th the late answeres may win frofm] thefm] 3 subsidies 
& 6 fifteenths'.344 Caesar’s contra position was clearly sceptical of those preconditions and 
provided instead a complex series of projects and sales for royal lands to service the debt.345 
Salisbury had been tellingly silent on supply throughout the last session and had even 
protested his detachment from James' peremptory demand in May.346 Experienced in
341pQster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 313-316 ([6 November]).
342xhe Commons' resolution on this point had been vague enough that James may well have had grounds for 
interpreting it as a promise. Commons Journal. 1 ,403,
343gL Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 41 v.
344gL Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 32v.
345b l  Lansdowne Ms 151, fol. 33v-35r.
346Foster (ed,). Proceedings 1610. II, 132-133.
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confronting a debt triple that of the present one and armed with Caesar's suggestions for a 
non-parliamentary solution, Salisbury may have been content to forgo that aspect of the 
project, but James was not. However, James' unwillingness to return to grievances ensured 
he could not meet Caesar's preconditions.^^?
The Commons' irresolution unleashed James' abrupt demand for supply, but it was a 
consequence of their coming to grips with satisfactory security in the bargain. Members 
made redress of grievances the test of their assurance, their ability to bind the prerogative, 
and the measure of the trust which they could place in James' to frame his kingship according 
to the law and public good. To Salisbury's address, Maurice Berkeley had risen and opined 
that it was something other than lacklustre attendance which explained their b a c k w a r d n e ss .3 4 8  
Berkeley wished that 'the first thing we do be to call for the King's answers to our grievances 
and if we find the answers satisfactory we may then with cheerfulness go on with the 
contract.' His argument was entangled, but acute: 'if we find them short of our expectation 
and not satisfactory in points where nothing but law is demanded, when this bargain is made, 
we can have a law made for our security. And if we find we may not be sure of that, what 
courage can we have to go on to the bargain?’ Berkeley was almost certainly referring to 
their biU against impositions, first requested in the petition of grievances, and presently 
laying unread in the Lords. He was among the most outspoken critics of James' treatment of 
their grievances after supply had been voted in 1606 and pointed to it as a sign of the king's 
bad-faith. Fuller seconded Berkeley and the house brushed aside George More's plea on 
James' behalf to perfect their memorial and pass it.
In pursuing this course, Berkeley and the house were observing a resolution which 
had been laid out in the previous session. Sandys informed Salisbury in the session's dying 
hours that four things of importance remained for the Contract including 'the grievances 
satisfied and the contract perfected.'349 Samuel Calvert certainly held that understanding in 
his letter to William Trumbull: 'it will be pressed to have the King bound to banish all
34?Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. H, 311.
348Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 305 (27 October). 
349poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1 ,161 ([21 M y]).
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grievances in consideration of the Royal contribution of £200,000 y e a r l y . ’^ ^o James' answer 
to the grievances were called for immediately, but Bowyer stalled their copying and delivery 
from the Lords.351 James' Halloween demand for an answer on the Contract interrupted, but 
members refused to delay the reading until after the king's address. James understood what 
the Commons were doing with the grievances and attacked their course in his message: 'It 
may be objected that you will be ready to relieve the King's necessities; but withal you would 
hear an answer to your grievances. In the former session I was not only content to hear, and 
to promise to make answer to your grievances before the end of the parliament, but I did give 
you an answer; now to require this again is actum agere, to tread upon my feet.... I am sure I 
have answered you in all. I know not whether I have pleased you but it befits you therefore
to give me an a n s w e r . '352
The Commons spent two days in debate on James' demand and reached the 
compromise position of deferring a direct answer but perfecting their memorial as Salisbury 
had first entreated.353 Members were moved by the authority of James' demand for an 
answer, including the likes of Berkeley and Brooke, but strong voices challenged the king 
over grievances.354 Edward Duncombe believed there existed no possibility of answering 
James without first examining grievances; 'If there be a jealousy that the justice of the 
kingdom hath been stop[ped], then there may be some jealousy in this too, therefore remove 
away this jealousy.' 'Doubt is upon security', argued Thomas Wentworth, If the King have a 
power over the laws, we cannot have security, therefore we must see if the law can bind the 
King, then it may be.* Fuller argued that seeing the law properly executed with impositions, 
the ecclesiastical commission, and the Welsh shires was the foundation on which they could 
proceed in security. Member Hyde reminded his colleagues that they retained the power of 
addition and proposed to include impositions in the Contract and to 'have in our bargain a 
declaration of the law of England in point of impositions and other such things.' John
350hMC Dowpshire. II, 328 (22 July). j
35lFoster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 305. |
352Foster (ed.), Proceedinpfs 1610. II, 311 (31 October). I
353Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 312 ([3 November]). I
354poster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 392-400 (2 and 3 November). |
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Hoskyns offered a prophetic alternative: ’we shall fall into the pursuit of the memorial and so 
answer the King that we are in hand with it.... If this the King will, it is that that will make us 
believe we shall have good security hereafter.' It was precisely James' peremptory demand 
against that course which triggered the collapse. The speakers who made a difference in 
responding to James' ultimatum all stuck at grievances. Pretenses of consensual language 
gave way to candor in their speeches and reveal the underlying conflicts of principle. 
Subsidies were not of the greatest concern to Brooke, who did not want to see the bargain 
break for that reason and believed, tellingly, that if James could not supply his necessity 'with 
the right hand, he would take it with the left.'355 But if impositions were not included in the 
bargain it was better to break and leave the king to impose alone rather than assess the subject 
for support and see impositions c o n t i n u e . 3 5 6  Mr. James, who had spoken strongly against 
composition in 1606, became passionate that 'so long as an arbitrary power of government (of 
impositions, of proclamations) shall remain, what heart can we have to go on to the
business?'357
If there was a defining moment in the Great Contract, it came in the speech of 
Thomas Beaumont, who preceded Mr. James. They were undone both ways in the bargain, 
either the king's necessity went unsupplied or the subject was impoverished. They could not 
agree with the king, but 'if we break, what shall we think can become of us, when even as 
things now stand our liberties are infringed... Is it now held inconvenient to speak for 
confirmation of that Charter which our ancestors got with much sweat and blood?* 
'Notwithstanding so many laws as have been made that no imposition shall be set without 
assent of parliament,' Beaumont charged', are not impositions set voluntarily and maintained 
to be just? In the case of purveyance wherein 36 laws were made to restrain it, is it now an 
undutiful speech to name the word law?' Beaumont was incapable of believing in security for 
their bargain and the obscure MP made his case in words oft-quoted: 'The walls between the 
King and us are the laws and if he and his ministers shall leap over them or break them down,
355pQgter (ed.), Pioceedings 1610. II, 317; Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.129. 
356Gardiner (ed.). Debates 1610.129.
3^^Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 319.
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what have we to secure us?’ If impositions were put down, the levy reasonable, and ’all our 
grievances drawn in together into the contract,' Beaumont's constituents were 'willing to give 
200,000H. a year and also to give some present supply.' Whether Beaumont truly brought the 
voices of his country into the Commons is unknown, but he spoke for many members who 
agreed, I think not 5 voices excepted', that they could not proceed in the Great Contract 
according to James' d e m a n d s .3 5 8  Roger Wilbraham recorded what must have been a common 
sentiment at the Contract's collapse: 'the Commons never treated further of that contract, the 
most of them doubting, those great royalties were never intended to be a b o l is h e d .'3 5 9
These events must give us pause to reconsider the revisionist orthodoxy offered by 
Conrad Russell on parliaments and politics, most recently in his discussion of the Addled 
Parliament.360 That failed assembly alone, Russell contends, manifested genuine 
constitutional conflict.36i Further, conflict in 1614 was not between 'rival constitutional 
ideas', but one 'almost exclusively centered on royal claims to raise money.’362 Accordingly, 
this constitutional dispute over impositions-every bit as disputed in 1610 as in 1614!—had 
'little chance of developing [into] a serious argument between prerogative and the rule of law 
when James was as certain he was legally in the right as the Commons were. *363 Yet that is 
precisely the question members unsuccessfully confronted with purveyance, naturalization, 
impositions, and tenures in James' first parliament. Nor could they effectively address that 
question when presented with the potentially contradictoiy and ill-defined nature of the dual 
prerogative and when, as Russell perceptively remarked concerning impositions, 'both sides 
were so firmly convinced that they were legally in the right that they never fully absorbed 
that the other party thought differently.'364 Whether this represents a 'constitutional' conflict 
per se is a sterile argument over an historiographical shibboleth. Rather, in the Jacobean 
polity-taken on its own terms—this was something potentially insoluble—and perilous: the
358pQgter (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 319. 
359Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 320n. 
360Russell, Addled Parliament.
361 Russell, Addled Parliament. 5-6,25-26. 
362RusseIl, Addled Parliament. 26. 
363Russell, Addled Parliament. 7. 
364RusselI, Addled Parliament. 7.
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inability to correspondingly interpret an agreed body of political principles, not least 
concerning the relationship between the law and the king's prerogatives. These incongruities 
of both principle and practice within fiscal policy, seen in matters like impositions, 
purveyance, and projects generally, were compromising the performance of governance.
The question was really a simple one in the Great Contract. Would James be good to 
his word embodied in an act of parliament? James told parliament in 1604 that 'The righteous 
and iust King doeth ... acknowledge himselfe to bee ordained for the procuring of the wealth 
and prosperitie of his people' and that he would 'ever preferre the weal of the body, and of the 
whole Common-wealth, in making of good Lawes and constitutions, to any particular or 
priuate ends of mine'.^^s Were that the extent of James espoused philosophy, members in 
1610 would have answered the question affirmatively. But there was another: 'although I 
haue said, a good king will frame all his actions according to the Law; yet is hee not bound 
thereto but of his good will, and for good example-giuing to his subiects'.366 Which James 
would give the royal assent to the act for support? Ellesmere may have derided it, but, 
reflecting on James' first parliament, he recognized the Commons' stance: 'there was no hope 
to have any security for the same, because they sawe that their grievances were not answered 
and lawe Sc Justice was denyed theym.'367
Redress of grievances were members' assurance in Salisbury's great contract for 
endowment. On a practical level redress tested James' good faith against the precedent of 
1606. But redress also embodied the reaffirmation of parliamentary counsel, the subjects' 
means of participating in questions of policy affecting the commonwealths The dogged 
defense of the prerogative by James, his ministers, and the judiciary over purveyance, 
impositions, and naturalization had to be answered. Satisfying the Commons' grievances, 
particularly that of impositions, would demonstrate that statute could bind the prerogative, the
thSKing James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 142-143.
366King James VI and I, Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 75.
3h?HHL Ellesmere Ms 2599. This same position was staked out after the proclamation dissolving parliament, 
A Record o f Some Wortfav Proceedings in The Honovrable. Wise, and FaithlVll House o f Commons in the Late 
Parliament (London. 1611) [STC 7751]; A Memorable Speech In The Hovse o f Commons 1611 (London, 
[1641]) [STC 7740], 8; an edition of Some Worthy Proceedings which omits the compiler’s preface; Larkin and 
Hughes (eds.), Proclamations: James 1.257-258 (31 December, 1610).
368Rjjjg James VI and L Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 155-158.
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law could Stand against the demands of fiscal necessity, and the king could be compelled to 
act for the public good. James could not, would not provide that demonstration of trust, of 
consensus. Speaking of security during the Union debates, James avowed ’yee need neuer 
doubt of my inclination; For I wiU not say any thing which I will not promise, nor promise 
any thing which I will not sweare; What I sweare I will signe, and what I signe, I shall with 
Gods grace euer p e r fo r m e .’369 q would heartily wish,’ James intoned, ’my brest were a 
transparent glasse for you aU to see through that you might looke into my heart, and then 
would you be satisfied of my meaning.'^?® In 1610, grievances were the glass by which the 
Commons hoped to look into the king’s heart, but James refused their desires and in so doing 
shattered Salisbury’s refoundation of the monarchy.
369Ki]]g James VI and L Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 178. 
3?0King James VI and I. Political Writings, ed. Sommerville, 162.
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CHAPTER 6
Northampton, Ellesmere, and Conciliar Fiscal Policy
( 1611-1617)
I
'Now that the parliament hath left your Majesty to stand upon your own foundation, 
fixed only upon the firm and lasting pillars of your ancient powers and profits ... it is not now 
a work to repair some small defects, but to raise a new building'.! Salisbury thus described 
the fiscal situation following the failure of 1610 while he glumly confessed, 'I be not able to 
recover your estate out of the hands of those great wants, to which your parliament hath now 
abandoned you, seeing that place hath ever been the only foundation of supply to those 
princes whose necessities have been beyond the cares and endeavours of private men.'2 
Particularly from 1611-1617, James and his ministers confronted Salisbury's twin challenges 
of making his estate self-sustaining and effecting repairs without parliamentary revenue. It 
was a prolonged attempt to find the balance between funding governance and meeting the 
demands of the patronage culture. This was the constant element in a period of fiscal policy 
which became increasingly conciliar and episodic; Salisbury and Caesar coping with the 
wreckage of 1610; Northampton, Caesar, and the treasury commissioners revisiting the great 
project initiatives of 1608-1609; the stupor and disinterest of Suffolk as lord treasurer and the 
usurpation of policymaking by other councillors and ministers; Ellesmere's attempts to 
overhaul finance and revive parliamentary revenue; the abortion of Ellesmere's program and a 
conciliar push for budgets and surpluses. This chapter will analyze the attempts of these 
policy regimes to master familiar fiscal difficulties.
II
Caesar composed the financial assessment which underpinned Salisbury's counsel for 
James in January 1611.3 The debt was £4(X),000 and the deficit of ordinary expenses
! Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 312 (23 January, 1610[1611]).
2An early draft o f this address, corrected by Salisbury, described parliament as 'the publicke fountain as yet so 
dry'. HH Salisbury Ms 140, fol. 224v.
3b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138r-139v (2 January, 1610[1611]; reviewed and amended 12 October, 1611).
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£140,000.^ As the principal cause of the debt, curing the deficit was the key. Retrenchment 
was ’the safest & most durable meanes' of cutting the deficit and Caesar posited £74,000 in 
savings after comparing current expenses with those of 1602;-^  the cofferer, wardrobe, 
chamber, and navy accounted for the majority. Salisbury was at pains—again—to impress on 
James that he must embrace retrenchment and make it a reality with his regal authority.^ He 
also discoursed on an issue crucial to retrenchment in the offices of state: the administration 
of the chief officers within the patronage culture. Caesar proposed that they 'carefully 
examine, whether that it bee not faisable’ to effect his proposed savings.^ Salisbury then 
pressed James to hold officers accountable for preventing charges in the first place, insist 
they present him with quarterly comparisons of charges, and force them to 'yield you a reason 
for it'.3 We 'have not in our hands or heads the power of prevention', Salisbury reminded 
James and wished he and Caesar be exonerated for the failings of officers at the sources of 
expense. Salisbury effectively illustrated the problem of administrative officers with vested 
interests in avoiding retrenchment. The failure of such officers to further the cause of reform 
in 1617 produced a decisive alteration in fiscal policy, but, until then, Caesar's collegial 
approach remained prevalent.^
The cousins to these officials were the officers of the receipt who had charge of 
improving revenues. As much as increasing charges, Caesar looked to enhance the 
percentage of revenues which James realized by reducing administrative ignorance and 
personal peculation. Improvement was possible with 'due regard that the subiect bee not 
oppressed, w[hi]ch may iustly bee, where the subiect shall pay no more then before, but all 
paymentes shall run to the right centre of the kinges coferes.'!® Caesar had in mind 
improvements in the great farm of the customs and sweet wines, casualties, accounts of 
receivors general and sheriffs, and, particularly, the wards. Salisbury placed responsibility
4b L  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138r.
^BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 158r-159v (20 December, 1610) and Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 148r-149v (16 
January, 1610[1611]; reviewed and amended 16 January, 1611 [1612] and 26 April, 1614); Croft (ed.), 'Several 
Speeches', 315.
^Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 314-315.
^BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138r.
^Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 316-317,
^Below, 223-227.
!®BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138r-138v.
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for these improvements squarely on the administrative shoulders of himself, Caesar, and the 
Exchequer barons. ^  Projects which were not 'contrary to the lawes nowe in force, or iustly 
distastefuU to the people' must supply the remaining £30,000 of the deficit.
Extraordinary, non-recurring expenses had averaged £100,000 annually since 1603. 
Caesar left extraordinaries in time of war or in peace for the 'necessity, co[n]veniency or 
honour of the king or kingdome ... to the greate wisedome of the Parliament, to who[m] it 
apperteineth,'!2 As for extraordinary expenses of 'pleasure or bountie', Caesar wrote, 'I 
knowe not in all the world what meanes may bee thought on to beare the burden' save the 
£40,000 annually received in repayment of the Dutch loans, but unless they were stopped, 
they 'will prove more inco[n]venient to the king & state, then I dare speake or thinke at this 
present.' Salisbury had no such luxury when facing James and repeated in much abbreviated 
form his earlier arguments to judge suitors on merit and utility while pressing the king to rule 
once and for all on grantable suits.!3 The situation worsened by October, when Caesar 
reviewed his memorandum.!^ The deficit had increased by £20,000 while nothing had been 
accomplished with abatements, improvements, or new revenues. £100,000 was added to the 
debt and Caesar resorted to counselling land sales to finance it while deriding ideas to pay 
pressing debts by more borrowing.
However, no foundations of a settled fiscal state were laid before Salisbury's death 
because policymaking and decisionmaking were in fiux.!^ The most pronounced factor was a 
withdrawal by James on a personal and political level from both the wider political 
establishment and his English ministers.!^ James, an individual of intense feeling, was 
personally wounded and embittered by English xenophobia, the failure of refoundation in 
parliament, and his councillors' partisanship in refusing to punish incendiary speakers in the
üCroft (éd.), 'Several Speeches, 314.
!2fiL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138v-139r.
!3Crott (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 314-315.
!4b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138r-139v.
!5pRO SP 14/61/33, fol. 61r (26 January, 1611).
!^James' reaction to the cold reception o f Sahsbury's planned composition with the counties for purveyance is 
indicative of his estrangement: 'by this doubtfulnes of the shires to holde their compositions or to compound he 
seeth the great cause he hath to wish ill to the last lower howse who have been the cause to take all respect o f  
the king and his Councell out of his peoples myndes.' PRO SP 14/63/29, fol. 39r (12 April, 1611).
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Commons during the last days of the 1610 session.!'^ James’ revealing letter to the council 
speaks of dejection over much more than impolitic speeches: 'we could not but have 
wondered greately what more uniust comptantes they could have found out then they have 
alredy, since we are sure no howse save the howse of hell could have found so manie ... 
Onely we are soiy of our ill fortune in this cuntry, that having lived so long as we did in the 
Kingdome where we were bom we came out of it with an unstained reputation and without 
anie grudge in the peoples hartes but for wanting of us. Wherein we have misbehaved our 
selfe here we know not nor we can never yet learn.... Our fame and actions have been daylie 
tossed like tennice bals amongest them and all that spite and malice durst doe to disgrace and 
infame us hath been used. To be short this lower howse by their behaviour have periled and 
annoyed our health, wounded our reputation, emboldened all ill natured people, encroched 
upon manie of our priviledges and plagued our purse with their deiayes. It onely resteth now 
that yow labor all you can to doe that yow thinke best to the repairing of our estate. And as 
for the repairing and clearing of our hono[u]r we will ourself thinke specially there uppon and 
at o[u]r return acquaint you with o[u]r thoughtes therein.'!^
James retreated behind the walls of the bedchamber, shielded by his Scottish kinsmen 
and first favourite in England, Robert Carr.i^ This occurred at the very moment Salisbury 
most required James’ political authority infusing fiscal policy. James ultimately presided 
over the patronage culture and it was only possible to retrench it with his decisive 
involvement. As Salisbury reminded the king, any settled fiscal establishment must receive 
its 'whole essence from your Majesty, (being the very soul thei:eof)'.2o Only James possessed 
the incontestable authority to decide on Caesar’s and Salisbury's counsel, demand their 
policies of retrenchment and improvement be implemented, and personally stem his silver 
stream of bounty (both directly and with a book of bounty). Two factors made James' 
political engagement more urgent. Salisbury's failure as parliamentary manager had triggered 
rounds of court politics aimed at undermining him.21 Henry Neville presented James with the
Salisbury Ms 147, tbl. 162r-162v (7 December, 1610). 
Salisbury Ms 147, fol. 162v. 
l^Cuddy, 'Entourage*, 208-214; Cuddy, 'Union', 116-119.
29Croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 314-316.
21hH  Salisbury Ms 128, fol. 78r-79v; Cuddy, 'entourage', 208-214.
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first of his undertaking proposals for parliament in 161 l-'so  as my Lord Treasurer would not 
intermeddle'22-and Northampton zealously curried favor with Carr throughout the year.23
Yet it is surely wrong to assert, as Neil Cuddy does, that James had ’ditched’ Salisbury 
by 1610.24 If 1610 precipitated Salisbury's eclipse, it was not as James' minister but as the 
pre-eminent broker of patronage. If factions and individuals were poised to carve up 'Cecil's 
inheritance' it was because his offices had become so highly politicized for their patronage 
possibilities—a development for which Burghley and Salisbury must accept much of the 
onus. 25 No one sought Salisbury's legacy for the responsibilities of governance that went 
with it as Suffolk's tenure as lord treasurer amply demonstrates. Fiscal policy remained his 
domain. Even a focus on patronage may overstate the situation.26 There are significant 
indications of Salisbury's undiminished importance. He managed the marriage negotiations 
for Princess Elizabeth, received the silk farm worth £7000, and remained beset by suitors 
after 1610.2? Taken together, these diverse forces demonstrate the limitations of too closely 
identifying the politics of patronage with governance.
It was Salisbury's terminal illness that increasingly left a policymaking vacuum, one 
which particularly demanded James' stamp of authority if fiscal challenges were to be faced. 
George Carew handled much of the daily administrative work of the secretaiyship and Caesar 
'effectively assumed the Lord Treasurer's duties: beginning 7 December, 1611.’28 Salisbury 
made temporary improvements, but he and James met in early February 1612 in what may 
have been a moment of personal reconciliation. Content with the 'visitation to his humble 
servant', Salisbuiy assured James 'that if he had bene now as sick as he is whole (some dreggs 
of paine in his arme excepted)... this roiall voice of visitation (like visitatio beatifica) would 
have given new life to those Spirits w[hi]ch are ready to expire for yo[u]r service'.29 But both 
men looked to the future: 'I have receaved now ye dispatch from ye new secretary ... I find
22RMC Buccleuch. 1 ,102.
23pRO SP 14/65/26, fol. 44r-45v and Peck, Northampton. 30-33,
24cuddy, 'Entourage', 208.
25ouy, Tudor England. 437-440.
26Eric Lindquist, 'The Last Year of the First Earl of Salisbury, 1610-1612', Albion 18 (1986), 30-36. 
2?Croft, 'Jacobean court', 145-146.
28Hill, Bench and Bureaucracy. 184; BL Lansdowne Ms 156, fol. 446r-447v (14 February, 1611[ 1612]). 
29pRO SP 14/68/59, fol. 107r (9 February, 1612).
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yo[u]r matters in him so well disposed, as you shall have no cause to doubt mistakings 
betweene ye old and new Robin.'30 Salisbuiy's physical decay coupled with James' political 
alienation left fiscal policy at low ebb.
m
The 'death of the littele man for which so many reioise and so feawe doe so much as 
seem to be sory'—the harshest of Northampton's many unkind words for Salisbury in the 
months ahead—mandated the institutional changes created by vacated offices.^  ^ James, who 
fancied himself 'prettelie skilled in the craft', installed himself as de facto secretary; much of 
the work load was actually taken up by Rochester (C a r r ) .3 2  Northampton was the logical 
successor to the treasurership, but never attained it, not a little from his own hesitation: he 
would not accept it before the entire state of crown finance was thoroughly examined and 
then only if he was absolved of responsibility for anything prior to taking office.33 Further, 
like the secretaryship, it symbolized the heart of Salisbury's patronage influence and was too 
politically charged to be disposed in 1612.34 James borrowed from his Scottish experience 
with the Octavians and reconstituted Salisbury's authority in a treasuiy commission.^^ 
Northampton and Caesar were joined by Suffolk, Worcester, comptroller Wotton, and Lord 
Zouch.36 In practice Northampton assumed Salisbury's place in the old partnership with 
Caesar and the two guided policy in collaboration with their fellow councillors, a bastardized 
form of conciliarism.32
30pRO SP 14/68/59, fol. 107r. There is uncertainty about just which new Robin Salisbury was referring to. 
Mary Everett Green provisionally identified him as Robert Naunton in CSPD 1611-1618.119. Citing the 
calendar, this has been upheld by Naunton's most recent biographer. Roy Schieiber, The Political Career of Sir 
Robert Naunton (London, 1981), 4. Perhaps Sahsbmy was actually referring to Robert Carr. The study o f  
Salisbury's 'secretariat' does not identify Robert Naunton as a member of it, which would seem to raise 
uncertainty about Naunton's 'appointment', particularly as Salisbury had a well developed secretariat o f eight 
men at the time o f his death; the need to bring in an outsider does not seem obvious. Smith, 'Secretariats', 481- 
482 and 493-495. Regardless, the individual is not as important as recognition of the change itself.
31pRO SP 14/69/56, fol. 70r (26 May, 1612). The mastership o f the wards went successively to George Carew 
(1612), Walter Cope (1612), William Knollys (1614), Lionel Cranfield (1618), and Robert Naunton (1624). 
32Cuddy, 'Entourage', 209; PRO SP 14/69/67, fol. 107v.
33peck, Northampton. 31 and 95; PRO SP 14/69/71, fol. 114r.
34see Hill. Bench and Bureaucracv. 185-187.
33The treasury commission was formally appointed on 17 June, 1612.
3^PR0 SP 14/69/71, fol. 114r.
37caesar 'was of the quorum. Anything done by him, with any one or two of the others, had the force of the 
entire commission.' Hill. Bench and Bureaucracv. 186.
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Caesar chronicled the broad outline of treasury commission counsel and policymaking 
until June 1613.38 James received Caesar’s report of his finances following Salisbury’s death 
which confirmed the deficit and debt remained £160,000 and £500,000 respectively.39 
Caesar repeated what he and Salisbury had counselled in January 1611, that abatements, 
improvements, and new revenues must address the deficit. However, parliamentary revenue 
was strongly offered for the deficit while Caesar left it as the only possibility for the debt, 
crossing through an original suggestion that the present entail of lands to the crown be broken 
up and sold. Caesar asked James to consider whether new projects alone would be sufficient 
to supply their wants. Parliament must play a role if they were inadequate and he cautioned 
against their introduction before an assembly.4^  Caesar concluded with broad considerations 
before a parliament including its timing, choice of members, demands to be made, the content 
of any reciprocal retribution, the stumbling blocks of the last session and their amendment, 
opening discussions with probable 'principall members of yt[that] house' to further James’ 
business (undertaking), and whether the aid for Princess Elizabeth should be pursued in 
parliament or outside it.
James mused upon Caesar's declaration and afterwards summoned his treasury 
commissioners, councillors, and son, putting the councillors on notice that he expected their 
complete support for the commissioners.4i However, James seems to have been disturbed by 
Caesar’s conclusions supporting parliament. Rather remarkably given Caesar's expertise, 
James commanded Prince Henry and the lords to examine the memorandum and Caesar was 
questioned at length 'how hee could iustifie that state of expe[n]ses & debtes'. Following 
Henry’s work, James directed Caesar and his fellow commissioners to examine 'the s[ai]d 
estate & to advise wherein his Mafjesjty might abridge his expe[n]ces or improve his 
revenewe or increase the same by newe p[ro]iectes & to acquaint hi[m] w[i]th their 
p[ro]ceadings at his retourne fi*o[m] his p[ro]gresse.’ James had rejected Caesar's counsel by 
setting a policy agenda in which parliamentary revenue played no part. Projects must fully
38b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 223r-227v (1 June, 1613).
3^Caesar’s memorandum for James is BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 211-212v (1 June, 1612).
40According to BL l.ansdowne Ms 165, fol. 223r, Caesar was blunter about this than the memorandum would 
indicate.
4^BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 223r-223v.
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serve the turn. The message was clear to Caesar and Northampton who took up James' 
injunction once they met immediate demands by selling lands and pursuing Princess 
Elizabeth’s aid.42
Northampton viewed Salisbury's death as an opportunity for a fresh-start in crown 
finance and painstakingly sought to advance James’ estate, particularly with the expert 
information and advice of individuals like Cotton and Cranfield.43 Projects were central and 
a subcommission headed by Caesar (including ministers like Hobart, Bacon, and Baron 
Sotherton) spent six full weeks considering then anatomizing projects for new and improved 
revenues.44 The four categories of projects evaluated were concealments (assarts, defective 
titles, surrounded grounds, tithes out of parishes, encroachments), unimproved revenues 
(estates entailed, wastes and commons, coppices and underwoods, old houses and castles), 
tenurial incidents and other casualties (by-rents and other obscure fees, perquisites of courts, 
outlawries, alienations, issues royal, the mint), and all-too familiar 'newe' projects (busses, 
usury, apprentices, starchmaking).45
Salisbury would have found nothing original about these projects, but conciliar 
policymaking produced an examination qualitatively different from the great project lists of 
1608-1609. Where Salisbury and Caesar met together and evaluated projects for their own 
benefit, the subcommissioners needed a written instrument appropriate for informing and 
counselling their superiors in detail. Consequently each project was presented with an 
estimate of its probable profitability, the grounds of the estimate, advice for its execution or 
further study, and reasons for the same.^ Particular attention was given to projects which 
were legal and deemed unlikely to cause political antagonism.47 Significantly, the 
commissioners adjudged their projects needed time to bear fruit and admitted the report only
42b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, M . 223v.
43peck. Northampton. 94-100.
44rhe commissioners also included Chancellor of the Duchy o f Cornwall Thomas Parry, George Carie, George 
More, and Walter Cope. PRO SP 14/70/38, fol. 83r.
45b l  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 71r-77v (18 September, 1612); Caesar's draft is BL Lansdowne Ms 165, 
fol. 207r-210v and clean copy is BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 6r-10v; Thirsk, 'Crown as projector', 299-316 is 
an effective summary o f the report except for the absence o f discussion about the new projects.
“^ B L  Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 7 Ir.
4%L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 224r-224v.
193
Norfliampton, Ellesmere, and Condliar Fiscal Policy (1611-1617)
represented initial work. Further examinations of accounts and experts would be required 
and many projects contained no estimates of possible revenues.^»
While the subcommissioners were engaged with projects, Northampton was working 
apace. Northampton's letters to Rochester throughout the summer and fall show him 
burdened by the cloth dispute with the Netherlands, examining projects for copper farthing 
tokens and starch, working on the aid, bullion questions, trading matters, the French debt, 
Ireland, and the customs farms—among more routine business While he might abuse 
Salisbury as the 'littell limiter’, Northampton soon came to appreciate the burdens of being a 
pre-eminent minister.^o Management responsibilities and fiscal demands took time away 
from policymaking and forward thinking and Northampton came to rely on Cotton for such 
counsel. Northampton received Cotton's long treatise on the crown finances late in 
September and his marginalia testify to the attention he gave it, as well as the many projects 
which Cotton compiled at this time.^  ^ As we earlier used Cotton's work to understand the 
financial system, so Northampton enhanced his own knowledge and studied the policies of 
his predecessors.^^ Once the subcommissioners reported, Caesar and Northampton spent the 
ensuing weeks drawing together the treasury commission's work and crafted their counsel for 
J a m e s . ^ 3  The commissioners' formal presentation seems to have been overtaken by the 
arrival of the Elector Palatine (16 October) and the onset of Hemy's final illness and death (6 
November), events from which James' attention could not be drawn until the prince's burial
early in December, ^ 4
48pRO SP 14/70/83, fol. 170r ([September?], 1612; Northampton to Rochester).
49pRO SP 14/70-71 (Northampton's letters to Rochester; CSPD 1611-1618.140-152).
SOpeck, Northampton. 84-100; BL Cotton Ms Titus C VI, fol. 88r-146v.
^^BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 41r-51r (25 September, 1612).
^2peck. Northampton. 113-117 effectively evaluates this document; also Sharpe, Robert Cotton. 113-150. Dietz 
offered a judgment o f Cotton's work revealing of die fundamental weaknesses of his study: 'there is extant his 
copy of Cotton's "Means to Repair the King's Estate", the first half of which is annotated at great length in 
Northampton's own hand. One cannot blame him for abandoning this tedious performance in the middle, for he 
certainly learned nothing from its precedents, which had no value in connection with the new situation which 
had arisen.' As lor the subcommissioners, Dietz concluded their labours justified 'the popular notion o f then 
utter incapacity.' Dietz, Public Finance. 153.
^3r L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 224r-224v.
^4Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant. 133-156.
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Northampton drafted the treasury memorandum and, in the company of the 
commissioners, personally read it for James.^^ with remarkable thoroughness, he detailed 
abatements and improvements, both those currently in progress or 'to be verie shortlie' and 
others 'within a while but not for the present'. The retrenchments are not particularly 
noteworthy, little different from those in James' first decade, with the exception of breaking 
up the households of the late prince and E l i z a b e t h . ^ ^  Henry's death robbed ministers of the 
opportunity to barter him in marriage and thereby pay James' debts, but Northampton 
eventually estimated valuable savings of £43,100 from his demise;^^ and £10,000 once 
Elizabeth sailed for the Palatinate. The overall tenor of retrenchment reflected the 
perspectives of the commissioners. Caesar's concern to provision the household with ready 
money and avoid costly credit purchases was prominent and subsequently found vocals 
champion in Cranfield and Ellesmere.^^ Cranfield offered Northampton spending criteria for 
the wardrobe which demanded genuine consideration of purchase-price and quantities 
procured.39 Cranfield subsequently applied these strictures to the wardrobe (1618) and 
general expenditure as lord treasurer. Northampton was eager to revisit his abortive 1608 
naval investigation, avowing that £8000 at the least could be saved, 'the corruptiones and 
abuses beinge so many and so g r e a t ' .^ ®  Finally, much like Salisbury, the commissioners 
urged the learned council to vet all questionable grants.
The many weeks of diversions since September provided time to complete the 
subcommissioners' work on projects for new and improved revenues; firmer estimates were 
made for many previously uncertain projects. Improvements of wardship, recusancy fines, 
Irish customs were added as were projects for a 3d tax on strangers goods pushed by
^^Northampton's memoranda is BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 84r-87v. Though undated the document 
offers the first estimated savings o f breaking up Henry's household beginning with the new year, looked to 
savings in the works proceeding from Christmas, and clearly stated that Fdncess Elizabeth remained unmarried 
(the wedding took place on 14 February, 1613).
^^For comparison BL Additional Ms 10038, fol. 310v (26 September, 1607; Caesar) and 327r-327v (24 
September, 1606; Dorset).
^^BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 93r.
58b L Additional Ms 10038, fol, 308r.
% K S  U 269/1.0ol88 [Cranfield Ms 4704].
^%L Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 85r; Peck, Northampton. 152-156.
195
Northampton. Ellesmere, and Condliar Fiscal Policy (1611-1617)
Cranfield, sale of dotard trees, and further baronets.^^ In the months following, these projects 
were refined, more added (disafforestation; dyed and dressed cloth; waterworks), and others 
rejected (fee-farming; revision of the book of rates; pre-emption of tobacco, pepper, salt, and 
other commodities; selling offices; exemption from shrievalities; ecclesiastical seal profits to 
the king; licensing alehouses and inns; patents of legitimation and naturalization; copper 
monies; clerk of the markets; usury fines; licensing apprentices; fees for coats of arms; 
enforcement of statutes of e m p l o y m e n t s ) . ^ ^  Caesar's estimates put the net improvement of 
these retrenchments and the subcommission's initial projects at £147,500 with hopes of 
improvements from customs and their fir st 'newe' p r o j e c t s . ^ 3
Factors which Salisbury would have found familiar undermined these efforts. Every 
quarter brought a rush to pay expenses which were invariably too great for revenues. 
Attention focused on projects for ready money and those for revenues were neglected. By 
June 1613, Northampton and Caesar had cut only £19,276 (works, Ireland, messengers, 
cofferer) and improved revenues by just £16,500, a far cry from their program's ambitions.^ 
More revealing was Caesar's abstract of £309,681 in ready money Ixom largely non-recurring 
projects which had been collected over the same period for 'ordinary wa[n]tes'^^ Notes made 
by Northampton later in 1613 show the same dynamic.^ Ready money was to come from 
such revenue projects as surrounded grounds and the improvement of forests, parks, and 
chases. Northampton and Caesar were fully capable of forward-planning, but they did not 
possess sufficient fiscal latitude to overhaul a system which raised £22,000 for Princess 
Elizabeth's aid and spent £115,000 on her wedding and related f e s t i v i t i e s . ^ ^
61c KS U269/LOEc23 [Cranfield Ms 4137]; U269/LOEc26 [Cranfield Ms 4166-4172]; U269/1.0Ec41 
[Cranfield Ms 4138,4180,4337,4339,4340]; U269/1.0Ec42 [Cranfield Ms 4368,4370-4372].
®2b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225r-225v. Though part of Caesar's 1613 chronicle o f the treasury commission, 
this project abstract was an earlier working copy which he appended. The progress o f these projects and others 
through 1613 can be seen in BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 240r-241v (17 October, 1613).
^3b l  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 225r. In the late summer of 1613, Northampton posited future abatements and 
improvements o f £74,000.
^ B L  Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 224v 
^%L Lansdowne Ms 165, fbl. 226r.
^%L Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 94v.
^^The figures are BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 226r; Dietz, Public Finance. 156. At estimated savings o f  
£10,000, a decade would be required to pay o ff Elizabeth's wedding and finally see the budgetary benefits o f her 
departure
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They often proceeded without James' direct support or authority and the demands of 
the patronage culture asserted themselves. Caesar stated that unspecified amounts of their 
£300,000 in ready money were diverted by James to non-essential e x p e n s e s . ^ 8  Despite the 
commissioner's rejection of the copper monies project, James granted Lord Harrington a three 
year monopoly of the project's profits in May and a proclamation to that effect was issued on 
19 June.®^  Such decisions against counsel might have been familiar to Sahsbmy, but 
Northampton and Caesar also confronted the interposition of Rochester between them and the 
king. Elizabeth's aid is revealing. The project was detailed to Ellesmere and Bacon, who 
worked it into shapely q u i c k l y T h e y  reported to the council that its profitability was 
unenticingly low and offered recommendations on procedures for the levy.^i Northampton 
sent 'a brefe abstracte' of their report to Rochester and a week later everything was ready, but 
Northampton had yet to learn James' pleasure from the f a v o u r i t e .  ^ 2 Further action wasn't 
forthcoming until the end of August. The commission was finally signed on 30 August after 
repeated explanations from N o r t h a m p t o n . ' ^ ^
Abstracts, instructions, and commissions were the staples of Salisbury's packets, 
which he once commented James habitually devoured before the next arrived—answers and 
comments were usually returned to Salisbury within a day.^4 Bacon and Ellesmere certainly 
worked quickly. Northampton had the matter settled and ready for signing a week later, yet it 
took two full weeks and more abstracts for James and Rochester before this was done. James 
remained interested and attentive but once removed behind a powerful favourite. Effective 
solutions were not going to come out of such a process. The lesson of the treasury 
commission was that proto-conciliar policymaking with finance worked, but without a
Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 226r.
^^Larkin and Hughes (ed.), Proclamations: James 1.287-290.
^®PRO SP 14/70/25, fol. 54r (Northampton to Rochester; [3 August], 1612); SP 14/70/30. fol. 65r (8 August,
1612).
^^PRO SP 14/70/30, fol. 65r.
72pRO SP 14/70/49, fol. lOOr (14 August, 1612).
73pRO SP 14/70/60, fol. 121r (Northampton to Rochester; [27] August, 1612); CSPD 1611-1618.146; BL 
HarleianMs 298, fol. 10r-12v; PRO SP 14/70/601, fol. 123r-124v.
^^Sahsbury remarked at James 'being quicker at a l[ett]re then the posts are w[i]th the packetts'. PRO SP 
14/27/9, fol. 27r (16 April, 1607).
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politically powerful lord treasurer and the fully supportive decisionmaking of James, the 
authority to reform crown finance remained ineffective in such demanding circumstances.
IV
James unenthusiastically summoned parliament in 1614 after Rochester joined the 
ranks of individuals like Bacon and Henry Neville in pressing for an assembly.^ 5 Despite 
agreement that only parliament could pay James' debts, Northampton opposed the meeting 
and countenanced it with dejection and little belief in its prospects.'^® Northampton evaluated 
parliament as he examined projects, the likelihood of profit and the necessary instruments, 
and he astutely judged that neither circumstances nor workable means were available.’^  ^ The 
privy council postponed the question in July 1613 against Northampton's support for the 
commission's present course. ^ 8 He did so again in September, avowing parliament 'would 
censure the King's modes of raising moneys' and well aware of James' lingering opposition. 
Northampton’s judgment was shrewd. Among their projects defective titles, assarts, 
alienations, and penal fines had elicited vocal opposition in the past.80 Impositions remained 
while there was 'infinit grudge upon the Baronettes' and privy seals exacted in 1611-1612.81 
Nevertheless, the fiscal situation reached a crossroads of necessity and Northampton was 
unable to shift parliament from the agenda.82
The decision made, James' ministers turned to preparation. In this they were assisted 
by a range of counsel proffered in the past two years by Neville and Bacon, each eager to 
acquire the secretaryship by succeeding in parliament where Salisbury had failed,83 Both 
seemingly called for a return to traditional managed parliaments and positive programs of
^^PRO SP 14/76/20, fol. Sir (Chamberlain to Carleton; 10 February, 1614); Peck, Northampton. 206-208. 
Views of the Addled parliament are to be found in Thomas Moir, The Addled Parliament of 1614 (Oxford, 
1958); Russell, Addled Parliament.
76h h L Ellesmere Ms 2628/1; BL Cotton Ms Titus F IV, fol. 329r-332v; also Peck, Northampton. 207-208, 
^^Linda Levy Peck, 'The MentaUty of a Jacobean Grandee', in Linda Levy Peck (ed.), The Mental World o f the 
Jacobean Court (Cambridge, 1991), 160-161.
78pRO SP 14/74/23, fol. 44v.
2^CSPD 1611-1618.199 (22 September, 1613; John Digby's report o f Sarraiento's dispatch to Phillip III).
8%L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 224v-226r.
81b L Cotton Ms Titus F IV, fbl. 331r-331v.
82pRO SP 14/76/2, fol. 2v.
83cuddy, 'Union', 118; Cuddy, 'Southampton', 140-141. Neville had access to .Tames, if  not influence, thanks to 
his friendships with Rochester and Thomas Overbury. HMC Buccleuch. 1 ,101-102, 112-113.
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legislation—the 'ancient form' as Bacon called it—but what lay behind their rhetoric was little 
different from Salisbury's bargaining. Neville offered a program of concessions and Bacon 
focused on management and electioneering.^^ The crown entered the fray with large parts of 
what both men had proposed.®  ^ James' addresses saw him playing a lawmaking, unmerchant­
like role ala Bacon and matters of grace nearly identical to those in Neville's memorial were 
delivered to the Commons.86 Caesar had foreseen the need to remedy the last parliament's 
major grievances which the rose-colored schemes of Bacon, Suffolk, Somerset, and Neville 
left James ill-prepared to do.87 Impositions contributed significantly to the breakdown 
because no amendment was found before parliament met. Confronted by the Commons, 
James defended his prerogative right.88 The implications were obvious to Edwin Sandys: 
'That makes us bondmen, gives us no propriety. May, by the same reasons make laws 
without parhament.'89
Supply and impositions were entwined and no voices to untangle them were allowed 
to prevail in the subsidy debates.^® Members like Sandys were genuinely eager to break the 
deadlock and he proposed the mediation of the Lords while others, including Lake, believed a 
general conference should be had between the houses with James in attendance. However, 
impositions had become a question of right between members and James which precluded 
compromise and demanded absolute consensus .When  James demanded supply and 
threatened the Commons with dissolution, members answered that he had affirmed his
84Bacon's proposals are BL Cotton Ms Titus F VI, fol. 334r-339v; for Neville: PRO SP 14/74/44, fol. 84r-89v; 
SP 14/74/45, fol. 88r-91v; SP 14/74/451, fol. 92r-93v; SP 14/74/46, fol. 94r-95v; SP 14/74/47, fol. 96r-97v. 
There are many other extant copies, often fragmentary, including those in BLHarleian 3787, fol. 185r-187v and 
CKS U269/1.0o214 [Cranfield Ms 4308].
8^Maija Jansson (ed.), Proceedings in Parliament 1614 (House of Commons) (Philadelphia, 1988), xvii-xxxvi. 
8^Spedding, Letters and Lite. V, 24-30 for Bacon's memorial on the King’s speech and Jansson (ed.), 
Proceedings 1614.13-19 and 43-46 for the actual speeches. PRO SP 14/74/44, fol. 94r-95v for Neville's 
memorial and Jansson (ed.). Proceedings 1614.45-52 for the actual points of grace delivered by the King. 
Unfortunately, the rumour and taint o f their advice helped undermine the parliament. The Commons set upon 
Bacon first, repaying his electioneering schemes by questioning the validity o f his own place in the House as 
attorney general, resolving thereafter that 'no attorney general should ever serve as a member o f the Lower 
House.' Jansson (ed.). Proceedings 1614. xxv. The privüedges committee investigated undertaking and Neville 
was forced to acknowledge his program, but it 'proved to be so innocuous, if  not supportive of parliaments 
generally, that the subject o f undertaking was immediately dropped'. Jansson (ed.). Proceedings 1614. xxx. 
87b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 212r.
88jansson (ed.). Proceedings 1614.141-142.
89jansson (ed.). Proceedings 1614.146-147; Holmes, 'Liberty, Taxation', 136-143.
^Jansson (ed.J. Proceedings 1614.146-159.
^^Sommerville, Politics and Ideology. 151-155; Jansson ted.J. Proceedings 1614. xx-xxii.
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prerogative right 'in open parliament... Therefore, before these impositions were laid down, if 
they should grant the King relief it might in after ages be accounted a real confirmation of the 
King[’s] absolute power of i m p o s i n g . ' ^ ^  L a s t  minute compromises proved abortive and James 
resolved upon a quick dissolution.^^ In 1614, the conflict was insoluble: 'A grant of supply 
might have guaranteed the continuation of the session, but it might also have confirmed 
James' stance on impositions... [and] ultimately spell disaster for the institution of parliament’ 
and the liberties of the subject.^  ^ Northampton had proved to be prophetic.^s
James' circle of ministers and councillors underwent dramatic changes at this time.
Parliament forced appointment of a principal secretary as mouth piece and Ralph Winwood 
won the sweepstakes: 'He succeeded, however, only to a rump of the office: CaiT retained 
both the signet and foreign correspondence, and Lake the procuring of the sign manual to 
bills.'®^  Parliament had been dissolved a week when Northampton died. Somerset assumed 
his major offices and Suffolk-Somerset's father-in-law-received the treasurer's staff. The 
Exchequer soon lost Caesar, who took the mastership of the rolls and Fulke Greville replaced 
him.97 Greville was not inexperienced, having served as treasurer of the navy from 1598- 
1604, and remained at the Exchequer until the crack Richard Weston replaced him (1621).9s 
Greville might have functioned as an able partner with a vigorous master, but Suffolk 
embodied the triumph of the patronage culture over governance. ISuffolk deserves objective consideration, but rehabilitation of his treasury career is 1
Ifraught.99 His papers, the few that survive, contain moribund projects to stem I
Imaladministration in the Exchequer, including proposals for an administrative supremo of I
92jansson (ed.), Proceedings 1614.425.
93Jansson (ed.). Proceedings 1614. xxxiii-xxxiv; Russell, Addled Parliament. 22-26 also attributes importance to 
the inflammatory anti-Scottish speech of Hoskins in James' decision.
9^Jansson (ed.), Proceedings 1614. xxxiv; Holmes, 'Liberty, Taxation', 143-144; Russell. Addled Parliament. 
15-18.
95b L Cotton Ms Titus F IV, fol. 329v.
9^ Cuddy, 'Entourage', 211.
97Rebholz, Fulke Greville. 89-180.
98Rebholz, Fulke Greville. 233-286.
99i am grateful to Professor Linda Levy Peck fer our discussions of Suffolk. Unfortunately, little o f Suffolk's 
correspondence is extant. It is worth remembering Thomas Wilson's earlier complaint that he had failed to 
obtain any papers left by Dorset and Suffolk. A small collection o f Suffolk's treasury papers survived as OBL 
Carte Ms 121 and 123.
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sorts and another which addressed Suffolk's own shortcomings. The lord treasurer was 
advised to ascertain the extent to which monies had been issued by his warrant without privy 
seals, find a trustworthy officer to audit the weekly books to see that money was properly 
disbursed, and abstain from signing payment orders before the end of the week and, upon 
seeing the balance, pay those most in need; 'ffor yf his lo[rdshi]p shall leave that to the 
discrecon of any under officer, much inconvenience hath & maye growe therby.'ioi The 
subtext of administrative incompetence and corruption which would bring about his fall is 
evident. Suffolk's correspondence further illuminates a minister uninterested in the duties of 
his office and eager to avoid responsibility for them.i®2 Suffolk's greatest service was to help 
run the financial ship aground with such force that James recognized the need for drastic 
action.
Into the vacuum that was Suffolk stepped James' councillors. The conciliarism of the 
treasury commissioners expanded after 1614, but not without complications with the presence 
of a formal lord treasurer. Focused authority was increasingly difficult because of Suffolk's 
venality, the distractions of patronage politics, and the emotional effect of another 
inflammatory parliamentary session on James, who had sincerely hope to restore a sense of 
goodwill with his English s u b j e c t s .  The most active participants in conciliar policymaking 
were Ellesmere, Edward Coke, Winwood, Lake, Bacon, less obviously Archbishop Abbot, 
Greville, and Cranfield (once removed). Suffolk retained the honour of Ms position and had 
several projects of personal interest including those for a general pardon and the notorious 
alum works. Caesar, though active in fiscal policy as a councillor, was personally content 
to become master of the rolls (his Exchequer tenure removed any attraction of the 
treasurership, nor did its political aura allow for a 'secondary' minister to attain it until 
Weston moved from Caesar's old post to the white staff in 1628).i®^  In many respects, this
lOOOBL Carte Ms 121, fol. 33r-48v. 
lOlQBL Carte Ms 121, fol. 46r.
^®2His treasury correspondence with Caesar is telling. BL Additional Ms 36767, fol. 346r-347v (24 October,
1613), 358r-359v (21 July, 1614), 362r-363v (14 August, 1614), 364r-365v (15 August, 1614); also Peck, Court 
Patronage. 182-183.
103 Jansson (ed.), Proceedings 1614.143-144.
104o b L Carte Ms 121, fbl. lr-20v and 73r-82v respectively. 
lOSuill, Bench and Bureaucracv. 197-199.
2 0 1
Northampton. Ellesmere, and Conciliar Fiscal Policy (1611- 1617)
period marked a return to a 'corporate management of "national" finance' by the privy 
council, characteristic of Elizabethan government.ioo
These different personalities confronted the same fiscal challenges as their 
predecessors and coped with practical demands in similar fashion. James returned to London 
in December 1614, but found so little pleasure that he quickly removed to Hampton C o u r t .  
His ministers were left to find ready money, ’w[hi]ch is a maine worke, and will hardly be 
compassed when the world is become so bare that there is litle superfiuitie and that but in few 
handes; but yt is doubted we shall see strange protects set on foote and yet all will not helpe... 
order is taken they say that all pensions shall cease, but for other abatements or deminishing 
of ordinarie or extraordinarie charge we heare of none.’^ ®^ Despite being forced to emphasize 
projects for ready money in practice, those for new and improved annual revenues had been 
central to the thinking of Salisbury, Caesar, and Northampton. This was largely abandoned 
until 1617 with the exception of Cockayne’s disastrous dyed cloth project. Even then the 
crown's share of Cockayne's project was conceived in terms of a £300,000 gain.^09
Similar hopes attached themselves to a project for a benevolence after parliament, 
'Pope' Hakewill's general pardon posited a yield of £400,000, and another which promised to 
raise £300,000 by 'making fifty new barrons at 6000h a peece’, while the cautionary towns 
(Flushing and Brill) were restored to the Dutch in 1616 for £213,000.ii® The cautionary 
towns were hotly debated in council and their sale forced on James, who delayed until the last 
moment hoping that some other monies might be found, m  The money went directly to 
finance ordinary outlays as Edward Sherburne informed Carleton: 'there is no money in 
thexcheq[uer] and those monies paid by the States, they are all afredy by his Ma[]es]tes owne 
direcion disposed of, save only a matter of 7 or 8000 li. w[hi]ch wilbe but sufficient for the
lO^Guy, Tudor England. 312-313.
107pRO SP 14/78/79, fol. 137v (22 December, 1614). 
lOSpRO SP 14/78/79, fbl. 137v.
Astrid Friis, Alderman Cockayne's Project and the Cloth Trade (London, 1927); Prestwich, Cranfield. 164- 
177; Acts 1615-1616.456-460,477-479,524-525,623-626,658-659 and Acts 1616-1617.7-13,21-29,53-61, 
67-69,108-115.
llOpRo SP 14/80/1, fol. Ir (5 January, 1615); HMC Buccleuch. 1 ,177; Dietz, Public Finance. 158-163. 
lllp R O  SP 14/86/130, fol. 228v (6 Aprü, 1616); SP 14/86/134x, fbl. 242r-243v (14 April, 1616); HMC 
Downshire. V, 457 (29 March, 1616).
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progresse and other necessary expences/112 Hakewill’s pardon project attracted S u f f o l k .
He retained a number of papers on pardons and conciliar debates reflected many of the 
positions in them.^i^ The proposition was simple: given the opportunity, guilty individuals 
would willingly compound for release from the legal consequences of their crimes—real or 
otherwise. Ministers worried that tliis amounted to the sale of royal justice, the only 
precedents of general pardons were parliamentary (usually after a generous subsidy) or as 
shows of benevolence at accessions, and it might prove unprofitable by pardoning offences 
worth more through prosecution than composition, In conciliar debate. Coke's colleagues 
agreed with little dissent that it was a dishonourable, 'venall' pardon with minimal utility. H7 
Coke was 'sory for p[ro]iectes' of this sort. Councillors like Coke and Ellesmere looked to a 
thoroughgoing reformation in crown finance and Ellesmere proved to be the decisive voice in 
moving fiscal policy toward genuine reform.
V
The Addled parliament was the motive force in Ellesmere's reflections on crown 
finance. Preoccupation with parliamentary preparation, management, and bargaining 
demonstrate a conception that there existed no unassailable case to make except that James' 
necessities required supply. Without traditional extraordinary charges ministers effectively 
requested support for the costs of government, but the Commons were manifestly unwilling 
to underwrite unheaded grievances, mismanagement, and disagreeable policies. Whether it 
was Salisbury's contract or Bacon’s ancient form, it was untenable to expect the Commons to 
purchase graces consequent upon bad government. Henry Finch tried to dispel apprehension 
among members in 1614 that they would actually receive little ease for supply: 'Agieed 
generally to relieve bountifully, cheerfully, and speedily.... Love casts out fear, our love to
Î 12pR0 SP 14/87/55, fbl. 114v (12 June, 1616).
^^3pRo SP 14/80/1, fol. Ir; Cranfield too toyed with pardons after the parliament of 1621. CKS U269/1.OE108 
[Cranfield Ms 6]; U269/1.OE190A [Cranfield Ms 1961; U269/1.0E1689 [Cranfield Ms 4460,6897,7602,7603, 
7604,7624,8168, 8936]; U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 8228].
 ^I'^OBL Carte Ms 121, fol. lr-20v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 445 ([June, 1615; my dating]). The dating is established 
by a letter in which Chamberlain informed Carleton that the project had been dismissed. PRO SP 14/80/115, 
fbl. 181r (15 June, 1615).
^ 5^q b L Carte Ms 121, fol. lr-2v, 15r-16v.
1 i^OBL Carte Ms 121, fol. 5r-6v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 445.
1 ^ 7h h L Ellesmere Ms 445.
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the King should cast fear away that the things offered should not take effect.'^^  ^ Thomas 
Crew was blunter; 'If the country possessed with the King's graces and that we are about 
them, the countiy will be willinger to grant.' Too many members believed restoration of just 
government was James' obligation. Purveyance, impositions, and other grievances 
precipitated assertions that redress was due of right and not g r a c e .  ^^9 That members in 1610 
had been willing to vote £200,000 annual support in exchange for fiscal reform undermines 
Conrad Russell's hypothesis that the Commons would never have adequately assisted in 
funding g o v e r n a n c e .  120 Rather, James had to deliver reformed government in some form and 
then  put the case for supporting it to parliament.
The privy council debated fiscal options in July 1615 after James' insistence they 
settle his estate. 121 The councillors deliberated much as they and the treasury commissioners 
had done and their opinions, delivered 'seriatim' were m u l t i f o r m .  122 They concentrated on 
the traditional formula of abatements, improvements, new revenues, and recourse to 
parliament with Lake and Coke occupying the majority of the notes Ellesmere took. 123 Lake 
suggested a variety of projects that would increase revenues and balance the books. For 
James' debts totalling £700,000 Lake was ambivalent, proposing parliament or improvements 
of forest and parks. Ralph Winwood was characteristically blunter, convinced of the 
'confusion & dissolucion of the monarchy yf there be not a p[re]sent remedye' and seconded 
Lake's options for the debt. Ellesmere 'agreed w[i]th Coke in toto; and w[i]th Zouch & 
Worcester.' They spoke to Ellesmere's growing preoccupation with waste and 
mismanagement and shaped his reflections in the next two months. Coke targeted those who 
tasted James' bounty, believing all voluntary pensions should be suspended and asserting the 
maxim that 'no subiect to lyve on the king untyll the king be hable to lyve by hymself.'
118jansson (ed.), Proceedings 1614.66-67
^19crott, 'Purveyance', 19 and 23; Gardiner (ed.), Debates 1610.127; Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. IT, 398; 
Jansson (ed.), Proceedings 1614. xxii-xxiii.
^2PRussell. Addled Parliament. 13-18.
121b L Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 224v and 229v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 441/1-4 [Ellesmere's pagination] (July, 
1615).
122h h L Ellesmere Ms 441; for the earlier deliberations: BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 211r-212v (1 June, 1612) 
and 223r-227v (1 June, 1613); Lansdowne Ms 487, fol. 224r-227v ([c. 11-13 February, 1614]); PRO SP 
14/76/23, fol. 55r-56v (16 February, 1614).
123h h L Ellesmere Ms 441/1-4.
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Offensive grants and those of the king’s revenues-in short, projects and monopolistic patents-
-were to be denied, thereby bringing their revenues directly to James' coffers instead of
private purses. The silk farm should be re-negotiated, forests and parks improved, copyholds
from £10-300 enfranchised, and special privy seals issued. Zouche and Worcester also
favoured wastes and copyholds with something for addressing Irish e x p e n s e s .  ^ 24 Zouche
approved denials of suits like Coke, but further believed an examination should be made of
lavish grants and those had under false pretenses.
Of these debates, J. D. Alsop recently wrote that Ellesmere was particularly struck by
two of Worcester’s points: 'Abatements maye make his state equall' and the oft-repeated
sentiment 'the leake in the cesterne to be s t o p p e d . ' ^ 2 5  'Rightly or wrongly,’ asserts Alsop, 'this
was the immovable centre of Ellesmere's position on Crown finance in 1615’. ^ 26 He never
accepted his colleagues' opinion that James' debts could only be paid by parliament; for
Ellesmere 'parliament was unnecessary'. Alsop's dichotomous position does not allow for the
far-reaching nature of Ellesmere's proposals and discounts the Chancellor's own statements of
wider principle too readily. Not least is Alsop's apparent failure to notice that among Coke's
opinions with which Ellesmere agreed 'in toto' was that 'the crowne was nev[er] maynteyned
by the ordinaiye but helped by p[ar]lem[en]t'.i27 Ellesmere was also an unwavering defender
of parliamentary pardons and their utility for inviting supply versus HakewHl's p r o j e c t .  128
Ellesmere's personal notes are explicit: 'matters first to be dealt w[i]th, for paym[en]t
of the debtes &c. In these specially note these 6. Abating/ Examyninge gyftes & grauntes/
the boke of rates/ Imposicons and therby to equalle the balance of exportacon & importacon/
and by putting some lawes in execucion.... And then a p[ar]lement but not before somwhat be
done in these thinges.’i29 Ellesmere's wider perspective concluded his formal program:
When all or some of the thinges before mencioned shall be tegunne & in doinge, as namely 
the abatinge &c, the amendinge o f the boke of Rates, the reformmge of the Imposicions &c,
124jih L Ellesmere Ms 441/3-4. Zouche wanted 'somwhat from Scotland to helpe' a proposal which Wotton 
turned into a suggestion for a Scottish parliament in September 1615, BL Harleian Ms 4829, fol. 228r.
2^5 Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform*, 199-200; HHL Ellesmere Ms 441.
126 Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform’, 200.
127HHL Ellesmere Ms 441/2.
128h h L  Ellesmere Ms 445.
129h h L  Ellesmere Ms 2507; Ellesmere completed only five points.
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the putting in execucon of some o f die statutes before mencioned, then yt wyll be requisite to 
calle a p[ar]lement, And yt is not to be doubted, but his Ma[jes]tes good and lovinge subiectes, 
seinge this course taken by his Ma[jes]tie, wylle wyllingly & cherefullye yelde large 
contribucon & ayde, by subsidies, tenthes, fyftenes & o t h e r w y s e .1 3 0
After a summer spent crafting a thoroughgoing fiscal program, there is no reason to discount 
Ellesmere’s statements of its relationship to parliament because the theme appears 'in a 
second-from-last p a ra g ra p h .'i^ i 'Thinges to be considered of before a Parliament to be called' 
were precisely th a t J  32
Ellesmere took it upon himself to untie the Gordian knot of fiscal policy and 
parliament following the abject failures of 1610 and 1614. Like Bacon, Ellesmere wrote 
angrily of Salisbury’s perversion of the normal parliamentary course in 1610 and the resulting 
disjunction between King, Lords, and Commons.i33 The Commons had 'growne bygge & 
audacious ... [the] causes of callinge of the parlement, which ought to have bene first treated 
of, were neglected, and some mens private devises preferred, and therin much tyme 
m i s p e n t . ' ^ 3 4  They spurned the king’s business, supply and Union, saying 'Pharaoes froggs 
were come amongst us', but their zeal to cure the 'mischiefs or inconveniences in the 
Comenweale' sought only the impeachment of 'his Ma[jes]tes prerogative’. 3^5 Theirs had 
become an ’iiregular & insolent course of p[r]ocedinge' in which they would postpone all 
until they had relief of their grievances.i36 Ellesmere’s opening speech in 1614 reminded the 
Commons ’to what end you are called, and what to proceed about, his Majesty has showed 
you in his writ’: urgent matters of state, none more pressing than supplying the king’s 
necessities.137
Ellesmere 'never lyked of novelties, espetially in Parlament as were ye new terms of 
Contribution & Retribution, w[hi]ch he thought had done muche h u r t ' .^ 3 8  Bacon and
130J.RJL Ellesmere Ms 2610/11 [Ellesmere's pagination].
^31 Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform*, 198.
132h h l  Ellesmere Ms 2610.
133h h L Ellesmere Ms 2599; BL Cotton Ms Titus F IV, fol. 333r-333v. 
^34h h l  Ellesmere Ms 2599, fol. lv-2r [Ellesmere's foliation].
135HEIL Ellesmere Ms 2599, fol. 3v, 5r.
136h h L Ellesmere Ms 2599, fol. 7r.
^37jansson (ed.), Proceedings 1614.28-29.
138b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 229v.
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Ellesmere were Elizabethans and the chancellor harked back to the parliamentary past he 
understood, also longing for the ancient course, *yt[that] his Ma[jes]ty should grant them 
good laws, they give him convenient relliefe, as his occasions should requyre/^39 Ellesmere's 
practical-mindedness was driven to acute frustration by directionless fiscal policy and 
mismanagement .He chastised his colleagues in 1615 for putting forward nothing ’w[hi]ch 
had not often been spoken of at yt[that] board'; more action and less rehashing would already 
have produced results. Policies of inaction and waste had eroded .Tames' estate and left 
him dependent upon parliament, a subversion of the proper aspect between monarchy, 
aristocracy, and democracy in the Jacobean p o l i t y .  1^2 por Ellesmere, a change in fiscal 
policy was crucial to the restoration of larger political relationships and re-establishing 
parliament as an effective source of revenue and tool of governance.
By what policies did Ellesmere hope to repair James' fiscal estate and counter 
parliamentary unwillingness to supply the k i n g ?  1^ 3 Ellesmere believed honest assessments 
were in short supply. A forthright diagnosis, with the patronage culture center-stage, was the 
first order of b u s i n e s s .  1^ 4  James' fiscal estate was being consumed by importunate suitors, 
and 'too much waye hath bene geven ... by those who had the charge & husbandinge of the 
kinges treasure, and therfore should have w[i]thstoode & stopped such sûtes, and have better 
informed his Ma[jes]tie. But they, for the most p[ar]te, made theyr owne gayne t h e r b y ' .  ^^ 5 
Ellesmere's exposition of this charge reveals his interest, like Coke's and Zouch's, in turning 
the weight of the law against corrupt and incompetent o f f i c e r s .  Presaging Cranfield's
Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 229v.
140sxiffoik and Coke were openly hostile in the July 1615 meeting. Suffolk angrily defended his late-ffiend 
Salisbury against Coke's aspersions on the silk farm and other grants with the stinging rejoinder that those made 
by Lord Chancellor Hatton should likewise be scrutinized. Ellesmere took up Coke's calls for investigations, 
clearly signalling animus for Suffolk.
141 BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 229v.
142h HL Ellesmere Ms 2599. Knafla, Law and Politics. 35-81-82 notes Ellesmere's concerns with 
mismanagement and fiscal decay already at the end of EUzabeth's reign, but does not make the connection 
between them and the pohtical consequences o f the necessity to obtain revenue from parliament.
143h HL Ellesmere Ms 2610 (18 September, 1615), supplemented by Ellesmere Ms 1216, is the Lord 
Chancellor's formal program. The evolution of its outline and various components can be followed in Ellesmere 
Ms 476,465,478,2507. For the inclusion o f Ellesmere Ms 1216 as a supplement, see Alsop, Fiscal Reform', 
196n22.
144jqjjL Ellesmere Ms 2610/1 [Ellesmere's pagination].
145h h L Ellesmere Ms 2610/1.
146h h L Ellesmere Ms 1216/1 [Ellesmere's pagination].
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treasurership, he argued the time had come to investigate all the gifts, grants, and superfluous 
new offices by which James’ revenues had been diverted to private g a i n .  4^7 Grants could be 
legally voided while individuals who had trafficked in James' bounty should be pressed to 
give over the value of their gains to James' c r e d i t o r s . i 4 8  Similar steps had been taken by 
parliamentary acts of resumption, but the lawyer-judge in Ellesmere preferred the equity 
courts. The tenor of former parliaments made a politically charged course of resumption as 
unappealing to Ellesmere-or James—as it once had been to Northampton (at Cotton's 
s u g g e s t i o n ) . i 4 9  Finally, extending rigorous accountability to James' officers, turning projects 
to the king's gain, delegating their execution to trustworthy individuals, and enforcing a 
balance between receipts and issues would do much to prevent future grants and policies 
adversely affecting crown revenues—and parliamentary o p i n i o n .  ^ 5o 'And from hence furthe,' 
proclaimed Ellesmere, 'the leakes in the Cisteme of the Treasurye to be stopped by his 
Ma|jes]tie.'i5i
There is a striking similarity between Ellesmere's attitudes and those of Thomas 
Wentworth in 1610: 'all theise courses would be to no purpose except it would please the 
king to resume his pencions granted to cortiers out of the exchecquer, and to diminish his 
charge and expences. For (sayes he) to what purpose is it for us to drawe a silver streame out 
of the contry into the royall cesterne, if it shall dayly runne out thence by private c o c k s ?  1 5 2  
Wentworth wished 'wee might joyne in humble petition to His Majestic that he would
147HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/3-4.
148i-]HL Ellesmere Ms 476 and 1216/2. Cranfield made a similar proposal, CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield 
Ms 6770].
149h HL Ellesmere Ms 1216/2; BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 42v-43r Alsop particularly cites this 
proposal to support his case that Ellesmere's program is anti-parliamentaiy in nature, but I do not believe it 
considers the contentiousness-well-nigh untenability—of a parliamentary examination o f the king's gifts, the 
political value to be gained by decisive legal action on James' part, and the logical unwillingness to surrender to 
parliament the initiative in any such course. Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform', 198-199.
15ÛHHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/1-3, 8-10; Ellesmere Ms 1216/3. Ellesmere proffered abatements in pensions, 
Ireland and the United Provinces, the household (in particular new tables), navy, stables, wardrobe, the robes, 
and buildings and works. He believed the quantity, quality, necessity, price, and intended use of all purchases 
should guide future expenditure in the departments. Ellesmere Ms 2610/1-3. ITie influence of Lionel Cranfield 
is particularly strong in these portions o f Ellesmere's treatises. For instance, CKS U269/1.0ol88 [Cranfield Ms 
4074] and OE1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770]; also Cranfield's copy o f Ellesmere 2610/1-3 is U269/1.0E1528 
[Cranfield Ms 2330]. Much like Ellesmere's attitudes, Humphrey May composed a memorandum after the 
Addled parliament tor the lord deputy o f Ireland, positing that it depended upon every officer to cast about for 
ways to relieve the king's necessities through new revenues and abatements. OBL Clarendon State Papers 90 
(16 August, 1614).
151h h L  Ellesmere Ms 2610/1.
^52Gardiner, Debates 1610.11-12.
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diminish his charge, and live of his owne without exacting of his poore subjects ... Or 
otherwise that some lawe might be made to this purpose which was not strange nor without 
president in former ages.' An 'acte of parliament was made' under Richard II, avowed 
Wentworth, 'that because the revenues of the crowne were wasted and exhausted by the 
excessive guifts of the kinge and misgovernance of his officers, that therefore a Counsel! 
appoynted should consider of the sayd guiffts and grants, and enquire of the king's receipts 
and expences to the end the king’s state might be mayntained without oppression of his 
subjects.’ Therefore, 'it were good that some good course weare taken herein, without which 
all we can doe is to no purpose, for thoe wee now make supplie, yet there may be the like 
overeaches hereafter if they be not prevented.' Ellesmere was offering just such a course as 
preparation for parliament. Wentworth would 'never give his consent to take money from a 
poore frize jerkyn to trappe a courtier's horse', but, implicitly, he would for public necessities. 
The lord chancellor and the vocal member were speaking much the same language.
Ellesmere fully recognized the importance of revenue in James' fiscal difficulties, but 
his suggestions are more than choosing extra-parliamentary over parliamentary r e v e n u e .  ^53  
Besides offering familiar projects, Ellesmere looked to economic forces shaping revenues, 
particularly commerce. He defended the king's right to impose, but recognized that a revision 
of the book of rates in line with Cranfield's advice could make customs both politically 
palatable and effective in balancing t r a d e .  1 5 4  Enforcement of the statutes of employment 
requiring merchant strangers and aliens to employ their proceeds before leaving England as 
well as other regulations, preceded by a proclamation and exemplary punishments, would 
encourage compositions for pardons and level the commercial playing f i e l d .  i 5 5  Cranfield, 
supported by Ellesmere, was instrumental in focusing conciliar attention on unbalanced trade 
in March 1615, 'the trewe cause w[hi]ch impoverisheth the king and his p e p l e ' . i 5 6  ’Yf this
153 Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform', 198-200 for this argument.
1 5 4 j j j j l  Ellesmere Ms 2610/4-5; Tawney, Business and Politics. 128-134, Despite authorization in January 
1616 to revise the book of rates, Cranfield's project was foremost projected to remove that grievance from 
parliamentary politics. Too many years passed before another assembly for the project to survive. CKS 
U269/1.0Ec94 [Cranfield Ms 4523 (5 January, 1616)]; FSLFolger Ms G.b.lO, fol. 84r [letterbook of Ralph 
Winwood].
155h h L Ellesmere Ms 2610/5-6.
156c k S U269/1.0Ec66 [Cranfield Ms 4532].
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poynte for equallinge the exportacion & importacion be not effectuallye and spedilye dealte 
in,' Ellesmere later parroted Cranfield, 'whatsoever else shall be attempted for abatinge or 
supplye, wyll be to litle purpose: for this is a consuming c a n k e r . ' 157
The chief 'proiectes for supplye & increase of his Ma|jes]tes yerelye revenewe' were 
those for parks, chases, forests, enfranchising copyholds, selling reversions and remainders of 
lands entailed to the crown, surrounded grounds, tithes out of parishes, and fishing busses. 158 
A secondary group of nearly two-dozen projects was included as things to be considered 'for 
the more spedye payment of his Ma[jes]tes debtes'.i59 Ellesmere was employing Dorset’s old 
dichotomy of rents and monies, confronting the difficulty of creating new revenues while 
facing overwhelming immediate needs. In short, Ellesmere was pursuing the same course of 
abatements, improvements, and new revenues in the same circumstances which Dorset, 
Salisbury, Caesar, and Northampton had before him. Yet they were ministers who had never 
discounted parliamentaiy revenue in their pains to repair James' estate, even while exploiting 
the king's own. Ellesmere was neither arguing whether parliament had a role to play in 
financing the crown nor presenting a contra position, but proposing under what conditions it 
could be effectively exploited to that end.
Ellesmere and his colleagues were commanded again by James to consider his estate 
after the summer progress of 1615. The record of debates leaves little doubt James' 
councillors were divided over recourse to parliament, While retrenchment began the 
discussion, some councillors concluded it was inadequate when placed against the king’s 
debt. 1^2 No 'perfect subsistence' was possible except by parliamentary supply, a motion 
which prompted argument among them 'about the difficulties of having a Parlfiament].' 
James' resolution was two fold: consider alternatives to parliament, but if none emerged to
157h h L Ellesmere Ms 2610/5.
158jih L Ellesmere Ms 2610/6-7; projects 'servinge rather for the future, than for the present and which wyll be 
longe in doinge'. Ellesmere Ms 2610/8.
5^9h u l  Ellesmere Ms 2610/9-10. Ellesmere believed these might also prove useful in the longer-term.
160b L Harleian Ms 4289, fol, 224v (24 September, 1615). Coke reported at the meeting on 28 September that 
.Tames' debt was £700,000 and the deficit between £140,d00 and £160,000. BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 226v. 
l^lThe records of the meetings from 24-28 September are BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 224v-230v; Lake's draft is 
PRO SP 14/81/115, fol. 184r-198r; Ellesmere's notes taken during debates on 28 September are HHL Ellesmere 
Ms 2628 (reprinted in Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform', 205-208).
1<^ 2b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 224v.
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examine the best course of preparation. James was obviously wary, refusing to sanction 
parliament until a program had been debated and offered to him, a reversal of 1614 in which 
he had acquiesced and then left his council to prepare for the session as they thought best. 
That parliament haunted him: 'he would not avoyd a Parlfiament] if he might see likelyhood 
of comfort by i t ... on the other side he would rather suffer any extremity then have another 
meeting w[i]th his people & take an affront.' The council resolved the following day that 
only parliament would suffice, but when it came time to debate preparation some 
'missconceaved the former days resolution & to press ye particular heads of abatements’. The 
previous debate was revisited until the dissidents s u b m i t t e d .
Noteworthy about the ensuing meeting is less deciphering the councillors who 
originally opposed recourse to parliament than the preparation which was discussed once the 
powerful voices of Lake, Caesar, Coke, and Winwood (four of the first six to speak) charged 
the debate.1^4 Lake framed the debate by arguing past impediments to success must be 
removed and new inducements p r o v i d e d .  Offering a conception which Wentworth would 
have found agreeable. Lake argued it was crucial to remove the taint of prodigality from 
James by persuading him to stay his bounty and balance his revenues and receipts through 
retrenchment. The other impediments were matters of policy 'which have been offensively 
taken; sum to be against law; & sum against ye liberties and privileges of his people ... 
w[hi]ch do best appear by suche grievances & petitions as have been delivered in former 
Parlem[en]ts.' The learned council should examine the grievances, referring those fit for 
remedy by law to the judges and the rest by James with his councillors' advice. Impositions 
were the pre-eminent grievance and Lake supported Cranfield's project for their removal 
through revision of the book of rates, Common wealth matters fit to be handled before or 
during parliament formed Lake’s incentives: fishing busses, balanced trade, statutes of 
employments, dyed cloth, and abolition of obsolete laws. Much like Ellesmere, Lake 
concluded that 'ye naturall kyndness of the people of England shall revyve agayn and shew
163b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 224v-225r.
164'jj[jg first six speakers were Lake, Caesar, Parry, Coke, Greville, and Winwood. Only Gieville was equivocal 
about parliament, but agreed with Coke it was the best option for paying the king's debts.
165b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 225r-225v.
166b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 225v-226r.
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itself ill a liberall & free contribution towards ye relief of his Mafjes]tes necessities’ when 
presented with such a p r o g r a m .
Caesar concisely seconded Lake's long discourse; nothing had changed since the 
debates at Northampton House before summoning the Addled p a r l i a m e n t .  1^8 Coke took a 
wider perspective which hinted at the actual contention among the councillors. Curing the 
king’s fiscal ills 'was ye scope of this present c o n s u l t a t i o n ' .  Balancing the books required 
abatements in offices and suspension of pensions until James' debts were paid while 
increased revenues were possible if the statutes of employment were executed, trade 
balanced, and fraudulent grants examined and v o i d e d .  170 Parliament remained necessaiy for 
paying James' debts despite a change in fiscal p o l i c y . i ^ i  Coke's distinction between 
preparation for parliament through staying gifts and pensions, abating, redressing grievances 
(especially impositions), suspending offensive grants and curing James' fiscal estate was 
tellingly b l u r r y .  172 por management of pai’liament, Coke wanted an irrefutable case
fashioned for members like Wentworth proving that James' debts 'proceeded not only out of 
facility & prodigality', but from matters of s t a t e .  173 Finally, Coke called for conciliar 
committees assisted by experts to settle these proposals and projects after which report would 
be made to the whole c o u n c i l .  1 7 4
Winwood approved the ideas for preparation, but actually reduced them to three 
dominant points to be handled by committees: removal of impositions, Coke's justification of 
expenditures, and an assurance to parliament that 'what they would give might be converted 
to publik uses, & not otherwise e m p l o y [ e ] d ' . i 7 5  The simplicity of Winwood's program is 
explained by his blunt assertion that 'there was no way to redeem ye King out of his
167b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 226v.
1^8h h L Ellesmere Ms 2628/1. Caesar agreed the parliament rolls should be called for and the Commons' past 
grievances examined. BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 226v.
169b L Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 226v.
170b L Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 226v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 2628/2. Compare to HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/1-5. 
171HHL Ellesmere Ms 2628/2; BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 227r.
^72b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 227r. Coke approved Lake's points in general.
173b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 227r. Coke also denounced electioneering and acquiesced to the Commons' 
demand in 1614 that none of the king's learned council sit in any future lower house.
174b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 227r; compare with HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/9. Greville weighed in next with 
pointed questions whether everything complained o f in parliament was worthy of redress aikl if many of the 
proposals for preparation were not fitter for parliament itself. BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 227v.
175b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 227v; HHL Ellesmere Ms 2628/3.
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necessities really and substantially, but by ye good will of his people in Paiiem[en]t & all 
other ways & means would prove frivolous, & time lost that should be spent in consideration 
of them,'i76 Following the earlier contretemps over resolution for parliament, the agenda 
became that 'ye point of preparation necessary to be speedily debated... yt[thafj his MaOesjty 
might have their Ix)[rdshi]ps resolutions yt[that] aftemoone before his going to Greenwich to 
ye Queen, wher he was to keepe Michelmass day, & on Satterday to be gone towards 
Royston.’i77 This is the crux, not whether parliament, but how soon. Winwood effectively 
rejected the 'expedition & mature deliberation' of Coke's wider fiscal policies and Lake's
longer coui’se of p r e p a r a t i o n .  7^8
Ellesmere's notes and the formal report record the extent to which the ensuing 
speakers signalled their support—or acquiescence-with Lake and Coke rather than 
Winwood.179 They were at pains to emphasize 'that before a Parliament must go a good and 
well-digested preparation', in the words of Comptroller W o t t o n .  1 8 0  i n  the opinions of 
Wotton, Knollys, Zouche, and Fenton, the best preparation had been offered by Coke and 
L a k e . E x e t e r  discoursed on the ends of parliament, believing that redress of grievances 
was a preparation for supply.^^2 He supported Coke's attention to wider fiscal policy by 
arguing that 'yf 4 subsidies be graunted, yt will not be sufficyent... if it were obtained, was 
but a rellief temporary; whereas abatement of expense was an easement both certayn and 
p e r p e t u a l l . ' i ^ 3  He did not believe a course of abatement or grievances was time misspent as 
Winwood had avowed. Pembroke offered a defining opinion: 'there was no reall way to 
rellieve ye King but by contribution of his people in Parlam[en]t w[hi]ch as he held for 
fundamental on ye one part, so did he hould it for no less fundamental! on ye other side
176b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 227v.
177b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 225r.
178b L Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 227r.
179HHL Ellesmere Ms 2628/3-5.
180b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 227v.
iSlj-UjL Ellesmere Ms 2628/3-4. Wotton offered also that a parliament in Scotland voting James* supply would 
prove an inducement to their English cousins, Knollys added forest, parks, and chases to useful projects, and 
Zouche reiterated his disapproval o f electioneering while enforcement of the laws against recusants should 
prove popular. BL HarleianMs 4289, fbl. 227v-228v.
182b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 228r.
^^ 3h h L Ellesmere Ms 2628/4 and BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 228r respectively.
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yt[that] a Parlam[en]t was not to be attempted w[i]thout dew p r e p a r a t i o n ’. i 8 4  Nottingham and 
Suffolk offered cautionaries about potential Commons' demands for redress of grievances and 
the possibility that no course with impositions would deter them from demanding the point of 
right be settled in their f a v o u r .  185
Ellesmere's opportunity to advance his program followed Suffolk. He spoke at 'good 
length' and, while his speech was heavily abstracted by Lake, it would appear Ellesmere 
delivered much of his fiscal outline in approximate o r d e r .  ^ 8 6  Ellesmere seems to have 
glossed over his long exposition of tackling the king's debts during preparation for 
parliament, perhaps because Exeter had already made the point for him: that parliament was 
part of the solution, but not enough for its totality and im m e d ia c y .i® ^  Ellesmere's attack on 
the corruption of projectors and the need for trustworthy undertakers in future may have been 
included in points concerning projects and mismanagement, but there is no evidence for it. 
Ellesmere’s conclusion reveals the complexity of the question before them: 'These severall 
heads ... had been formerly mooved but foreslowed. He wished they might now be 
quick[e]ned & pursued, as things wherof sum were good means to bring ye King rellief by 
themselves; sum others good preparations for a Parlament; and sum others fitt to be treated in 
a Parlem[en]t.’i88 Like Coke, he believed it was time to get down to business and supported 
the committees project.i89
Archbishop Abbot's accustomed seniority left him the task of summation. He took 
great comfort from their proceedings, never having seen matters 'handled so seriously & 
methodically' and believed a 'Parliament so prepared & ordered ... might carry w[i]th it a 
likelyhood & probability of bringing good s u c c e s s . ' i 9 0  The council resolved on committees 
after Abbot's speech and appointments were made the next day once James' had reviewed
184b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 228v.
185b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 228v-229r; HHL Ellesmere Ms 2628/5. Lennox offered a short speech in which 
he deferred to the council's resolution anti seconded Fenton's point that a parliament in Scotland had already 
contributed to the king's debts. Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 229r.
186b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 229v-230r; HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610/1-7 
187h h L Ellesmere Ms 2610/8-10; BL Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 229v-230r.
188b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 230r.
189b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 230r.
190b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 230r. Abbot urged discretion and secrecy on his colleagues in their futuie 
proceedings and supported the execution of the recusancy laws proposé by Zouche.
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their p r o p o s a l s .  They rewarded attention to fiscal policy and thoughtful preparation. 
Ellesmere, Lake, and Coke got what they wanted with committees for examining gifts and 
grants; balancing revenues and expenditures with cuts in Ireland, the navy, household, 
wardrobe, robes, and works; impositions and trade; fishing busses; and statutes of 
employment. 192 Lake was frustrated over obsolete laws, but he and Coke could take 
satisfaction from the review of past grievances by .Tames' learned council. No committees 
were appointed to justify James' expenses, prevent electioneering, devise means to commit 
the king to spend subsidies on public expenses, and secrecy in proceedings, Ellesmere 
crabbed that for 'abatinge of pencions, anuityes, new fees & new offices there are no 
com[m]ittees, nor tyme appoynted', while his projects for defective titles, assarts, the mint, 
and coinage were ignored.
A number of factors were at work in the omissions. The councillors were spread thin 
and the committees chosen reflect a prioritization in favour of difficult problems, but ones 
likely to yield the greatest benefit. Ellesmere alone seems not to have heeded James' cryptic 
warning that many difficulties would ensue from examining p e n s i o n s .  193 James was 
presently unwilling to have them touched while he probably held as much antipathy to any 
direct preparations for an assembly. It was James who had originally assembled his 
councillors for the establishment of his estate, 'as well by payment of his detts as by reducing 
his expenses to an equality with his revenews; & fell uppon sum particulars in that point of 
a b a t i n g ’. i 9 4  Parliament was forced onto the agenda by declaiing as inadequate James' talk of 
a b a t e m e n t .  1 9 5  Proposals for active reform of the offices of state remained tenable, but serious 
retrenchment of the patronage culture and calling parliament were not the art of the possible 
in 1615.
At the conclusion of the meetings, James offered only his approval of their course 
with committees and left them to their work while he began the progress to R o y s to n .i9 6
191b L Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 230r-230v. 
192h HL Ellesmere Ms 2614.
193b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 230v. 
194b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fol. 224v. 
195b l  HarleianMs 4289, fol. 224v. 
196b l  Harleian Ms 4289, fbl. 230v.
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James probably agreed with Ellesmere that his councillors proposals could ’be very good for 
supplye and increasinge of his Maiesties yerely reuenewe, and wyll in tyme helpe towarde 
the payment of his debtes’, but until their work was completed he neither could nor would 
choose to face parliament—and not even then.^^  ^ Significantly, the committees amounted to 
little in practice, Sweeping fiscal reform of the kind envisaged by Ellesmere remained 
conceptually out of time while neither its strictures nor parliament were palatable to James. 
John Throckmorton put his finger on the pulse in a letter to Trumbull: Theye begin to speake 
afresh of a parlement without which these wants can not be substantially releaved. But when 
theye shall be theirby supplyed unies the same parlement can provide that hearafter their be 
better care taken in the spending or issewing of it then heartofore their [hathe] bien, all that 
will not helpe nethei.’^ ^^  Thomas Overbuty’s murder and Somerset’s fall also absorbed 
political attention for much of 1616 as did James' great feud with Coke.200 It wasn’t until 
1617, when the money from the Cautionary towns was spent that echoes of Ellesmere began 
to be heard in policymaking.
VI
A conciliar fiscal program set out in a book in February 1617 recognized that James 
would not countenance recourse to parliament for his debts. The program harked back to 
perceptions of Burghley’s days, when running budget surpluses anticipated or paid debts.^02 
James’ councillors attempted to make the same principles a reality: a budget in surplus would 
eventually pay off the debt. To that end, it became a matter of practice that ’the most 
necessarie partes of the ordinarie be assigned upon the most certaine receiptes' and £30- 
40,000 was to remain ’either for the extraordinarie or the ordinary unassigned as shall be
Ellesmere Ms 2610/7.
l^^Alsop, ’Fiscal Reform’, 204-205. Ellesmere's and Cranfield’s projects for impositions and statutes of 
employments languished from indecision and problems of enforcement respectively. BL Lansdowne Ms 152, 
fol. 174r-174v (14 November, 1615); CKS U 269/1 .0oll8  [CranfieldMs 4542] ([19 December, 1615]); 
Lansdowne Ms 152, fol. 179r-180v (13 November, 1618); Lansdowne Ms 152, fol. 172r-172v (15 November, 
1618); PRO SP 14/148/92, fol. lllr -1  l l v (13 July, 1623).
^^^Transcription in HMC Downshire. V, 441-442 (12 March, 1616); also HMC Downshire. V, 373-374 (1 
December, 1615), 388 (25 December, 1625), 404-405 (10 January, 1616).
290Knafla. Law and Politics. 126-127,178-181.
201pRO SP 14/90/71, fol. 131r-140v (20Februaiy, 1617).
^®^Guy, Tudor England. 379-382.
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moste p r e s s i n g . ’2 0 3  Anticipations and unexpected charges were transferred to the d e b t . 2 0 4  in 
short, they assigned the crown's ordinary revenue to its most important charges while 
anything which was not budgeted was treated as extraordinary and tacked to the debt. The 
maintenance of this 'balance' depended upon the offices being 'kept w[i]thin the compassé 
delivered now by the Lo[rd] Threr. as a m e d i u m . The offing of this plan allowed Suffolk 
to claim 'to have don a great peece of service in bringing the K[ing]s revenewes to surmount 
his ordinarie expences more then lOOOli a year’.^ o^  GrevUle knew better and gave 'out that 
the reconing is mistaken for a very great summe.’ There was 'scant goode quarter between 
them' for To the councillors’ credit, budgeting was a constructive rationalization, but 
the problem of inadequate revenues remained.
James’ councillors fuUy avowed the debt could be supplied by the posited surplus on 
the ordinary accounts, future savings from abatements in offices, suspension of pensions by 
James, improved and casual revenues (including 'proiectes of lawfull & convenient natures’), 
and b o r r o w i n g . 2 0 8  Boirowing was the real key and projects to raise two lump sums of 
£100,000 apiece were essential: 'To maintain this equality ... it was found necessary that 
200,0001. of your Majesty's most pregnant and pressing debts should be d i s c h a r g e d ' . ^ o ^  The 
councillors first met for this purpose in June 1616, at which time they were concerned only 
with raising £100,000. Greville proposed the sale of burgages, mills, old castles, and decayed 
houses, fee-farming more lands, and asking 1000 people to donate £100 a piece.2io Coke 
thought people who had been most favoured by James' bounty should be asked to lend money 
on security of their land. Viscount Fenton's respite of homage project was finally assigned
203pRO SP 14/90/71, fol. 133r.
204pRo SP 14/90/44, fbi. 79r (31 January, 1617).
205pRO SP 14/90/44, fol. 79r.
206pRo SP 14/90/25, fol. 55r-55v (Chamberlain to Carleton; 18 January, 1617).
207pRo SP 14/90/25, fol. 55r; Rebholz, Fulke Greville. 245.
208PRO SP 14/90/71, fol. 134r. Revenue improvements were to come from Ireland, the petty farm o f customs, 
recusants, the court of wards, 'leasinge o f copps woodes', disafforesting remote parts and turning to cultivation, 
fines ih courts, and 'other increasementes upon discoverie by a good survey.' SP 14/90/71, fol. 135r. Casual 
revenues were principally forfeitures of lands and goods upon various treason and refusal o f the oath of 
allegiance, lands escheated for lack o f heirs, licences o f exportation, concealments, and projects. SP 14/90/71, 
fol. 136r-137r. Among the projects were licences for exemption from juries, 'seacoles', compositions for 
alienations (in Wales), encroachments, and assarts, and 'lycences for Badgers.' SP 14/90/71, fol. 138r. 
299spedding, Letters and Life. V, 254.
210pRo SP 14/87/63, fol. 126r (19 June, 1616).
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for examination.^ii New hunts for concealments and a project involving woods were 
added.212 Out of these cursory projects for new revenues it was decided to undertake three 
separate loans until surpluses on the ordinary materialized. The center-piece project was 
Giles Mompesson's for sale of wood from the royal forests worth £100,000 (£25,000 annually 
for four years).2i3 The councillors confidently contracted with the customs farmers to 
directly advance James' creditors the same £25,000 annually for four years; they would be 
repaid at the end of each year from Mompesson's sales.214 The City and Merchant Strangers 
agreed to lend £120,000 in early 1617.215 These monies were to be answered from a project 
to convert remote lands and forests to cultivation.2i^ The councillors had embarked upon a 
policy of paying the king's debt by borrowing upon 'security' of anticipated revenue from 
projects: 'These thinges will yeald money with tyme. In the meane tyme to borrowe.'2i2
This fragile program unravelled in 1617 thanks to James and conciliar policymaking 
contending with an ineffective lord treasurer. James was determined to return to Scotland 
and the loan monies paid for the coming progress.2is Nothing could persuade James that his 
'wantes being so greate as they are, to have them inaeased by such an unnecessary chardge 
were not to be wished, but rather to be prevented.'2i9 James left London in March and finally 
returned on 15 September 1617.220  Reminiscent of Salisbury's years, Lake was the conduit 
with the councillors remaining in London.221 His letters with Winwood and Suffolk 
illuminate the collapse of the councillors' financial pohcy. Things began going awry in May
211pRO SP 14/87/63, fol. 126v; SP 14/87/75, fol. I54r-154v (30 June, 1616).
212pRo SP 14/87/64, fol. 128r (29 June, 1616).
2A3por the initiation and progress o f Mompesson's project. Acts 1616-1617.137,174,209-210 and PRO SP 
14/93/99, fol. 126r ([27 September], 1617).
214pRo SP 14/93/99, fol. 126r; Ashton, Money Market 88-92.
215A.cts 1616-1617.122. Ashton, Money Market. 122-127 for the details of the city portion of the loan 
(£100,000) and Dietz, Pubhc Finance. 166-167. j
216pRo SP 14/93/99, fol. 129v. For such projects see Hoyle, Disafforestation', 353-388 and Peter Large, 'From |
swanimote to disafforestation: Feckenham Forest in the early seventeenth century', Hoyle, Estates 1558-1640. I
389-417. I
217pRO SP 14/87/64, fol. 128r. |
218pRO SP 14/90/25, fo l . 55r.
219pRo SP 14/90/36, fol. 68r (21 January, 1617). I
220Lee, Government bv Pen. 155-174.
221 See the orders for the post. Acts 1616-1617.188-189. The councillors remaining in London to attend i
business in the king's absence were principally Archbishop Abbot, Lord Keeper Bacon (new appointed to 1
replace Ellesmere), Suffolk, Greville, Winwood, Caesar, Viscount Wallingford (KnoUys, master of the wards), i
and lord privy seal Worcester. Acts 1616-1617.216-329. !
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when James reached Scotland. The Exchequer was empty and Suffolk hoped to preempt 
trouble when he wrote Lake: 'I am sure that the kinge will heare by divers that are greedy for 
mony that some of them are unpaide. I prey yow to take notice that yt is noe fault of myne 
for yet we want 2000011 w[hi]ch should come from the citty of the loane mony to be the 
kinge... I have but one principaU caire w[hi]ch is to provyde mony to supply the necessary 
wantes of the tyme for although yo[u]r iourney hath drawne not more from us then stood with 
the necessity of the tyme to doe, yet out of our empty chestes yt could ill be s p a r e d . ' 2 2 2
They were waiting on the last £20,000 instalment when Winwood, known for his 
bluntness, informed Lake of bigger problems in the offing with their loans: 'how we shall 
repay that w[hi]ch we have, I feare for the reconing wee made for the woods, I dowbt we 
made w[i]thowt our h o s t . *223 As with so many projects, reality was setting in on
Mompesson’s undertaking. James was always wary of plans involving the royal forests and 
'the chief point that his Ma|jes]ty wold heare of is whether the somme of 25000 yearely be 
like to rise without spoyle of his woodes and fbrestes, wherof I have writen one or twice but 
no aunsweare c a m e ' . 2 2 4  Winwood was ordered to obtain an explanation from S u f f o l k . 2 2 5  
Suffolk already knew the project was in trouble. Caesar had undertaken an investigation and 
found trees being sold 'for lesse then half the valewe & they were the most choise timber’, 
those reserved for the king’s n a v y .2 2 6  Suffolk was finally forced to admit 'yt is trew that the 
commissioners for the woodes doe fall shorte this years of the 25000U ... for the present yt 
lyes upon us to make a supply untill his Majjesjtes retourne when we are to conceave his 
further pleasure what course shalbe t a k e n ’.2 2 7
Suffolk had given up and descended to impolitic ineptitude as matters worsened. He 
wrote Lake on 14 July: 'It seemes by Mr Chauncellor that yow wrote to him & the kinge was 
angrie bycause we made him noe retourne about the futur assurance to the Queen. And we
222pRo SP 14/92/40, fol. 129r (23 May, 1617); also Acts 1616-1617.172-173,256-257,298-299.
223pRO SP 14/92/65, fol. 165r (10 June, 1617).
224pRo SP 14/92/76, fol. 188r ([29 June], 1617). Lake had written Winwood on 19 June that the king 'doth 
expect to heare what the commissioners finde is like to come of the woodes for to have the woodes cutt and yet 
the somme intended in fowre yeares not to be fiirnished... his Ma|jes]ty thioketh it were an unfitting crosses'. 
SP 14/92/69, fol. 170r.
225pRO SP 14/92/76, fol. 188r.
226gL Lansdowne Ms 161, fol. 343v (24 June, 1617).
227pRo SP 14/92/90, fol. 212v-213r (14 July, 1617); Spedding, Letters and Lite. V, 255.
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marvaile asmuch that his Ma[jes]tie will thinke to have speidy answeres of thinges of that 
nature w[hi]ch cannot be done but w[i]th some t y m e . ’2 2 8  The king rebuked, Suffolk replied 
that the book (for the Queen’s estate upon James’ death) was in fact ready and would be 
dispatched, Suffolk also promised to send much-needed monies to Carlisle for the return to 
London. The money was never dispatched and Lake’s query must have been ominous to 
Winwood. 'That which maketh me send away to you,' wrote Lake, 'is an expresse 
commandement of his Mafjes]ty for want of money here. I have written alredy twice or 
thrise to my L[ord] Threr and Mr Chancellor but there cometh no aunsweare not so much as 
an excuse.... his Ma[ies]ty is much moved especially that he is so much neglected as not to 
have an aunsweare or a reason why. If my Lo[rd] Threr or Mr Chancellor be with you I pray 
you speake to them of it.'229 Winwood stirred the waters. He forwarded the letter to Greville 
and informed Lake he had 'often heard my L[ord] Tresorer say that he would send to Carlyle 
300011. Yf the wantes be so great in yo[u]r iomey, what will you find at yo[u]r returne.’230 
Lake replied: 'For the moneys here is no newes nor any aunsweare of excuse w[hi]ch moveth 
his Ma[jes]ty much as though he were neglected ... he is much displeased he doth not 
heare.'23i Greville set out in person to calm James' f u r y ,2 3 2
What satisfaction James recei ved has escaped record, but he was welcomed back with 
a bleak, blunt fiscal report at Hampton Court. 233 Ordinary revenue had nearly drawn into 
balance when he left for Scotland, 'w[hi]ch would accordinglie have held, if yo[u]r great 
extraordinaries had not interrupted it.'234 For the annual £25,000 advances of the farmers on 
the customs, 'the same to be repaide againe out of the sale of woodes', that course 'doth not 
only fayle for the present, but is to be feared will fayle for the tyme coming'. They had no 
choice but to abandon the project. Further, the City loan, was gone, expended on privy seals
2 2 8 p R O  SP 14/92/90, fol. 212r-212v.
229pRO SP 14/93/25, fol. 36r (18 August, 1617).
230pRO SP 14/93/31, fol. 51r (20 August, 1617).
231pRO SP 14/93/69, fol. 90r (28 August, 1617).
232pRo SP 14/93/73, fol. 94r (30 August, 1617); SP 14/93/73, fol. 94r. The financial difficulties must have 
been a bitter counterpoise for James compared to the effectiveness o f provisions by his ministers in Scotland. 
William A. McNeill and Peter G. B. McNeill, The Scottish Progress of James VI, 1617', Scottish Historical 
Review 75 (1996), 38-51.
233pRo SP 14/93/98, fol. 125i (25 September, 1617).
234pRO SP 14/93/99, fol. 126r-126v ([27 September], 1617).
220
Northampton. Ellesmere, and Condliar Fiscal Policy (1611-1617)
for bounty, provisions for the journey, enlarging Theobalds parks, ambassadors, and 
diversion to ordinary needs, all which amounted to £114,000, That was paid out of such 
forests as James would sacrifice to that debt, but it was still 'a worke of t y m e . ' 2 3 5  The whole 
of his debts amounted to £726,000, with only the dubious hopes of the woods to pay the 
City's share due the following y e a r .2 3 6
James' distemper must have been considerable, prodigious measures of 
disappointment and exasperation. As for sorting the mess, 'the wayes are yett in yo[u]r 
Majjesjtes best iudgement to be considered of.'237 Those ways defied settlement for the next 
month and were overshadowed by the sudden death of W i n w o o d . 2 3 8  His abrasive honesty 
had, in the end, earned him considerable respect: 'seeing it was gods pleasure to call him, he 
could never go in a better time when he was in his highest favor with the king, Quene, Prince, 
and principall favourite, and was generally growne into so good opinion'; his death was 'much 
lamented' save for 'some y 11 willers that are as glad he is gon as most are s o r y . ' 2 3 9  Once again 
James concluded ’he was never so well served as when he was his own secretarie’ and 
delivered the seals of office to B u c k i n g h a m . 2 4 o  By the end of November James had 
resolutely begun the repair of his estate.24i Thomas Murray wrote Carleton of its progress in 
four months time: 'his Mafjesjty labours verie much to redresse the disorders of the estate 
and now is much busied with the houshold by reformation of the w|fiijch it is conceaved he 
shall saif yearlie thirtie thousand lib... He is now preparing ane exact examination and 
censure of the abuses of the Excheker w[hi]ch in all mens opinions ar liklie to proove verie 
foule. The lyke is intended in the Navie, and in I r l a n d . ' 2 4 2  James and Buckingham had
235pRO SP 14/93/99, fbl. 129v.
236pRo SP 14/93/99, fol. 129v. The loan was not repaid until the I630’s and elfectively destroyed royal credit 
with the City into the next reign. Aston, Money Market. 125-127.
237pRo SP 14/93/99, fol. 129v.
238pRo SP 14/93/148, tbl. 254r-254v. Chamberlain's description for Carleton's benefit is quite extraordinary: 
My feare was not vaine w|hi]ch I conceaved o f Mr Secretaries disease, and I presaged too truly of the successe... 
seeing yt appeares upon the opening of the body that he could not possiblie last long, having his heart widiered 
almost to nothing, his spleen utterly rotten, one o f his kidneys cleane gon, the other perished, his liver full o f  
blacke spots, his lunges not sound, besides divers other defects so that yt was a wonder how he held out so long, 
and looked so well.' PRO SP 14/93/158, fol. 266r (31 October, 1617).
239pRO SP 14/93/158, fol. 266r.
240pRo SP 14/94/12, fol. 14r (8 November, 1617).
241pRO SP 14/94/23, fol. 32r-33v. This is provisionally dated to November and the reference to Buckingham's 
acquisition of the seals would seem to indicate it belongs veiy closely to the period of the previous letter. 
242pRo SP 14/96/91, fol. 151r (28 March, 1618).
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joined to confront the crippling deficiency of Jacobean fiscal policy: the failure of 
simultaneous retrenchment and refonn within the patronage culture without James' direct 
support. Murray knew what would determine the fate of their labours: 'We all wishe a 
constance in this good r e s o l u t i o n * . 2 4 3
243pRO SP 14/96/91, fol. 151r.
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CHAPTER?
Lionel Cranfield and the Reformation of Crown Finance
(1617-1624)
I
Projects were the conceptual core of crown finance. The Jacobean state did not 
possess the administrative development and bureaucratic culture for this to be otherwise; nor 
did its monarchical basis and patronage culture make the abandonment of suits and projects 
politically desirable. Their history of large promises and little performance demonstrates 
they were not even in part the best means to translate economic resources into revenues for 
the state. The political antagonisms caused by projects were commensurate with their 
ineffectiveness. Both Salisbury and Cranfield stepped outside the project mentality of the age 
and offered James different responses to the inadequacy of projects, but th ^  had in common 
a fundamental redefinition of the Jacobean state. In Salisbury’s mind, frugality—well-ordered 
finance—was a virtue in two parts, 'the one is to have, the other is to get'.  ^ The having and 
getting of money under Cranfield were one and the same: restraint of James' bounty and 
amending the importunity, corruption, and incompetence of the king's servants which 
undermined administration in the culture of patronage. Cranfield advised Northampton, 
Ellesmere, and Buckingham before his appointment to the t r e a s u r e r s h ip .2  Between 1617 and 
1621, he was James expert instrument of retrenchment and, through Buckingham, his pre­
eminent fiscal counsellor in transcendence of institutional responsibilities. Cranfield's 
acquisition of the white staff actually marked the beginning of his decline. The gulf between 
his principles and Jacobean reality was too large. Cranfield’ s policies attempted to give them 
effect, but he had scarcely eighteen months in which to do so. By early 1623, policy no
 ^Croft (ed.), ’Several Speeches', 299.
^Tawney, Business and Politics: Prestwich, Cranfield. This chapter seeks to offer a reassessment of Cranfield's 
fiscal policy in keeping with the new perspective o f crown finance offered in this study and fhe general revision 
of the period, but is not intended to provide a comprehensive treatment of Cranfield's career.
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longer centered on James’ estate. The Spanish match and 'blessed revolution' subsumed 
governance and Cranfield spent much of his time simply trying to meet their demands.^
n
Cranfield's thinlcing and counsel were anchored in the conception set out in 
Ellesmere's 1615 program, a product of their intellectual partnership from which Cranfield 
consistently drew principles and policies.^ Recent scholarship has failed to see this 
continuity, though Cranfield's emphasis varied somewhat as treasurer.^ For instance, 
Cranfield's willingness to identify the functioning of the patronage culture as the fundamental 
problem was strident and unrelenting. The conciliar budgets of 1617 reflected Ellesmere's 
dictum to make expenditure 'a p[er]fecte and certen compassé, to be ... inviolablye kepte' in 
proportion to revenues.^ Ellesmere and Cranfield argued that significant abatements in 
pensions, Ireland, and the household, navy, stable, wardrobe, robes, and works must proceed 
apace with budgeting.^ Expenditures had to be stringently evaluated by the quantity of 
provision and its quality, necessity, price, and utility.^ These principles were the core of 
Cranfield's treasurership, while the second treasury commission placed similar store in 
budgeting ordinary expenses.^
We have seen that James' Scottish progress upset the conciliar balancing act and 
created fiscal imperatives from which the king embraced retrenchment and reform .Jam es 
had met his councillors to examine the situation, but, preparatory to the meeting. Bacon had
3 Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. An indication of tiiis process is the rapid decline in weekly accounts which 
Cranfield received as treasurer. There ai^ some 40 reports from late-September 1621 to mid-December 1622. 
Between March 1623 and March 1624 there are only five sets of accounts. CKS U269/1.0E1426.
'^Particularly HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610 (18 September, 1615). Cranfield's copy in his own hand is CKS 
U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 2330] (undated).
 ^Alsop, 'Fiscal Reform'.
^HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610; CKS D269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 2330]; PRO SP 14/90/71, fol. 133r (20 
February, 1617) and SP 14/91/70, fol. 128r (20 February, 1617); PRO SP 14/94/23, fol. 33r ([November],
1617).
2c KS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 2330].
^ffl-IL Ellesmere Ms 2610. This taxonomy o f quantity, quality, and so forth smacks of Cranfield's business 
acumen and provides some of the best evidence that his work witii Ellesmere was a genuine partnership of ideas. 
The criteria o f 'quallitie & quantifie... pryce [and] use' were employed in the manuscript among Cranfield's own 
papers which countered parliamentary charges against the king's bounty in 1614. CKS U269/1.0 0 I88 
[Cranfield Ms 4074].
^CKS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs7906] andU269/1.OE1430 [CranfieldMs 6775]. 
lOpRO SP 14/93/73, fol. 94r-94v (30 August, 1617).
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advised James to scrutinize the failui'e of those plans. Bacon's language predisposed James 
to find deception and mismanagement and was delibaately designed to inflame the king.12 
Bacon, Cranfield, and Buckingham were conspiring to conclusively wrest fiscal authority 
from Suffolk by stoking and then meeting James' demands for retrenchment. 13 These they 
did at the expense of the privy council: their triumvirate took over fiscal policy with James' 
sanction.
Secretary Winwood's death in October removed the most independent voice among 
James' councillors.^^ No sooner had Buckingham taken possession of the secretarial seals 
than James commanded his councillors to pursue a broad program of retrenchment. t5 
Buckingham encouraged the cause of reform in these years and was instrumental in 
supporting James' attentiveness to it.t^ Like its many predecessors, the effort embraced the 
household, wardrobe, navy, pensions, Ireland, and Berwick ganison.^^ King and favourite 
monitored the work closely, but in December 1617 James made a fundamental change. The 
entire progiam was removed from the purview of the council and given over to an 
interlocking group of commissioners led by Cranfield and Bacon. This was done out of 
practical and political necessity. The council turned to the very people responsible for 
maladministration to put right its consequences. Lake's report for Buckingham at the start of 
the program is telling: 'my Ll[ordships] after debating and disputing, finding no other ceitain 
way, did command the officers in his Majestyfs] name to take it in hande' with orders to
t^Spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 254-256. 
t^Spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 255-256.
l^Greville almost certainly supported them, having long been an exponent of fiscal reform. Michael B. Young, 
Servilitv and Service: The Life and Work of Sir John Coke (London, 1986), 23-31 and 41-47. U ie relationship 
between Cranfield and Bacon is discussed in Prestwich, Cranfield. 179-180,205-206,232-233, and 270-271. 
That of Bacon and Buckingham is particularly evident in the memorials and letters between the two men in 
1616 and 1617, notably while James and Buckingham were in Scotland. Spedding, Letters and Life VI. 13-56, 
164,171, and 250-252; also Roger Lockyer, Buckingham: The Life and Political Career of George Villiers First 
Duke of Buckingham 1592-1628 (London, 1981), 29-31,45-48. Prestwich is remarkably vague and ambivalent 
about Cranfield and Buckingham’s relationship, saving its collapse, due to the overwhelmingly negative bias 
toward the duke and James. For instance, Prestwich, Cranfield. 273-285. The early relationship between the 
two men is touched on in Lockyer, Buckingham. 48-49.
14pRO SP 14/93/158, fol. 266r-268v (31 October, 1617).
ISpRO SP 14/94/23, fol. 32r-33v. 
l^Locfcyer, Buckingham. 49.
^^Gardiner (ed.), Fortescue Papers. 30-31 (Lake to Buckingham; 14 November, 1617),
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reduce household expenditures to £50,000, Lake was of the ’opinion it shalbe to good 
purpose that his Majesty writt to them a lettre to that effect ... for in truth they went very 
unwillingly about the business’; James’ intervention would spur their 'project
Buckingham wiote Bacon that James was pleased with the initial work, but wariness 
was written between the lines.20 Bacon responded that the 'liking which his Majesty hath of 
our proceeding concerning his Household, telleth me that his Majesty cannot but dislike the 
declining and tergiversation of the inferior officers; which by this time he understandeth.'^i 
Bacon ended, 'methinks his Majesty, upon these tossings over of his business from one to 
others, hath an apt occasion to go on with sub-committees.’ Together with a council report 
repeating the officers’ pleas of ’incapacity’, Bacon's letter had its desired elfect.22 James was 
surprised by the officer’s stonewalling, and Bacon disingenuously disavowed the council 
letter as one having simply been passed to him for signature by the council clerk. 23 But 
James concluded that 'it will be now a fit time to make use of Sir Lionel Cranfield's 
propositions'. Buckingham, Bacon, and Cranfield-hl much of the last two weeks of 
November—took household retrenchment out of the officers' hands and placed them into 
those of independent commissioners. Buckingham persuaded James to write the council 
personally of his decision, which would prepare the gi ound 'as well as is possible.'24
Upon Cranfield’s recovery, he and Bacon drafted the commissioners' instructions; the 
corrected draft in Cranfield's hand would indicate he played the leading r o l e . 25 Presented by 
Buckingham with Bacon's clean copy, James enthusiastically signed is as the final instrument 
and sent it to the c o u n c i l .  26 The triumvirate checkmated the privy council and administration 
by playing upon the household officers' obstructionism. The commission left no doubt why
 ^^ Gardiner (ed.), Fortescue Papers. 30.
l^Gardiner (ed.), Fortescue Papers. 31. Robert Mansell, treasurer o f the navy, offered to save the king annually 
£7200: by permanently discharging three ships and crews at a one-time cost o f £10,000; the council agreed. 
Pensions, Ireland, and Berwick were on their next agenda. Gardiner, Fortescue Papers. 31.
26spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 274 (Buckingham to Bacon; 17 November, 1617).
21spedding, I.^ tters and Life. VI. 275 (Bacon to Buckingham; 19 November, 1617).
22Acts 1616-1617.372. Spedding. Letters and Life. VI, 275.
23spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 276 (Bacon to Buckingham; 20 November, 1617).
24spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 276 (Bacon to Buckingham; 22 November, 1617).
25c KS U269/1.OW106 [Cranfield Ms 881] (undated). Spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 279-280 (Bacon to 
Buckingham; 27 November, 1617).
26spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 281 (Buckingham to Bacon; 2 December, 1617).
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the work of the household officers had been suspended: ’we do find what difficulties are 
made, and what time is lost, in disputing and devising upon the manner of doing that whereof 
the matter must be and is so fully r e s o l v e d . ’^ ? That verdict was extended to the entirety of 
administrative vested interests: ’Neither can we but see in this, as in a glass, the like event to 
follow in the rest upon the like reasons. For the inferior officers in every kind, who are best 
able for skill to propound the retrenchments, will out of interest or fearfulness make dainty to 
do service; and that which is done with an ill will will never be done.'^^
James ordered his councillors to nominate subcommissioners for 'the mechanic and 
labourious part of every business', but Bacon and Cranfield actually selected their fellow 
commissioners.29 Bacon forwarded Buckingham the 'the names (by his [Cranfield] advice 
and with mine own good allowance) of those which we wish his Majesty should select.'30 He 
cryptically added that he 'had respect somewhat to form, more to the avoiding of opposition, 
but most to the service’ in the choosing.3i They chose Exchequer auditors, junior household 
officers, and customs experts. The commissioners were to receive occasional directions from 
the council, but the instructions charged it with 'disputing' policy so 'fully resolved'.32 Faced 
with the household's calculated incapacity, the council had caved in. Earlier conciliar 
timidity had also plagued pensions.33 James, understandably, was unwilling to accept the 
onus for suspending pensions and expected his council to effect the savings, but Lake wrote 
on behalf of his colleagues that 'I feare there wilbe so much diversity of opinion as there will 
not be much don’.'34 Lake had already been scolded for putting the matter back in the royal 
lap and this too must have contributed to James support for the triumvirate. The instructions 
bluntly asserted it was 'too tedious' for the whole council and would only 'draw the business
27spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 280.
23spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 280.
2%pedding, Letters and Life. VI, 280.
36Spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 280,283 (Bacon to Buckingham; 6 December, 1617). 
31Spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 283.
32spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 280-281.
33Acts 1616-1617. 372 (17 November, 1617); PRO SP 14/123/79, fol. 109r ([October?], 1621). 
34Gardiner (ed.), Fortescue Papers. 33 (Lake to Buckingham; 21 November, 1617).
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itself into length', while sub-committees would 'impose that upon a few, which requireth to be 
carried indifferently as the act of you all.'35
The triumvirate’s gambit produced a sudden appearance of purposeful action.36 No 
longer pleading their own or the household's incapacity, the council reported the officers 
would soon 'present some modules of retrenchmentes of divers kindes, all ayminge at your 
Majestie's service.' For pensions, they had suspended some, reduced others by a third, and 
would press on until James was satisfied. They asserted their place in the process when 
discussing the wardrobe: 'although some doubt did arryse unto us, whether your Majestie's 
letter intended a stay of our laboures ... yet presuminge that such a course by sub-committee 
[commission] was purposed rather for a furtherance then lett to that worke, wee did resolve to 
goe on still'. 3? Bacon persuaded James to leave his councillors with this impression.38 It 
remained politically important for the commissioners to maintain a pretence of conciliar 
authority, 'without seeming they should have any immediate dépendance upon his Majesty, 
but merely upon the table.' James should reassure the council that the commission was to 
'give help and not hinderance ... and that he doth expect the propositions we [the council] 
have in hand, when they are finished,'39 But this was subterfuge; the commissioner's 
authority was 'to be kept in breast, and to come forth by parts', but come forth it did.40
Pohtics were at work here. Buckingham was James' favourite, but he had yet to 
extend his pre-eminence to policy and governance, something Somerset never achieved. 
James' councillors and office-holders were not of Buckingham's affinity. Cranfield held no 
major office; snobbery against ’so base a fellowe, who hath no manner of learning, nor
35spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 280.
36Acts 1616-1617.399-400 (5 December, 1617). They purported to have received the cormnission in the midst 
of 'the course wee had begunn for retrenchment'.
37Acts 1616-1617.399-400. 'In the meane time wee thought it our dutie to informe your Majestie... that neither 
your Majestie may conceave that wee have been negligent in those thinges, which were comitted unto us nor 
your direccions by your late letters hinder or cast backe that which is alreadie soe ferr procceeded in.' 
3%pedding, Letters and Lite. VI. 284.
39spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 284; Acts 1616-1617.401-402
“^ ^Spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 284. Bacon's sequence of revealing the commissioners' authority was first, to 
'employ the sub-commissioners in the reconsidering of those branches which the several officers shall 
propound.’ Then they were consider their own plans for retrenchment not offered, examine all debts and arrears 
in the offices, 'whereby the arrear past destroys the good husWndry and reformation to come', and, finally, move 
to consideration of improvements in the offices.
228
Lionel Cranfield and the Reformation of Crown Finance (1617-1624)
experience' held him back/i Bacon admitted retrenchment was properly outside his 
Chancery remit.42 Greville's influence was muted whhe Suffolk remained treasurer. Vested 
interests without obligation to Buckingham were represented in the council including Suffolk, 
Lord Admiral Nottingham, and leading household officers. Buckingham may have 
concluded the way to avoid his predecessor's fate was to secure his place as James' de facto 
chief minister.43 ft was not without thought that he pursued the lord admiralship, a premier 
office of state, or that the incumbent, Nottingham, was forced out by the cause of reform.'^ 
Reform presented—and was sustained by—the opportunity for Buckingham to people the 
council and offices with his creatures. Subcommissions composed of Bacon, Cranfield, and 
other reform-minded experts like Greville, John Coke, Richard Weston, and John 
Wolstenholme could bring dangerous and useful scrutiny to bear on the household, wardrobe, 
navy, and exchequer.
Household expenses were slashed in a cutting war between the commissioners and the 
officers, moderated, in the end, by the council.45 Cranfield's micromanagement of the 
wardrobe produced astonishing savings."^  ^ The navy commissioners rendered such an 
effective reform plan, they were appointed to administer it.^2 The Exchequer was picked 
apart for abuse and Suffolk paid the price for presiding over such corruption and 
incompetence.48 In no small measure because of this work, there were new faces among 
James' officeholders by 1620. Buckingham was lord admiral. Robert Naunton and George
41pRO SP 14/89/33, fol. 69r (18 November, 1616); SP 14/89/39, fol. 81r (23 November, 1616).
'^2speddmg. Letters and Life. VI. 277 (Bacon to Buckingham; 22 November, 1617).
'^^Bacon's long advises for Buckingham on being the king's favourite read as much like advice tor a chief 
minister. Spedding. Letters and Life. VI. 13-56, Also Lockyer, Buckingham. 29; Cogswell, Blessed 
Revolution. 64-66.
‘^ '^Peck. Court Patronage. 106-127.
45pRO SP 14/94/55-59 12/7/1617; SP 14/95/12, fol. 21r-22v (10 January, 1618); CKS U269/1.0W151 
[Cranfield Ms 4839 and 4840] (10 and 11 April, 1618 respectively); U269/1.OW150 [Cranfield Ms 4742] 
(undated); SP 14/103/64, fol. 102r-103v (2 November, 1618). Also, Tawnev. Business and Politics. 157-159; P. 
R. Seddon, Household Reforms in the Reign o f James I', Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research 53 
(1980), 47-49; Prestwich, Cranfield. 206-218.
^Seddon, 'Household Reforms', 50-52; Prestwich, Cranfield. 228-232; CKS U269/1.OW40 [Cranfield Ms 
6543] (undated).
47peck. Court Patronage. 106-127; CKS U269/1.0N8 [Cranfield Ms 6156] (undated); Young. Servilitv and 
Service. 40-92; BL Additional Ms 64876, fol. 69r-74v, 84r-85v, 96r-96v, 120r-121v.
^^Tawney, Business and Politics. 164-168.
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Calvert were new s e c r e t a r i e s .^ 9 Cranfield was sworn to the council and installed in the court 
of wards.59 His preferment was cemented by marriage to Anne Brett, despite originally 
spurning the favourite’s matchmaking.5i Bacon was elevated from lord keeper to chancellor. 
The household officers were s h u f f l e d .^2 Finally, the second treasury commission took the 
reins from Suffolk: Greville, Naunton, and Bacon, were joined by Archbishop Abbot, 
Caesar, Edward Coke and Cranfield (in 1619). The commissioners were acknowledged 
experts in finance or resolutely committed to reform, unlike their 1612 counterparts. Bacon 
summarized their early work: ’Mr Chancellor [Greville] imagines well; Coke seeks and beats 
over, as well where it [money] is not as where it is; Secretary Naunton forgets nothing. I will 
look to bow things to the true ends.'^3 When Bacon and the treasury commissioners 
successfully balanced the ordinary accounts with stringent management, James puckishly 
willed them 'to set it downe in wrighting, uppon the vouchees handes in the several places of 
abatements & increases, for our justification & theire charge hereafter, if it holde not.'54
Something of larger significance than a facelift for the council was occurring in these 
years. The venues for counsel and governance were passing into the hands of Buckingham 
and his clientage. The council declined into the principal organ of administration, becoming 
a more truly executive body. Real policymaking took place in a dynamic relationship 
between James, mcreasingly Prince Charles, Buckingham, and the changeable body of men 
making up the favourite’s 'privados' and 'creatures'.^^ In the years before 1625, Buckingham 
fashioned and refashioned the officers of state and household into 'men of business' for his 
own ends. At differing times Buckingham's instruments included Bacon, Cranfield, Greville, 
Naunton, Calvert, and, later, Secretary Conway, Lord Treasurer (later Lord President of the 
Council) Mandeville, and Weston at the E x c h e q u e r .5 6  This policy clientage remained fluid in
'^^Lockyer, Buckingham. 69; Schreiber, Robert Naunton. 68-84. Naunton's successor, Edward Conway, became 
Buckingham's workhorse on the council. Young, Servilitv and Service. 40-42.
50Tawney. Business and Politics. 174-183.
51 Lockyer, Buckingham. 71.
52pRO SP 14/94/81, fol. 149r-149v (26 December, 1617); SP 14/94/82, fol. 150r-151v (27 December, 1617). 
53Spedding, Letters and Life. VI, 320 (Bacon to Buckingham; 25 July, 1618).
54b L Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 302v (21 May, 1619); Tawney, Business and Politics. 168-173.
55cmt, Forced Loan. 24; Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 80.
5^For Buckingham's Caroline circle, see Cust, Forced Loan. 23-25. The existence, if  not significance, o f such 
an inner circle was briefly discussed in Michael Van Cleave Alexander, Charles I's Lord Treasurer: Sir Richard
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reflection of changing circumstances, not least when facing James’ authority or significant 
changes in policy as happened with the war-policy in 1623-1624.57 By then, the need to 
exert administrative authority for the war against Spain had resulted in more remarkable 
changes: Conway was unchallenged at secretary, Calvert marginalized (by 1625 replaced by 
Buckingham clients, Albertus Morton and John Coke successively), and Mandeville acted as 
more than a token lord president;^^ Cranfield was impeached and the white staff given to 
James Ley; and officers like Weston and Lord Keeper Williams kept their places by keeping 
their p e a c e . 5 9  The process which became policymaking by inner circle with Charles I and 
culminated in the charged rhetoric of excluded counsel in 1640 began with Buckingham, 
Cranfield, Bacon, and the cause of reform in 1617.^
Ill
Cranfield possessed a remarkably holistic conception of finance and the policies 
which he believed were essential to addressing its Jacobean deficiencies. In themselves they 
are a counterpoint to the project mentality despite the fact that, like Salisbmy, he (unhappily) 
employed projects throughout his treasurership.^^ On closer scrutiny Cranfield’s conception 
of himself as an adviser-minister sought to reconcile the demands of serving his king and the 
state within the patronage culture. In 1617, reform moved outside the council’s authority 
because it would never have succeeded otherwise. The Jacobean state was riven by the 
contradictions inherent to personal, monarchical government, the presence of an alter rex, 
administrative office-holding in a patronage culture, and the responsibility of governing for 
the common weal, for the state as an entity in its own right.^2 That James’ resolved policy 
could only be effected outside his council and administration is an indictment of the state.
Weston. Earl o f Portland (1577-1635) (Chapel Hill, 1975), 47. G. E. Aylmer, The King’s Servants: The Civil 
Service of Charles 1 .1625-1642 (London, 1961), 19 and 61 is contradictory on this question. Also Willson, 
James VI and 1.394-398.
37por instance, Calvert and Lord Keeper Williams were largely James' choices over the candidates preferred by 
Buckingham. Lockyer, Buckingham. 69-70.
5®Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 80-83, 88-89,
^^Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 270-273.
^®L. J. Reeve. Charles 1 and the Road to Personal Rule (Cambridge. 1989), 198-199; Donald, Uncounselled 
King. 1-42; Cust, Forced Loan. 31-32,39; Aylmer, King's Servants. 62.
^Ipor instance, CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7489,4488,6775].
^^Quentin Skinner, The foundations of modem political thought ftwo volumes; Cambridge, 1978), II, 349-358
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Cranfield understood there was no distinction between matters of policy and administration; 
they were united as issues of politics and p a t r o n a g e . ^ 3  Professional civil services, with their 
cultures of administrative professionalism, bureaucratic objectivity, and government service- 
though imperfectly realized ideals—emerged in developing states from the necessity to 
provide more effective government by separating politics and patronage from 
administration. '^^ Cranfield attempted to refashion fiscal policy to meet the competing 
requirements of state and crown. His defeat embodied the failure of the Jacobean state to 
shed its early-modern skin,
Cranfield and Ellesmere maintained mismanagement was the plague of James* fiscal 
house.^5 By 1620, Cranfield believed only proper management offered a lasting solution, 
despite strides in retrenchment and concern for trade becoming commonplace in fiscal 
thought, Well-ordered finances were the grounds out of which revenues grew and the 
crown prospered, Cranfield sought to replace the whole culture of fiscal policy and 
administrative weakness between 1619 and 1624, putting himself forward as the instrument 
of rehabilitation. Cranfield’s assessments of James’ estate scathingly attacked current 
policymaking and administration, addressing James with an honesty he r e s p e c t e d . ^ 7  
Defalcations (administrative charges), anticipations (advances on the revenue), and interest 
were the cankers.^  ^ The bane of James’ estate were his bounty and ’the unfaithfullnes & 
ignorances of his mynisters’—Cranfield sounding much like Caesar and Salisbury in 1611.^  ^
Cranfield believed only he was capable of employing the necessary policies to cure James’ 
consumption through never-ending debt: 'ffor the satisfying of w[hi]ch som neither the lords 
of his Majjesjtes councell in générale nor the comissioners for the thresury in p[ar]ticular can 
offer any means, but to conclude in their wordes do saye it is neither their p[ar]t nor in their
^^spedding, Letters and Life. VI. 283-284; Aylmer, King's Servants. 9-12.
^Aylmer, King's Servants. 12.
5^c KS U269/1.0o88 [Cranfield Ms 4074] ([c. August, 1614]); also the discussion in Tawney, Business and 
Politics. 142-151,196-204.
^CKS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 6774] (November, 1619).
67fh6y am CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6773 and 6770] (1620 and 1621) respectively; PRO SP 
14/164/53, fol. 92r-93v (5 May, 1624); also Willson, James VI and 1.427-428.
63c KS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 6770].
69c KS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6773]; BL Lansdowne Ms 165, fol. 138r-138v; Croft (ed.), 'Several 
Speeches', 314-317.
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power to creatt materials but faithfully to dispurse them’jo Sufficient revenue existed to 
support James if it was properly managed: 'To improve his Ma[jes]ties revennewe by 
reformacon ... wilbe honorable, iuste, and exceeding profitable.... ffor all men well affected to 
there king and contrie greeve the king should be deceaved of his owne, and be therby 
constrained for support of his royall estate to make supplye uppon his subiectes by p[ro]iectes 
&c.'2i Cranfield was blunt about alternatives: 'All meanes to helpe yo[u]r Ma[jes]tie are 
exhawsted, uncertayn, or a work of tyme.’^  ^ Cranfield had defended James' bounty in 1614, 
but now argued the 'king must be releeved by holding his hand for a tyme', and 'by imploying 
faithfiill and understanding mynisters.’ Criticism was extended to James: 'And so the care of 
that is left upon the king w[hi]ch is w[i]th a generate vote concluded to be impossable.'
Cranfield's sense of failed policy is illuminated by his proposals. James must restrain 
bounty for a year and maintain it checked thereafter according to Cranfield's criteria.23 Akin 
to Salisbmy, he believed bounty must come from within existing revenues: patronage should 
not constitute a licence to extort monies from the p o p u l a c e . 2 4  Bounty was best derived from 
fines of offices, felon's goods, and other casualties. Pensions must be pruned by disallowing 
exchanges and preventing renewals by James, while the creation of new offices was to 
cease.25 Finally, in a change from 1614, Cranfield supported new 'proiectes' w[hi]ch 
w[i]thowt grevance to the subiecte & losse or impayring his Majjesjtes revenew allredy 
settled maye rayse monye.' He was not averse to projects that worked principally to James' 
benefit, but detested those which served private gain, 'I doe generally mislike the using of the 
king's name and power to serve a private mans tume', he wrote.^^ Cranfield truly meant to 
enforce Salisbuiy's book of bounty which had been re-issued in 1619.2?
7«CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6773].
71CKSU269/1.00188 [CranfieldMs4074].
22c k S U269/LOE1528 [Cranfield Ms 6773].
73c KS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 6770].
24c k S U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770].
25c KS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 6770]; also Prestwich, Cranfield. 341-342.
7^CKS U269/1.0E1528 [uncatalogued note] (26 Februaiy, 1623[1624]).
27pRO SP 14/97/19, fol. (14 April, 1618; commission for suits). Additional Ms 10038, fol. 2r-3v (16 April, 
1618; Caesar's copy o f the commission), SP 14/97/20, fol. 33r-37r ([April], 1618; King's declaration of limiting 
grants and memorial o f suits grantable), and A DECLARATION OF HIS MAJESTIES Royall pleasure, in what 
sort He thinketh fir to enlarge, or reserve Himselfe in matter of bountie (London. 1619) [STC 9240.3 and 
9240.5].
233
Lionel Cranfield and the Reformation of Crown Finance (1617-1624)
Restrained bounty was hardly an innovation, but Bacon, in pushing James to replace 
the treasury commissioners with a strong lone voice, argued that a faithfiill treasurer would 
'stop suites, put back pencons, check allowances, question mérités ... in short to be a skreene 
to your Ma[jes]tie in thinges of this nature, such as was the L[or]d Burleighe for many 
yeares'.28 Cranfield intended to assume a monopoly of that power so that 'uppon the first 
proposing I maye be made acquainted w[i]th them to see how they will stande w[i]th his 
Majjesjtes purse, whether they be fitt to goe on & how farre', with freedom to challenge 
propositions before they became 'resolutions'.^^ Cranfield explained that by 'this meanes all 
opposing & contestations wdbe avoyded ... before resolution & declaration ... [and] his 
Ma[jesjte shall not be deceived nor any man the nearer his suite by misinformations to the 
king & gayning his signature surreptitiously.'®® This marks a point of departme with 
Salisbury. Cranfield was willing to take the onus upon himself, in reality demanding that the 
authority be ceded to him, while Salisbury had sought to spread responsibility among 
commissioners and councillors. Cranfield believed that it was politically impossible within 
the patronage culture for James or his ministers to vet suits. Only Cranfield had the courage— 
stupidity?—and support of the king sufficient for the task.
James' determination to have the council handle pensions in 1617 and the necessity of 
pursuing retrenchment outside established administration must have decisively influenced 
Cranfield's thinking.®  ^ James' councillors would not bear the political envy and Cranfield 
was jaded about their effectiveness had they been willing.®  ^ Mismanagement, poor 
government, and hollow promises had undermined the authority of James and his ministers: 
'The Kinges speeches & promises are not vallewed as is fitting for want of performances. 
The pryvy councells resolutions & orders not respected bycawse alltered upon privât 
informations & extraordinary directions from Cort.'®3 Tricks of denial would no longer 
suffice. The whole culture of Jacobean government had to change. Cranfield called upon
2®BL Harieian Ms 3787, fol. I61v.
29c KS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 6770].
®®CKS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs 6770].
®^Peck. Court Patronage. 211.
®2b L Harieian Ms 3787, fol. 161v.
®3c K SU 269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs6774] ([c. November, 1619]).
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James and his ministers to discharge their responsibility for the welfare of the state with 
policies to repair its dangerous fiscal condition: ’his Majjesjtie & the Lords to be pleased to 
consider the necessity of defraying his Ma[ies]tes owne chardg at home as well for his honor 
as saffety of his kingdome.’®^ He was challenging James and his servants to become the 
state’s servants.
Cranfield stmck at the patronage culture that he believed subordinated the state’s 
welfare and good government to political considerations. For the well-being of the state, the 
king must preserve 'his own settled revenew aswell by restrayning his bountye as by the 
frugale & trusty disposing & yssuing'.®  ^ He charged that 'to move the king to give now is 
to move the king to mack him selff miserable for the presant & to kepe him soe.' 
Condemning those who 'move the king' was an indictment of patronage in its entirety, not 
simply suitors, but their pations and means of influence. Cranfield drove the point home 
when he offered a project that all beneficiaries of James' bounty since his accession should by 
'waye of thankfulness' give James the value of their grants for one year to pay his debts.®® 
Cranfield's assumption of the king's final authority over suits would further the cultural 
change (and provide practical benefits): w[hi]ch besides the preserving his Majjesjtes state, 
will give him great ease, ffor when suitors fynd what they suggest to the king must be 
examyned, they will not troble the king so often as they do,’ Echoing Salisbury before him, 
Cranfield lectured James on the need for a new outlook: ’By this tyme yo[ujr Majjesjtie 
maye iudge me to be of the disposition of the schoolmen who bee no schoUer, who 
propound[sj such questions as they are not able to answer. My intendment is to deale closely 
w[ijth yo[ujr Majjesjtie by shewing yow the tmthe of yo[ujr estate, that beinge lefte to yo[ujr 
selffe yow maye tacke care of yo[ujr selffe & not by pyteing and releeving other mens 
necessity es bring yo[ujr selffe into extremety.’®^
The royal extremity spawned by the patronage culture created political problems in 
parliament. It made the 'subiectes to forbeare to releeve those necessetyes w[hijch [Jamesj
®4c KS U269/1.0E1528 [CranfieldMs6770].
®5c KS U269/LOE1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770]. Emphasis mine.
®®CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770]. This project was not simply rhetorical, but taken seriously. For 
instance, PRO SP 14/133/59, fol. 121r-12Iv (26 October, 1622).
®?CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6773].
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him selffe voluntarely cawseth.'®® The lesson of 1614 needed repeating: 'they will not 
beleave he wantes himsellfe that gives to supply other wantes, naye they will saye (untill he 
hold his hand from giving) that whatsoever they shall give is neitha" to supply his Majjesjties 
actions forreyn nor domestick, but to give away.’®^ An unreformed fiscal system left the 
state in a 'fever hecticke' (James’ words) and was the single gi eatest obstacle to securing 
parliamentary supply.^® Cranfield's conception was a continuation of the program he and 
Ellesmere constructed in 1615.®i Cranfield's first address to parliament (November 1621) 
requesting supply as lord treasurer betrayed how, three years after retrenchment, the case for 
funding reformed government remained u n f u l f i l l e d ,  ^ 2 Cranfield candidly admitted James' 
misfortune with his ministers and 'exceeding bountye', but countered these by reminding 
parliament of expenses for the Palatinate which the king had supplied himself and the lack of 
subsidies in comparison to his predecessors.®® Further he reminded members of recent 
reforms in justice-'we have had a greate Example in the Deposition of the Lord Chancellor"- 
-and the 35 patents and monopolies 'which have ben damned by the King and no Monopolies 
since that presented and no proiect but only one.'®"^  But Cranfield's pleading for the house to 
carry themselves 'so as that the King may be in love with Parliaments' and calls for faith in 
James' intentions are indicative of his weak hand.®5 By 1621, the parliamentary world that he 
and Ellesmere understood in 1615 was also changing. Supply was no longer a simple 
question of fiscal policy and James' necessity. Foreign policy and its volatile religious 
implications were becoming the cause célèbre of parliamentary politics.
Nothing Cranfield avowed for reforming the king's estate could have been particularly 
popular, but James preferred him immediately when lord treasurer Mandeville was cut loose 
before the fall session of parliament in 1621.®® While Cranfield's ambitions had set the
®®CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770].
®®CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770].
®®HHL Ellesmere Ms 2610.
®lCKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 2330], U 269/1.0ol88 [Cranfield Ms 4074] and HHL Ellesmere Ms 
2610.
®2pRO S P  14/123/122, fo l. 179v (24 November, 1621).
®®Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 428 (21 November, 1621).
®‘^ Notestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.), Debates 1621. IV, 429 and Debates 1621. Ill, 425 respectively.
®%otestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. IH, 424-425.
®®Mandeville was appointed ahead of Cranfield in 1619. Tongues wagged that Mandeville was willing to 
purchase the office and his departure from the chief justiceship would allow a double harvest when the attorney
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paiiiamentary hounds after Mandeville--and Bacon—his support, for dealing with monopolists 
and projectors had been a vote-winner in the first session.®^ When it became apparent more 
was needed than the two subsidies already voted, a reforming treasurer had many more 
attractions than one who was seen as a projector's friend.®® Yet the relationship between 
Cranfield, Buckingham, and James must not be overlooked. ®® There is every indication that 
James appointed Cranfield because he liked, trusted, and respected his forthrightness, 
something which the king had also favoured in Cranfield’s patron, Ellesmere.^ ®® Cranfield's 
devotion to James was indisputable. Thomas Wilson, attuned to the prevailing winds, 
recognized the support for Cranfield: 'you have made knowne to ye world both your owne 
ability es and the good services that you have done his MaQesjIy ... a stepp to yo[u]r other 
worthyer preferm[en]ts.'i®i Cranfield personally sent the bill for his treasurership 
appointment to James for signing. Buckingham hoped he would 'as well deserve that title 
hereafter as you have alreadie this which our master hath sined.'i®  ^ When Cranfield feared 
the wrath of vested interests in 1618, Buckingham reassured that 'I will have so great care of 
you that you shaft not count your labour & indeavo[ur]s in so good courses ill imployed. And 
for the Lo[rd] of whome you write I ... have allreadie fixed you so fane in his Majjesjtes
and solicitor generals moved up. PRO SP 14/111/16, fol. 25v. Lockyer concludes that Buckingham probably 
brokered a deal with Mandeville for the treasurership at the rate of £20,000. Lockyer, Buckingham. 67-68. 
Snobbery played a part; Cranfield had been of the privy council for only 18 months when Mandeville was 
appointed. Anthony Weldon found time to vilify Cranfield as brutally as James: '"A creature of Northampton's- 
-his honour he raked out of the channel; that he was nothing but a pack o f ignorance soldered together with 
impudence—a fellow of so mean condition that none but a poor-spirited nobility could have endured his 
perching upon that high tree o f nobility, to the dishonour o f the nobility.'" Godfrey Goodman, The Court of 
King James the First (2 volumes; London, 1839), 1,297
®7pRO SP 14/119/90, fol. 151r-152v (10 February, 1621) and SP 14/119/123, fol. 250r-251v (27 February, 
1621).
®®Prestwich, Cranfield. 323-326; CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770].
®®Cranfield would seem to have had a lashing tongue that probably appealed to the king's own wicked sense of 
humour. Locke described one altercation between Cranfield and Lord Digby: 'there passed verie disgracefull 
wordes betwixt the[m] as marchant & insolent man on the one side, on th'other 3rd sonne o f a yunger brother & 
a branch of a race tainted w[i]th treason'. PRO SP 14/128/9, fol. 9r-9v (2 March, 1622). 
l®®Knafia, Law and Politics. 61.
1®1CKS U269/1.0L35 [Cranfield Ms 279] (14 January, 1620). Also the praise in U269/1.OE108 [Cranfield Ms 
169] (23 February, 1619); U269/LON1 [CranfieldMs 1] (Buckingham to Cranfield; 25 October, 1618) and 
U269/1.OE108 [Cranfield Ms 167] (Buckingham to Cranfield; 10 December, 1618).
1®2c K SU 269/1.OE108 [CranfieldMs6856] (4 July, 1621);CKSU296/1.OE108 [CranfieldMs 174] (15 
August, 1619).
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good opinion that... you should not have anie cause to feare his Lo[rdshi]ps displeasure how 
much soever he should threaten against you.’^ ®®
Cranfield was exorcised to surprising honesty and candour by the support of king and 
favourite. Condemning the fitness of ships guarding against channel piracy, he wrote 
Buckingham, 'I have made bolde according to my accustomed ifeedome with yo[u]r 
Lo[rdship] for the kings service, to deliver mine opinion cleerlie & at large'.i®  ^ A draft letter 
for Buckingham, reporting on Cranfield and Weston's work with their project to improve 
forests and wastes reflected the same principle, i®^  It was undertaken for the king’s 'owne 
imediate use & service aswell for increase of his Majjesjtes yeerlie revenue as for raysing 
some money es'. Encroachments were discovered in the process which spawned suitors 
clamouring for the right to compound with the offenders. Cranfield was livid that they 
laboured 'to bring forth some fruit for the supply of his Majjesjtes manifold occasions' to 
have grants made 'against our wills, to serve private mens turnes to his Majjesjtes preiudice 
& disadvantage.' His pointed conclusion was tetchy: it would have been better never to have 
embarked on the project, 'then that the same should be diverted to any other course, then the 
advancement of the publique releme.'
Cranfield defined himself with these businesses of ships and woods. He fully 
believed in the royal mandate with which the treasurership seemingly endowed him. Henry 
Fane informed Cranfield that Buckingham had taken notice of the labours and believed 
James' estate 'wuld not prosper in any mans hand but your Lo[rdshipjs'.i®® Hitherto, James 
had succoured others, but 'now the tables must bee burned and hee muste make muche of his 
owne' while Buckingham 'laboured to hold the kinge in that way to ye uttermost of his 
power'. i®7 Cranfield considered himself the king's servant acting for the welfare of the state. 
When the patronage culture and the state's welfare conflicted, Cranfield believed the public 
good should be accommodated first. Salus populi suprema lex esto was James' standard for 
himself and Cranfield intended to hold James and his affinity to its application in fiscal
^®®CKS U269/1.OE108 [CranfieldMs 167] (10 December, 1618); also Lockver.Buckingham.74. 
^®%L Harieian Ms 1581, fol. 87v (4 September, 1621).
1®®CKS U269/1.OE1059 [CranfieldMs 305] ([30October, 1622]).
1®6c k s  U269/1.0E256 [CranfieldMs2415] (1 9 October, 1621).
1®2c KS U269/1.0E256 [CranfieldMs 2415].
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policy. Cranfield’s mistakes as treasurer were first to believe he had won the argument with 
Buckingham and James, then to underestimate his ability to defeat the favourite and sway the 
king when it became clear he had not, and finally to ignore the contradiction of advancing 
within—and profiting by—the culture of patronage at the same time he pursued the cause of 
the commonweal against it.
IV
Precedent and history increasingly became fiscal guides for James’ ministers and 
Cranfield-the base merchant, ironically-fully encapsulates that intellectual approach. 
Cranfield was deeply interested in his predecessors' pohcies, for which he made full use of 
the king’s papers and Robert Cotton's library. Thomas Wilson sent him precedents for 
retrenchment and manuscripts on Ireland, including a book of reforms once dedicated to 
Burghley.i®® When Wilson 'perceaved that your Lo[rdshi]p was not willing to meddle with 
such newe proiectes’, he sent details of revenue-raising since William the Conqueror, a work- 
in-progress Cranfield never voluntarily returned. Despite triggering his removal, Cranfield 
employed policies and projects discussed with Mandeville and borrowed his treasury 
notebook. 11® Henry VII and Elizabeth were particular models, m  Cranfield received a 
critical analysis of Henry VII’s policies based on Bacon's life of the king. 112 Its attention to 
grants of the subject, trade, and profits of regalities reflected Jacobean norms as much as 
Henry's real or supposed policies.n® Yet Cranfield would have empathized with the defense 
of Henry's rapacity as the product of 'having ev[er]y day occasion to take notice of the 
necessities and shiftes for money es of other great princes abroad', the better to enjoy the
1®8CKS U269/l.Hi257 [CranfieldMs 8758] andU269/1.0E789 [CranfieldMs 9460].
1®®CKS U269/1.0E789 [Cranfield Ms 2320 and 9460]. The portion which Cranfield retained may be 
U269/1.0E1375 [CranfieldMs 6906], an undated book of precedents from Henry VII to Elizabeth of loans, 
subsidies, and other levies, part of wWch is clearly in Wilson's hand.
ll®PRO SP 14/123/79, fol. 109r-109v; CKS U269/1.0E1373 [Cranfield Ms 6894]. Mandeville certainly made 
an effort both for managing the revenues and in preparation for parliament. He borrowed Cotton's parliamentary 
notebooks of Edward I, Edward HI, and James and the book of projects originally compiled for Northampton. 
BL Harieian Ms 6018, fol. 148r.
rtl Manuscripts o f Henry VIFs policies and practices were especially common among the papers of Caesar and 
Salisbury. For instance BL Lansdowne Ms 127; Lansdowne Ms 123, fol. 72r; Lansdowne Ms 168, fol. 21 Ir- 
214v
112cKS U269/1.0E1482 [Cranfield Ms 6902] (undated). Part of the manuscript is in Thomas Wilson's hand. 
11®CKS U269/1.0E1482 [CranfieldMs 6902].
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'felicity of full coffers ... spending more upon his owne state and memory then upon the 
deserts of others.'
Elizabethan accounts were regarded as the most efficacious balancing of expenditures 
and revenues and Cranfield—like Caesar and Salisbury had—intended to compare them with 
.lames', 'by w[hi]ch cowrse the differens being found it maye bee tacken into consideracon 
what is fitt to bee continewed and what to bee retrenched... [and] discover the abuses of tyme 
paste and wyll give a good satisfaction to all well affected that his Ma[jes]ties debtes have not 
growen by his bounty only', but by the misgovemance of his previous ministers. ^ 4 Cranfield 
was experienced with such methods, having received on loan from Cotton 'Dudley’s book of 
accomptes to Hen[ry] the Seventh'. Coupled with an abstract of Tudor household expenses 
through Mary, Cranfield was armed with history-as-policy when he confronted the household 
officers and settled an affordable establishment in 1617-1618.^1® With the practical 
information provided by weekly accounts and annual assessments, Cranfield was the best 
informed mind at the treasury in a decade,
Cranfield began his treasurership much as he had outlined it.n® Among his frequent 
remembrances, one dictated to John Osborne samples this early work.n® He had a book 
made of all yearly payments in England and Ireland with a view to suspending as many as 
possible with necessity as his working criteria. Cranfield hoped to force James' creditors to 
discharge his debts against the gifts they had received from the king. Savings fi*om 
suspended payments were to be applied to debts and Cranfield wanted it known 'how it shall 
be vayne for them to sue' until their was money to pay them. He intended to tighten the 
projects underway for disafforestation, wastes, concealments, and copyholds. James' minor 
servants were to be put on notice that they would be replaced if found ethically wanting. 
Anyone with responsibility for casual revenues was to be 'warned to remember the kinges
114CKS U269/1.0EI 140 [Cranfield Ms 541] (2 May, 1622).CKS U269/LOE1528 [Cranfield Ms 4488] 
(undated). The end of the memorandum is worn, but the fragments indicate he concluded by condemning prior 
mismanagement; this would be in keeping with his parliamentary speech in November 1621 and his oft-repeated 
criticisms o f this sort (U269/1.0el528 [Cranfield Ms 6773]).
115b l  Harieian Ms 6018, fol. 150r.
11®CKS U269/1.0W38 [CranfieldMs4721] (1617).
U269/1.0E1426 [Cranfield Ms various] (September 1621 to March 1624).
^1®CKS U269/1.0E1429 [Cranfield Ms 6776]. Cranfield took the usual full survey of James' estate.
119CKS U269/1.OE540 [CranfieldMs 7503] (11 October, 1621).
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necessityes% He answered with deeds the many words on Irish reform and shared initiatives 
between England and I r e l a n d .  120 Cranfield was beginning where he meant to end: 
efficiency, accountability, and serving the state. In December 1621, Buckingham relayed 
James’ great praise for his initial work, holding ’it for a great mysterie that whereas at 
Hampton Court there was talking of pawning iewells only for his remove, now w[i]thout any 
such shift he is removed & his servants payed & yet money rem ayning.'i^i
Reform was naturally his métier. Cranfield's sympathy for James' long-suffering and 
unpaid officers was lukewarm and became a convenient source of savings. The lot of 
ambassadors and diplomats became worse when Cranfield and the council resolved on 
cutting or eliminating allowances for intelligence, travel, and per d i e m s .  1^ 2  one point, 
Cranfield departed Westminster to survey newly-purchased property in Sussex, leaving 
Robert Pye with signed warrants for ambassadorial payments, but orders not to process them 
or any other payments until his r e t u r n .  1^ 3 Borrowing a tactic from Salisbury's commission 
for suits, Cranfield persuaded James to issue a proclamation against composing and 
presenting ready-made suits and bills to the king.i^^ There 'ensueth a continuall vexation to 
his Majestie, and many times exceeding danger and prejudice both in his revenue’ which must 
be checked by reducing the process to its ’ancient order and institution'. Those presuming to 
'intermeddle with the drawing, writing, or preparing for his Majesties Signature, of any Bill, 
Warrant, Letter, or other instrument’ would face James’ 'indignation and displeasure and such 
imprisonment and other punishment as may justly be inflicted for their contempt'. The same 
applied to those who would intercede for others with such bills. James' servants who dared 
draw a bill without proper warrant would be suspended for ’their default and abuse.' A 
central proposal of Cranfield’s was given royal voice and taken s e r i o u s l y .  ^ 25 Lord Keeper
120c k S U269/1.OE108 [Cranfield Ms 2459]; U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 8222]; CKS U269/1.0E1528 
[unnumbered Cranfield Ms; one folio of remembrances in Cranfield's hand]; PRO SP 14/123/79, fol. 109r-l lOv; 
Prestwick, Cranfield. 348-356. For shared policies between England and Ireland, U269/1.Hi28 [Cranfield Ms 
7521]; U269/l.Hi209 [Cranfield Ms 8128]; U269/l.Hi210 [CranfieldMs 8544]; U269/1.OE1059 [CranfieldMs 
872] (11 October, 1622).
121 CKS U269/1.OE108 [Cranfield Ms 2459] (7 December, 1621).
122pRO SP 14/131/54, fol. 71r-72v (22 June, 1622).
123CKS U269/1.0E455 [Cranfield Ms 17] (13 August, [1622?]).
I24jjiriaxi and Hughes (eds.), Proclamations: James 1. 524-525 (7 October, 1621).
125c k S U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770].
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Williams wrote in panicky fashion to Buckingham’s secretary for clarification: did it include 
himself, Cranfield, the judges, and the c o u n c i l ? ^26 The proclamation's language remained in 
place, but the practical effects for the ’eminent’ was probably m i n i m a l ,  ^27  Coupled with his 
demand that nothing pass which concerned James’ revenue before he had vetted it, the lord 
treasurer was putting in place the process to stem the silver stream of James’ bounty.
Regardless, Cranfield always remained an imperfect clearinghouse for suits and his 
best intentions needed more than administrative channels. They requiied the active support 
of James and Buckingham. They must refrain from pressing a suit which was not appropriate 
and accept a refusal from Cranfield if they persisted. Only then would othens follow their 
lead. Cranfield had some success, but practice failed to live up to his i d e a l .  ^28 hectored 
Buckingham within weeks of the proclamation when word reached him that James was about 
to grant a pension. ^ 29 How could he perform the services expected of him against royal back­
sliding; he relied upon Buckingham's friendship to dissuade the king.i^o Such object lessons 
abound. Questions of bounty forwarded by James preoccupied a letter of Cranfield's to 
Conway, With sugared words, he stonewalled on a grant to Lord Carlisle, but pledged Janies' 
direction would be ’preferred to the full' as sensitivity to circumstances allowed, Yet, he 
was forced to accept a pension for Carlisle, a form of reward in complete opposition to 
Cranfield's principles. 122 Cranfield's approval of a knighthood for Carlisle's son is revealing. 
James’ 'losse by it is but casuall' which accorded with Cranfield's thinking, yet he wished 'it 
might be donne as privately as may be & his Ma[jes]tie to be sparing in the like grace to 
others’; he dreaded it becoming a precedent. 1^ 3 Even where bounty fit into Cranfield's 
prescription he wanted it limited, discouragement meeting ever-present clamouring suitors.
l26(3aiUmer (ed.), Fortescue Papers. 161 (17 October, 1621).
127pRo SP 14/133/41, fol, 95r-95v.
 ^28xawney, Business and Politics. 213-220.
129qKS U269/1.ZZ21 (transcript of Cranfield to Buckingham; 21 October, 1621). This letter is in the form of a 
modern transcript preserved in the collection of Cranfield's papers at CKS. No citation o f its source was given, 
but it contents are sufficiently m keeping with similar letters to appear reliable.
13%269/1.ZZ21.
121pR0 SP 14/139/52, fol. 70r (7 March, 1623).
^22pRo SP 14/140/38, fol. 66r-67v (26 March, 1623). Carlisle was to receive the residue of the deceased 
Nottingham's pension with an additional £316 added to it to make up an even £2000.
133pRO SP 14/139/52, fbl. 70r.
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Cranfield was a provocative figure to the vested interests of the patronage culture. 
While on embassy to Brussels, Weston tried to soothe Cranfield's distemper over tensions at 
home: 'I have now told yowr Lor[dship] our difficulty es abroad; I wold yow could tell me 
there were none at home. I am still of my old minde, that yow have wisedom, yow have 
powei', and purposes strong enough (there cann want but constancy and unity of minds) to 
overcome the worst accidents that cann happen heer or theare’.^ ^^  Cranfield's ego agreed 
with Weston's assessment of his strength. From that resolve, he was not aficaid to confront 
either Buckingham or .Tames. He blocked a grant for Christopher Villiers, 'being restrained 
therein to lands improved, which must be supplied by the disafforestacons in hande, it cannot 
be the worke of a dale or weeke.’i35 Robert Naunton's 'severance' became an issue. Was he 
to receive a £ 1 0 0 0  pension (marketable at £ 5 0 0 0  or five years purchase), £ 5 0 0  of improved 
lands (worth £ 7 5 0 0  at the going rate), or, the most recent overture for £ 5 0 0  in old fee-farm 
lands (worth forty years purchase or £20,000)?i36 Whether the last offer 'may stande with his 
Ma[jes]ties service' Cranfield left to James' decision. James ordered that Naunton should 
receive the pension until £ 5 0 0  of improved lands were a v a i la b le ,  Buckingham may 
actually have settled the issue while negotiating the Spanish match, having received word 
fi*om Conway of Cranfield's intransigence two months before James' o r d e r .
As Salisbury had, Cranfield resolved that casual fines would be the chief stream of 
bounty, thereby protecting ordinary r e v e n u e s . ^ 3 9  Cranfield helped ensure that his clients 
obtained the farm of the greenwax monies, but James had signed petitions for numerous fines 
and recognizances out of them. He seems to have been desperate to find legal loophole to 
void the grants, asking Attorney General Coventry to peruse the patents, hear the farmers’ 
representative, and then consult with the Exchequer barons. Cranfield was both defending 
his fifends' interests and up-ending suits of 'the cheif thinges set apart for his Ma[jes]ties 
bounty' which he had not approved. Legally voiding a block of James' grants was delicate
13^CKS U269/1.0E778 [Cranfield Ms 2426] (May, 1622).
135pRo SP 14/139/52, fol. 70r. This puts a new perspective on the goals o f die disafforestation project; they 
included the king's bounty.
136pRo SP 14/139/52, fol. 70v.
137pRO SP 14/146/74, fol. 87r-87v (13 June, 1623).
138pRo SP 14/142/67, fol. 129r~130v (12 April, 1623).
13^CKS U269/1.OE1096 [Cranfield Ms 599] (20 November, 1622).
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work and Coventry was to report his and the barons’ resolutions to Cranfield before 
acquainting anyone, including the farmers. Cranfield's efforts with James' bounty very soon 
became the studied practice of just this sort of obstruction and legal wrangling. David 
Murray and James Fullerton were 'instant' with Cranfield about a pension for Thomas 
Murray’s wife and son ( £ 5 0 0 ) ,  after 'pressing his Ma[jes]tes pleasure for d i s p a t c h . ’i^ o  
Cranfield refused it, arguing that Murray was Prince Charles’ servant and only Charles had a 
right to press the king to dispense bounty on his son’s behalf. Charles was conveniently in 
Spain with Buckingham. It is unlikely the suitors went away 'willingly contented to expect 
his Highnes retorne' as Cranfield claimed.
What did Cranfield, now earl of Middlesex, have to show for his labours by 1623? 
Very little by his own a s s e s s m e n t s ,  Middlesex engineered few successes in checking 
expenditure. He largely kept the offices of state and household within their ordinary budgets. 
Accounts of spending by the cofferer are contradictory, indicating at one point reductions 
from £48,000 (1619) to £26,300 (1 6 2 2 );i^2 at the least Middlesex kept that department of 
household under control. The same was true of the long-running sink-holes of the wardrobe, 
works, and chamber while Ireland progressively began to pay for i t s e l f .  Too often, 
however, these accomplishments simply masked failures in planned retrenchments and 
cloaked costs charged as extraordinaries.Middlesex had hoped to save annually £20,000 
in the wardrobe, chamber, and Ireland. The growing costs of foreign policy played havoc 
with budgets in the navy, ordnance, ambassadors, and intelligence allowances, accounting for 
at least £120,000 in extraordinaries. Some of these were beyond Middlesex's grasp, but he 
failed spectacularly with his favoured targets of wasteful expenditure and bounty. By 1622, 
consumption of wines and fruits reached gluttonous proportions against the standards of 1619 
(£4304 versus £8 9 8 9 ). The jewel house and presents skyrocketed from a budget of £5000
l^OpRO SP 14/143/60, fol. 86v (24 April, 1623).
1‘^ ^The ensuiog discussion is drawn from four accounts covering 1619 and 1621-1622. CKS U269/1.0E1528 
[Cranfield Ms 7906-7908] and U269/1.OE1430 [Cranfield Ms 6775].
142CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7906 versus 7907 and 7908].
143c KS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7906-7908].
144c k S U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7908] and U269/1.OE1430 [Cranfield Ms 6775].
145c k s  U269/1.OE1430 [Cranfield Ms 6775].
146c k S U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7906].
147c k S U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7906 and 7908].
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to actual charges in excess of £2 4 ,0 0 0 ; hoped-for savings of £1000 seem silly by 
c o m p a r i s o n .  1 4 9  Finally, pensions, fees, annuities, and rewards were again climbing to 
worrisome levels, from £62,895 (1619) to £73,839 (1622), ominously at the same time 
Middlesex hoped to pare them by £22,000.1^® It was the familiar stoiy of short-term 
financing of ever-increasing expenditures, i
Middlesex never accepted that he was asking too much of the Jacobean patronage 
culture, particularly with the added wrinkles of an alter rex. In the suit of Captain 
Penyngton, Middlesex confessed 'it [is] iust and honor[a]ble for his Mafjesjtie to reward the 
petio[n]ers faithfull service, to the incouragem[en]t of men of his meritt and profession; yet I 
doe not hold this request fitt for him to have, nor his Magesjtie to graunt; the same being 
directly within one of the prohibited braunches of the Booke of Bounty’.i^  ^ Middlesex was 
thus exacting and prickly, defending his axiom to 'stand against all guiftes otherwise all 
undon[e]’, but he could not indefinitely oppose the resolution of James or B u c k i n g h a m . ^^3 
Yet Middlesex's downfall was not caused by questions of bounty, even if his provocative 
stances ensured no one stood with him in the end. His relationship with Buckingham 
collapsed while the favourite was in Spain, but only when Middlesex conspired with James to 
wreck the parliament of 1624 did Buckingham and Charles cast him to his jealous enemies.
V
The Spanish match was the most delicate political issue in James' later years.^ ^^  The 
security of the religious settlement was brought into question while fears abounded of 
Romish influences being brought to bear on Charles if he married a Catholic princess and 
allowed her freedom of w o r sh ip .J a m e s' ministers worried over its ramifications, 
particularly favours which might be demanded on behalf of English Catholics as a condition
148CKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7906].
149c k S U269/1.OE1430 [CranfieldMs 6775].
tSOcKS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7906] and U269/1.OE1430 [Cranfield Ms 6775].
^^^Expenditure for 1621 was £475,764 and 1622 stood at £608,114; an increase over one year of £132,350. 
152c k s  U269/1.0E1493 [undated, uncalendared Cranfield Ms].
153c k S U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 7489]; PRO SP 14/138/51, fol. 88r-89v (20 February, 1623) and SP 
14/138/99, fol. 156r-157v (27 February, 1623); also Peck, Court Patronage. 214. 
l^^CogsweU, Blessed Revolution. 6-53.
^^^For instance, PRO SP 14/147/80, fol. 98r (28 June, 1623); also Anthony Milton, Catholic and Reformed: 
The Roman and Protestant Churches in English Protestant Thought 1600-1640 (Cambridge. 1995), 58-63.
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of the marriage. Talk of the match had hung in suspension for years and Charles sought a 
resolution by personally wooing the Infanta in Spain, travelling in secret with Buckingham. 
It was a high-risk strategy of Charles' making which Buckingham supported in order to 
secure the heir's f a v o u r ,  Against this tense, uncertain backgi'ound of negotiations and 
princely politics, Middlesex thoroughly alienated Buckingham. The lord treasurer was not 
opposed to the match, but judged it principally upon financial gain from the Infanta's dowry 
and monies saved by a peaceful restitution of the Palatinate. However, the match would 
entail substantial outlays before they ever saw the Spanish gold.^ ^® For Middlesex, it was 
cmcial to get the dowry on the cheap; there was little point spending its equivalent in 
securing the match. Consequently, Middlesex hectored Buckingham incessantly on all 
matters financial while he and Charles were in Spain.
Middlesex's immediate responsibility was to prepare an appropriately impressive fleet 
to return Charles and the Infanta. Middlesex moaned that he had never been 'put to such a 
plunge for monye, the som beinge so greate’ and beseeched Buckingham to hasten their 
r e t u r n .  1 59  For good measure he added: I hope yo[u]r Lo[rdshi]p will not forgett the monye. 
I knowe not whether the necessitye or the expectation of it are g r e a t e r . ' i ^ ^  one point, 
Middlesex ineptly warned of an 'Excheq[ue]r so bare of monye' and many men who were 
'desirous the kinges wants maye force him to a Parlament which is not fytt shold bee in the 
Piynces absens considering how mens affections s ta n d .'T h e  Infanta's jointure, the houses 
and properties from which she would support her court, was more important Its size was 
material to negotiations and the Spanish expected satisfaction of her h o n o r .  1^2 Middlesex 
was instructed to send a selection of properties and lands worth £50,000-60,000 from which 
Buckingham and Charles could make o f f e r s ,  jje obliged, but concluded it would be 
impossible to 'furnish the full some spoken of unless it was made up out of the customs or
156pRO SP 14/138/99, fol. 156r (27 Febmary, 1623).
157cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 59-62.
158c k S U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 6773].
159b l  Harleian Ms 1581, fol. 93r (30 March, 1623). 
l^OBLHarleianMs 1581, fol. 93r.
161b L Harleian Ms 1581, fol. 95r (8 April, 1623); also PRO SP 14/143/60, fol. 87v (24 April, 1623). 
1^2pRo SP 14/144/3, fol. 3r-3v (2 May, 1623).
163pRO SP 14/144/3, fol. 3r~3v.
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casual revenues7^4 This letter followed one to Conway in which Middlesex crabbed he 
could not provide more than a provisional jointure left unaware of what had already been 
discussed in Spain^^s Middlesex was defended by Calvert over the jointure, but 
Buckingham could only have concluded he was being deliberately difficult^^^
By the time Charles and Buckingham returned empty-handed and disillusioned in 
October, Middlesex knew he was in trouble. Middlesex persuaded Conway to intercede, but 
Buckingham was furious and cold-shouldered h i m .  1^ 7  Middlesex blamed 'those that have so 
busely and maUtiously practized against us both' for the rupture, but his own behaviour was 
as much to blame as the whispers of enemies. The breach was further illuminated when 
Conway presented for Middlesex's vetting a petition delivered to James by Buckingham. 
Conway left him under no illusions it must be passed.^ ^  ^ Middlesex retorted that the petition 
was a monopoly like those which had been taken away in the last parliament and offered only 
that the petitioner could claim the specific benefits as they occurred without a general 
grant. Their shared enmity was apparent to all the day after Christmas. Thomas Locke 
reported that Middlesex 'hath stayed the passing of some things granted to the D[uke] of 
Buckingham] w[hi]ch makes the[m] looke strange upo[n] each o t h e r . ' ^ ^ o
A passage of political power began upon Charles' return and continued with the 
parliament of 1624.121 Charles and Buckingham gradually replaced the familiar axis of 
James and his favourite. The conventional story was described by Chamberlain: 'yt seemes 
the D[uke] of Buckingham ingrosses the Princes favour so far as to exclude all others both 
from the father and sonne. This is thought to cause some heart burning and that they ayme to 
take downe his greatnes upon w[hi]ch apprehension (yt is saide) he stirres not from the king, 
but keepes close about him, to cut of[f] all a c c e s s e . ’ i 2 2  James' ministers were divided over
164b l  Harleian Ms 1581, fol. 99r-99v. 
l65pRO SP 14/144/4, fol. 4r-5v (2 May, 1623).
166pRO SP 14/144/7, fol. 8r-8v (3 May, 1623); also Prestwick, Cranfield. 425.
167pR0 SP 14/153/94, fol. 122r (25 October, 1623).
I^SPRO SP 14/154/25, fol. 29r (11 November, 1623).
169pRO SP 14/155/15, fol. 23r-24v (4 December, 1623).
120pRO SP 14/156/3, fol. 4r-4v (26 December, 1623).
 ^21Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 63; also Conrad Russell, Parliaments. 145-203 on this parliament. 
122pRo SP 14/158/72, fol. 91r (31 January, 1624).
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the war which Charles and Buckingham were determined to have after their Spanish 
f a i l u r e .  ^23 The Spanish were culpable in the Palatinate mess and war cries of sulhed honor 
would play well in p a r l i a m e n t .  124 Properly manipulated an assembly could provide sanction 
and financing for the Prince's d e s i r e s .  ^ 25 Middlesex played his part in the drama when he 
and James found common ground in d i s a g r e e m e n t .  ^26 Neither believed the state could afford 
a war and they joined to stop the rush toward it. ^ 27 After an account 'of the fowle delayes and 
abuses of Spayne in both the Treaty es of the matche and of the Palatinate’ delivered by 
Buckingham, parliament petitioned James to renounce all dealings with S p a i n .  128 James 
composed his response at Theobalds two days later in a set-speech for parliament astutely 
calculated to sow unrest and apprehension in the a s s e m b ly .  129 The speech may be the single 
strongest argument for James' political shrewdness and his willingness to publicly double- 
cross Charles and Buckingham.is®
James began with many stately professions of gratitude for parliament's advice. He 
had sought it and would not dishonour it with rejection. 'But left mee acquaint you a little 
w[i]th the difficulties of this course', he continued, i i^ First, 'I omitt to speake of my owne 
necessities, they are to[o] well knowne’, but, James added, 'this I am sure, I have had lesse 
helpe of you by p[ar]liam[en]t of any king yt ever raigned over you.' That rebuke delivered, 
James spoke a great deal of his necessities. He had incurred substantial charges sending 
money to the Palatinate and dispatching peace-making embassies. To those must be added 
the expedition to Spain, reminding them of Charles' ill-fated wooing of the Infanta which had 
precipitated the entire situation. Further charges beckoned. The poor princes of Germany 
looked to him for assistance, the Irish back-door had to be secured, and the navy prepared. 
Middlesex’s mind can be seen at work when James' asserted that customs were his fiscal base
^23pRO SP 14/158/72, fol. 91r-91v; Cogsweil, Blessed Revolution. 77-94,133-134. 
^24cogswelI, Blessed Revolution. 138-142.
125cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 145-149,177-179.
^26james' opposition is detailed in Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 72-75.
127pRO SP 14/160/62, fol. lOOr (11 March, 1624).
128pRO SP 14/160/46, fol. 68r (9 March, 1624).
^29cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 184.
^^^Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 65,118-119.
ISlpRO SP 14/160/62, fol. lOOr-lOOv.
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and farmed on condition that the contracts were to be discharged in the event of w a r .  1^2 
Consequently, he would require large subsidies, but they would take time to collect which 
would necessitate costly borrowing. Without sufficient supply to enter into war was 'but to 
shewe my teeth and doe noe more; In the meane time I hartily thancke you for your advise 
[and] I pray you to consid^ of these other p[oin]tes.’
James played upon his own parliamentary reputation to revive old doubts lost in the 
present goodwill. If he chose the path of war, he pledged parliament by its own 'deputies 
shall have the disposing of the m o n e y ' .  it was no secret members wondered aloud how 
much of the subsidies voted in 1621 had gone to the P a l a t i n a t e . i ^ 4  while reiterating this 
assurance, James, in off-hand fashion, slipped in what could surely destroy the entire session: 
'Gi ve mee what you will for my owne meanes, but I p[ro]test none of the monyes w[hi]ch you 
shall give mee for those uses shall be issued but tor those endes & by men elected by 
y o u r s e l v e s .*1^5 ne had just asked parliament to supply his own necessity and the cost of war. 
Further, if they funded a war, he would not make a peace without consulting them.i^e That 
James might do just the opposite was an constant fear.i^? Finally, James expressed a heartfelt 
desire to end his days making good laws and remedying grievances with his subjects, a 
dramatic reversal in the eyes of James' contemporaries and one alien to Conrad Russell's 
shrewd assessment of James' parliamentary interests. Fully embraced, that task could side­
track parliament-and Baron Tell-clock!—for months. It was also an invitation to re-enact the 
rancorous feuds over grievances and supply. James had raised enough contentious issues to 
destroy the momentum of the session.
Members received James' word on 8 March and 'Sir John Eliot then proposed that 
given the "manye strange Reports" of James's speech, "all members may take Copies" of 
James's reply in order to prepare for "debating and treating of the Things herein
182pRO SP 14/160/62, fbl. lOOv.
183pRO SP 14/160/62, fol. lOOv.
184pRo SP 14/160/62, fol. lOlr; Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 199,260-261. 
185pRO SP 14/160/62, fol. lOOv.
186pRo SP 14/160/62, fol. lOOv.
182pRo SP 14/163/16, fol. 29r (19 April, 1624).
188pRo SP 14/160/62, fol. lOlr; Russell. Parliaments. 45-48.
249
Lionel Cranfield and the Reformation of Crown Finance (1617-1624)
propounded’3^  ^ Middlesex entered the fray in the Lords the same day, following James’ 
instructions to 'informe you of these thinges yt[that] concerne my esta te .M id d lesex  was 
honest, deliberately so. The Infanta escapade and manoeuvrings to recover the Palatinate had 
cost £661,670.1^1 Diplomacy consumed the king's money at the rate of £145,763, postage ate 
up £14,836 more, and £113,000 had been spent on Charles' wooing. £172,888 was disbursed 
for the Palatinate's defense while Princess Elizabeth and the Elector Palatine were supported 
by £30,300. Finally, James owed another £106,508 to various creditors, including the king of 
Denmark, for Palatinate disbursements. James had taken in £371,640 in extraordinary 
receipts including the unpopular 'contributions' levied by b e n e v o l e n c e .  1^2 Middlesex had 
given a full account of the costs of failure in the Palatinate and a rough wooing for which 
members of parliament had had as little taste as the Infanta. The lord treasurer performed his 
task like his predecessors Dorset or Salisbury, spelling out James' extraordinaiy charges and 
his estate’s necessity before asking parliament to make them good. Weston delivered 
Middlesex's summary to the Commons on 10 A u g u s t .  1^ 2
Not surprisingly, both houses stuck upon the very question of supply and Charles 
rushed 'to give his owne sense therof, a message Calvert dutifully outlined on 12 M a r c h .  
James did not intend for them to clear his debts; he only sought to illustrate the necessity of 
financing the war through p a r l i a m e n t .  Charles also promised that future sessions would be 
held to give them time to deal in commonwealth matters, after the war issue had been 
decided. The prince tried to rally his cause with a plea to consider how far matters had 
afready gone and the necessity to continue with expedition. It was a matter which concerned 
both the king's and prince's honor, 'this being his first action of his entrance into the world.' 
Finally, Charles slyly directed their thoughts toward his reign. He 'would acknowledge our 
cares & that when the tyme should serve heerafter we shall not thincke our labours ill
^^^Cogswell, Blessed Révolution. 187. 
l^OpRO SP 14/160/62, fol. lOOv.
191CKS U269/1.0E1413 (10 March, 1623[1624J); PRO SP 14/160/62, fol. lOlr is less accurate. 
192c KS U269/1.0E1413; PRO SP 14/160/62, fol. lOlr. 
l^^Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 187.
194pRo SP 14/160/67, tbl. 108r; Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 193-194.
^95pRo SP 14/160/67, fol. 108r.
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bestowed.' This last point proved most soothing to any lingering doubts after the Commons' 
vague pledge of parliamentary a s s i s t a n c e .  1^ 6 The joint resolution of lords and commons 
acknowledged that James' meaning had been to inform them his estate could not sustain the 
cost of w a r .  192 They pledged that upon the treaties' dissolution 'we wilbe reddy in a 
parliamentary manner w[i]th o[u]r p[er]son & abillities to assist'. 198
Instead of sticking doubts into parliament like fine pins, James' next address slashed at 
consensus. Members proceeded from a false assumption: 'Buckingham made a relacon to 
you by my comandment ... but I never yet declared my mynde upon it.'i99 As Jupiter's 
thunder follows his words, so a 'King should not speake except hee maintayne it by action.’ 
He thanked them for their pledge of assistance, but their general pledge was no basis on 
which to begin a war or induce others to join him; 'unlesse p[ar]ticuler meanes bee discovered 
it is little to the poynte.... I will deale freely w[i]th yow and tell yow plainely what I thincke 
will doe the turne'. James undoubtedly intended to wreck the session when he asked 
parliament to 'bestowe uppon this greate busines 5 subsidies and 2 fifteenes to every subsidie. 
And for my owne necessities my cryeing debtes are soe heavie that noe man can bear them ... 
I desier yow would give mee one subsidie and 2 fifteenes yearely untill my debtes be paied.' 
What members thought of James' request for something akin to a Great Contract to pay his 
debts can only be imagined. Thomas Cogswell is equivocal about James' intentions with this 
speech, interpreting it more as forthrightness than m i s c h i e f .200 Within the context of fiscal 
policy and the Jacobean experience with parliamentary supply, James' request was stunningly 
extreme and well-nigh provocative. Parliament had always resisted any obligation to pay the 
king's debts. Further, James had never demonstrated the ability to govern without 
accumulating debt. By this scheme, parliament might have been paying off his debts until 
death took him. Salisbury had asked for essentially the same deal in 1610.201 If the Great 
Contract was any precedent, argument and debate in fashioning such an agreement would
196cogsweli, Blessed Revolution. 194.
192pRO SP 14/160/76, fol. 126v (14 March, 1624).
198pRO SP 14/160/76, fol. 127r.
199pRO SP 14/160/78, fol. 130r-130v ([15 March], 1624).
20t>Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 195-198.
201 £200,000 annually and £600,000 up-front were roughly the equal of the subsidies James had requested.
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have been endless-and fruitless. James fed parliament some final tasteless food for thought. 
Members must balance the immediacy of the sum with its bmden, while he pledged again not 
to make a separate peace without advising them. Lastly, he promised sessions in the fall and 
following spring, and reminded them that he meant to make 'this a session w[i]th the passing 
of as many good lawes as in convenient tyme may bee prepared.’^ o^
Political destruction in his wake, James 'putt off his hat to them and went his way'.203 
Reaction to this comedy of errors was captured by Edward Nicholas (MP). James' first 
speech was given 'in such manner and w[i]th such wordes as that it was thought to contradict 
all that had either beene done or say de before by the Pr[ince] or Buckingham] and the whole 
talke of the cyty and cuntry was that all yt[that] had been delivered in our house was now by 
the king disavowed.'204 Members who 'were to take noates and report for us durst not avow 
theyr noates publiquely' while the entire incident 'gave greate incouragm[en]t to the 
papistes'.205 As for James' second outing, the young Dudley Carleton wrote his uncle: 'it 
stmcke a great reserve amongst those of the committee, and put them to such a silence that 
there was not heard so much as one God save the king'.206 Charles and Buckingham were 
left 'to cleare the cloudes and to remove the obscuritie'.207 According to Charles correction, 
Buckingham persuaded James to accept instead 6 subsidies and 12 fifteenths for the war and 
drop supply for his own debts.20S James significantly refused to let the speech be amended to 
remove the contradictions; so it entered the parliamentary record.209 Not surprisingly these 
reassurances 'did not settle the mindes of the house'. i^o it required some of the hardest 
parliamentary political manoeuvring in the reign by Buckingham's and Charles' clients and 
like-minded allies to prevail in the Commons.^n Parliament finally offered 3 subsidies and
202pRO SP 14/160/78, fo l 13 Ir.
203pRo SP 14/160/89, fol. 146v (17 March, 1624); Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 195-198. 
204pRo SP 14/160/81, fo l 135r ([15] March, 1624).
205pROSP 14/160/81, fol. 135r.
206pRo SP 14/160/89, fo l 146v (17 March, 1624).
207pR osP  14/160/89, fo l 146v.
208pRO SP 14/160/78, fo l 130v.
209Lord Journal III, 265.
210pROSP 14/160/89, fo l 146v447r.
211 Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 199-215.
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fifteenths to be collected the first year after James’ formally broke the treaties.212 James did 
not refuse this offer well-short of his demands, but their is scholarly division over the 
enthusiasm with which he accepted it 2i3 Parhamentaiy wrangling ensued for the some 
weeks because of the slowness with which Jupiter prepared to loose his thunder: 'Sir Edward 
Conway, the secretary's son, observed with characteristic whimsy that James argued the 
merits of faith alone while the Commons insisted as well on the efficacy of good works'2i4 
If the 'session never seemed to progress from suspicion to accord' in Cogswell's words, it was 
because members understood there was a significant difference between Rex Pacificus 
accepting subsidies for war and actually making good on their bellicose desires.215
Neither Charles nor Buckingham could have had any doubts who had guided James. 
Middlesex's complicity in James' first speech could be excused as the performance of his 
office, but he almost certainly focused James on demanding specific sums from 
parliament.216 When Middlesex, seconded by the earl of Arundel, pressed the point in the 
Lords, Charles countered that 'all the rest of the Ll[or]ds were of a contrary opinion [and] it 
must not be their two voices that should hinder the common resolution.’2i2 Both men later 
excused themselves before Charles, but Middlesex had doomed himself: 'it is well knowne, 
the Tresorer hath kept his chamber at Chelsey ever since, being sicke of the caquerelle.' 
Middlesex's impeachment received remarkably little attention from Cogswell except to say 
that it was an unwanted distraction from the subsidy for Charles and Buckingham.218 
Prestwich found in it a millstone to grind her many axes against James, the duke, and 
Middlesex’s debased contemporaries.2i9 Despite being unfashionable, Tawney’s remains the 
most unaffected judgment: 'It is difficult, however, to resist the evidence that Buckingham
212b l  Additional Ms 64878, fol. 82r-83v ([24 March, 1624]).
2t3According to Cogswell, Simon Adams and Conrad Russell concluded James was 'less than excited'. 
Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 215; Russell, Parliaments. 187-190. Cogswell sees in James' speech of 
acceptance 'the reluctant warrior, that o f the honest peaceable man provoked beyond his limits of Christian 
forbearance' while pointing to contemporaries' happy reaction to it. Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 216. 
214cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 250 and 227-261 generally.
215cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 250 and 266-281.
216pRO SP 14/160/89, fol. 145v.
217pRO SP 14/160/89, fol. 145v.
218cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 233.
219prestwich, Cranfield, 440-461.
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and Charles, if they did not prompt the plan, quickly made it theii* own, and, once resolved on 
it, left little to c h a n c e / 2 2 0  Years of resentment and court politics finally called Middlesex to 
account. That it would be public destruction by impeachment was almost certainly 
necessitated by Middlesex being the only person with the stature to oppose the war on fiscal 
grounds, the one basis yet sufficient to frighten wavering or fainted-hearted members of 
parliament.221 Conway’s son wrote gleefully to Carleton, ’if you are any way enclined to 
mischeefe it will be as mutch pleasure to you to heare that he is mined as it is delight to us to 
ruinne the Lord Treasurer',222 The younger Carleton was more thoughtful: the commons 
’have declared him most unworthy; and desired justice of the Ll[or]ds; the particularities are 
not in themselves of so crying a heinousness, as might not be excused in these tymes ... it is 
concluded he will be punished most exemplarely unlesse the king do mitigate animos.’223
Middlesex’s impeachment puts his career in perspective. Ironically the means of his 
destruction were charges of corruption in the wardrobe, accepting bribes from customs 
farmers, ’extorting double fees’ for livery as master of the wards, and ’mismanagement of the 
o r d n a n c e . ’2 2 4  Prestwich’s analysis leaves no doubt that Middlesex made money in his offices, 
particularly the wardrobe and wards.225 There existed an irreconcilable conflict between this 
behaviour and Middlesex’s carping about the mismanagement of the king's bounty and 
unfaithfulness of ministers. He was guilty of profiting from office and the possibility always 
existed that, perhaps for political ends, Middlesex might be held to his own standards and 
found w a n t i n g . 2 2 6  The seminal contradiction is that, when that moment came, Middlesex 
believed the king would rescue him.227 He expected to be absolved of the charges against 
him because of the favour in which James held him. In this sense, Middlesex never escaped 
the patronage culture in which he served. And to this fact must be attributed much of
220xawney, Business and Politics. 238 and 231-274; despite its biases die discussion in Prestwich, Cranfield. 
440-461 remains useful; also Peck, Court Patronage. 189-190.
221 Russell. Parliaments. 15 is correct also to emphasize the importance o f removing Middlesex’s influence from 
the privy council.
222pRo SP 14/163/1, fol. Iv (18 April, 1624).
223pRO SP 14/162/56, fol. 97r (15 April 1624).
224prestwich, Cranfield. 448-453; Tawney, Business and Politics. 238-262.
225prestwich, Cranfield. 375-422; CSPD 1620-1623.335-336.
226pRo SP 14/162/56, fol. 97r-98v and SP 14/163/2, fol. 3r-4v (18 April, 1624).
227pRO SP 14/163/74, fol. llO r -lllv  (30 April, 1624)
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Middlesex's failure to decisively alter the balance between the demands of patronage and 
governance in crown finance, a failure he shared, for the same reasons, with James, 
Salisbury, Northampton, Ellesmere, Bacon, perhaps even Buckingham.
James did intervene on Middlesex's behalf. It was a sad testimony of both men's fate 
at the hands of Charles and B u c k in g h a m .228 'The king came to Whitehall,’ wrote Thomas 
Locke, 'to speake to the upper howse in the behalf of the Lo[rd] Tre[asure]r. He tolde the[m] 
that he was come to signe a Psalme unto the[m] of mercie & iustice concerning a servant of 
his whom they had questioned, being one that was comended unto him by the D[uke] of 
Buck[ingham] & said that he had done him good service. The K[ing] told the[m] he was a 
King of a facile & free dispositio[n] & readie to give & that the Lo[rd] Tre[asure]r had made 
staye of some things that he had given for w[hi]ch the king said he liked him the better & that 
he had perhaps for that contracted the envie of many against him. And for the matter of the 
impositio[n] upo[n] the wine, it was done for his service & he had the money & therefore that 
they might aswell arraigne him for it as his Tre[asure]r. And heere the Prince beeing spoken 
unto by one of the Ll[ord]s to tell the K[ing] that he had not bin questioned for that in the 
howse the Prince finding oportunitie did so, but the King told him he lyed & so did he that 
told him so, but in conclusion the K[ing] left him to the howse, to be proceeded w[i]th'.229
Middlesex once wrote (with genuine self-awareness): 'So as it now appears, that my 
dutie & care to doe his Ma[jes]tie right did begett this ill-affection ... which notwithstanding 
must not, nor shall discourage or dishearten me, in discharging the faith & dutie I owe to His 
Ma|jes]tes service, who I doubt not, will as in this, so upon all occasions graciouslie stande 
by me in my so doing & believe that the like murmurs and & complaints which naturallie 
follow men in my place male have the like unworthy foundacons.'230 That the king could not 
stand by his lord treasurer in 1624 demonstrates that both men had failed for serving the 
commonweal. Salus popuU suprema lex esto had proven a difficult philosophy for Middlesex 
and James to turn into political practice.
228on the relationship between James and Buckingham after the session, Cogswell, Blessed Revolution. 269, 
300-301, and 314-315.
229pRo SP 14/164/53, fol. 92v-93r (8 May, 1624).
230pRO SP 14/153/8, fol. 8r (2 October, 1623); also Tawney, Business and Politics. 263-274.
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I
A study of this length and complexity particularly demands that we revisit its main 
arguments and seek to place them in the larger perspective of the period. The central premise 
is that financing the Jacobean state was the seminal question of governance for James and his 
ministers. That crown finance and fiscal policy are worthy of this attention merits an 
explanation itself. It begins with recognition that the essential responsibility within any 
polity is the preservation of governance. The continuance of which is the elementary premise 
of both politics, the civil philosophy, according to Maurizio Viroli, whose basic elements 
must include 'the rule of law, consent, [and] the implementation of the common good' and the 
art of the state, politics as preservation and advancement of the ruler's power. i James VI and 
I, like generations of civic philosophers before him, might triumph the public good, salus 
populi suprema lex esto, but all discussions of common weal rested on the presumption that 
there existed a governing authority within the city, republic, principale, or monarchy which 
was empowered to act for that end.
The language of politics and reason of state progressively fused over the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries with two contradictory elements. The traditional civil philosophy 
stressing virtue and the public good remained—and seems a precursor of James' own 
philosophy: Princes must 'rely upon good counselors and guarantee justice to all his
subjects.... Being just to all, the prince protects himself from the hatred of subjects. In his 
public person he is justice, and the subjects who appeal to him appeal to justice. If a prince 
disregards the administration of justice and pursues his own appetites, he corrupts the 
institution of the Principality into the most pernicious private power.... The more the prince is 
absolute, the more he must endeavor to pursue justice since principalities have been instituted 
for the good of the subjects.'  ^ Yet the same writer, Giovanfrancesco Lottini, proscribed no
1 Viroli, Reason of State. 68-70 and 238-280. 
2Viroli, Reason of State. 241-243.
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prevarication on the part of princes in wielding 'the mles of the art of the state, no matter if 
they are repugnant to the principles of justice.' The preservation of the state for Lottini 
sunounded the 'appointment of magistrates and the distribution of public offices', but the 
primacy of reason of state was clear: 'The first concern of the new prince in the phase of 
consolidation of his power must then be that of changing the "laws of state" to be sure the 
government is in the hands of his friends. Later on the state wiU guarantee justice, but its 
origin and establishment requiie an arbitrary discrimination.’ Implicitly, the continuation of 
justice and good government required the preservation of the ’state’, in short, the preseivation 
of the prince as lex animata, the spirit of the law or the living law.^
The responsibility for continued governance and the provision of good government in 
the early-modern English polity resided in the monarch, where 'one onely ruleth, and hath 
soueranitie: directing such his gouemement (next vnto the glorie of God) vnto the
prosperous, and happy estate of his subiectes.'  ^ An unsettled succession drove William Cecil 
to philosophize on and devise plans for an enforced inten egnum whose sole purpose was the 
continuation of governance until the proper monarchical basis of the polity was restored.  ^
Cecil could envision 'England without a monarch', but he could never conceive of the 
intenuption of governance in the realm. ^  While popish plotting and an unsettled succession 
drove Elizabethan's to distraction, the hydra of evils which might befall the Jacobean polity 
had more to do with bankruptcy, penury, or the inability to fund a watchful peace-'I need not 
speak unto your Lordships in how dangerous and fearful estate this kingdom should rest for 
wanting means', Salisbury told the Lords in I6 IO.2 Further, James' ministers articulated with 
increasing vehemence that the king's necessities were the state's necessities: 'Now his 
Majesty's charges being likely more and more to increase, there needs a supply answerable to 
the expense, for otherwise as in a natural body where there are divers diseases yet albeit all be
5 John Procope, 'Greek and Roman political theory', J. H. Burns (ed.), The Cambridge History of Medieval 
Political Thought c. 350-c. 1450 (Cambridge, 1988), 26-27; D. M. Nicol, 'Byzantine political thought', Burns, 
Medieval Political Thought. 64-65.
^Charles Merbury, A Briefe Discovrse of Royall Monarchie, as of the Best Common Weale (London, 1851) 
[STC 17823], 8.
5 Alford, 'William Cecil', 126-140.
6 Alford, 'William Cecil’, 135.
^Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610.1,6.
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cured but one, all the humours will fall to that and gangrene and so destroy it, so in like sort 
in the political. For unless some course be taken, the state will be but in a hectic forever.’® 
And members of parliament agreed that their 'King and the Prince must live in honor and 
plenty, if not in plenty, not in safety [and] we not in plenty', even if they disagreed on the 
apportionment of fiscal responsibility.9 The greatest practical challenge to the continuation 
and preservation of governance under James was fiscal necessity. It is these circumstances 
which make explicable the disjunctive interpretations of political principle and practice in 
fiscal policy throughout James' reign, never more so than in 1610.
II
The fiscal foundations of the Tudor monarchy had reached their limits by the close of 
the sixteenth century. It was, in Lord Treasurer Buckhurst's words, a situation of 'grete 
paimentes & of our smal m e a n e s . ' James' ministers faced greater difficulties than any in the 
previous hundred years: they did not serve a fiscally canny monarch (Henry VII), could not 
erect a new treasury by pillaging the church (Henry Vni and Edward VI), and were seldom 
able to supply their master's needs through parliament (Elizabeth); !^ a perspective strikingly 
developed by Salisbury at the opening of parliament in 1610,12 There existed a genuine 
sense of disjunction between the Tudor past and the harsh realities of Jacobean England. The 
crucial point of departure was the patronage culture which had been largely held in check by 
Elizabeth's parsimony and the enforced stringency of the war with Spain. James' dispensing 
of bounty, at turns politic and foolishly generous, became the norm at the same time the 
peace of 1604 brought the court and patronage culture back into the European fold during the 
emerging age of baroque. 'In little more than a generation,’ Malcolm Smuts has written, 'the 
English court evolved fi*om a backwater into an environment whose sophistication astounded 
Peter Paul Rubens in 1628.'i5 Not only was competition occurring on a new level of 
magnificence, but a century of inflation ensured that the costs of fulfilling the Renaissance
®Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. 1,5.
9Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610. II, 35.
Salisbuiy Ms 183, foi. 146r (20 Febmary, 1603). 
l^Gunn, Early Tudor Government. 109-162 and Guy, Tudor England. 379-389. 
t2Foster (ed.). Proceedings 1610. II, 19-21.
^^Smuts, 'material culture', 86.
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ideal of being a bountiful prince were even more challenging. Released from its Elizabethan 
constraints, the patronage culture, in its abstract and personal guises, soon exhibited 
imperatives of consumption and financial demand which redefined the character of fiscal 
policy: pensions routinely cost in excess of £60,000 per annum and James’ debts were 
seldom less than £500,000 while Suffolk built the magnificent Audley End for an awesome 
price, Somerset's bride, Frances Howard, received £10,000 in jewels as a wedding present 
from the king, and Cranfield was making £12,000-14,000 annually before his appointment as
lord treasurer. 14
James presided over a vast hierarchical welfare state for the elite and their social 
dependants that was also, as Linda Peck has conclusively demonstrated, the practical 
extension of government and administration.i  ^ The pervasiveness of the patronage culture 
should not overshadow the wide-ranging matters of practical governance for which James, 
his ministers, and the fiill body of crown officials were responsible.!^ Whether as a means of 
privatizing certain of these functions, licensing apprentices for instance, or as a way of raising 
revenue to fund direct administration, projects were integral to Jacobean government. We 
have seen the pervasiveness of projects and the projecting mentality through all facets of 
crown finance and fiscal policy as James' ministers scrambled to mobilize economic 
resources. Simultaneously, projects were an essential component of financing the patronage 
culture, nowhere more dramatically illustrated than in the volumes of 'suits and projects’ 
belonging to Salisbury and Caesar. In theory projects like licensing alehouses or fishing 
busses were ideal pairings of private initiative and public gain. Yet despite the best efforts of 
ministers and their multiplicity of projects and policies, the Jacobean polity survived only on 
a hand-to-mouth basis.
Julius Caesar repeatedly presented us with the framework for discussing chronic 
deficits and debts: retrenchment, improvements, new revenues, and parliament. Ministers 
regularly counselled retrenchment in bounty and costs of govmment: Salisbury in James'
14Dietz, 'Receipts and Issues', 158-163; Akrigg, Jacobean Pageant. 94-97; Prestwich, Cranfield. 375-380. 
Cranfield's profits were those from the court o f wards and wardrobe.
15peck. Northampton. 64-100 and 146-167; Peck, Court Patronage. 1-46. 
l^Aylmer, King's Servants. 1-68 is instructive despite its Caroline focus.
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first decade and Coke and Ellesmere again in 1615; some even confronted expenditure as 
Salisbury did with the book of bounty and Northampton with the naval commissions (1608 
and 1613). But, until 1617, James and his ministers pursued a different course to abatement, 
the one to which he and they were understandably more amenable: new and improved 
revenues to meet expenditure. Year-after-year increases in revenue accompanied with 
recurring, often growing deficits make the case in blunt terms, The pairing of Robert 
Cotton's fiscal tabulae with projects held by ministers as well as the great project 
examinations (1607-1609 and 1612-1613) illustrated the ascendancy of projects in the 
repeated attempts to balance the ledgers from the revenue side.
James' ministers were wedded to projects yet they-and the 'public'—found glaring 
deficiencies in them. Salisbuiy and Cranfield believed those in hand were an inadequate 
response; that James died in debt bears out their contention. The prevalent charge against 
many of these suits and projects attacked the corruption and extortion—real and perceived—of 
projectors and undertakers. Ben Jonson found abundant material here for hard-edged satire in 
The Devil is an Ass. Members of parliament, who, with their constituents, most intimately 
experienced their effect, criticized projectors’ work in their localities and as a larger facet of 
governance. Their spirited, sometimes vicious attacks on the likes of Gües Mompesson in 
the parliament of 1621 are indelible. Cranfield established his reputation as a hater of 
projects in that assembly while his patron Ellesmere had earlier seen the self-aggrandizement 
of projectors as a crucial part of the fiscal maladministration plaguing James' estate and his 
relations with parliament. Among many ministerial reservations, Dorset gave us, perhaps, the 
epitaph of projects when he condemned their large promises and little performance.
Balancing private and public gain was the underlying question for this financial 
system conceived in terms of projects and fiscal policies built around them. James ministers 
were effectively seeking the point of equilibrium between the consumptive interests of the 
patronage culture and the fiscal requirements of the state in discharging the responsibilities of
l^Revenues o f £315,384 in 1606 and £324,075 in 1607 increased to £415,586 by 1619 and in 1624 reached 
£539,903. BL Lansdowne Ms 164, fol. 419r, PRO SP 14/28/60, fol. 1 lOr (29 September, 1607), BL Additional 
Ms 58833, fol. lOr (1619), and Prestwich, Cranfield. 368 respectively. The Caroline improvements were even 
more remarkable, from £618,379 at the death o f Lord Treasurer Weston in 1635 to £899,482 in 1641. PRO E 
407/78/5, fol. 4v and Sharpe, Personal Rule. 129.
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governance. The customs farms epitomized these competing forces, assigning a fixed 
revenue to the cTown out of its fiscal entitlement and consigning all gains above the 
contracted price to private individuals. For instance, Cranfield farmed the sugar customs for 
£2000 while pocketing £4000; he was churlish enough to complain this was poor 
compensation for giving up the mastership of the wardrobe which left him with £8000 after 
its bills were paid.!® It was a familiar story: in 1613 Salisbuiy's son made £7000 on the silk 
fai m, Suffolk £5800 from cuiTants and gold and silver thread, the earl of Montgomery £2000 
from draperies, Cumberland £3000 on white cloth, and over £10,000 went to the farmers of 
French wines.i9 Around this time, Caesar and Northampton hoped to increase the king's 
takings by £6000 fi“om French wines, £4000 ft-om silks, and £5000 from currants, but these 
improvements would have to wait until the leases lapsed and were only conditional.^  ^ It was 
difficult for governance to have priority, even equality, when such powerful, interested 
individuals held the largest stake in these crown revenues.
This was the crux of complaints with projects, particularly those which were less 
economically robust than customs and impositions. Cranfield melodramatically opined in 
1621 that the king had not seen £400 fi*om some 60 patents and John Carvile asserted in the 
same parliament that of every £1000 levied according to those grievous projects only £200 
reached the royal coffers.21 This was true overall and persisted despite the increasingly 
strong negative counsel given James by his ministers as the reign progiressed. Coke was 
adamant that questionable suits and projects had diverted large sums fi'om the crown while 
bringing disrepute upon it for the projectors' behaviours.22 Ellesmere thoroughly seconded 
Coke and believed investigations and suspensions of these patents and projects were 
essential, as were entrusting the execution of projects to trustworthy individuals in future and 
ensuring the overwhelming majority of fiscal benefit was the king's.23 The essential problem
!®Prestwich, Cranfield. 376-377.
19c k S U269/1.0Ec25 [Cranfield Ms 4039] ([March, 1613]); also Prestwich, Cranfield. 21-24. Another 
document identified gains of £10,000 for Sahsbury and £6200 for Suffolk wliile confirming the rest. BL Cotton 
Ms Cleopatra F VI, fbl. 96v
2dBL Lansdowne Ms 165, fbl. 240r (7 November, 1613); BL Cotton Ms Cleopatra F VI, fol. 95r-95v. 
2lNotestein, Relf, Simpson (eds.). Debates 1621. II, 87-90.
22h HL Ellesmere Ms 441/2 (July, 1615).
23h h l  Ellesmere Ms 441 and 2610 (September 1615).
261
Cro wn Finance and Governance under Tames 1
was identified in much the same language when Coke proposed that 'no subiecte to lyve on 
the king untyll the king be liable to lyve by hymselfe', Ellesmere decried that 'much waye 
hath bene gyven to these importune suitors by those who had the charge and husbanding of 
the kinges treasure', and Cranfield proclaimed that 'to move the king to give now is to move 
the king to mack him selff miserable for the present & to kepe him soe.'24 Members of 
parliament and James' own ministers were convinced that the balance between private and 
public gain was dangerously and scandalously skewed in practice with projects. Cranfield in 
particular believed the governance of the realm was being progressive subsumed within the 
demands of the patronage culture.25
This conflict between patronage and governance was inherent to projects and, 
logically, accentuated within the crown finances and fiscal policy because of their project 
bases. We have seen that Salisbuiy, Ellesmere, and Cranfield offered contrasting policies in 
balancing the patronage culture and governance. The three ministers were agreed on the 
deleterious aspects of projects, but Salisbury (and Northampton) and Ellesmere remained 
supporters of the projecting mentality while Cranfield's enthusiasm was more lukewarm and 
situational. Salisbury saw the benefit of suits and projects as patronage, rewarding patentees 
own industry in seeking personal gain, accepting a share of the profits for the crown, but, 
importantly, protecting established revenues from diminution for purposes of r e w a r d .2 6  
However, as early as 1605, Salisbury and other councillors advised James that projects must 
not become a license to extort money from subjects to their 'infinite grudge' against the 
crown. The incessant pressure of suitors and James' lack of restraint prompted Caesar's and 
Salisbury’s efforts with the commission of suits, book of bounty, and recommendations for a 
formal commission to examine projects. Even together with plans for budgeting the offices 
of state and payments for James' core affinity, Salisbury was seeking only to manage or 
contain the patronage culture's demands upon crown revenues. As he told James, it was
24h HL Ellesmere Ms 441 and 2160; CKS U269/1. OE1528 [Cranfield Ms 6770].
25 Above, 227-240.
2^This was particularly explained by Salisbury over grants of the benefits o f recusancy. PRO SP 14/15/105, fol. 
169v (24 October, 1605).
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preferable to find the money to finance the household than clean its Augean stables of waste 
and corruption 27
Salisbury aggressively, perhaps more aggressively than any of James' treasurers, 
expanded crown revenues to balance the equation. Endowment, new revenue, was 
paramount in Salisbury's goal of refoundation. We have seen the range of projects that he 
and Caesar—and Dorset-examined and then pressed to fund the needs of governance and 
patronage, impositions foremost among the former. Salisbury’s plan for parliamentary 
endowment in 1610 was not unfike a project writ large. In the eventual form of the Great 
Contract—the moniker itself is highly indicative—it was a composition with the political 
nation for relief from the prerogative powers of purveyance, wardship, and other individual 
projects. Salisbury's emphasis on the revenue side of fiscal policy is clear. Caesar's original 
analysis of the Contract posited no net revenue gain, but its corrected form, certainly 
reflecting Salisbury's perspective, cast a sceptical eye upon both posited improvements and, 
particularly, abatements. When parliament reconvened in the fall, this revised, but 
inadequate gain was the basis from which Salisbury sought to induce the Commons to 
increase their offer. Salisbury's principle aims in retbundation were to reduce the dependency 
upon projects and endow the crown with a new revenue which he was detormined would not 
be alienated for bounty, for supporting the patronage culture.2® Significantly, it was only 
when the Contract collapsed that Salisbury most forcefully and practically made the case for I
isustained retrenchment as the primary road out of the fiscal m o r a s s .2 9  i
After 1612, ministers including Caesar, Northampton, Lake, Coke, and Ellesmere j
tried their hands at striking a balance between patronage and governance. Following the j
ineffectiveness of the first treasury commission and disastrous Addled Parliament, Ellesmere |
consciously looked to the Elizabethan past and articulated a program which was the precursor 1
of Cranfield’s treasurership. While asserting the importance of revenue expansion, Ellesmere j
believed, in a departure of emphasis from Salisbury’s refoundation, that James' first problem |
was maladministration. The officers who had charge of the king's finances were to blame for |
27croft (ed.), 'Several Speeches', 286.
2®Foster (ed.), Proceedings 1610.1 ,158; Foster (ed.), ftoceedinps 1610. II, 278. 
29 Above, 186-190.
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their negligence, peculation, and tolerance of, or complicity with, corrupt and incompetent 
projectors and other suitors. Ellesmere was looking to reform the patronage culture and the 
contagion its demands brought to James’ finances. The dozens of projects he proposed for 
ready money and new revenues would do much to restore fiscal health, but only in the hands 
of faithfull undertakeis and once the fraudulent and feckless has been called to account. 
'When all or some of the thinges before mencioned shall be begunne & in doinge,’ Ellesmere 
concluded dramatically, ’then yt wyll be requisite to calle a p[ar]lement. And yt is not to be 
doubted, but his Ma[jes]tes good and lovinge subiectes, seinge this course taken by his 
Mafjesjtie wylle wyllingly & cherefuUye yelde large contribucon & ayde'.^o The ancient 
course of well-ordered finance and sound governance reciprocated by the subjects' affections 
and lovingly-given parliamentary supply was the aspiration of Ellesmere’s reform program. 
However, as we have seen, distractions within the patronage culture's politics eclipsed 
Ellesmere’s counsel and aborted meaningful reform in his lifetime.
Lionel Cranfield is, in many ways, the figure which towers over this entire study. 
First in the reform years of 1617-1618 and later as lord treasurer, Cranfield was the one 
Jacobean minister who possessed—fleetingly—the power and audacity to do more than control 
or reform the patronage culture. He was the most dangerous of individuals to the likes of 
Buckingham because he did not seek simply to balance the demands of the patronage culture 
with the responsibilities of governance. Cranfield was determined to tip the Jacobean scales 
decisively in favour of governance and the public interest. Suitors and projectors found the 
lord treasurer a formidable obstacle in his brief tenure, but we know Cranfield’s confrontation 
with the patronage culture broke him as did his—and James’—attempts to serve the state’s 
interests in the parliament of 1624. Cranfield's ultimate ineffectiveness as lord treasurer was 
the familiar product of James' personal incapacity for sustained support of retrenchment and 
the structural fiscal imperatives of the patronage culture that were almost beyond control of 
anyone, including James. !^
30fiHL EUesmere Ms 2610/11.
5!Peck, Court Patronage. 210-211.
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Cranfield remained unrepentant for his treasurership during the rest of his life. His 
memoranda on Charles I's fiscal state (1637-1641) reminds us of the salient points examined 
in this thesis and the even more spectacular failure of the Caroline polity’s fiscal policies to 
find a balance between the patronage culture and governance through p r o j e c t s .5 2  in offering 
Charles counsel, Cranfield revealed the extent to which the Caroline mental world of crown 
finance had changed from its predecessor, becoming one in which necessity no longer 
defended projects and policies in question, but served as the doctrine which created them: 
'Power must of necessity be used for the present ffor support of his Ma[jes]tie & saffety of 
the kingdom ... but it must be made to appeare to them his Ma|jes]tie is inforced to do it by 
the lawe of necessetye Pro Salute Reipublicae.'^  ^ Yet Cranfield coupled his well-worn 
injunction to this reason of state philosophy, counselling that in the collecting and disbursing 
of such revenue, it must genuinely serve the 'publique good'. Unfortunately, Cranfield 
perceived, Charles unsuccessfully articulated the public good in ship-money and failed to 
truly advance the commonweal with other projects. To Cranfield, Caroline fiscal policy 
presented the old imbalance between public good and private gain: 'The king hath lost more 
by the myscarriadge & abuse of his owne revenue w[hi]ch his ffather lefte then he hath 
gayned by all the proiectes & extraordinary c o r s e s . '34 The conflict between the demands of 
the patronage culture and the responsibilities of governance remained unresolved with 
familiar consequences. Cranfield’s response contained a new sense of gravity: 'Every
ffootman can rayse mony for the king by the kinges power w[i]th the alyenating of the 
subiectes hart. But that is so faiT from service as it is treason of the worst kynd, even ludas 
his treason, whoe betraed his master w[i]th a kys as theise men do under pretence of
service, •35
Yet in Cranfield's rise and fall through the very patronage culture he sought to 
combat, the lord treasurer, like his predecessors, remained an unresolved confrontation.
32xhe memoranda are discussed in Prestwich, Cranfield. 547-559.
33por instance, OBL Bankes Ms 5/56, fol. 125r and 5/57, fol. 127r-127v (both undated); also Sharpe, Pemonal 
Rule. 546-554; Conrad Russell, 'The Ship Money Judgments o f Bramston and Davenport', English Historical 
Review 77 (1962), 312-318.
34c k s  U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 8218].
35c KS U269/1.0E1528 [Cranfield Ms 8218].
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Cranfield conceived of himself as the king's servant acting for the best interests of the state. 
When the interests of the state in the form of fiscal solvency and the patronage culture 
conflicted, Cranfield demanded that the patronage culture give way, even if that meant 
confronting James dispensing patronage-welfare to the elite and their dependants. At the 
same time we have seen Cranfield's profits of office with which he met the personal life-style 
demands of existing in the patronage culture. 36 Evidence of Cranfield offering James a new 
favourite in the form of his brother-in-law Arthur Brett even testifies that the lord treasurer 
engaged in court and patronage politics on a level few of his predecessors had.37 Cranfield 
possessed a fool hardy, almost blind rectitude with which he absolved himself of the 
principles and rules to which he demanded others adhere. Nevertheless, he offers us the 
sharpest Jacobean image of a minister conceptualizing his responsibilities to the state and 
public good in their own right. Ultimately Cranfield represents the enormous personal and 
political challenges facing the reconciliation of the patronage culture and the governance of 
the state within the Jacobean polity.
36prestwich, Cranfield. 375-422. 
37prestwich, Cranfield. 277-278.
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